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SUMMARY 
This study focuses on meaning construction as it occurs in the 
reading act. It explores and challenges the view that the 
reader usually uses language to construct meaning in a 
referential way. This study envisages that the reader who 
engages in a literal reading of the text may encount~r serious 
epistemological and ontological problems which ensue from such 
a narrow reading of the text. 
In the context of the dynamics of meaning construction, this 
study subsequently problematizes the notion of language vis-a-
vis the notion of subjectivity and representation. It 
challenges the taken for granted assumption that meaning is 
pre-ordained and which has to be extracted by a sovereign and 
authoritative reading subject. The question of precision and 
correctness of grasping textual content is addressed by 
exploring those views which seek to go beyond Cartesian 
representationalism. This study therefore critically explores 
an alternative reading theory by examining the pioneering 
dialogical views of earlier theorists to include, ultimately, 
those subversive attempts of radical theorists. The latter 
group clearly seeks to subvert and even displace the dialogical 
reading practices of their predecessors. This study ultimately 
proposes the notion of a differential reading discourse. Such 
an integrative theory postulates an alternative theory of 
reading which in fact provides a more expansive, yet inclusive, 
framework of reading. This would entail a form of reading 
which would combat the mere consumption of meanings and 
acquiescence into ideology-building. It would be a reading 
framework that is more in keeping with our socio-political 
reality in South Africa, in which people can enjoy a far more 
critical and comprehensive view of themselves and of the 
society in which they operate. 
I declare that TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE THEORY OF READING is 
my own work and that all the sources that I have used or 
quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of 
complete references. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ORIENTATION OF THIS STUDY. 
1.1 A CASE FOR METHODOLOGY 
I think I read in at least two ways. First 
by following, breathlessly, the events and 
the characters without stopping to notice 
the details, the quickening pace of reading 
sometimes hurtling the story beyond the 
last pace - as when I read Rider Haggard, 
the Odyssey, Conan Doyle and the German 
author of Wild West stories, Karl May. 
Secondly, by careful exploration, 
scrutinizing the text to understand its 
ravelled meaning, finding pleasure merely 
in the sound of the words or in the clues 
which the words did not wish to reveal, or 
in what I suspected was hidden deep in the 
story itself, something too terrible or too 
marvellous to be looked at. (Manguel, 
1995:13) 
Alberto Manguel, with his usual erudition and wit appears to 
move deftly through a mass of written material, emphasizing in 
his questioning stance not so much the human dimension of 
reading and readers, as indicated in his own experiences above, 
but more particularly highlights his fervent search after the 
elusive intriques of the reading act and the process of meaning 
construction which the Argentinian writer Ezequiel Martinez 
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Estrada proclaims, "This is one of the most delicate forms of 
adultery" (see Manguel, 1995:20). 
If the reading act is to be compared to a "form of adultery", 
it certainly suggests a pleasurable relationship between a 
reader and a text, engaging in a self-surrendering, almost 
impenetrable private affair into which few, if any, outsiders 
have any approval for or insight into. Whatever intimacies pass 
through and in this relationship, one fundamental question 
remains unsolved: did we, the readers, reach out and capture 
letters on a page, or did the letters reach out to our senses? 
Does the notion that we are capable of reading, hark back to the 
Platonic assumption that ideas of knowledge exist in us before 
the thing is perceived, i.e. that we "discover" a word because 
the object or idea it represents is already in our mind, "ready 
to be linked up with the word?" (Stern, 1985). These, and many 
other related questions, mark the onset of the dilemma this 
study grapples with - which essentially pursues an inevitable 
problematizing of the reading act in terms of its sense and 
meaning making dimension. 
Understanding the entire range of intricacies involved in the 
construction of meaning, as exemplified in the reading act, may 
usually follow a research route of either the theory-testing 
type or the theory-building type (Rose, 1982:11). First, there 
is research executed primarily to test theories and the second 
type concentrates on theory construction in which case the whole 
research process proves to be a much more flexible and 
qualitative process than the quantitative structured techniques 
3 
of theory testing. This significant distinction also usually 
marks extreme perspectives of, on the one hand, human beings 
responding in an almost mechanistic or even deterministic 
fashion to the situations encountered in their external world, 
and on the other, human beings as being much more creative and 
not merely being manipulated by outside forces. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) believe that, whilst there are social theories 
which tend to adhere to each of these extremes, the assumptions 
of many social scientists are usually pitched somewhere in the 
range between them. 
It is our intention in this study, regarding the reading act, 
to adopt a theoretical/conceptual route which pursues an 
overriding qualitative emphasis, for this approach tends to give 
greater credence to"··· the grounded theory approach [which] 
tends to emphasize the importance of processes of interaction 
and the way in which individuals play a part in "constructing" 
their social environment"(Layder, 1993:5). An examination of 
the issues surrounding the analysis and clarification of the 
reading act is thus strategically based on a qualitative 
methodology whereby the relevant literature/ideas are to be 
researched for the purposes of rigorous inference, 
interpretation, explanation and prediction. The preferred 
methodology used in this study is more than likely to help us 
to understand, in the broadest possible terms, not necessarily 
the products of scientific enquiry but the process itself (see 
Kaplan, 1973). While Merton (1958), among other social 
scientists, has come to abandon the spurious choice between 
qualitative and quantitative data, he emphasizes the concerns 
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of both, making use of the most valuable features of each. The 
problem is essentially at which points the research shall adopt 
the one and at which the other. While methodological 
sophistication is our aim, technical precision is not 
necessarily, for the elusive dynamics of the reading act 
inevitably defy precision and complete certainty. 
1.2 THE DIFFICULTY OF POSITIVISM 
In our post-information era which emphasizes the purposeful 
application/use of information in people's everyday lives, there 
seems nevertheless to be an increasing tendency to base our 
reports, poll results, surveys, analyses, etc. upon scientific 
fact, and those who cannot understand how the "facts" have been 
reached, will generally be unable to separate fact from 
speculation and wish. On the other hand, the status and 
prestige of the "scientific study" proves persuasive enough so 
that many reports, poll results, surveys, etc. are give this 
label without adequate justification. We remain however mindful 
that the growth of every science (including information science) 
has been accompanied by the development and sophistif ication of 
research techniques in that field. The inevitable 
epistemological assumptions in these "research techniques" are 
critical, even in this study. Cohen & Manion (1960:6) are quite 
clear on this issue: 
"How one aligns oneself in this particular 
debate profoundly affects how one will go 
about uncovering knowledge of social 
behaviour. The view that knowledge is 
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hard, objective and tangible will demand of 
researchers an observer role; to see 
knowledge as personal, subjective and 
unique, however, imposes on researchers an 
involvement with their subjects and a 
rejection of the ways of the natural 
scientist. To subscribe to the former is 
to be positivist, to the latter, anti-
positivist." 
A qualitative conceptual approach to the reading act will thus 
profoundly affect what understandings we arrive at regarding the 
reader, text and the role of language - which an objectivistic -
positivistic approach will not be able to do. 
This study declines to pursue a positivist, empirical approach 
as overriding methodology. While the positivist tradition in 
no way claims that observation of the reading dynamics, as in 
this study, occurs without theorising one cannot make 
meaningful observation and analysis of the reading act without 
first formulating hypotheses and theories (Mouton, 1993). 
According to Mouton (1993: 7) the positivist insists on the 
uncompromising empiricist component of research " ... that in 
order to qualify as scientific knowledge, all scientific 
research must originate in empirical observation, and all 
theoretical constructs must in the final analysis be able to be 
tested against the reality of empirical facts." 
This study, however is moreover mindful that where positivism 
seems less successful, is in its application to the study of 
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human behaviour, in this context, the interaction between text 
and reader, " ... where the immense complexity of human nature and 
the elusive and often intangible quality of social phenomena 
contrast strikingly with the order and regularity of the natural 
world" (Cohen & Manion, 1980:12). In practice, therefore, this 
implies scientifically that the tenability of any theory or 
hypothesis of reading depends on the nature of the empirical 
evidence for its support. In fact, we believe that an empirical 
approach for this study would build on nothing more than naive 
assumptions of "law-like" generalizations of the reading act 
and, as a result, impoverish our already shackled understanding 
of deeper information and discoveries of the reading dynamics. 
The reading act, of necessity, has to contend with infinite 
variable, unique and non-measurable situations of reader-text 
interaction, rather than the investigation of repetitive, 
simplifiable and obviously observable reading behaviour. We 
have noticed that there has been considerable overstatement and 
often more misunderstanding concerning the application of 
scientific methods to social data and therefore enhancing the 
trivalization of the real issues we in fact need to clarify. 
In this regards Shipman (1972:19) concludes: 
"The more effort, it seems, that 
researchers put into their scientific 
experimentation in the laboratory by 
restricting, simplifying and controlling 
variables, the more likely they are to end 
up with a pruned, synthetic version of the 
whole, a constructed play of puppets in a 
restricted environment." 
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Against this formidable background, this study charts a 
conceptual, theoretical approach to the analysis of the meaning 
making dynamics in the reading act, precisely in order to avoid 
the crude trivializing of it by reducing the reader and its 
interaction with the text to a "play of puppets in a restricted 
environment", as pointed out by Shipman (1972:19). 
1.3 THE CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL ROUTE 
It has in many instances become evident that the strict 
distinction between theory-testing and theory-constructing is 
not always clear-cut (see Layder, 1993:45). In this study our 
emphasis is swayed to a predominantly theory-constructing 
approach simply because theorising moves the researcher away 
from the empirical world into an abstract world in which the 
appeal to theory becomes viewed as a constant and flexible 
accompaniment to the incremental collection/sifting of ideas and 
the unfolding nature of the research {see Glaser & Strauss, 
1971). In order therefore to develop a theoretical, conceptual 
framework for the analysis of the act of meaning construction, 
as it unfolds in the reading act, we need to develop a system, 
i.e. we ought to pursue ordering principles of how we conceive 
of reading. Our assumptions are that any reading act earns its 
orientation as reading because we assume that someone is 
involved with a text, the interaction of both which constitutes 
more than a mere decodification process. The mere 
decodif ication of written/printed letters and words in the text 
assumes that no variables interrupt what would otherwise be a 
smooth process and understanding the text. The act of reading 
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therefore makes significant assumptions regarding the concepts 
of subjectivity and representation. It is not unusual to assume 
that it is a subject who represents the object in language, to 
make meaning. Instead of embarking on any empirical 
verification of these actions, this study rather explores the 
"specialized" area of reading (as opposed to literal 
decodif ication) in terms of how and what the concepts of 
subjectivity, representation and language have evolved in their 
interplay and therefore to theoretically demonstrate what we 
mean when we refer to reading, and not only the translation of 
words and sentences. 
It is by ordering the notions of subjectivity, representation 
and language in a meaningful way in terms of their relationship 
and status that we are likely to develop theory. For without 
theory this study would not seem to yield any predictions and 
without the latter we simply have no mechanism to exercise 
"control" over our material world where people live among many 
messages, emanating from a diverse range of sources. In order 
to elucidate the rationale behind the theoretical/conceptual 
approach this study adopts, Hatt & Goode (1978:8-10) point out 
five valuable purposes of theory, viz (1) it defines the major 
orientation of a science, by defining which data are· to be 
abstracted; (2) it offers a conceptual scheme by .which the 
relevant phenomena {eg. language, subjectivity, representation) 
are systematized, classified and interrelated; (3) it summarizes 
facts into (a) empirical generalizations (b) systems of 
generalizations; (4) it predicts facts; and (5) it points to 
gaps in our knowledge. 
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Our conceptual approach highlights the orientation of this study 
by narrowing our focus down to the dynamics of meaning 
construction in the reading act, the latter of which we assume 
to be something more and even other than the literal 
decodif ication of sentences. The conceptualization of the 
reading act refers to the relationship and ensuing understanding 
of subjectivity, presentation and language. These concerns are 
embellished on a "developmental" level in this study, tracing 
their ideas since early Cartesian representationalism through 
the psycho-analysis, post structuralism and post-modernism. We 
inevitably extrapolate from the known or accepted assumptions 
of reading as a masterable, replicable and controllable act of 
meaning construction - to the unknown and critical assumptions 
of reading as possibly being an unmasterable, non-replicable and 
uncontrollable act of meaning construction. Finally this study 
seeks to highlight the possible gaps and/or weaknesses in our 
understandings - pointing at other possibly different areas of 
understanding of meaning construction that may not have been 
explored. This will, of necessity, change/modify our conceptual 
scheme by systematically questi0ning the deficient, anomalous 
or spurious assumptions. Therefore, on the basis the thinking 
of the selected philosophers/theorists presented in this study, 
we envisage to gain greater clarification and redefinition of 
the theories/thinking that inform a much more integrated and 
enriched understanding of the reading act than the myopic 
limitations of literal representationalism. 
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1.4 OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
CHAPTER 2 
This study departs from the assumption that the reading act 
remains hamshackled in that it tends to operate in terms of the 
notion that if the reading had been concluded successfully, it 
in fact had been received, interpreted and understood - even if 
some difficulty had to be resolved. This chapter therefore sets 
out to problematize the problematic issues involved in meaning-
construction in the reading act, particularly by unravelling the 
role of language, the authoritative role the reading subject 
plays and how the notion of representation has given rise to 
tricky pitfalls. The essential question that is problematized, 
is what separates the reading act from the mere act of 
decodification, i.e. to what extent can language be used in a 
tool-kit fashion and suggest to literally unlock meaning for 
whatever purpose readers propose. It emerges that this dilemma 
is in serious need of redress. 
CHAPTER 3 
In this Chapter we seek to shift the boundaries to address the 
question of how meaning gets constructed, pursuing a more 
expansive understanding of what views of language, subjectivity 
and representation have come to be held. Having realized the 
limitations of the production of literal meaning in the form of 
Cartesian logical representationalism, Nietzsche, the first of 
the pioneers in this study, departs on the basis of casting 
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radical doubt on our meaning-giving practices, including the 
central role of a sovereign subject using language in a 
manipulative way. These pioneers, which include Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and Ricoeur, all in their respective 
ways, seek to rethink the subject-object dualism in the context 
of pursuing an immediate and literal correspondence between 
words and meaning. In their respective phenomenological and 
hermeneutic attempts they set out to question the Cartesian and 
Kantian views but also seek to cast a new and refreshing 
perspective on the ~ole of language as it unravels in reading 
discourse, in the context of a brave and creative attempt to 
bridge the subject-object dichotomy hence subverting the 
notion of an authoritative subject, manipulating the object in 
the reading act . 
arduous task of 
Their attempts, however, only initiate the 
rethinking the complexity of meaning 
construction as it occurs in the reading act. 
CHAPTER 4 
Here we explore further ramifications or, in instances almost 
subversive dimensions, than the stage-setting attempts of the 
old pioneers, departing from the cul-de-sac of co-determining 
and sharing dispositions of subject and object in the 
construction of meaning. In their subversive attempts these new 
masters, Eco, Lotman, Barthes, Derrida and Lacan, variously, 
postulate critical discursive practices which are to be 
"encapsulated" in the ideas of semiotics, post-structuralism, 
post-modernism and even psycho-analysis. While they generally-
speaking do not claim to have a consistent range of "common" 
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notions, they however all do seek to deconstruct the act of 
reading in radical ways as to lay bare the deeper or even other 
or different layers of what it is to conceive of representation 
and subjectivity. These attempts include questioning the 
validity of the latter concepts as well. They intelligently 
question the contriving status of the afore-mentioned concepts 
as been fixed "masterable" and "controllable" mechanisms within 
their very definite understandings of language. Their incisive 
problematization would moreover explore attempts of suspending 
the centrality of the action of a fixed subjectivity vis-a-vis 
the act of language. The new masters' attempt therefore push 
their own thinking beyond the pioneering masters' , towards 
plurality of meaning and, as a result, opening the text to many 
more different readings than that which it seemingly carries 
within the literal written text. 
CHAPTER 5 
This chapter attempts to critically synthesize the unravelling 
processes of the shackled nature of the literal reading act 
where meaning - which already exists in the text - is "fished 
out" by an all-knowing and controlling subject. The 
developmental "sequence" of the theories of the pioneers and the 
new masters have been gleened to propose a much more expansive 
and heterogeneous notion of meaning-construction, exploring many 
other meanings that may not at first be obvious to or controlled 
by the reader. The expansive and more integrated approach to 
reading ushers into our meaning construction practices the 
inevitable presence of the conflictual, uncontrollable, often 
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unreadable and unmasterable dynamics which mark our daily 
interpretive practices and ultimately our definitions we coin 
of ourselves in the present-day context. 
CHAPTER 6 
We attempt ultimately to postulate an integrated reading 
discourse which will hopefully transform our otherwise usual and 
limited ways of understanding the "location" and "purpose" of 
language vis-a-vis or within the constantly reconstituted 
engagements of subjectivity and representation. Beyond the 
centralizing and totalizing tendency of subjectivity and 
representation, this study ultimately demonstrates the 
theoretical underpinnings of a new or transformed way of 
reading. In this way the possibility of multiple readings become 
inevitable, conceiving of the act of reading, and the "identity" 
of the reader, which becomes nothing more than a discursive 
practice of constantly reflecting back and forth, within and 
beyond, imposed and disclosed, conferred and deferred, between 
and mong reader(s) and text(s). This study thus proposes a new 
framework of what can be referred to as differential reading, 
as a means of addressing the demands of an ever expanding post-
information society. As a significant way of managing the often 
unmanageable volume, complexity and diversity of textual and 
information challenges in our newly-found democracy in South 
Africa, this study concludes its theoretical exploration of 
meaning construction by proposing a differential reading 
discourse where there cannot necessarily be any pre-established 
meanings. In our political transition there can only be an 
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engaged here-and-now, productive moment or meaning construction 
of texts, as well as the construction of meaningful identities 
of ourselves as persons. Alberto Manguel (1995: 21-22) 
poignantly vindicates the challenge of the most pleasurable (or 
most practical) of solitary acts, i.e. reading: 
" ... the artificial dichotomy between life 
and reading is actively encouraged by those 
in power. Demotic regimes demand that we 
forget ... totalitarian regimes demand that 
we not think ... both, by and large, require 
that we become stupid and that we accept 
our degradation meekly, and therefore they 
encourage the consumption of pap. 
circumstances, 
subversive." 
readers cannot 
In such 
but be 
The ultimate subersive attempts entailed in differential reading 
are attempts to remind us that no reading can ever be 
definitive. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HAMSHACKLED STATUS OF READING: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A PROBLEM 
2.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 
2 .1.1 THE READING ACT AND MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
Generally-speaking, we accept that the main task of a text is to 
communicate a message and the act of communication embraces all 
the aspects pertaining to messages, their senders, their 
receivers and what transpires during the interaction among the 
three (Hatt, 1983: 16). We moreover believe that access to the 
recorded word presupposes the ability on the part of the reader 
to decode it for specific purposes in life. It is this view of 
reading, besides its communicative function, we believe 
constitutes the very fabric of what we regard as civilization: 
11 progress (especially scientific and 
technological advancement) in any 
civilisation is dependent on the ability of 
that civilisation to record its knowledge in 
an interpersonal or symbolic manner so that 
this memory can be shared and expanded from 
generation to generation 11 (Kesting, 
1980: 151) . 
We have also come to accept that it is expedient to commit the 
text, as "representing" the product of human thought and, owing 
to the limitations of man's memory, to record - a view which has 
proven to be both positive and negative. The complexity of the 
reading act resides especially in the "negative", i.e. the 
resuscitation of the meaning that had been committed to record. 
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We assume that "a meaning" exists in the text. The conventional 
role of the reader is to divine or unlock that meaning. 
Since we have long ceased to operate in an exclusively oral 
society, we have come to realize the importance of the reading 
act in order to construct or extract meaning from the text. For 
beyond the basic literate levels of identifying signs on roads, 
shops, buses, toilets, etc., schools, government, the press, the 
advertising world, commerce and science, we as readers constantly 
engage in a multitude of "reading acts" via documents, texts, 
reports, policy documents and notices to convey our ideas, 
findings and information to a broad spectrum of audiences. Such 
"reading acts" normally suggest attempts to give meaning to 
"what" we have read as opposed to "how" we have read. It is 
characteristic of the signs of our times that people have become 
results-driven, operating usually within the constraints of time 
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limitations. Since contemporary life has become increasingly 
hurried we usually tend to just scan through newspapers, 
magazines, office memos, telephone messages, minutes of meetings, 
advertisements, sales pamphlets, etc. in order to grasp the 
essence contained in the document. This is precisely the 
difficulty of the nature of the reading act, viz. does one 
actually understand the implications of what one reads? Are all 
readings of a text a legitimate and complete reading of that 
specific text? Moreover, the wider implication of this is 
whether we grasp the function of reading in the life of a 
community and the nation at all. How do we grasp the reading act 
as a signifying practice? Does reading have to signify and 
produce meaning at all? Burnett (1995: 10-11) is quite correct 
in remarking that the " ... eye and the body are in constant 
conflict ... Seeing and feeling are not separate; both traverse and 
are traversed by desire". Kristeva (1990: 90) argues: 
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II the desire to give meaning is not 
innocent but, rather, is rooted in the 
speaking subject's need to reassure himself 
of his image and his identity faced with an 
object 11 • 
Kristeva therefore already touches on an issue, i.e. the identity 
of subject and object, which is inescapably part of the reading 
act but one which we have not seriously reflected on. Whilst we 
assume that the purpose of all reading of documents or texts is 
to communicate certain information for specific purposes, which 
in turn would be implemented for personal and social advancement 
(Bernson, 1981; Crosman, 1980) , the difficulty of regarding 
reading as a meaning-giving practice does not always seem to 
guarantee these purposes. This is the gist of our problem in 
this study: a text is regarded as an object that our Western 
culture consumes, it is viewed as a finished product and the 
process of its productivity is usually ignored. 
The problematic assumptions of the reading act is furthermore 
exacerbated when it is believed that reading, if concluded 
successfully, had been received, interpreted and understood but 
it usually may not occur to the reader that while the action was 
received and conceived "successfully", even if conflict and 
difficulty had to be resolved, does not necessarily imply that 
the process of signification and meaning-giving had been correct 
or qualified. 
On the whole, the reader's habitual meaning-giving practices, as 
it occurs in the act of reading, is often taken so much for 
granted, to the extent that at first glance it would seem that 
nothing need be said of it. As Kristeva pointed out, reading is 
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perhaps not such a "natural" or innocent activity, nor does it 
represent an easy act of unanalyzable communication between the 
reading subject and a text (Culler, 1980; Clegg, 1993). Any 
attempt therefore to problematize the reading act may reveal 
deeper complexities which constitute, first and foremost, a 
subjective act emphasizing the predominant identity of a 
reader. It is only subsequently that the reader may question how 
generalizable an individual interpretation of a text really is. 
It is therefore only upon critical reflection that the reading 
act comes to be viewed as an objectified act that had taken place 
in which I, the reader, realize that I may have been involved in 
a meaning-giving process. 
The fact that we have, generally-speaking, given little serious 
thought to the meaning-giving practice of reading has perhaps 
greatly got to do with the fact that we have not sufficiently 
pondered its purpose and application in real life and humane 
situations. This has been clearly evidenced by the numerous 
misreadings, distortions, superficiality or even dogmatism of 
interpreting documents and how they ultimately impact on 
individual and social behaviour. Looking at reading in this 
problematic way could imply that its fabric may entail more than 
Ryle's view that it is 11 ••• an act of interpretation performed 
upon an artifact (the text) produced by a communicator (the 
author) in the process of expressing a particular mental content" 
(see Coetzee, 1977: x). Understanding the complexity of the 
meaning-giving role of the reading act can be assisted by 
reflecting on the views we hold of language since language, as 
the generally accepted dominant vehicle for meaning construction, 
is so closely associated with our human endeavours in all social 
contexts - and this assumption, too, forms part of our bigger 
dilemma in this study. 
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2 .1.2 LANGUAGE AND MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
The essential problem of understanding the reading act has got 
to do with the uncritical or often contradictory assumptions we 
have come to hold of language. If reading is believed to be 
embodied primarily in and through language, i.e. language as a 
tool to unlock, create or express meaning, then language could 
assist us in clarifying the ultimate dynamics of reading, i.e. 
the dynamics and exchanges among people. (Virilio, 1993: 7-8) 
The question of the meaning-giving function of language departs 
from the assumption that language does not function in a clinical 
vacuum - or so we have come to believe. We accept that it is 
people who use language and people who give or ascribe meaning 
to, with the assistance of linguistic tools. Ultimately the 
reader, in our conventional use of the concept, is assumed to be 
a human subject who gives meaning to textual content. In this 
regard Kristeva (see Oliver, 1993: 91) highlights the gist of 
this study, i.e. any theory of meaning must necessarily be 
theory of the subject. Who or what exactly this subject is, is 
the problematic question of this study. 
If we assume, as we have done, that the reader uses language to 
construct meaning, we also assume to have a very definite 
understanding of the nature of language. The most commonly-
accepted approach to language is that it has been regarded as 
having a referential function in everyday life. This view of the 
nature of language seems to have become the entrenched manner in 
which language is used in meaning construction. If readers use 
language wrongly or not in accordance with the usual linguistic 
or social conventions, it will block full understanding and could 
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give rise to misinterpretation (Sapir, 1949:11). Hence, it is 
constantly impressed on all authors (especially in policy 
documents, manuals, guidelines, documents, etc.) to formulate 
their ideas accurately (choice of words, correct spelling and 
sentence construction) as well as that readers should read 
correctly in order not to formulate spurious conclusions. This 
very limited grasp of the nature of language therefore places 
epistemological constraints on meaning construction. De Beer 
(1993: 81) refers to Maclean who emphasizes that it is the very 
search for precision in language which is the cause of ambiguity, 
obscurity and unintelligibility. 
Language moreover has been accorded with responsibility to act 
as the medium of conveying meaning, i.e. that a message has been 
put into the text by an author, which, in turn, the reader has 
to extricate for accurate understanding and use in a particular 
context. Herein lies the assumptions of the problematic of 
language, that it is perceived as 11 ••• the stable representation 
of an intention" (Bagwell, 1986:31). Language, in the reading 
act, has usually been charged as embodying somebody's meaning -
if not the author's then the reader's. Indeed, it is this human 
or anthropological element contained in language that prompts 
readers to plead for a sense of authority, i.e. any sequence of 
words means nothing until somebody either means something by it 
or understands something from it. Our pursuits of the meaning 
of a text also raises essential epistemological concerns and this 
requires us to examine the nature of the source or giver of 
meaning, which inevitably raises anthropological concerns - i.e. 
if we believe that the source is a human subject. 
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2.1.3 THE SUBJECT AND MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
Our conventional assumption of language as a neatly-packaged 
commodity which functions as a tool to construct meaning, has 
given a challenging, albeit problematic, role to the human 
subject as sole knower who controls the language embedded in the 
text. 
This has meant that the view that our use of language has always 
sought to stabilize and even totali~e meaning-giving in and 
through the reading act. It moreover implies that the reader, 
as the master of this event, inevitably controls what is derived 
from the text. The reader as a result always assumes both the 
ability and the responsibility to name, describe, infer and 
explain - even his own nature as reader - through or in language. 
It is in this regard that Emile Benveniste (in Scholes, 1989:71) 
emphasizes: 
"Language is possible only because each 
speaker sets himself up as a subject by 
referring to himself as I in his discourse. 
Because of this, I posits another person, 
the one who, being as he is, completely 
exterior to "me", becomes my echo to whom I 
say you, and who says you to . me. This 
polarity of persons is the fundamental 
condition in language, of which the process 
of communication, in which we share, is only 
a mere pragmatic consequence. 
This act of sharing of intentions, i.e. the giving and deriving 
of meaning has been privileged by the way we use language. It 
privileges the reading subject not only as the creator, shaper, 
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designer, definer and controller of meaning but moreover fulfils 
his own desire for creating an identity. In other words, within 
the reading act readers are clearly busy with a seemingly 
habitual act of subjecting (i.e. in the first place defining 
myself as the subject who has dominion over myself and the world 
around me) and objecting (i.e. as subject I determine objects, 
their status and use) . The reader is subjecting his own identity 
as reader, i.e. defining and asserting himself. He is 
furthermore subjecting the construction of meaning to his own 
intentions and conventions - even if the facts are exploited, 
distorted or misunderstood. Subjectivity becomes thus the 
original source or basis of what can be regarded as objectivity. 
Objectivity, in as far as the text embodies an object which is 
separate from the subject, yields a distance in positions. The 
object (i.e. the words, the text) becomes my human construction. 
Deutscher (1983: 19) argues that: 
"Objectivity is an intelligent learned use 
of our subjectivity." 
The very construction of meaning is an anthropological endeavour 
executed in terms of human intelligence. The relation from a 
sovereign subject to an object is our big stumbling block, for 
this referential stance proves to have far reaching 
epistemological consequences such as validity, consistency, 
variety, expansiveness and innovation of knowledge. 
The problem of the imposed status of dependence of the object on 
the subject, is a position that has been unilaterally created by 
the subject and over which the subject believes to have control 
and confidence. In the reading act the reader 1 s view of 
objectivity therefore always requires an accurate sense of his 
potential and limitations as a subject when dealing with the 
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object at hand. Clearly, to be objective readers always seem to 
take the lead to evaluate what is important and what is not. As 
creators, judges, shapers and definers, readers assume absolute 
responsibility in making judgements about the general or specific 
value of things, texts, enterprises, people and actions. This 
split in the responsibility and authority of subject on the one 
hand and object on the other, produces fundamental epistemolo-
gical implications in terms of how meaning about these objects 
and events get constructed. It has become evident that the 
status of the sovereign reading subject as controller, definer, 
shaper or as "poacher" and "consumer" (De Certeau, 11995) is in 
radical need of re-evaluation. This easy and inherently 
superficial one-way representation of subject to object, 
challenges our views of representation and how, as well as what 
kind of meaning, gets constructed in the reading act. Burnett 
(1995: 11) problematizes this process of "seeing" from the position 
of the subject by questioning whether"··· "to be seen" refers 
as much to a subjective of mind as it does the fact that someone 
is looking ... ". This view raises an important component in this 
study, viz how exactly "representations" occur in the 
construction of meanings. 
2 .1.4 REPRESENTATION AND MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
Our concern is in this study that the reading act continues to 
occur under the yoke of educational practices and of how we have 
learned to see the world. Whether we read a picture, landscape, 
film or text the reader starts a "seeing" of something which is 
usually about something. "Seeing" has therefore become a 
subjective reading which has been initiated in the domain of the 
reader's subjectivity to mean something, i.e. to refer to 
something (the object). Virilio (1993: 7) paves the way when he 
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argues that it is through language that we" ... put ourselves in 
the other person's place, to see with his or her eyes, to take 
advantage of his or her optical system, to be warned of an event 
to re-present to ourselves people and objects we cannot see or 
cannot yet see, and to finally act accordingly". Nicholson 
(1984:38) argues that human actions (including the human act of 
reading) is always seen as projects. The reader's projection and 
gazing upon the object proves to be problematic because it 
implies an outside position of the subject looking into the text 
as Scholes (1989:5) explains: 
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••• as people we "see 11 in the painting only 
signs that we read as people. We cannot 
enter the world of this or any other 
painting. The reader is always outside the 
text". 
This problematic of separate or an outside position of the reader 
vis-a-vis the object, yields a form of one-way meaning 
construction which is firmly rooted in the fallible human 
endeavours which seek to attain coherence, objectivity and 
accuracy. In other words, objectivity, accuracy, truth, falsity, 
etc., inevitably become fickle and subjective concepts, depending 
on the subject. It is evident that a dual discourse emerges, 
i.e. the one pertaining to an internal world and the other to an 
external world. However in the reading act this image described 
above furnishes a one-sided or biased approach on the part of the 
reader who campaigns for legitimate meanings of the external 
objective world. A one-sided relationship of referring to the 
object becomes of prime importance if we wish to understand the 
act of meaning construction. This egotistical act of looking at 
the content of the text is comfortable and ideal to the reader 
who assumes the role of knower, acting in relative predictable 
25 
ways of making his world known to himself through language. 
Representation essentially becomes a human (i.e. subjective) or 
at best an intellectual exercise. In this way language which is 
used to represent with may very well be rendered the status of 
a "tool-kit". This view of representation ushers us into nothing 
less than a cul-de-sac as far as meaning construction is 
concerned. 
On the other hand the language of objectivity in meaning 
construction becomes primarily the language of vision, that which 
can be seen and read, that which is controllable and hopefully 
verifiable. Descriptions of the same "objects" (i.e. the world, 
texts, etc) carried out in the terms of any other modality would 
be viewed with caution and suspicion. Within the literal way of 
meaning construction it is advantageous to be "compelled" by the 
facts and what one sees, rather than to search for facts or 
findings that are agreeable with other variables within any 
reading context. This literal approach of representation which 
unfolds under the authority of the reading subject ensures an 
epistemological legitimacy imposes serious limitations for 
knowledge-production and ultimately personal being. 
2.1.5 THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM OF THIS STUDY 
• Our essential concern in this study is how we as humans 
construct meaning. More specifically, our focus is on the 
reading act, as a special act of the reader involving 
himself in a text. The critical question is, what separates 
the reading act from the mere act of decodification. 
• Our problem is moreover the notion of language, for it has 
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been usually in terms of linguistic dynamics that we support 
and construct meanings in the reading act. 
• Furthermore, the reader of the text has traditionally been 
regarded as the subject who uses language and controls 
language. Our concern is what assumptions underpin this 
sovereign position of the subject in the reading act. 
• Finally, our concern is how does representation in the 
reading act occur? Traditionally the human subject uses 
language to represent meaning in the reading-act. It is 
precisely because language is a human fabrication for use, 
as well as defining himself, that it can theoretically be 
put to any use - calling into questions the validity of our 
human and subjective re-presentations of our world and of 
ourselves. Is reading and the construction of meaning a 
true reflection of how things really are, or are they a re-
presentation, a reconfiguration of the subject's conventions 
and intentions? Is reading necessarily such a one-sided, 
act, which is initiated by the reading human subject? 
The key concepts of language, subject and representation as 
deployed within the context of the reading act need to be 
examined more closely in terms of the statement of the problem. 
But the attempt of problematization of these key concepts needs 
more substantial elaboration. 
2.2. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE. 
2.2.1 THE POTENTIAL OF LANGUAGE 
It is clear that the crux of the reading act is how readers, 
generally-speaking, make sense of information for their own 
understanding within their specific contexts - particularly in 
view of the reality that "··· reading meaning and deciphering 
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letters correspond to two different activities, even if they 
interact" (De Certeau, 1995:154). This difference between 
"reading" and "deciphering" becomes problematic. The role and 
purpose of "reading" differs radically from that of "deciphering" 
in that the latter is including in the former (see De Beer, 1992; 
Leenhart, 1980; Mumby, 1993). This is our dilemma that 
deciphering is exactly just that viz, unlocking what is there in 
the text, whereas the reading act would appear to be far more 
than a mere literal extraction of meanings contained in a text. 
Our concerns in this study is to grasp what variables (if any at 
all) "mobilize" the reading act - not so much in terms of oral 
communication but rather the reader's engagement with the 
written/printed text - whether in the form of literature, books, 
magazines, reports, minutes, stories, memo's, etc. The question 
is essentially what makes readers represent the content of a text 
and how do they represent or interpret such messages contained 
in these texts. This dilemma is important when we consider our 
usual interpretive strategy in reading which essentially relies 
on a habitual literal translation of words by a sovereign subject 
who controls the use of words - making the act of representation 
a very vulnerable and manipulative act. 
By focussing on the referential function of language we realize 
how much we as readers rely on language to fulfil the job of 
producing meaning. It may hardly occur to us as language users 
that language may not have any producing capacity at all. But 
in order to function as humans amongst people who "use" texts 
(Bunch, 1990) we need to function both in a quality as well as 
in a humane way - a view that impacts on our understandings of 
the meaning of language. Representation therefore, 
epistemologically, seems to suffer at the hands of its 
28 
vulnerability and credibility status. 
Chomsky clarifies the distinction in terms of how language 
facilitates our human interactions. Chomsky (1986) refers to an 
externalized language which embodies the technical notions of 
language that corresponds with grammar and universal grammar, and 
internalized language which is the elements of the mind of the 
person who knows the language, acquired by the learner and used 
by the speaker-hearer. In the case of face-to-face communication 
a message is generally rendered immediate, whereas texts which 
have been codified in writing are usually mediated by the reading 
act. This mediative act through language and its possibilities 
for the development of meanings and understandings is our concern 
in this study. The importance of language as fulfilling a 
mediational act in reading, consequently proves tricky and 
therefore complex in terms of the problematic assumptions which 
reproductive or literal reading have come to pose and in which 
people so easily acquiesce into. 
Kristeva (in Oliver, 1993: 5-8) refers to the abstract dimension 
of language which includes the rules of language and where 
language is used essentially as a tool. The reader either uses 
language in a manipulative way, or may assume that a text 
contains a pre-ordained meaning, which, with the help of the 
right linguistic tool, one is able to divine or extract. Chomsky 
(1986: 15) similarly raises the dilemma of what he calls "rule-
guided linguistic behaviour" which coincides with Kristeva' s 
abstract dimension of language. 
The habit of employing or using language predominantly or 
exclusively in terms of its abstract dimension and rule-guided 
approach, originates greatly from our human conventions of 
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seeking quick solutions and seeking comfortable modes of 
expression amidst all the demands in a rat-race society. Given 
the convenience and importance of the function of language, in 
our acts of representation, we moreover do not only seem to take 
it for granted but moreover often have unrealistic expectations 
of it. Within this human state of either being too zealous or 
too blase we fail to see how language potentially proves to be 
double or multi-edged in nature. While words may enlighten and 
inspire, they may also confuse and mislead. Language furthermore 
fulfils a human need in that it assists us to impose a measure 
of order on our experiences while at the same time it could 
deceive us by letting us believe that this order is greater than 
it really is. In this context we may possibly have come to be 
expect too much of language and have not usually pondered on its 
inherent limitations: 
"Not aware of the inexpressible, what we 
cannot say, what we should not expect to be 
able to say. Not aware of the vagueness and 
uncertainty that clouds much of our 
understanding. Not aware that language only 
enables us to communicate with one another 
when the conditions are right. Not aware of 
the emptiness of language, when they are 
not" (Moore & Carling, 1988: 40). 
Our problem with language, as sketched by Moore & Carling, would 
therefore compel us to look at reading as being really more than 
an act to communicate information. This act of communicating 
information would, at its most basic level, purely entail a 
decodif ication or decipherment of what authors had put into the 
text and what they had intended it to mean. Our conventional 
understandings of the reading subject and the text as object, 
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represents a narrow position of positing a distance and a sense 
of opposition between reader and text. The reader as the subject 
that usually directs, controls and manages the meaning-giving 
project of the reading act has come to use language in a very 
logical, rule-guided manner. Part of our purpose in this study 
is to problematize this view of the subject and its treatment of 
language at a level which could challenge the usual polarization 
of subject and object, i.e. the subject who sub-jects an object 
to its purposes, and an alienated apparently awaiting object 
which sub-jects itself to the subject. 
Beyond the polarized nature of subject and object which is 
embedded in our use and manipulation of language, we realize how 
complex the issue of language is. Given Kristeva and Chomsky's 
distinction of the function of language as outlined above, words 
which make up language have come to assist us to acquaint 
ourselves with the facts or descriptions of things and people and 
yet may effectively have hidden our ignorance from us. We have 
come to use language to super-impose order and structure to a 
chaotic life and as such regard language as a logical instrument 
which we falsely believe can achieve coherence in an otherwise 
chaotic and paradoxical world. Lecercle (1990: 5-6) speaks about 
the fact that we have treated language as a "scientific object" 
which we hope will be ideally "susceptible to comprehensive 
description in terms of system and coherence". We realize that 
life is generally unpredictable, that events change so quickly, 
and that human nature is fallible and fickle. To expect language 
to be the panacea that had acquired an all-powerful and 
waterproof mechanism to construct meaning, would be foolhardy. 
Another problematic assumption about language is that if 
conditions were "favourable" for effective and meaningful 
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communication, we may easily be able to employ symbols, words, 
phrases and conventions to represent or make sense of a certain 
kind of "terrain" - and if detached from that "terrain" (eg. 
politics or labour) they appear to take on a life of their own. 
For example, we often assume certain meanings in a particular 
area of knowledge or topic when we speak of "the disadvantaged", 
"the bosses", "the government", "rights of minorities", "equal 
opportunity", etc. These expressions, used in a particular 
subject area, have allowed us to generalize or locate 
similarities in situations that may be completely different -
allowing us to assume that just because we know the words, we 
necessarily understand much about that "terrain". As mentioned 
earlier, the double- or multi-edged nature of language often 
proves sometimes to be more confusing than clarifying. The 
confusing or worst still, chaotic nature of language, in the 
reading act has problematic implications for how we grasp the 
nature of the subject and object in terms of their neatly 
oppositional stance. Are subjects who interpret their perceived 
objects by "representing" them, all-knowing and sovereign in 
their making sense of the meaning of the object? On the other 
hand, do objects willingly surrender themselves (almost 
passively) to be interpreted and given meaning by the gaze or 
look (no matter how analytical) of the subject? What kind and 
what quality of meaning construction (if any at all) pass between 
them? Does the act of representation tell us more of the subject 
than the object itself? 
For, in the reading act our understanding of the subject who 
reads and believes he understands the language, does not always 
realize that there may be a struggle to get the balance right 
between the private 11 I", and the "we" the struggle of 
generalization. Herein resides our problem of opinions, fact, 
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truth, lie, accuracy, science, fallacy, scepticism, etc. Our 
conventional understanding of language also super-imposes another 
dilemma of the subject, i.e. that the latter still holds sway 
over the criteria of truth, validity and consistency in terms of 
his all-embracing subjective judgements of the text. It is more 
important, apparently, to understand what makes subjective or 
human judgment of things true, rather than the other way 
2.2.2 LANGUAGE AND JUDGEMENT 
In the reading act we generally assume that there is almost a 
[human] obligation to make sense of or derive meaning from the 
linguistic conJent of a text. Our chief concern is who (rather 
than what) makes this sense or what will this meaning be. What 
this meaning will be (eg. in a politically-correct environment) 
assumes an almost pre-ordained meaning which has to be fished out 
of the text or document by the reader. 
Whether by convention or intention there appears to be a human 
desire or obsession to pursue correctness. Life no doubt has 
become hurried, deadlines have to be met and time is of the 
essence. Within the broader framework or ethos of life's demands 
we seek to manage ourselves efficiently and effectively and 
therefore seek to avoid situations, messages, interactions, etc. 
which are not correct. 
While "correctness" (especially·of a factual nature) undoubtedly 
has its place, it certainly has its limitations too. Insisting 
on the "correct" concept can, in some circumstances, be 
misleading as much as using the "wrong" one. It hardly occurs 
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to the average reader who has to fill in official forms, read 
policy documents or scrutinize manuals, eg. "how to use your 
appliance", that there may be some or other judgement involved. 
It is often an accepted practice that the content of such 
documents are "given", true and therefore "should be accepted" 
as such. 
Our use of language in verbal communication or reading, rarely 
turns out to be simple. Language inevitably involves judgement 
especially when such language refers to or are anchored in the 
external, objective worlds, even when the words may seem testable 
against their familiar context. In this regard we encounter a 
fair share of problems: 
" the sheer absurdity of the use of 
verifiability as a meaning criterion: how 
can one ever say that a theory was gibberish 
because it could not be verified" (Popper, 
1976:80). 
The scientific or "tool kit" use of language would turn out to 
be especially problematic if it always has to be verified in 
terms of an external, objective world. How do we verify (for the 
sake of correctness) our internal, i.e. subjective feelings and 
thinking? Who is to be the judge of the correctness of what is 
expressed and offered as valid meanings? Against the notion of 
verifiability as an "ill-designed instrument 11 or "defective 
device" (see Botha 1992:18), Chomsky (1972:10) argues that, 11 
the normal use of language is innovative, in the sense that much 
of what we say in the course of normal language use is entirely 
new, not a repetition of anything that we have heard before and 
not even similar in pattern". This challenge suggests the 
paradox of language that, in as much as it is "understandable" 
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and perhaps "generalizable" in a given context of familiarity it, 
in the final analysis, seems to remain utterly unique and non-
replicable for each individual hearer/speaker (Baker & Hacker, 
1984) . 
Having recognised the problematic of verifiability, the question 
is how much space or opportunity is left for uncertainty and for 
differing judgements, when it is essentially the intangible, 
invisible and immaterial that we are dealing with in the reading 
of a text. It is undoubtedly part of the human condition to 
speculate, feel, imagine, suppose, fear and hope through 
language. Any commonsense approach to language would suggest 
that this "dichotomy" of visible and invisible, fact and 
speculation, thinking and feeling does not imply two separate 
worlds, though in writing about them we have been forced to treat 
them separately. It is because they are interdependent, that we 
have to challenge language which is only seen as a mode which 
11 refers to", "moulds", "interprets" and "discovers experience". 
In other words, is language only to be grasped in terms of its 
"referential organization" (Sapir, 1949: 11) in order to 
construct meaning? The epistemological link between subject and 
object becomes an axiomatic exercise for precision and certainty. 
Moreover, the problematic relation between language and judgement 
in reading proves essentially a question of the generalizability 
of textual reading. John Locke in An essay concerning human 
understanding (1960) argued that to grasp the role of language 
in meaning construction is acknowledging the ultimate privateness 
firstly of meanings: 
"Man, though he has great variety of 
Thoughts, as such, from which others, as 
well as himself, might receive Profit and 
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Delight; yet they are all within his own 
Breast, invisible and hidden from others, 
nor can of themselves be made appear" (III, 
II, 1). 
Parallel to this scenario in his problematization, Locke 
identifies another man as a social creature who wishes to break 
out of his privacy and isolation and create a world with others: 
"The Comfort, and Advantage of Society, not 
being to be had without communication of 
Thoughts, it was necessary that Man should 
find out some external sensible Signs, 
whereby those invisible Ideas which his 
thoughts are made up of might be made known 
to others" (III, II, 1). 
Part of the dilemma of the reading act therefore is the subject's 
intention to make known or give expression to his thoughts to 
others, i.e. to render the invisible visible and the unreadable 
readable. Locke argues that we make links between our subjective 
language and "the world", for words"··· belong not to the real 
existence of things, but are the Inventions and Creatures of the 
Understanding, made by it for its own use" (III, II, I). This 
subjective generalizability of understanding language in making 
judgements, whilst it has been made in terms of excellent 
judgement, does not mean that its meaning is necessarily well 
understood. We often arrive at specific judgements, believing 
that we had grasped the meaning just because the meaning is 
shared by (and communicated to) others. The dilemma we still 
encounter is operating in a framework in which limited meanings 
have been constructed and therefore regarded as justified valid 
meanings at that, just because we had played the meaning 
construction game by the rules. Our concern is "how else" 
36 
meanings are constructed, other than spearheaded by a master-mind 
subject, imputing from the outside meaning into a text. Is 
"judgment" or "correctness" the only valid criterion for 
legitimate meaning construction? Even if this was the case, how 
do we define these concepts and in which contexts are they 
applicable? "Correctness" in its conventional use of the term 
implies likeness, correspondence and literalness, as is often 
encountered in and applied to conventional everyday reading of 
texts such as memos, newspapers, circular etc. The strategy of 
reproducing meanings is based on the assumption that texts are 
adequate and complete and that readers are self assured and 
capable of manipulating the textual content. 
2.2.3 LANGUAGE AND LITERAL MEANING 
In the act of representation, our essential concern regarding the 
role of language is the practice of using it in a "tool-kit" 
fashion in order to achieve a specific end. The assumption that 
informs our subjective and almost uncritical "use" of language, 
in as far as language represents issues, events, objects and 
people in the external world, is the essence of "literal 
reading". At an academic level literal reading may not always 
be the case (and it may even be scoffed at) but one does not need 
to search far to realize how on a daily basis eg. newspaper or 
magazine readers virtually buy into reports or articles as 
reporters (whether in a sensational manner or not) present them 
to us. In literal reading usually the word or sentence seems 
firmly trapped within the decodification process where it is safe 
and where it is judged and analyzed. The conventional way of 
grasping the meaning is that the text holds the capacity to 
convey or transmit the literal sense which is usually attached 
to each of its sentences. Meyer (1983: 67) argues that literal 
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or sentential meaning normally embodies "knowledge of which is 
presupposed" . Language would therefore be "safe" and remain 
firmly in the hands of the subject of speech who acts as the 
judge, master, analyst and decoder of the reading act (see 
Barthes, 1986: 64). This view precipitates the radical 
questioning of the notion and the object in the reading act, as 
we have come to understand it. Does the object always fall 
captive to the reader's eye, and become trapped in human opinion? 
Part of our dilemma in grasping the reading act, particularly in 
examining the role of the subject who, in everyday life is 
confronted with newspapers, minutes of meetings, statistical 
data, memo's, advertisements, etc., is whether literal meaning 
have validity for full meaning construction and if so, to what 
extent. What is clear in everyday life is the fact that literal 
reading still holds great sway over our interpretation of things 
around us. 
In our problematization of the views of objectification and 
subjectivity it appears that we cannot totally ignore the effects 
of literal language as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest, for 
"literal" is a word which is already firmly established and 
frequently used in our everyday use of language. Literal meaning 
moreover can be assumed to yield valid meanings that words have, 
independently of where and how they are used. In this context-
free sense " ... words by themselves do not ever have metaphorical 
meaning, only literal" (Way, 1991:16). Novitz (1977:20), in 
dealing with the notion of representation, problematizes, for 
example, "pictures" and "depiction" (similarly "texts" and 
"meanings") when he asserts: "How do we determine what a picture 
is of, if not by determining what it stands for or denotes?" It 
is typical of our hurried life in contemporary society to want 
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to have quick answers. Off ice circulars or memo's are often 
given a cursory and superficial glance, yielding often literal 
message constructions. 
Quine (1960) emphasizes the sentential view of language. His 
view of language regards the act of learning language to be the 
learning of a network of sentences - a process which can be 
performed by direct conditioning, association, and by analogy, 
construct sentences. Needless to say, this view is heavily 
criticized, among others by Chomsky (1968) who thought this view 
to be "perverse" since Quine confuses performance with competence 
in characterizing language. 
Wittgenstein on the other hand addresses the question of language 
in the hope to eradicate what he regards as "philosophical 
problems" that may be caused by the misuse of ordinary language. 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1922) renders the picture theory (or 
correspondence theory) of language in a sentential and 
representational way. 
Al though the 
investigations 
later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical 
(1967) corrects and expands this position by 
viewing language as a game which takes on meaning when in use, 
he still remains trapped in what Kristeva refers to as the 
abstract dimension of language. Katz (1966) argues that 
Wittgenstein underestimates the complexity of language especially 
when he postulates no condition/s that may be necessary or 
sufficient for what the latter calls "language games". The 
Wittgensteinian view moreover seeks to insulate language and its 
essence from dealing with the more uncontrollable aspects of 
making sense of a text other than in its logical and totalizable 
pursuit. This view still places the reading subject in firm 
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control, acting upon the object in a unilateral way, yielding 
very definite subject-ive meaning. The problem clearly is that 
in the act of literal reading readers generally still enjoy the 
supreme role of the subject who remains master of the reading 
act. The object is patently separated from, and subjected to his 
control in an apparent uncomplicated manner. 
The implicit assumption of literal reading is that words present 
a smooth surface, containing pre-ordained and neatly-packaged 
meanings which, through the simple act of decodif ication reveal 
their meaning. In problematising the act of representation, our 
concern about the reading act is that it may not have occurred 
to readers that, as in real life, they may possibly have to 
encounter contradictions, rough surfaces which would precipitate 
what Botha (1992: 20) refers to as the "war of words". Do words 
or does the textual object readily surrender to the controlling 
endeavours of a human reading subject? The danger of this view 
is that it is naive and tends to diminish the complexity of life 
at large. Bredella (1989: 33) argues that in literal reading 
(i.e. one-way reading from subject to object, via the 
decodification route) we tend to be" ... in danger of explaining 
away the heterogeneity and contradictions of our experience". 
We may add that explaining away the "rough surfaces" in literal 
reading makes us patently vulnerable to surprise, crisis or even 
lurking disaster in terms what we normally think to be easy 
reading and easy interpretation. The tool-kit use of language 
may not be as efficient and effective as we may think. 
The "tool-kit" status of literal reading for meaning construction 
is, according to Bakhtin (in Volosinov, 1973), a "perversion" 
which exists between subject and object, and as a result raises 
both critical epistemological and anthropological concerns. For 
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ultimately the dangers of mere literal reading have implications 
for what it means to be human in a post-information era which 
emphasizes the judicious application or use of information in our 
society (see De Beer, 1992; 1993; Mumby, 1993). This challenge 
for representation moreover proves crucial in view of the 
subject's unilateral extraction of meaning from an object - a 
position which could prove limiting. Whether we view the reading 
act, on the other hand, as an author expressing a particular 
message for the consumptive subject, this could prove equally 
limiting or even disastrous. In terms of literal reading Said 
(1972) expresses concern for the totalizing strategy which claims 
for textuality a privileged stake in the production of meaning. 
This view, according to Said, shows scant concern for the text's 
(object's) 
situation in the material world. The epistemic dangers and 
validity of the literal reading discourse is recognised as our 
major problem in this study. Literal decodification or 
decipherment implies the supremacy of " the reader as a 
processor of texts" (Jauss in Machor, 1993: ix) pursuing a 
complete and homogeneous view of "interpretation" and "meaning" -
i.e. by using language like a recipe according to its logical and 
rule-guided nature we hope to guarantee success of communication 
and understanding in life. Not only does it imply an over-
simplificatio:Q. of life and all its events, but moreover an 
oversimplification of the nature of the subject who constructs 
these meanings. Both the noun subject, and the verb to subject, 
speak of key or controlling interests vis-a-vis the action of 
meaning construction and, as a result, require closer scrutiny 
in our problematization of the reading act. Representation has 
become so entangled with the preoccupations of subjectivity, the 
one cannot, it seems, be understood without thorough insight into 
the other. 
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2.3 THE SUBJECT AND THE READING ACT 
In the act of representation the question we face is: who or what 
constructs meaning during the reading act? There is still the 
accepted notion that the reader assumes the sole role of 
controlling subject, the one who creates, shapes, designs, 
defines and controls the meaning contained in the text. Not only 
do we assume that the text is "dead" and that the human subject 
usually takes it upon himself to reclaim, extract and exploit the 
meaning, but moreover that he determines the depth, slant and 
credibility that a textual message will have. The sovereign 
human subject acts upon the textual object in a one-way 
relationship in which the text is subjected to the subject's 
intentions and in this very unilateral process the subject also 
subjects (i.e. defines and describes) himself as reader. What 
we face here is, through the use of and dependence upon language, 
the subject defines and describes himself as person, as well as 
produce of body of knowledge that he himself has created. The 
anthropological and epistemological consequences of this 
situation is essentially a biased and therefore limited 
understanding of how things, meanings and people are. Things, 
meanings and our idea of people are represented by the reading 
subject from a distinctly separate or rather an oppositional 
stance, i.e. the reading subject positions himself opposite his 
textual object and confers subjective meaning upon what he sees 
and believes he understands. Is this the correct stance, and 
moreover is it the only stance which readers have come to adopt 
in making sense of the document or text in front of him? Our 
rather uncritical use of the concept "subject" also exacerbates 
the problem furthermore. Despite the fact that subject or 
subjectivity has always 
"human", these notions 
been associated with that which is 
have also undergone changes at the 
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theoretical conceptualization level. It would therefore be 
useful to explore the development of "subjectivity" in order to 
problematize the meaning-giving process in the reading act. 
Subjectivity may very well be better understood by looking at the 
attempts that representation has come to hold, in as much as 
understanding representation would clarify our perceptions and 
conceptualizations of subjectivity. 
2.3.1 THE NOTION OF SUBJECTIVITY. 
The use of the notion of "subjectivity" or the "subject" is in 
danger of becoming extremely obscure and imprecise, especially 
if it is taken to be more than a social, cultural or political 
concept, i.e. one which includes theorizations such as a "space" 
or an "opening" within discourse - a location which might be 
called "the subject position" or the "subject effect". De Bolla 
(1989:240) clarifies: 
"This involves more than simply readers and 
texts; at its base it is concerned with the 
place of the subject, how it is constructed 
and who or what can be said to own it". 
In the arena of representation our dilemma in this study centres 
around a crucial aspect of reading, i.e. the position of the 
reading subject, the role of textual representations, whether 
pictorial or verbal, vis-a-vis the construction of textual 
meaning and knowledge. We have normally been confronted with the 
subject who may be the author or the reader who desires to limit 
the text to the expression of a particular meaning - a view 
associated with the "representa-tional thesis". Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, as we will see, were of the first to postulate 
clearer views on the difficulty of critiqueing subjectivity in 
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language and within the ambit of modern metaphysics. 
One could question the view that it is generally held that the 
"· .. quarrel of the subject is ... when all is said and done, a 
scholastic quarrel" (Descombes, 1991:133). Part of the 
difficulty of the "subject" or the "subject position" is what 
Derrida (1991: 101) argues as the getting away " from this 
contract between the grammar of the subject or substantive and 
the ontology of substance or subject". There seems, generally-
speaking, to be a necessity or even an obsession to have a 
subject in the reading act, despite the attempts to remove or 
decenter it - at least the notion of a homogeneous and certainly 
a biographical subject (see Caws, 1998:240). This dilemma in the· 
act of representation has unequivocally impacted on the stability 
and intelligibility of the subject in terms of meaning-
construction of content and of self. The quest for the subject's 
identity in the reading act (whether the reader or author) 
generally tends to impose sole ownership and sovereignty over 
others. 
The other problem is that we seem to ref er a philosophical notion 
when we talk about the subject. The philosophical subject 
usually functions as an empirical historical and autobiographical 
subject. The problem proves to be exacerbated by the fact that 
the philosophical subject is itself double: it operates both as 
a transcendental and an empirical entity. As transcendental 
subject it serves often as the condition of possibility of all 
other subjects - and this transcendental subject is represented 
in the text by the same "I" that designates all other empirical 
subjects. Therefore, the text confronts the reader with the 
confusion of a special subject (i.e. the transcendental subject) 
with all other subjects. However, the empirical subject 
represented in terms of the reading act creates the illusion that 
44 
the philosophical and literary subject are one and the same. 
As already mentioned, the role of language becomes of central 
importance in the reading act, for subjectivity constantly refers 
to the reality of discourse. It is within this context and 
workings of language that the reader constitutes himself as 
subject and it is moreover within this context that the "I" does 
not necessarily refer to an individual but probably more a 
locutionary position within an utterance - where subjectivity is 
seen as a discursive effect. 
Despite the fact that postmodernism, in the realm of 
representation, has sought to declare the death of the subject, 
for many readers, there remains an uneasiness to live with all 
these and other often confusing views. Part of this dilemma has 
probably to do with our definitions of the subject and 
specifically how we have come to conceptualize the 
anthropological notion of mankind and how knowledge, as a result 
of the interaction between the subject and textual object has 
been construed. These conceptualizations naturally have a direct 
bearing on deeper held world-views. 
In the European philosophical tradition, subjectivity had come 
to refer to the Cartesian roots as the conditions of possibility, 
i.e. viewing it from a transcendental perspective, whereas the 
Anglo-American philosophical tradition refers to subjectivity as 
an empirical subject, whose content is generally subjective, i.e. 
intentional, personal and individual. (Flam, 1965; Payne, 1993). 
The prelude to our Western problematization of the subject is 
perhaps best encapsulated in the seminal thinking of Descartes 
and Kant. It will therefore be helpful for our understanding of 
the reading act to reflect on and draw from the Cartesian and 
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Kantian 
without 
subject both of which cannot be fully understood 
their reference to "representation" and ultimately, 
meaning construction. 
2.3.1.1 DESCARTES'S SUBJECT. 
It seems that the Cartesian subject cannot ordinarily be equated 
with what we now call "a subject", i.e. a subject or person 
defined as a social, psychological and moral entity. In fact it 
rather represents a particular interpretation of consciousness 
whose status is defined in terms of mathematical principles. 
The Cartesian use of the Nominative "I" indicates the autonomy 
of a subject vis-a-vis the objective status of the world. The 
problem is that the epistemological constraints imposed upon the 
Cartesian subject result in its actual disenfranchisement as self 
or subjective being. The very definition of the Cartesian 
subject, as a result, would delimit its personal, psychological 
and historical essence. 
Furthermore, Descartes's notion of a mathematical and 
philosophical subject appears not to function descriptively but 
rather prescriptively. His version of subject, based on his 
mathematical model, parts with any anthropological-humanist 
account. The subject is particularly posited as a mathematical 
reductionism of the world and proves, as we will see, perhaps an 
empty formal entity, devoid of human or divine content (Kenny, 
1968:170). 
Descartes essentially seeks to resolve the question of the self 
and that of sceptical doubt through a new theory of knowledge. 
Against the backdrop of his Praeambula (1619) Descartes presents 
his view of a subject as linked to the project of .. founding a 
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universal science on mathematical principles. His rejection and 
fear of illusion in the Praeambula, the Regulae, and the Discours 
illustrate his refusal to consider the problematic nature of the 
relation of knowledge and how such knowledge is represented 
(representation) . We may thus infer that in terms of the reading 
act this pursuit of certitude represents the search for an ideal 
view of language in which truth can hopefully be equated with 
propositional correctness and where language itself ceases to 
exist materially as discourse (see Curtis, 1984:29). In fact, 
the philosophical language used by Descartes has been developed 
according to mathematics - a view which we may deduce is not far 
from seeking a literal meaning in a text. 
The Cartesian attempts therefore to propose a redefinition of 
philosophy on the basis of subjectivity nevertheless paved the 
way to a new concept of mankind and what it means, in his terms, 
to be human. However, by perhaps not problematizing the relation 
of man to representation, he clearly omits that which could be 
the defining essence of man - language. 
2.3.1.1.1 CARTESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND REPRESENTATION. 
The Cartesian model of a new science seems not restricted to the 
sciences alone but is extended to a mathematical formulation of 
knowledge in general. The Regulae formulates a generalized form 
of logic and a new form of symbolic language, 
terms of mathematics. This is to be interpreted 
fashioned in 
in a more abstract and general sense as universal mathematics. 
This conceptual interpretation of mathematics postulates a new 
perception and yardstick for things which is not at all derived 
experientially, but which is rather imposed upon them as an 
axiomatic order to which they must submit. Representation, as 
the manner in which knowledge gets constructed, becomes thus no 
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longer an inquiry into the essence of things but an exercise in 
certitude, the criteria of which have been set up in advance. 
For our purposes, in the reading, act these "pre-established" 
logical criteria could therefore postulate nothing less than 
dogmatism and perhaps one-dimensional reading - one in which the 
subject is fully in control of. 
2.3.1.1.1.1 RESEMBLANCE. 
The Cartesian concept of universal mathematics is furthermore 
deployed as a critique of the notion of resemblance. Resemblance 
is rejected by Descartes as a false way of acquiring knowledge -
one that will fall prey to the danger of illusion. (see Wright, 
1993:50). 
Descartes's critique of experience, as presented in his 
discussion of resemblance, involves a new interpretation of 
knowledge vis-a-vis its relation to nature. By reducing things 
and forcing them to fit the rules of mathematical criteria, 
Descartes in effect transforms them into signs. Thus, a sign can 
communicate what it signifies without necessarily resembling it. 
Descartes clearly sees no need for images to resemble the things 
they represent (see Joachim, 1957:21). 
The reduction of things to mathematical signs implies not only 
their uniformity within its symbolic signs, but also their break 
with the natural order. This view of Descartes pronounces the 
emergence of a new kind of discourse that processes special 
analytical and inferential properties. The self-referential 
character of certitude replaces the referential character of 
experience as expressed by the principles of resemblance and 
difference. This new order moreover involves the use of signs 
as instruments of analysis, for the true referent of the sign is 
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the system itself which is constituted through its axiomatic 
order. Given these views, we may infer that an axiomatic form 
of reading puts the reading act in a straight jacket, operating 
perhaps exclusively in the realm of the controllable and under 
the dominion of logic. 
2.3.1.1.1.2 THE NEW CARTESIAN ORDER OF ENUMERATION, INTUITION 
AND DEDUCTION. 
Descartes's development of concepts goes hand in hand with the 
categorization of mental operations and the emergence of a new 
order of deductive judgements, resulting into intuitive 
judgements. In Rule 3 Descartes states that, "· .. intuition is 
the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and 
springs from the light of reason alone". (see Joachim, 1957:25). 
It is primarily by deduction, Descartes argues, that all 
inference can be made from other facts that are already known. 
This is attained through intuition and intuition is in fact more 
certain than deduction since it is by definition simpler. This 
"superhuman" subject relies on the process of intuition, for 
intuition, according to Descartes, is an unmediated and 
continuous act of clear vision. This may appear to be in 
contradiction to Descartes's mathematicized version of 
representation of knowledge-construction which does not rely on 
experiential factors. However he believes that deductive 
judgements are conferred by memory - a faculty Descartes often 
rejects as unreliable. 
between intuition and 
Descartes thus sets up an opposition 
deductive arguments where intuition 
replaces concepts like "senses" and "imagination". Whilst the 
latter are not significant or legitimate in their own right, 
Descartes presses on his mathematical pursuits in that he argues 
that the senses and imagination are dependent on understanding 
(see: Joachim, 1957:51-55). However, the Cartesian~definition 
of intuition postulates an identity in the light of reason -
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since reason remains identical to itself regardless of the 
objects that it reflects. 
The unity of human reason, according to Descartes, as experienced 
through intuition can be made tenable by maintaining an absolute 
resemblance between human and divine reason. It would appear that 
this self-sufficient subject in fact embodies a super-human who 
is endowed with pre-established meaning. 
2.3.1.1.1.3 ENUMERATION 
In Rule 6 Descartes expounds the concept of enumeration as a 
special kind of deduction which reflects the unity of sciences. 
Enumeration embodies a serial system of order, intended to 
replace the hierarchical judgements of genus and species which 
were used by the Aristotelians to classify things by reference 
to ontological categories (Gaukroger, 1992:100). The process of 
enumeration reproduces the object as a series of propositions 
which define the object in the area of knowledge within the order 
of understanding. It appears that what is simple in Descartes 
has meaning only by reference to understanding and its 
conventions and does not concern anything but the categories of 
knowledge themselves. We may thus conclude that the reader could 
perhaps already have a blueprint of what the reading before him 
could entail, i.e. by using the right logical "tool" the subject 
would be able to construct meaning. This is precisely our dilemma 
in this study. 
2.3.1.1.2 THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT. 
Up till now the problematic of the Cartesian subject has been 
hidden in the order of discourse and Descartes' vision of 
representation. It becomes apparent that he does not coherently 
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develop the notion of the subject as a philosophical and 
discursive entity until Le Discours de la methode (1637) . Here 
we encounter the philosophical subject of the method as well as 
the empirical/autobiographical subject. The idea of subjectivity 
in relation to his views of the mathematical order is not 
explicitly presented in the Regulae. The multiplicity of 
locutionary positions in the Regulae can however be seen as the 
index of the problematic presence of subjectivity which is 
implicit in the order of representation. Despite his use of a 
mixture of pronouns the subject does exist, even if its presence 
is implied. Thus.the subject in the Regulae proves a purely 
symbolic construct, lacking in terms of the real dynamics which 
constitutes what Hannah Arendt (1958) calls the human condition. 
The subject proves purely a theoretical construct used by 
Descartes to explain his view of representation. 
Descartes's mathematical view of language and his criteria of 
certitude constitute the backbone of his entire system. It is 
evident that the main feature is the axiomatic relation to 
objects (representation), i.e. an object can be constituted only 
if it can be accommodated within both the foundational project 
and the proper order of knowledge. 
The dilemma with Descartes is not merely the submission of 
physical experience to the conditions of mathematical knowledge 
but rather that mathematics is interpreted by him in a 
philosophical sense as a logical order (Marion, 1992:116-120). 
It is not just the elements of mathematical language that relate 
to nature or things but that its meta-mathematical assumptions 
are applied to and qualify in the area of rationality. 
Despite the implications of Descartes's seminal thinking for this 
study of how the reading act could unfold, the obsessive 
Cartesian scientific method involves nothing more than the 
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interpretation of nature, things or people according to 
mathematical laws which have been set up in advance. Judovitz 
(1988:79) believes that the "· .. submission of past knowledge to 
the criterion of certitude leads to a decontextualized and 
dehistorized truth". The implications of this for the reading 
act would mean that the theoretical Cartesian subject potentially 
excludes any notion of the historical and linguistic context. 
Epistemology in his view tacitly absorbs the historical reference 
since the notion of clear and distinct ideas defines itself by 
reference to the thinking subject and not to tradition. Whereas 
Heidegger, as we will notice, posits a subject that is always 
already present for representation, the Cartesian subject is 
constituted in the strict order of representation as the symbol 
of a discursivity which cannot reflect upon its own practical 
reality. As an empty sign or symbol, this subject is used to 
refer indiscriminately in the Discours and Meditations both to 
the transcendental subject and the empirical autobiographical 
subject. 
In order to grasp the "subject" we must remember that 
representation in the Cartesian fashion implies a special form 
of control and therefore predictable interpretation of being, as 
a form of certitude in so far as it conforms to logical norms 
determined in advance. This new symbolic system therefore frees 
words and things from their analogical relation by viewing them 
in terms of the normative criteria applied to representation and 
understood as certitude (Gaukroger, 1992:108-111). 
"Subjectivity" is therefore a "disconnected" entity which is 
constructed on the basis of logical certainty. 
Judovitz (1988:80) highlights the inextricable conceptual bond 
of subjectivity and representation and believes that the 
Cartesian epistemology embodies "· .. a theory of representation 
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where the order of discourse is predicated on the order of 
reasons, dissimulating within it a nascent theory of 
subjectivity". Thus, the Cartesian subject of the Regulae is not 
defined by its content as a narrative, autobiographical or 
polemical entity but by its power to perform, to execute, i.e. 
to present. This absolute power base is logically patent and the 
nature of the subject is like that of intuition, a schematic 
entity produced by the reduction and absorption of metonymic 
chains. What we encounter is a prescribed Cartesian subject 
which is defined as the axiomatic substrate of representation 
rather than as one representation among many (Loeb, 1992:213-
218} . If we were to apply this subject to the reading act, 
language may still be regarded as a tool which is used according 
to the rules of a mathematically constructed subject. 
It is interesting that Descombes (1991: 128) argues that the 
philosophical subject discovered in the cogito is ultimately a 
"pseudo-subject" posed in terms of the cogito. As a result, it 
may be safe to infer that this could be a subject which functions 
autonomously regardless of the presence of the world of things. 
This implied theoretical construct ultimately would yield a 
"dogmatic" or rather an incomplete view of subjectivity. 
According to Descombes (1991:129), there is a difference between 
the human being and being the subject, II and each of us can 
say "ego cogito", I think. In other words, it is I who think: 
I am, when I think, not a human being, but a thinking subject". 
This clearly renders, in our view, the Cartesian subject nothing 
more than an axiomatic, logical subject trapped in its own 
mathematicized representation. This apparently unimaginative 
view,when applied to reading, presupposes nothing more than the 
"non-human" ability to decodify a text acontextually. We can infer 
that this form of reading moreover predates the referential mode 
of meaning construction since it remains essentially incarcerated 
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in the myopic, albeit intuitive order of representation. We can 
also inf er that the Cartesian subject as reader embodies a 
"super-individual" in a way which makes it difficult for other 
subjects to have reasonable access to his thinking, for it has 
nothing to do about being human but certainly everything about 
executing logical thinking. The result would be that the 
dogmatism of each individual making sense prompts an 
authoritative voice which reflects merely a sequence of words, 
devoid of a true human subject - let alone an object. The 
Cartesian subject, however limited, nevertheless paves the way 
for Kant and other thinkers who subsequently develop a more 
expansive notion of subjectivity further. 
2.3.1.2 KANT'S SUBJECT 
Essentially Kant claims that the subject does not as subject, 
have a location within the world of its object of representation. 
However, Kant realizes that as humans we are aware of ourselves 
as objects within our respective worlds. The difference between 
these two modes of being aware of ourselves stands behind most 
classical formulations of the mind-body problematic. The Kantian 
picture is clear: 
11 there are two stems of human knowledge, 
namely sensibility and understanding 
through the latter, they are thought" (Kant, 
1960: 29). 
Kitcher (1982) claims that for Kant there is no subject, 
certainly not in any sense that entails that it is a 
significantly unified entity. She argues moreover that Kant's 
I is nothing more than an interconnected 11 system of di verse 
states" but contrary to this view of Kitcher we need to revisit 
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Kant's complex thought of self-consciousness. 
Kant argues that the certainty of self-knowledge as postulated 
by Descartes for his notion of "subjectivity" had been wrongly 
described. For Descartes, whatever the world contains, contains 
the thinking being that I am. 
According, to Kant (1960: 133) the "cogito" proves that there is 
a thought but not that there is an "I" who thinks it: 
"As my representations (even if I am not 
conscious of them as such) they must conform 
to the condition under which alone they can 
stand together in one universal self-
consciousness, because otherwise they would 
not all without exception belong to me". 
Kant moreover argues that neither experience nor reason alone is 
able to provide knowledge. The former provides content without 
form, while the latter form without content. Only in their 
synthesis does knowledge become possible - hence there is no 
knowledge that does not bear the marks of reason and of 
experience together - a departure of the clear and distinct ideas 
of Descartes. Kant too seems not able to develop an 
understanding of "subjectivity" apart from the idea of 
"representation" 
Objects do not depend for their existence upon the subject's 
perception of them but they can be perceived. Experience 
contains, according to Kant, within itself the features of space, 
time and causality. Bennett (1974: 52) therefore points out that 
objects are appearances or representations and not things in 
themselves: This notion of a "thing in itself" and the 
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associated notion of "noumenon", will give trouble at several 
points in the Dialectic. A thing in itself is, roughly-speaking, 
a thing considered independently of any fact about how it might 
impinge upon our experience. The ref ore, in describing my 
experience, I am referring to an ordered perspective on an 
independent world. 
In the reading act, by focussing on the "description of 
experience" as above, does not mean that the reading subject who 
performs this act is a psychological entity, neither is it an 
authorial voice for which no true subject can be found. For Kant 
the subject can be identified as being essentially the subject of 
experience: the single premise of self-consciousness. And this 
consciousness is neither empirical but rather transcenden-tal, 
suggesting that the subject is presupposed in the self-conscious 
experience of reading and not derived from it. Kant (1960: 406 -
407) states: 
"I do not know myself through being 
conscious of myself as thinking but only 
when I am conscious of the intuition of 
myself The object is not the con-
sciousness of the determining self, but only 
that of the determinable self, that is, of 
my inner intuition." 
Unlike the contrasting view of Kitcher (1982) that the subject is 
a system of informationally interdependent states, Kant did 
not think that the mind is not a simple substance. 
contrary, he insisted that the mind could be just that. 
is a result of synthesis and not an agent of .it. 
reader's mind consists of is of representations. 
(1968:253) clarifies the Kantian position: 
On the 
The self 
All the 
Cassirer 
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"Every thinking being is, as such, a simple 
substance - [this] is a synthetic a priori 
proposition: it is synthetic in that it goes 
beyond the concept from which it starts, and 
adds to the thought in general (i.e. to the 
concept of a thinking being) the mode of 
existence: it is a priori in that it adds to 
the concept a predicate which cannot be 
given in any experience". 
Like in the case of Descartes, Kant also develops a definition of 
the subject which is intricately tied up with his view of 
representation. If all the mind consists of is representations 
then they include representing oneself as subject. Our usual 
response is that every representation of something represents it 
to someone or is intended by someone. Here we encounter a 
departure of the conceptual or clinical Cartesian reader, for the 
Kantian reading subject constitutes someone and as such ushers 
into the reading act the human element. 
However, the Kantian notion of representation is limited for it 
embodies an intrinsic representation not necessarily the 
representation to represent to someone, for"··· so long as we 
are not conscious of ourselves as ourselves, we shall be 
confronted with presentations which lack any objective reference; 
and none of our presentations will be recognised as belonging to 
an object" (Cassirer, 1968: 67). 
The Kantian reading subject is thus that aspect of a system of 
representations that does the judging (interpreting) and recog-
nising of representations, someone who can take representations 
up, let go of them and transform them into new representations 
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without itself changing in any essential way. The autonomous 
subject is able to refer to itself as itself (Brook, 1994). 
However we have seen that the only constraints are (i) that there 
must be a single common single subject (Kant, 1960 :35) of all 
representations and/or objects of representation united in a 
global representation and (ii) that the awareness this subject 
has of objects and/or representations must be unifi~d eg. unity 
of consciousness, unity of apperception and the absolute unity of 
the thinking being (Kant, 1960: 353). 
According to Kant, I am therefore the subject not just of single 
states of awareness but of a great many states of awareness in a 
single representation - and I am the same subject of each of 
them. Kant believes"· .. the only permanent appearance which we 
encounter in the soul is the representation "I" which, for all we 
know, may be in the same state of flux as the other thoughts 
which by means of it, are linked up with one another" (Kant, 
1960: 364). 
The Kantian subject therefore does not embody a substance in the 
empirical sense but is purely a human designation of the object 
in the inner sense in so far as we know it through no further 
predicate (Kant, 1953: 98). To examine the peculiarities of our 
self-awareness is to examine them in the world - not an "I" seen 
as the object of consciousness. The "I" is merely an expression 
of my perspective but denotes no item within it - a view which 
later influences Heidegger and Wittgenstein. 
Sometimes Kant implies that the "I" of self-consciousness refers 
to a transcendental object. For it might seem that having argued 
that the "I" is not part of the empirical world, Kant has given 
us reason to refer to the world of the thing-in-itself which 
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resides beyond experience. Since we experience nothing but 
changing representations in terms of inner experiences, this 
perception is possible only through a thing in me: 
" the determination of my existence in 
time is possible only through the existence 
of actual things which I perceive outside 
me" (Kant in Wilson, 1974: 53) . 
With regard to the reading act, Kant certainly progressed further 
than the Cartesian mechanical-cum-mathematical subject which 
functions prescriptively. Instead of the Cartesian mathematical 
deduction of a new order of enumeration, Kant posits a form of 
transcendental deduction of categories, the reading subject which 
is enabled, for the first time, to become conscious of objects 
proper, as distinct from purely private impressions. At least 
there is a sense in the reading act that the reader becomes the 
point of designation who connects with the text that is his 
object, instead of conjuring up his own private readings in an 
abstract domain. 
Despite Kant's "Copernican turn" towards subjectivity he 
decidedly leaves the main feature of traditional ontology in 
tact, viz. the centrality of substance, the thinghood of the 
thing remains uncontested. The dependent "thing" in its very 
being remains separate from the subject. The general assumption 
of the subject somehow continues in the Cartesian-Kantian 
tradition to bestow "form" or "meaning" on objects, giving the 
reader sovereignty over the reading text. Truth is still 
conceived as the correspondence and verifiability between 
thoughts (or the content of our consciousness) and the outside 
world as embodied in the text. 
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It is this notion of language, knowledge and truth that is 
generally taken to "represent" what is "there" in an outside, 
objective world, and raises major questions with regard to 
representation and all its ramifications. Therefore, the latter 
requires closer examinatiori in terms of its significance and 
validity in the reading act which we are seeking to problematize 
in this study. The subject who reads is usually alway~ assumed 
to pre-exist any meaning, for the latter normally comes about as 
a result of the referential function of literal representational 
reading of any text. The diffulties we encounter in 
understanding the act of meaning construction in reading is 
whether the text in actual fact does "represent" anybody's ideas, 
and moreover whether the reading subject is responsible for the 
activation of f 11 representations that occur in the "seeing" or 
"perception" o the words or objects that are being read. Part 
of the hamshac led status of the reading act is the problematic 
coupling of subjectivity and representation. This "contract 
between grammar and subject" (Derrida, 1991: 101) may hold some 
validity but the full extent of this contract may also hold the 
potenti~l of unexplored spaces for new meanings and, moreover , 
for new[ or innovative ways of constructing meaning, as expressed 
or implied in the act of representation. The use of the concept 
"representation" is also in need of more clarification. 
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2.4 REPRESENTATION AND THE READING ACT 
Our key concern is how does representation, as the "inevitable" 
practice of the meaning-construction process, occur in the 
reading act. Traditionally it was taken that the controlling and 
sovereign subject interacts with his objective world and assumes 
the initiative of how, when and what the quality of 
representation shall be. It has become evident that the separate 
outside (of the object) position of the reading subject vis-a-vis 
the textual object is problematic because it inevitably results 
in a one-way meaning construction which is rooted in the biased 
endeavours of the subject to attain a sense of coherence and 
accuracy of the information contained in the text. This 
representational act in the process of referring to an.object, is 
of ten executed according the rules of language which are of ten 
used as tools to extract or divine meaning from the text. This 
"rule-guided" practice of language assumes relative predictable 
ways of making the objective world known to the subject. In 
representation this oppositional stance of subject and object 
poses major problems in which we of ten acquiesce into short-
sighted and biased knowledge construction processes of the world 
and of ourselves. It would be helpful to look at the notion of 
representation more closely in order to grasp the problematic 
contained in its application in the reading act. 
2.4.1 THE NOTION OF REPRESENTATION 
In order to understand the dichotomy of subject-object in the 
reading act it is essential to reflect on the dynamics of 
representation. Woolgar (1988:30) states: 
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"Representtion is the means by which we 
generate images (reflections, 
representations, reports) of the object "out 
there". Representation is axiomatic not 
just to science but to all practices which 
trade upon an objectivist epistemology, in 
short, to all activities which claim to 
capture some features beyond the activity 
itself." 
Reading may therefore be grasped in that activity which resides 
beyond the representation of the textual word itself. Expounding 
on the notion of representation is a way in which the subject can 
write about nothing but representation, because a structure 
governed by a privilege of representation is what seems to make 
it possible for the subject to say anything at all. Foucault 
(1970:364) thematizes this problem: 
"The human sciences, when dealing with what 
is representation (in either conscious or 
unconscious form), find themselves treating 
as their object what is in fact their 
condition of possibility. They are always 
animated, therefore, by a sort of 
transcendental mobility. . ... They proceed 
from that which is given to representation 
to that which renders representation 
possible, but which is still 
representation". 
The notion of representation as a "condition of possibility" is 
of key importance in the reading act since the reading subject 
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is always bent on seeking a representation of an outside reality 
or of himself ·in the text as object. Foucault's problematization 
of representation resides between two extremes, i.e. those who 
operate firmly within correspondence theories of truth and those 
who out rightly reject any validity of representation (Rorty, 
1970). The aforementioned requires elaboration as this 
constitutes our dilemma in this study. 
The pre-Modern conception of what was regarded as "thought" gave 
a central role to a difficult concept 11 in-form-ation 11 : it is the 
concept of a "form". In the pre-Modern framework there was no 
concept corresponding to "thinking" although there were 
conceptions of "seeing", "contemplating", "calculating", 
"dreaming", "remembering", etc., but these were not united under 
the umbrella notion of "thinking" (see Pratt, 1987:11). For 
Aquinas, seeing was a matter of "grasping" the form of the thing 
(Storig, 1972:242) - but we may ask what exactly does this in 
essence mean? Aristotle on the other hand asked the question: 
what is it that makes a thing the kind of thing it is (the "it" 
being "form") (Storig, 1972:170). The root of this dilemma is 
our assumption that any account of perception in the reading act 
must address itself to the problem of how contact is made between 
the perceiver, i.e. the subject, and the object perceived 
contact across the assumed divide that separates the two. 
Rorty ( 1970: 144) explains that this pre-Modern conception of 
"knowledge-as-identity-with-object" is at least half retained in 
the thesis of the 11 indubitability of our sensory impressions held 
by John Locke" - the basis of our understanding the problematic 
of literal reading. 
It is our Modern view of the human subject as reader who 
63 
constitutes someone distinct from "the world" and on that account 
constituting the kind of person who must have some sort of 
"relationship" with the world. This notion is a 17th Century 
innovation. Following the lead of Descartes"· .. the new 
thinkers drew screens round the human being, as round a hospital 
patient ... The patient surrounded by screens is the mind, and 
the patient him or herself is the mind's eye. In perception, it 
is the mind's eye that does the "seeing" : and what it sees are 
the images of things as they are thrown up on the screens. The 
world is accessed in perception only via representations" (Pratt, 
1987:15). Accessing "form", i.e. accessing the world through 
"seeing", while being generalizable, is in the final analysis, 
utterly unique - leading to the conclusion that there could be 
as many "theories" of representation as there are people. 
Be that as it may, the act "to represent" traditionally centres 
around a human agency of a reading subject - an assumption which 
inevitably generates anthropological views on the one hand, but 
also clear epistemological (representational)views on the other. 
The epistemological and anthropological concerns may even impact 
on tricky ethical concerns in the representations in the reading 
act. However, in the context of representation where the reader 
is usually assumed to give expression to meaning construction, 
various aspects of the "seeing" act of the reader may be 
emphasized eg. the biological, neurological, intellectual, 
computational, cognitive, perceptual or sensory functioning. 
These various "processes" or "acts" of representational 
functioning, however overlapping and integrated, in the act of 
meaning construction merit their "place" in this study in that 
they clearly highlight the fact that there is no quick and direct 
access to the literal translation of the world and subsequent 
knowledge construction. For the purposes of the problematization 
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of the act of representation, the varied (various) views as 
postulated by Cummins, Bobrow and Maund have been gleened, as 
examples to highlight the potentially multiple strands of 
reasoning and reflection that interconnect the reading subject 
and reading object in the act of representation. Representation, 
any way, is strictly an absolutely "unique" experience and, 
paradoxically, it could also be such a "generalized" form of 
behaviour which relies on automatic cues for meaning 
construction. It is however useful to look at the examples of 
the following theories. 
2.4.1.1 CUMMINS' THEMATIZATION OF REPRESENTATION. 
In his views on representation Cummins (1989) distinguishes two 
problems about mental representation. First, the Problem of 
Representations (plural) constitutes a theoretical problem in 
empirical science. For example, the states of and the processes 
in the nervous system play the role of representations in 
biological systems. These may however open to question. 
Connectionists, for example Rumelhart et al (1986), hold that 
mental representations are realized as mere activation levels of 
ensembles of simple processors and/or as the strengths of the 
connections among processors. 
The second problem - the Problem of Representation (singular) 
constitutes, according to Cummins (1989), a paradigmatic problem 
in the philosophy of science. The empirical sciences of 
cognition, to a large extent, take the notion of mental content 
as an explanatory primitive. If it appears that the notion of 
mental representation cannot be given a satisfactory explanation 
then that empirical theory must be regarded as ill founded. For 
the purposes of meaning construction, these views operate very 
much on a cause-effect basis and as such are closer to literal 
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representationalism. Cummins, as a result, goes further to 
problematized the notion of representation as not being purely 
a simple connection between subject and object. 
Cummins (1989:2-61 believes that the above notions of 
representation are interrelated, and in order to contextualize 
the concept he refers to to its components: (i) Mind-stuff 
inFORMed: A theory in perception holds that the immaterial mind 
becomes inFORMed by the same FORMS that inFORM the thing 
perceived. There appears to be two basically different kinds of 
stuff: mental stuff and physical stuff. (ii) Images: Here the 
favourite theory of Berkeley and Hume is that mental 
representations are images. At a simplistic level this is 
nothing other than the "picture" theory. (iii) Syrngols: If 
mental representations are symbols, then the former cannot be 
founded on similarity because symbols do not resemble the things 
they represent. The advantage of symbols, however, is that they 
can be the inputs and outputs of computations. Putting these two 
things together gives us a quick account of the possibility of 
thought and abstractions. Symbols do not resemble numbers but 
they can be readily manipulated. (iv) Neurophysiological states: 
The point here is that mental representations cannot be 
identified at any level more abstract than actual 
neurophysiology. Mental representation, in this regard, is 
essentially a biological phenomenon. 
Given the multiple strands that interconnect the reading subject 
and his representions Cummins (1989:9-10) identifies four 
problems related to representations: similarity, covariance, 
adaptational role, and functional role - acts which the reading 
subject acquiesces into almost unconsciously when "making 
meaning" of the text. 
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2.4.1.1.1 Similarity. The idea that representation emanates 
from similarity is what drives the idea that mental 
representations are inFORMed mind stuff, or images. 
If we think of any object we need something to go 
proxy for those objects in thought. One cannot 
literally turn over objects in one's mind; all one can 
do is turn over ideas. Readers are therefore assumed 
to have encountered objects in the world to have 
ideas about them. On this basis they construct "new" 
or their "own" ideas through coveriance. 
2.4.1.1.2 Covariance: The idea that representation derives from 
covariance or causation is naturally motivated by 
reflecting on vision research. We may, for example 
observe that a certain characteristic activity in the 
structure covaries with the presence of moving objects 
in eg. a frog's field of vision. It seems, as a 
result, natural to suppose that what causes that 
structure a motion detector is just the fact that it 
fires when there is motion in the frog's field of 
vision. If one is attracted to covariance theories 
one is not going to think much of the idea that 
representations are images, because the similarities 
images promise to deliver are going to be irrelevant. 
Representation is therefore an ongoing process of 
reflection based on vison. 
2.4.1.1.3 Adaptational role. The idea that representation is 
rooted in adaptational role is most easily understood 
as a reaction to certain problems facing covariance 
theories. The bee dance, for example, represents the 
location of flowers to spectator bees, but it does not 
covary with the location of flowers any better than it 
covaries with lots of things it does not represent eg. 
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the absence of an insecticide cloud in the indicated 
direction. Millikan (1984) argues that we take 
"flowers over there" to be the content of the dance, 
even if flowers are not "over there". The view that 
representation is essentially an act of adapting what 
we "see" to make new meaning, is probably the most 
plausible. 
2.4.1.1.4 Functional or computational role. This is just 
functionalism applied to mental representations. 
Functionalism says that a mental state is what it is 
in virtue of its functional role. It is functional 
roles that individuate mental states. But mental 
representations are, by definition, individuated by 
their contents. Therefore content must depend on 
functional role. 
The representational mode of referring to an object or state of 
events is, according to Foucault, "individuated by their 
contents". This may be problematic in that the reader normally 
seeks to establish similarity (of the known world) , covariance 
(causal explanations), adaptation (fitting things into what is 
familiar) and function (being lucid and in control of the reading 
act) . Readers would therefore be compelled by "the facts" or 
what they see - and under the authority of the reading subject, 
establishes epistemological legitimacy. Cummins' arguments remain 
fairly "technicist" and as a result places great emphasis on the 
controllable, predictable and masterable disposition of the 
reading act. The reading subject remains the centre-stage brain 
box responsible for virtually all dynamics of what could happen 
between text and reader - paying scant explicit attention (even 
if implied) to the social, cultural and other contexts, or even 
other intuitive and emotionally explicit elements. 
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2.4.1.2 BOBROW'S COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION 
Bobrow (1975) on the other hand proposes perhaps another a 
framework where representations are viewed as being the result 
of a selective mapping of aspects of the world - an approach 
which he sees as systemic and procedural in order to promote 
understandability and communicability in the reading act. 
Central to Bobrow's specific understanding of representation is 
the notion of INFERENCE. Not all of the facts in any knowledge 
state need be kept explicitly in a scheme of representation. 
If partial knowledge is available in the system, he argues, then 
some set of explicit facts may have implications, that is, 
determine further facts which satisfy the constraints represented 
in the particular knowledge state. Inference is the process, 
according to Bobrow, of deriving implicit facts from the initial 
set of explicit formulas according to some fixed rules of 
inference without interaction with the outside world. These 
"fixed rules" are exactly the problem the reading act faces, for 
literal reading suggests "using" language, generally-speaking, 
in a tool-kit fashion even in inferences. The form of 
inferences available according Bobrow and the structure of the 
data to support these inferences are important design decisions 
for a system. Bobrow (1975:10) subsequently distinguishes four 
different forms of inference: 
2.4.1.2.1 Formal inference: covers the family of techniques used 
to predict calculus representational systems. 
2.4.1.2.2 Computational inferences: describes a process in which 
facts are derived through bounded known computation. 
2.4.1.2.3 Meta-inference: covers techniques by which knowledge 
about structure and content of the data base is used 
to derive further facts consistent with the original 
set. 
69 
2.4.1.2.4 Preferred inferences: these are often what give a 
representation much of its power especially in 
idiosyncratic reading. 
In this theory of representation of Bobrow's, greater leeway 
seems to be afforded to the "expandable" and creative dimension 
of the reading act by allowing greater space for the 
uncontrollable, unpredictable and perhaps unmasterable potential 
of the reading act. His elaboration on the range of inference 
principles in representation assists us in escaping the otherwise 
more "technicist" approach of Cummins. Bobrow's cognitive 
approach to representation proves sophisticated but still however 
operates very much within definite knowledge transactions based 
on an objective perception to structure a subsequent body of 
knowledge. The centre-stage reading subject, endowed with the 
cognitive abilities to think, still makes sense, via inferences 
and therefore control meaning. In a way this view resembles the 
Kantian subject who "synthesizes" (Bobrow's "inferences") 
meaning. It seems as though the subject can "smooth over" and 
explain his object (the text) in a self-assured and authoritative 
manner. The divide between subject and object is still clearly 
patent, the latter being given meaning, even through the process 
of inferring of a sovereign subject. 
2.4.1.3 MAUND'S NEO-CLASSICAL VIEW. 
Maund's theory on presentation can, finally, be postualted as 
another kind of attempt at "sophisticating" the attempts of how 
meaning gets constructed between subject and object. He believes 
that he is one up on his "classical" predecessors. Since the 
"classical" representation theory of perception (i.e. the literal 
correspondence between the subject's interpretation of the 
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object) has not proven to be very popular, according to Maund 
(1993), he proposes the "nee-classical theory" and wishes to 
defend it in that form. The nee-classical theory according to 
Maund entails that conscious perception generally involves an 
awareness of sensory states (images, items, contents, etc.) by 
the subject and which in turn have two sets of (expanded) 
features (Maund, 1993:52): 
(i) They have representational properties, i.e. they represent, 
and 
(ii) They have non-representational features. 
virtue of having the latter features 
It is not by 
that the sets 
represent, but they do not represent because these features 
resemble features of physical objects, for some of the 
features used to represent do not resemble. 
Maund defends his views against those who object to 
Representationalism (especially Smith & Jones, 1986; Dennett, 
1969 and Searle, 1983). Their criticism is essentially (i) that 
the theory requires sensory states that lack objective 
significance; (ii) that the explanation proposed by the theory 
are either circular or lead to an infinite regress, and (iii) 
that the theory requires a notion of "resemblance" that is 
incoherent. It is exactly the notion of "incoherence", call it 
uncontrollable or unmasterable, that the reading act may bring 
about if such reading is taken beyond its rule-guided tendency. 
Maund quite rightly finds these objections untenable in that 
Representationa-lism is not committed to them and, while there 
is some role for resemblance to play, in reading this role is 
quite legitimate. The objection is that it does not rest on the 
conflation of different senses of resemblance. 
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Representation and its impact on meaning in the context of the 
reading act seems to have a sharper focus in view of the 
problematic of a subjectivity which "holds" or "locates" the 
ideas which are represented. Yet again the reading subject 
shapes, defines and controls the meaning (in the process of 
representation) of the text in very much the same way as Maund's 
"improved" view of representation. 
The reading subject in Cummins' and Bobrow's representationalism 
rules from an "outside position" (Scholes, 1989) - a relationship 
of referring to the object. In this view we still regard the 
reader as the knower who controls and verifies the reading 
11 content" before him according to his intentions and conventions. 
Hardly does it occur to the proponents of representational 
theories that an object may hold and direct the gaze, vision and 
intention of subjects. The prevalent notion of the dichotomy of 
subject and object seems to be the biggest stumbling block in our 
understanding of meaning construction. The "split" or divide 
between subject and object has necessitated the use of the term 
representation in the reading act. The question is whether we 
in fact do need to depend on this concept or better, do we need 
representation at all! The modernists and post-modernists, as 
we will notice, have sought to overcome this dilemma. Virilio 
(1993:6) points out how mediatization (i.e. the media/press, as 
object) has stripped the subject of his or her immediate rights 
and sense of purpose, for "whenever a people can be mediatized, 
they are!" In this study however we would need to examine the 
"split status" of subject and object in order to do justice to, 
and as a result, problematize the key concept of representation 
which has claimed a foothole in the reading act. 
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2"5" THE SUBJECT-OBJECT SPLIT AND THE READING ACT 
The problem that has been highlighted in terms of subjectivity 
and representation still clearly revolves around the split which 
exists between the subject and the object. We have noticed that 
Descartes and Kant tend to explain subjectivity in terms of 
representation - in their separated state. Even the respective 
views of Cummins, Bobrow and Maund constitute representation as 
a process which has been generated by a subject. Our concern is 
the entrenched framework in which limited meanings are 
constructed and, as a result, are regarded as justified and as 
valid meanings - only because the autonomous subject has played 
the "rules" game in constructing meaning. It is a seemingly 
simple process which is driven by a master-mind subject, imputing 
from the outside (of the text) meaning into a text - based on 
"judgements" that prejudice the variety of meanings that could 
be possible in the reading act. It is clear however that in 
reality life is unpredictable and chaotic, so that we cannot 
pretend or assume that our description and interpretation of 
events can be a smooth and easy process. Words which seek "to 
capture" and "interpret" events and people, similarly, will 
experience difficulty in representing and constructing meaning 
adequately. Words may possibly also be in conflict with each 
other in seeking to establish coherence and consistency of 
meaning - if that is our pursuit. 
In the problematic of subjectivity and representation, and their 
relation, the "war of words" (Botha, 1992) or the "hysterical" 
nature of reading (Barthes, 1986), essentially hinges on two very 
definite and tricky realities, i.e. the fickle behaviour of the 
reader and the elusive text. The reader and the text 
traditionally characterize a radical distinction between subject 
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and object - a problematic dualism which has come to reside at 
the very root of Western thinking as fundamental and prior to any 
other (Palmer, 19 9 2 : 1) . Since the subject has come to be 
regarded as the habitual inaugural point of language and meaning 
construction, Kristeva suggests that "· .. any theory of meaning 
must necessarily be a theory of the subject" (Oliver, 1993: 91). 
It moreover seems that the inverse is true as well, i.e. the 
theory of the subject has become of necessity entrenched with the 
theory of representation. The essential anthropological concern 
is that without any confrontation between subject and object the 
subject will lack identity and placement in the world. 
Similarly, 
identified 
our epistemological 
(represented) and 
concern is 
according 
how the object is 
to which specific 
conceptions or guidelines of the interpretation the object will 
be determined. This almost enclosure of subject and object in 
the dualism mode postulates a conception of meaning-construction 
which has generated and maintained a distinct distance between 
interpretation of the subject vis-a-vis the object, between 
theory and practice, yielding the classic binary polarization. 
This is what Latour (1991) warns us of in his anthropology of 
science - how we should be rethinking the separation of the human 
and nonhuman, the subject and the object. While the interaction 
of subject and object constitutes an anthropological question and 
an epistemological question, it may also inevitably pose an 
ethical question - important questions for this study, which 
needs more clarification. 
2.5.1 THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUESTION 
The human subject clearly dominates the meaning-giving process. 
Our understanding of "human nature" or "mankind" is usually 
approached from many different vantage points and as a result 
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raises a wide variety of issues. When we speak of "subjectivity" 
or the effects of subjectivity, we continue to link it with the 
human element. In this study we do not specifically wish to 
postulate an interpretation as to what human nature is, i.e. we 
do not intend advocating whether a particular view of the 
structure or substance of human nature is the correct one. Our 
guiding question in our problematization rather is at what point 
do we refer to or invoke the "subject" as corresponding to human 
nature in the reading act. This view broadly refers to a 
philosophical anthropology without necessarily dealing with 
narrow analytical questions. Landman (1966), for example, 
conceives of a philosophical anthropology which comprises of (i) 
man and God (religious anthropology: the creation, theocentrism, 
anthropocentrism, the doctrine of guilt and grace, etc.), (ii) 
man and mind (rational anthropology: the apotheosis of reason, 
the dethronement of reason, creative reason, etc.), {iii) man and 
animal {biological anthropology: Darwinism, naturalism, etc.), 
(iv) man and culture (cultural anthropology: man as creator and 
product of culture; social; historical values, etc.). 
Beyond the views of philosophical anthropology there also seems 
to remain a psychological approach - at least psychological in 
the scientific sense (Jordaan, 1980:135), but everyone familiar 
with the difficulty and complex discipline of psychology will 
realize that the science of psychology cannot necessarily, in its 
present stage of development, furnish us with ultimate truths 
about human nature and conduct. In this regard the psychologist, 
11 deals with phenomena that are often 
thought of as complex, incomprehensible, 
unpredictable and uncontrollable - people, 
things and events. He believes that 
reality is not capricious and that it is his 
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challenging task to simplify this reality by 
observing and inferring, through scientific 
procedures so that reality becomes to 
some extent more comprehensible, predic-
table, controllable" (Jordaan, 1980: 137). 
In fact Toulmin (1990: 114) claims that there can be no science 
of psychology: 
"Human thought, consciousness, and 
experience follow a more or less rational or 
logical course: they are not trapped into 
regularities, so there is nothing in them 
for "scientists" to study. About human 
thoughts and actions, the questions to ask 
are never of the form, " How do they 
[casually] happen?", but rather, "How well 
or badly are they [rationally] performed?". 
It is so that the reason for invoking the notion of human nature 
through the subject is to make that which is incomprehensible, 
unpredictable and uncontrollable become comprehensible, 
predictable and controllable. It means having to deal with these 
afore-mentioned issues when constraints are placed upon the 
subject when reading. Moreover, if we speak of the universality 
of human nature, we understand that when the concept "subject" 
is invoked (eg. in the reading act) it is asserted that what is 
attributed to human nature is usually true for all humans. 
It seems that the most universal conception of man is that he is 
uniquely rational and therefore self-conscious - a view which 
appears to be the most commonly held interpretation of human 
nature in Western culture. According to Hegel (1975:50) the 
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"fundamental character of human nature" is man• s ability to 
think. Therefore, to say that man alone can think is almost to 
regard man as being uniquely free. Agacinski (1991:9) argues 
that the " claim of subjective consciousness consists in 
believing that, essentially it can question itself and answer for 
itself". Therefore, if humans are held to be rational, self-
conscious beings, then this means that they are also responsible 
for their actions. This also applies to their acts of meaning 
construction as problematized in the reading act. 
The Hegelian notion of a "thinking man 11 which is behind all of 
what we regard as humanity, is echoed in Hannah Arendt's notion 
of people. It is usually people who create meaningful 
experiences and who make sense of themselves and others. This 
sense of plurality in personal awareness according to Arendt, is 
the condition of general human behaviour because while we are all 
the same, that is, human, nobody is ever the same as anyone else 
who ever lived or will live. Hannah Arendt (1958: 9) as a result 
does not seek to equate the human condition of people with that 
which we call "human nature 11 : 
11 The human condition comprehends more than 
the conditions under which life has been 
given to man. Men are conditioned beings 
because everything they come in contact with 
turns immediately into a condition of their 
existence. The world in which the vi ta 
activa spends itself consists of things 
produced by human activities; but the things 
that owe their existence to men nevertheless 
constantly condition their human makers 11 • 
As subjects we have come to usurp the dominant role to design and 
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control our objects. But if we wish to develop a profound 
understanding of the reading act, we have to realize (according 
to Hannah Arendt) the way in which we can also be conditioned by 
those very things we have created and have come to "master" on 
our terms. This is the very crux of this study, viz. whether the 
subject has sole propriety over meaning construction or whether 
we as subjects would not perhaps also become aware of the 
conditioning effects of things around us, including the text we 
read. 
This would mean that the subject's environment or the world of 
people and objects conditions or influences how and what subjects 
feel, think and produce. In his anthropology of science, Latour 
(1991), urges us to rethink our problematic distinctions, between 
ourselves and our world, between nature and society, between 
human and thing. We have become bent on not to " . . . mix up 
knowledge, interest, justice and power ... not mix up heaven and 
earth, the global stage and the local scene, the human and the 
nonhuman" (Latour, 1991: 3) . This state of alienation and 
separation, as pointed out, is at best limiting and partial, and 
at worst, false and deceptive about the way life really is. The 
production of ideas and views, i.e. the construction of knowledge 
in terms of the subject's existence proves reciprocal rather than 
being inalienably dualistic: 
"The impact of the world's reality upon 
human existence is felt and received as a 
conditioning force. The objectivity of the 
world - its object - or thing - character -
and the human condition supplement each 
other, because human existence is 
conditioned existence, it would be 
impossible without things, and things would 
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be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-
world, if they were not the conditioners of 
human existence" (Arendt, 1958:9). 
Michel Serres, in his Philosophy of Science, questions how a 
discourse can derive its power from the legitimacy it claims for 
itself. The subject, according to him, cannot claim absolute 
domination, for it would be nothing more than a rationalization 
of personal power. Serres (in Harari, 1979:48) speaks of the 
fallacy of separating events or issues on the basis of power and 
control - as science, from the beginning, was bent on mastery and 
accuracy. Social and historical events may also influence how 
science had developed - a view which is easily ignored. Latour 
proposes the word "collective" to describe the reciprocal 
association of humans and nonhumans (things etc.) and it is not 
reducible to the one or the other. Latour (1991: 139) argues for 
"· .. the nonseparability of quasi-
objects, quasi-subjects. Every 
concept, every institution, every 
practice that interferes with the 
continuous deployment of 
collectives and their 
experimentation with hybrids will 
be deemed dangerous, harmful - we 
may as well say it - immoral." 
Similarly, in the reading act, in terms of the reciprocal and 
conditioning view of subjects (which would be impossible without 
things) and objects (the conditioners of human existence), there 
develops an unavoidable situation which would hold clear 
epistemological consequences in our attempts at meaning 
construction in the reading act. 
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2.5.2 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION. 
Our essential dilemma with the epistemological consequences of 
the subject-object split is that of representation, i.e. the 
feasibility and adequacy of subjective ideas referring to 
objects. More specifically, is any test of judgement and truth 
conceivable which does not appeal to human experience, and 
especially to human thinking? Badiou (1991:25) problematizes 
this position: "To conceptualize the subject outside of any 
object position makes no sense except from the point of view of 
a doctrine of truth that has so completely recast as to go beyond 
the critique of correspondence theories of truth". This has been 
the age-old problem: what is truth? What are the criteria for 
truth and can we speak about truth at all? Badiou believes there 
can be a notion of "truth" if we do not blindly embrace the 
tenets of any form of representationalism. If we have to live 
within the precarious borders of our subjectivity, and therefore 
live in the precarious borders of human society, it will mean, 
according to Kristeva, that we will have to live with the 
precarious borders of "truth" (Oliver, 1993: 13). It is in this 
context that Nietzsche calls for the radical revaluation of 
"truth" when he exclaims., "··· es gibt keine ewigen Tatsachen 
so es keine absoluten Wahrheiten gibt" (Nietzsche, 1979: I, 448). 
Since there are no eternal truths, everything is permitted - this 
is the challenge for our concerns about representational ism, i.e. 
to question the narrow confines in terms of which we view the 
subject and object, and their interaction. 
It has become common practice that if the subject had reached a 
coherent account of objects, he feels often justified in saying 
that he now knows the truth about them, i.e. he has knowledge of 
that object in his grasp. If one claims that knowledge 
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production is an act of one's mind, it could very well be, that 
which one knows, is other than one's knowledge of it. 
Part of the crisis of the act of representation is the 
problematic binary of subject-object or mind-matter in the 
reading act which raises the question of what criteria we have 
attributed to "truth" in order to know and, as a result, 
understand the "content" of the text. Moreover, the universe is 
so large and the "knowing subject" so small that it seems strange 
that the latter should know reality as it is. This 
epistemological idealism " ... arises from the radical ontological 
distinction which entails that thought cannot "reach out" and 
grasp being" (Palmer, 1992:2). 
"Reaching out" between thought and being, according to Palmer, 
raises a crucial criterion of truth in terms of the notion of 
correspondence. In examining the latter, we may argue that our 
ideas cannot be compared with other objects, for whenever we know 
real objects, it is always by means of our ideas. Subjectivism 
becomes the decisive operative practice where naming and 
knowledge-production is executed from the point of view of the 
sovereign subject (Badiou, 1991: 27). The human desire for 
identity i.e. acknowledging the centrality of "subjectivity", 
(i.e. that I am the reader) almost always becomes the departing 
point for epistemic certainty. 
The subject thus becomes that knowing entity which uses names in 
the tool-kit sense of using language to make hypotheses about 
truth. The problem here is that if one's idea and the objects 
which one knows are incapable of being directly compared, how 
does one know that there is any reality beyond one's immediate 
ideas. Similarly, if there were a real universe, how can one 
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know anything about it at all? (Ayer, 1971; Taylor, 1982). 
Consequently, what starts with Descartes as a form of doubt, is 
the inverse of reasonably establishing the scope and foundations 
of knowledge and meaning. This implies that to claim that 
experience is a guarantee for certainty, is 11 to suggest that 
knowledge is a necessary feature of existence because of the 
nature of language and not because claims of knowledge correspond 
with objects existing independently of language" (Palmer, 1992: 
3) . The use of the word object would apply to anything and 
everything that can be known, wherever spatio-temporally situated 
and whatever its nature. This being the case, we come to realize 
the problem that correspondence in the act of repre.sentation 
cannot be the criterion of truth because the idea cannot always 
be compared directly with the reality that is its object. 
Epistemic dualism thus suggests a split where knowledge consists 
of idea and object, neither of which is identified with or can 
be reduced to the other. Moreover, the object appears not to be 
identical with the idea of it or that the idea refers to or knows 
it. The problem with this dualism is that it is not always a 
solution to the problem of knowledge; it is only a statement of 
the problem; for on the one hand we have thought and on the other 
an object. Between them remains a great gulf which remains the 
dilemma of subjectivity and representation. 
Russell, in The Problems of Philosophy (1912) raises the notion 
of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. 
Acquaintance with an object, he suggests, is knowledge we have 
when the object is immediately present to and before the mind, 
while knowledge about the object or knowledge by description 
constitutes what arises from inferences, reasoning and 
explanation. Thus, acquaintance for the subject is direct or 
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immediate or intuitive knowledge, while description is indirect 
or mediate or inferential. To what extent are acquaintance and 
description dependent on each other for meaning-construction in 
the reading act? 
In the reading act the issue of knowledge by acquaintance appears 
to be the more difficult. It raises the question of whether 
knowledge by acquaintance presupposes that the idea and object 
are one. It only suggests that the reading subject's personal 
experience of seeing is one that is directly given and not 
necessarily derived from reasoning. There may moreover be 
intuitive truths which are different from the psychological fact 
of one's perception. Moreover, how do we deal with the case of 
personal self-consciousness? In any act of self-experience there 
aren't normally two realities. Whereas self-experience in the 
reading act is clearly inevitable, self-knowledge remains a 
difficult exercise for the latter remains dualistic. Thus, 
living within what Kristeva believes to be "precarious borders" 
of our subjectivity, our notions of "truth" (especially in the 
light of Nietzsche's exclamation that everything is permitted) 
clearly would entail ethical implications for ourselves as well 
as human society, for ultimately any epistemic concerns regarding 
human nature do impact on social concerns regarding their ethical 
status. 
2.5.3 THE ETHICAL QUESTION. 
The ethical dimension of reading is not an essential focus of 
this study, but it remains nevertheless an important dimension 
of problematizing subjectivity and representation in the reading 
act, for reading ultimately has ethical implications, both in how 
and what is being read as knowledge construction. A great deal 
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has been said on the problems of the subject. If reading becomes 
an operation of "refiguration, situating itself at the 
intersection of two "worlds", those of the text and the reader" 
(Ricoeur in Greisch, 1991: 67), our concern remains what the 
consequences of the subject's representation of the object 
entail. Miller (1987) :1) questions whether the reading act is not 
perhaps primarily a cognitive act, after which some ethical 
reading might or might not be made but argues eventually that 
"· .. there is a necessary ethical moment in that act of reading 
as such, a moment neither cognitive, nor political, nor scial, 
nor interpersonal, but properly and independently ethical". In 
other words, there is a peculiar and often unexpected relation 
between the affirmation of universal moral law, storytelling or 
whatever text is read. Miller (1987:2) argues: 
"Ethics and narration cannot be kept 
separate, though their relation is neither 
symmetrical nor harmonious." 
The issue is primarily what the reader's responsibility would be 
towards the text he "represents" in his thoughts and ultimately 
in his social behaviour. Levinas goes further and argues that 
the subject, when reading, confronts a labour of reading and also 
a labour of thinking, which is of capital importance for Levinas' 
conception of ethics in the experience of reading. It involves 
getting the "balance" of truth right insofar the subject-object 
engages in what Levinas calls a hypocritical act. Reading, 
according to Levinas, is hypocritical in that the encounter " ... 
with the voice of a determinate text awakens other voices, the 
fruit of previous readings" (see Greisch, 1991: 68). This 
suggests that the hypocrysy resides in the fact that the truth 
or meaning does not adhere in the text, as many suggest, but 
rather what the reader claims it to be: 
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" ... the instance of the letter and of the 
reading that has always already begun .. . 
making a plurality of contexts intervene ... " 
(Greisch, 1991: 67) 
Which voice (context) is or voices are the correct ones 
to"produce" a meaningful representation - a view that brings us 
back to Nietzsche's"··· everything is permitted". How are we 
generally-speaking to conceptualize our views of objects but more 
particularly how will we conceptualize the notion of 
subjectivity, for" ... the truth and meaning of language cannot 
be dissociated from the speaking subject" (Kristeva in Oliver, 
1993:91). It is claimed that mature and responsible readers are 
to evidence care, caution and accountability in terms of what 
meaning is or meanings are given to or derived from texts. The 
ethics of reading is concerned with the reader's 11 ••• response 
to something, responsible to it [text], responsive to it [text], 
respectful of it [text] . 11 (Miller, 1987:4). The "ethical" notion 
is decidedly, first and foremost, an anthropological notion, for 
what "ought to be" right or wrong is totally tied up with the 
condition of the human reading subject - once again entrenching 
the centrality of a human subjectivity "bestowing" meaning in 
terms of universal laws upon an object. Even if the reading 
object fixed and determined the gaze or seeing of the reader, the 
latter may be tempted to manipulate it in the sense that it 
becomes congruent with social and other expectations - hence the 
"hypocritical" nature of reading, as suggested by Levinas, i.e. 
a reading is necessarily an "operation of refiguration" (Greisch, 
1991:67). This act of refiguration is an attempt to destabilize 
the absolute claims of literal reading, i.e. looking beyond the 
schism of subject and object which has impacted on the beleagured 
issues of ethics in meaning construction. The impact of our 
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meaning constructions has serious consequences for social 
interaction at every level, for this determines the quality of 
what it means to be human among other people in our society. 
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2.6. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
It is clear from our afore-mentioned exposition of the 
hamshackled condition of the reading act that we will have to 
address the problematic of the subject-object schism, where the 
dominant subject usually assumes the ability and responsibility 
to extract meaning from (or even bestow meaning upon) a perceived 
and allegedly passive object. As a result, we are compelled to 
question this form of seeing and construction of meaning in the 
context of how we envisage the role of language. Burnett (1995:8) 
states the dilemma quite well: 
"Vision, the cultural approach to seeing and 
thinking, privileges the objects of sight, 
as if they will provide some clear answers 
to the dilemmas of viewing and 
understanding, as if the questions, indeed 
possible contradictions of autonomy, need 
not be addressed." 
It has been evidenced that by using language, vis-a-vis the 
subject-object problematic, in a narrow instrumental ("tool-kit" 
to decipher meaning) manner, we are decidedly likely to 
perpetuate the limiting view of the production of literal meaning 
in the form of Cartesian logical representationalism. As also 
illustrated earlier, it may even continue the entrenched practice 
of operating in the Kantian mode of a self-conscious subject who 
is more often likely, given our personal and social conventions 
and intentions, to manipulate the reading object. 
In this study our challenge is clearly to seek ways to question 
the practice of an exclusive subject who uses the text as some 
87 
blueprint or recipe to construct meaning - a position which is 
perhaps nothing less than a naive and often simplistic reading 
of a text. There would moreover seem to be the critical need to 
examine why we have come to grossly underestimate (or perhaps 
overestimate) the status and abilities of the reading subject on 
the one hand and the object on the other. What is clear, in the 
final analysis, is that we cannot simply use texts as complete, 
final, usable or even replicable objects manipulated by 
sovereign subjects (see De Beer, 1992; 1993; Iser, 1978). 
What clearly affects the reading act at a very fundamental level 
is what we can assume to be the vibrancy and energy with which 
language in society has been endowed. Ormiston and Schrift 
(1990:4) speaks of the inevitable "circulation" and 
"proliferation" of meanings which ensue as a result of the 
subject and object encounter in the reading act. If we are to 
question our level of how we perceive this vibrant encounter, it 
could possibly suggest a different dynamic than the perceived 
passive status of the "awaiting object". Untying the "knot of 
discourses" (De Bolla, 1989: 322) that constitute the problematic 
of the reading act, may compel the reader to challenge" ... the 
level at which the "literary object" is perceived" (Harari, 1979: 
39) . 
Since it seems that generally-speaking no mistrust interrupts the 
direct or literal impact of words on the reader in the case of 
simple, reproductive or literal reading, this easy mode of 
reading holds the inevitable promise of abuse, distortion, 
exploitation as has often been the case of ideological/political 
abuse, religious zeal, financial and administrative 
mismanagement. Such negative practices in the act of 
representation certainly do not necessarily imply that readers 
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of these documents are ignorant, less intelligent or down-right 
gullible. (Johnson, 1990; Spivak, 1987). But, in a sense, all 
ideologies can be related to pandering to oversimplified readings 
- and hence limited and incomplete readings. 
It has been demonstrated that any form of oversimplification of 
a reading potentially results in experiences of catastrophe in 
that it could lead to some form of distortion and of course 
abuse, in whatever area of operation of documentation use. 
History evidences clear cases where, for example, ideological 
manipulation of socio-political situations have resulted not only 
in misunderstanding and exploitation but also anarchy. 
Moreover, imagine a newspaper heading reading: 6 000 TEACHERS TO 
LOSE THEIR JOBS IN THE WESTERN CAPE. How would the average 
teacher (or any reader) perceive this message and how would he 
unmask the supposedly "uncontrollable" elements that characterize 
the unwritten or unseen message. If we argue with our usual 
confidence and bravado that no text is really as "uncontrollable" 
as it appears, we clearly need to question the social 
construction of reading or any news-gathering process to 
understand the role subjective "control" plays in the act f 
representation. It can generally be argued that the social 
construction of meaning does not occur in a political or social 
vacuum but is the working and product of various constellations 
of power and socio-political interests (Mumby, 1993:6-7). It is 
inevitable that interests are held by subjects and in their 
assumed "divine" conventions and manipulation of language they 
structure texts (objects) which will of their own accord later 
influence or reinforce positions and views held by readers. Is 
the headline of 6 000 teachers losing their jobs, for example, 
to be read by all teachers, of all backgrounds or persuasions in 
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the same way? What socio-political and ethical role do 
newspapers, for example, play to create and reinforce a 
particular view of education in South Africa? Does the power of 
"control" in this reading operate in the textual representation 
of content or in the gaps, omissions, limitations, or in all of 
these? This is the multi-faceted dilemma of the reading act and 
eventual meaning and knowledge construction. 
Our challenge in this study is the realization that language or 
discourse hold fundamental implications for the notions of 
"truth" and "validity" and could, as a result, problematize the 
tendency of reproductive or literal reading's insistence on an 
objective, scientific or even neutral reading of a text. While 
Crosman (1980: 164) argues that " ... meaning is made precisely 
as we want it to be made", Foucault actually wishes to further 
problematize this view for" ... it is not a certain power with 
which certain people are endowed; it is the name one gives to a 
complex strategic situation in a given society" (see Harari, 
1979:42). The Foucaultian argument clearly calls into question 
the centrality of the power of the author, of meaning in literal 
or reproductive reading particularly, and the functioning of this 
power-ful notion in its relation to reading discourse. ·What 
Foucault challenges is that textual objects do not simplistically 
mirror a social reality but rather that the author of a text 
represents a ce:ttain function/dimension of power by which certain 
discourses in a given context are made explicit. 
In the arena of representation the problem facing the reading 
subject therefdre is to engage a reading act which hopefully 
seeks to critically unmask or deconstruct his own identity and 
' 
role in terms df which his reading may seek to limit, exclude, 
i 
choose, impede, free, compose, decompose and recompose a textual 
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object (Foucault, 1972:216). 
The value of problematizing the literal act of reading in this 
unmasking and emancipatory fashion (i.e. the movement of 
discourse) would unsettle and eventually dismantle the notion of 
mastery and control of texts which generate fixed messages. How 
would students for example, challenge a supposedly respectable 
political science journal which proclaims: THE WEST SEEKS PEACE 
TALKS WITH TERRORIST MOVEMENT? In communicating ideological 
conceptualizations such as "West", "peace", "terrorist", and so 
forth, the question arises whose notions are these and how these 
discourses have been constructed, for what and whose benefit? 
To get to understand the complex strategic situation (according 
to Foucault) which operates in meaning construction, would 
require of us to challenge the tendency to gloss over the 
application of language especially in how we construct meaning 
with regard to our notions of subject and object. The 
preponderance of any single one (be it subject or object) would 
compound the already beleagured pathology of meaning-distortion 
and human relationship-distortion as experienced in our day and 
age. 
A community of readers has no option but to challenge the seminal 
view but nevertheless the sense of dogmatism of the Cartesian or 
Kantian approaches to meaning construction and, as a result, re-
examine the potential distorted communication which of ten 
hallmarks the falsification of taken-for-granted justifications 
which ensure entrenched interests (see De Beer, 1993 (1) :91). 
This challenge presupposes essentially an all-encompassing 
willingness by all readers to disengage ourselves from taken-for-
granted and partial views of subjectivity and representation and 
distance ourselves from our traditional attachment to or 
I 
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association with the separated status of reader and text. Whilst 
bearing in mind that the working concepts of "reader 
subjectivity" and "textual representation" are by no means 
rendered obsolete, our pursuit in this study remains unequivocal, 
i.e. to re-think them differently and hopefully reconceptualize 
them in more expansive ways that would eventually enhance the 
quality of meaning-construction (including of ourselves as. 
people) and the quality of human interactions in ever changing 
contexts. 
In our attempts at rethinking and reconceptualizing our 
understandings of the notions of subjectivity and representation, 
this study wishes to shift the limiting boundaries in terms of 
which the subject has come to deploy representational modes of 
referring to objects and claiming or implying that the meanings 
constructed in this way could possibly pass as true and 
legitimate knowledge. As mentioned earlier, with regard to the 
notions of subjectivity and representation, these are concepts 
which since Descartes, Kant and others, have gone through a 
process of development, becoming increasingly flexible and 
expansive concepts which seek to address the critical stumbling 
block in this study, viz. the schism between subject and object. 
Our rethinking of this dilemma also tends to pursue a 
"developmental" stance, if you wish, in Chapter 3 - starting with 
the critical Nietzschean disposition of healthy scepticism in 
order to start anew in our re-evaluation of notions like 
representation and subjectivity, and ensure that we arrive at a 
more balanced, expanded and integrated basis for the construction 
of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SHIFTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE READING ACT: THE PIONEERS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Shifting perspective and looking with new eyes at practices which 
we have often taken for granted either does not go off well with 
many people, or requires, metaphorically-speaking, a jolt in the 
direction which would precipitate a radical break from the old. 
If we assume, as we do in this study, that the reading subject 
uses language to represent meaning from what he perceives, we 
might also at the same time, have particular critical assumptions 
about the nature and ability of the subject, language and the 
object (textual or otherwise) . Whatever the detail of the 
assumptions, Chapter 2 problematized the usual smoothness and 
simplicity with which we have come to grasp language; its 
inevitable meaning-giving implications, but moreover how the 
human subject has assumed the status of the divine life-giving 
agent of language and its ensuing meaning-giving dynamics. This 
dilemma, as has been largely argued, almost posits a view that 
no ambiguity, obscurity or imprecision might intervene between 
subject and object . If any did it could be ascribed to a 
careless reader who did not decode properly or a careless author 
who did not encode his thoughts properly - hence the imprecision, 
ambiguity or obscurity. Without rendering the concepts of 
language, subjectivity and presentation obsolete, we do however 
have the opportunity in this study to re-orientate our 
assumptions about them, as well as their interactions, in order 
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to posit another, perhaps broader and more integrated approach 
as to how we construct meaning. 
Nietzsche, strategically, is perhaps the ideal starting-point, 
for standing on the threshold of the twentieth century, he 
inaugurates a substantially different, and therefore seminal way 
of rethinking subjectivity and representation, and upon whose 
shoulders a great many significant subsequent 
theorists/philosophers as selected for discussion in this study, 
stand. 
Our purpose is to critically draw on Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and Ricoeur to address the crisis whether 
we have to represent things for meaning at all, and whether the 
contract between object and subject in which the latter has 
ingratiated itself in an almost sovereign position, is tenable 
at all. Our ultimate intention has been to elucidate the 
hitherto limited and partial constructions of meanings (Margolis 
1987; Margolis, 1988) that had ensued as a result of the role 
language had come to play in the "dangerous, harmful and immoral" 
(Latour, 1991:139) separation of subject and object. Following 
Nietzsche's critical and suspicious jolt of unsettling 
traditionally held views of language, subjectivity and 
representation, this study advances to rethink our dilemma by 
revisiting the "new" views of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer 
and Ricoeur as representative theorists/philosophers who 
pioneered new pathways of thinking and of conceiving the meaning 
construction process in a far more critical and expansive manner. 
3.2 
3.2.1 
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NIETZSCHE AS THE MASTER OF SUSPICION OF MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION. 
THE RADICAL CHALLENGE OF THE READING ACT. 
There seems to be general consensus that modern philosophy begins 
with Descartes's inward turn of the subject -.seeking certainty 
through doubt. Descartes, as a result, labels this self-certain 
subject res cogi tans, which he distinguishes from all else, 
described as res extensa. As the locus of certainty and truth, 
subjectivity is the first principle from which everything arises 
and to which everything returns. The sovereign subject relates 
only to what it constructs and therefore is unaffected by 
anything other than itself. Absolute knowledge is actualized in 
the full self-consciousness of the subject. 
The radical rethinking of the reading act in terms of the views 
we have come to hold of subjectivity and representation seems to 
find a definite foothold in Nietzsche's thinking of "philosophiz-
ing with the hammer". Standing on the threshold of the twentieth 
century, the master of suspicion of the entire world order and 
the way we as readers have come to describe it, Nietzsche takes 
up the battle axe and contemptuously sets out to radically 
critique everything with the 11 hammer 11 • 
be helpful in this thesis since he 
His thinking proves to 
wants to destroy all 
knowledge, including that of the subject, object and language as 
notions which have deceptively come to gain legitimacy based on 
those spurious and illusory assumptions we hold of them. These 
concepts have all slipped, into our perceptions and knowledge-
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base as having absolute stability and eternal truth. It is for 
this reason that Nietzsche (III: 424) exclaims that everything 
is false and everything, as a result, is deemed permissible. 
"Alles ist falsch! Alles ist erlaubt!" 
The implications of "freedom" of "Alles ist erlaubt" is 
Nietzsche's critical point of departure to propose a critical re-
evaluation of all notions (which would ultimately include in the 
reading act), i.e a re-evaluation of the "truths" of what we have 
come to believe about the subject, its thinking and the 
interpretation of the world. In short, the truth is a sum of 
human relations. To re-evaluate the reading act, for our 
purposes, in terms of Nietzsche, we need to look at his proposed 
metaphysical "revolution" in terms of his notion of the "will to 
power" and its ultimate effects on subjectivity and 
representation in the reading act. 
3.2.2 THE NOTION OF "THE WILL TO POWER". 
Since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, absolute truth cannot 
adequately be proved or refuted in any rational or discursive 
way, which leads Nietzsche consequently to demonstrate that in 
meaning construction the intellect constructs its own world, 
transcends it and ultimately destroys it. Nietzsche critically 
disengages himself from the traditional metaphysical and 
epistemological concepts such as matter and form, knower and 
known, and truth and falsity. These concepts ultimately hold 
significant implications for our rethinking of literal, 
representational reading. Our conception of truth and its 
formulation in intelligible language, according to Nietzsche, 
rests upon illusory and shaky foundations (Nietzsche, III: 539). 
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To grasp Nietzsche's "new" understanding of subjectivity and 
language as representation we need to grasp his view of reality 
as captured in his notion of the will to power (Wille zur Macht) . 
According to Nietzsche's metaphysics, there is nothing else 
besides the will to power and all essences, senses or 
interpretations, including those of ourselves as readers and the 
world, will ultimately depend on nothing else but the will to 
power (Nietzsche, III: 917). The very nature and composition of 
the notions "will" and "power" present a sense of plurality and 
complexity. Nietzsche views the "will" as a form of reality 
which wields immense quantities of energy and power. Since the 
will to power is characterized by what he regards as the dynamic 
process of continuous unfolding and differentiation, it would 
seem to differ from those metaphysical views of a complete, 
homogeneous and unified substance (including the subject and 
object), as evidenced in the Cartesian sense. Nietzsche 
therefore believes that the am~unt of power which constitutes the 
driving force of power quanta is activated by the intensity of 
opposition (Gegenstande und Widerstande) that is experienced 
(Nietzsche, III: 778). For our purposes, this view places the act 
of meaning construction under pressure to reconsider its emphasis 
of regarding reading as a simple act of extracting information 
from a text. 
What we experience is that the notions of subject and object, as 
opposites (Gegenst&nde) are, in their "opposition", in fact a 
positive stance which may assist readers in bringing new and 
creative dimensions to the construction of meaning. In fact, 
according to Nietzsche, their apparent "opposition" or 
"separation" is paradoxically also an equally false state of how 
97 
we have come to view things and the world around us. What we 
regard as an absolute view of a sovereign subject looking upon 
an object in front of us, in the act of meaning construction, is 
nothing but a "bad habit" which is based on the consequence of 
the artificial nature of logicality. Nietzsche is thus 
suspicious of the smooth causality pattern between objects and 
words, and therefore words and meaning. There are only 
differences of degree but no absolute opposites; and these 
differences are dependent on the amount of power that is 
mobilized - a form of metaphysics which radicalizes meaning 
construction: 
"Es gibt keine Gegensatze: nur von denen der 
Logik her haben wir den Begrif f des 
Gegensatzes - und von da aus falschlich in 
die Dinge iibertragen" (Nietzsche, III: 541) . 
What determines, according to Nietzsche, the differences of 
degree in the problematic divide between subject and object, is 
only the dynamic working of the will to power. The effects of 
the dynamism of the will to power may cause an increase 
(Steigerung) or decrease (Verminderung) of the will to power, 
arranging themselves ultimately into constellations of power. 
This is the essence of Nietzschean meaning construction and the 
implication is that, since there is no complete state of being 
of the subject in the construction of meaning but only a constant 
sense of becoming (Werden), the "essence" of power resides 
precisely in their performance (Wirkung) . We may infer that in 
the reading act, there is no stable essence of a thing as 
content, for according to Nietzsche, there are no longer objects 
or subjects as we have come to know them, but only 
"interpretations" thereof. This radical shift in thinking 
implies that a being or a thing essentially does not have one 
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specific form but could potentially have several. Nietzsche 
rejects the limiting Kantian Ding an Sich, for thinghood or even 
subjectivity is purely a matter of "projecting one's 
interpretation into something", i.e. hineininterpretieren 
(Nietzsche, III: 424). In the reading act the act of "seeing" 
or perception of an object, including the perception of the 
reading subject of himself as the designer and master of things, 
would therefore, according to Nietzsche, be nothing more than the 
constant working (Wirkung) of power quantities. Meaning 
construction is therefore not a once-off-interpretation of 
textual words. Meaning construction is therefore also not a 
controllable activity over which we assume the reader holds sway. 
In contrast to the mechanistic view of subject and object in the 
Cartesian sense, Nietzsche's Dionysiacally-conceived view of 
"chaos" in everyday life, and therefore we assume in the reading 
act, embodies a multiplicity of vigorous impulses which are 
constantly attuned to the increase of power. We can conclude 
that even the reader's perceptions of things or textual content 
would be attuned to the ebb and flow of power. This 
"multiplicity nature" of conceiving of the world and its subjects 
marks the break with Descartes and Kant ' s "correspondence" 
between subject and object, in which the subject imposes 
stability, order and ultimately meaning on the object. In 
contrast to the reading subject putting "labels" and meaning on 
an object, Nietzsche is helpful by positing a new way of thinking 
of the reciprocal relationship of power struggles. In terms of 
the dynamic invigorating impulses, subject and object constantly 
assert themselves to overcome each other's resistance and, as a 
result, gain ever more power. In the act of meaning 
construction, this process of becoming (Werden) creatively marks 
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an infinite process which defies stability of their being as well 
as the stability of their being named and labelled through 
language a view is valuable and which radicalizes the 
epistemology in the reading act we wish to explore. 
3.2.3 
"Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins 
auf zupragen - das ist der hochste Wille zur 
Macht" (Nietzsche, III: 895). 
THE DYNAMISM OF POWER AND OF TRUTH. 
In rethinking the act of reading, we draw on Nietzsche's manifest 
suspicion of any form or substance supports his argument of not 
relying on any 11 stable 11 world-order based on any logicality in 
the Cartesian sense. This new view leads Nietzsche to rethink 
all values in that he approaches the notion of "truth" of reading 
content (in our case), very much in the same way as the will to 
power. The objective world, in terms of the increase or decrease 
of the will to power, is in a constant state of flux - nothing, 
not even the reader's views of the truth of things and events, 
remain stable and definite. If in the reading act events and 
meanings do seem to appear stable and fixed to us it is only as 
a result of the "coarseness" of our senses to simplify and make 
life easy for our own convenience (Nietzsche, III: 555). What 
subjects perceive in making meaning can be assumed, according to 
Nietzsche, to be nothing more than perspectives: "Es gibt nur 
perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches "Erkennen"" 
(there is only perspectival seeing and perspectival knowing) 
(Nietzsche, II: 861). The implications of this view marks the 
significant break with the past where the reading act is seen as 
an objectified act that had taken place in which I, the reading 
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subject, gives a specific meaning a text. Even the reader's 
conceptualizations of subject and object would therefore reflect 
nothing more than a biased (or one-sided) attempt to impose a 
sense of "order" as we see it in the reading act. 
For Nietzsche the only "stability" or "permanence" is constant 
change. The criterion for truth in the act of meaning 
construction lies therefore in the increase of power. A literary 
object, for example, or some event imparts the "truth" if it 
increases my will to power and contrarily, an object or event is 
deemed false when it decreases my will to power. We may construe 
this view as a "subjective" criterion of truth, but Nietzsche 
argues that, something might be true or false, depending on the 
perspective from which the judgement is executed. This form of 
"perspectivism" changes the problematic view of correspondence 
between object or word and meaning. 
Nietzsche has been clearly influenced by the rise and development 
of science of his day which would give impetus to his concerns 
with the dynamism which is the driving force behind his 
challenging thinking. He argues that his "new" conception of 
truth has nothing to do with the logical or representational 
content of a proposition. In fact, we can deduce that readers 
as subjects have no "organ" (kein Organ) for knowing the truth. 
While this is the case in meaning construction it does not imply 
that readers would have arbitrary notions of truths, for the 
"truth" represents nothing but layers of interpretations. The 
intellect is also impounded by this notion of multiple 
perspectives - a view which challenges the view of Descartes and 
Kant. (Nietzsche, III: 539). 
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3.2.4 THE FALLACY OF LANGUAGE IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
Nietzsche's challenge to rethink the notions of subject and 
object is closely linked to his view of language - a concept 
which has to be understood in the same way as his view of truth. 
Like Pascal, Nietzsche argues that there are questions which one 
cannot answer merely in terms of one's intellect but rather with 
one's entire being. This implies looking at the reading act 
beyond the logical representational mode. Despite the fact that 
Nietzsche may himself have been a first class stylist in terms 
of the use of language, he argues that language as a means of 
expression, ultimately remains impotent and, at the best of 
times, proves inadequate to express that which we actually wish 
to say. Behind every Apollonian form and symbol resides another 
abstraction, for behind every opinion expressed hides another 
opinion and every word effectively masks another word (Nietzsche, 
VIII: 268). We can assume thus that in meaning construction 
subjects therefore cannot plead for a sense of authority, i.e. 
they cannot posit a stable representation of an author's 
intention. Compared to music, language for Nietzsche embodies 
a defective device, precisely because language has come to be 
linked to the rational thought of a "fictional" notion of the 
subject. Nietzsche's view of language is pivotal in this study, 
for it cannot be separated from his view of subjectivity, for in 
terms of the limited view of language we created a limited view 
of subjectivity. 
If logic, according to Nietzsche, is merely a fiction which is 
based upon the assumption of "identity" to which nothing in 
reality corresponds, the notion of a reading subject consequently 
too proves nothing else but fiction. The "ego" or the reading 
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subject, we can assume, does not exist at all: "It is a fable, 
a fiction, a play on words" (Nietzsche, II: 899). The notion of 
a sovereign "subject" seems only to embody an interpretation that 
the ego seeks to pass on as a form of substance, as the cause of 
all action, as a doer. The actions of thinking, perceiving, 
knowing, willing, etc. are normally attributed to "the doer" -
the latter of which remains a fallacy and an invention for 
Nietzsche. (see Schlacht, 1993: 40). We deduce thus that in 
terms of Nietzsche's perspectivism he would challenge the notion 
of a sovereign subject who assumes the ability and responsibility 
to name, describe, infer and construct meaning. 
If the notion of the subject is only a fiction, so is the object 
too. We can infer that since we as readers have created ourselves 
as subjects we have also invented the reality of things and 
projected them into the medley of our subjective sensations. 
Nietzsche's challenge is helpful in that we get rid of all forms 
of "thing-ontology" and develop a different way of thinking about 
the world and therefore a different way of meaning construction. 
The subject and his world embodies mere fragments and decadence 
(Nietzsche, II: 393), and therefore we infer that in the reading 
act our conscious experiences are selective and are therefore a 
matter of self-willed and subjective choices. Consequently our 
interpretations would be deemed as nothing more than erroneous. 
We can assume that the subject according to Nietzsche has come 
to believe in I an intellect whose procedures are essentially 
I 
illusory since I they operate in terms of a vacuous tool, i.e. 
language, seeks to construct fictitious subjects 
(Nietzsche, II: 959): 
"Das Vernunftige Denk en ist ein 
Interpretieren nach einen Schema, welches 
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wir nicht abwerfen kOnnen" (Nietzsche, III: 
862) . 
This pattern of interpretation or meaning construction in terms 
of language, implies how we as readers and our entire human 
existence have become entangled in seemingly indispensable 
patterns and schemas created by the intellect. The notions 
therefore of body-mind, subject-object, as binary concepts 
constituted by the conscious subject, are also convenient (albeit 
fallacious) schemas created by the intellect in trying to 
construct meaning in an intelligible way. It is precisely by 
challenging ttis sense of intelligibility and stability in terms 
of a precon eived world order that Nietzsche proposes an 
alternative view, to destroy all neatly-packaged thinking, 
including ourselves as divine meaning-givers. 
If the implication is that the subject constantly changes his 
identity and defies all sense of stability (in terms of 
Nietzsche's universal "will to power"), subjective thought 
changes and remains irreducible to any single object, event or 
experience in the act of meaning construction. According to 
Nietzsche (III: 311) everything is not only one, two or three 
dimensional, but rather multidimensional. In terms of this 
multiplicity, as opposed to correspondence, we ought to become 
suspicious, including of the subject-object status that the 
reading act pivots on. Since the use of language sets the 
subject up as the knower of the known (the object), readers would 
need to radically doubt these very truthful metaphysical and 
epistemological "fallacies" constructed in terms of the text. 
Therefore, our only stance is to radically reconceptualize these 
fallacies and regard every view, opinion or reading as only being 
tentative. The reading subject and the textual object would 
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continually appear differently so that no particular perspective 
can ever be considered final and complete. In this way the 
reading act would challenge the pursuit of absolute validity and 
truthfulness which constrains the variety and expansiveness of 
meaning that gets constructed. 
3.2.5 NIETZSCHE'S ALL-EMBRACING PERSPECTIVISM IN MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION. 
Nietzche's views are helpful so that we will seriously rethink 
the notion of referential and literal reading, executed by the 
master subject. He ushers in the power of suspicion which would 
help interrogate the spurious and fictitious use of language by 
readers. This f ictionalism is to be destroyed by his very 
suspicion of all metaphysics and epistemology. This stance also 
paves the way to what Nietzsche regards as a form of all-
embracing perspectivism and ultimately the notion of multi-
subjectivity. This marks Nietzsche's break from "a form" of 
meaning construction where the subject would believe to have 
control and confidence in what he sees as being objective and 
therefore an accurate reading of the text. Nietzsche challenges 
this one-way representation of subject to object. In the reading 
act we cannot assume to have one final notion of the subject, for 
it changes with every "seeing" of an object. We can deduce that 
this is the working or effect (Wirkung) of the turbulent will to 
power of Nietzsche's perspectivism, which in our case, will break 
the grip of referentiality and correspondence in meaning 
construction. 
Despite the fact that Nietzsche breaks with the Cartesian-Kantian 
traditi~n, he postulates a hypothetical subject who, we believe 
I 
105 
in the reading process, will still fulfil the decisive roles of 
perceiver, experiencer and judge. However, this notion of the 
subject would be compelled to creatively deal with the demands 
of constantly shifting perspectives of the object and the variety 
of ensuing knowledge which, unlike the literal reading of the 
object (i.e. text), is constantly being challenged, destroyed and 
resurrected. Since Nietzsche raises the value of critical 
awareness and radical doubt, he forces us to restart from the 
premise that there is no sense in anything ("Alles hat keinen 
Sinn"). The implication is, in the construction of meaning the 
force of necessity (Notwendigkeit) in every reading encounter 
would rema~n unique, including the notion of the reading subject, 
in order t be reconstituted every time, many times. It is 
obvious, we still encounter with Nietzsche a subject or what he 
would like s to believe to be a multiple subject, who operates 
separately from the object. Although he acknowledges the 
reciprocal roles of the conceptual subject and object, he 
nevertheless seems to neglect the object as a meaningful 
component of the reading act. Important however, is the 
implication of Nietzsche's critical stance of approaching every 
word, every sentence with suspicion so that we consequently would 
not acquiesce into any practice of seeking completion and 
coherence of meaning, including a "stable 11 notion of reading 
subjectivity. The significance of Nietzsche's command to 
"philosophize with the hammer" initiates far reaching effects on 
many subsequent thinkers who have sought to challenge the 
problematic of a stable sovereign subject and object in the 
reading act and meaning construction. 
The implica1ions of Nietzsche's radical challenge for our 
concerns
1
reg1rding the reading act is to destroy the notion of 
a pre-packaged body of meaning which is to be unlocked by a 
manipulating reading subject in a referential way. The influence 
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of his sense of perspectivism clearly goes contrary to the 
literal approach of representation which always unfolds under the 
control and authority of a single, unitary reading subject to 
ensure the debilitating consequences that we have come to refer 
to as epistemological accuracy and legitimacy. In this way 
Nietzsche sets the scene regarding our concerns about the status 
of the reading act in this study, by assisting us to shift the 
boundaries by way of radical doubt and opening the process of 
meaning construction to allow for multiple perspectives of 
meaning and meaning-giving. In this way Nietzsche has "forced" 
us to problematize the relative smoothness and simplicity with 
which we have come to conceptualize language, including our 
notions of subject and object - a view which Heidegger, in his 
own way, expands and elaborates on. 
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3. HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDING OVER IN THE READING ACT 
3.3.1 THE HEIDEGGERIAN RESTART OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
The implications of Heidegger's rethinking of the nature of the 
subject and the object forms a dominant theme throughout his 
concern with the meaning of Being and with language as a speaking 
of the truth of Being. Heidegger undoubtedly stands on the 
shoulders of Nietzsche in that he too wishes to critically re-
start with the Abbau of all thinking (literally "deconstruction") 
in order to start anew. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger also 
critically rejects the Kantian dualism in which a phenomenon is 
contrasted with a mysterious "thing in itself" (see Macquarrie, 
1973: 11) . Heidegger challenges the notion of a subject that 
would normally perceive the objective world and in turn describe 
it in terms of what we would call "language". The inextricable 
connection between language and postulation of a subject, vis-a-
vis a perceived object, constitutes the core of Heidegger's 
understanding of phenomenology. Since reading, at least in its 
literal sense, has everything to do with seeing and therefore 
with perception, we rely on Heidegger's restart regarding the 
perceiving subject. 
In the reading act the notion of perception becomes crucial to 
this study since when the meaning of one subject is different, 
or worst still, incompatible with the meaning construction of 
another subject, arguments arise concerning the criteria of 
meaning and therefore the validity of the meaning construction. 
As the reading act is usually approached by a controlling subject 
from a particular angle, the phenomenological approach focuses 
on a description of that phenomenon as it presents itself to the 
reader's consciousness and moreover, wishes to clarify how 
meaning is given to or derives from it in the reading act. 
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3.3.2 THE THRUST OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE READING ACT 
In order to shift the boundaries in terms of looking at the 
phenomenological approach to reading, we realise that it does not 
evidence a unitary or monolithic movement and would as such elude 
complete description. (see Misiak & Sexton, 1973; Kochelmans, 
1967; Gras, 1973; Suleiman, 1980) . It would be helpful to 
understand that there are a variety of typically phenomenological 
issues or concerns rather than attempt to grapple with a 
definitive conceptualization of all areas of inquiry it impacts 
on. In order to understand the reading act, the focus of 
phenomenology seems to be on direct intuition, emphasizing 
primarily the efforts of the reading subject who establishes the 
textual object and its meaning as an object of consciousness 
within the context of a specific intention. Moreover, since 
phenomenology proves not to be monolithic, it spills over into 
other approaches precisely because its focus is on the nature of 
the subject that intends (means, imagines, conceptualizes, is 
conscious of) an object - a process which consequently unfolds 
in a given context of perception, intuition and ultimately 
meaning construction. How this process unfolds becomes 
Heidegger's focus in order to expand our own view of reading. 
In the respective views of existential phenomenologists such as 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the common thrust embodies a 
critical characterisation of the reading subject who is conceived 
as what is regarded as "being-in-the-world". Heidegger's Dasein, 
expresses the pre-reflective and reflective processes of 
consciousness whereby meaning comes to being. The subject, for 
Heidegger is therefore, not so much an entity but rather a 
process, in which it experiences its being-in-the-world through 
temporality which constantly seeks to interpret the emerging 
world while simultaneously creating its own identity (Heidegger: 
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1993:53). In our own understanding of the reading act, we observe 
that phenomenology presupposes that every moment of consciousness 
or intention presumes both a subject and an object, reciprocally 
constituting each other as an act and as structure (see: 
Kockelmans & Kisiel, 1970; Kockelmans, 1967; Gras, 1973). 
Phenomenology proves particularly useful for meaning construction 
in establishing what type of relationship exists between the 
objective reality outside of the human mind and the thought which 
we as subjects have of it. In this way readers are able to 
critically revisit the subject-object dichotomy that we have 
inherited particularly since Descartes. In the reading act the 
phenomenological method asserts that only phenomena can reveal 
to readers what and how objects essentially are, and any clarity 
or understanding of the reading experience must, as a 
consequence, begin with the phenomena of the subject's 
consciousness since they are the only givens accessible to 
readers. How the subject and the objective reality relate to 
each other in this type of "disclosure" finds peculiar 
expressions, as we will notice, in the respective 
phenomenological approaches pursued by Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty. 
Heidegger's critical phenomenological approach aims to search 
beyond the mathematical Cartesian subject which conforms to 
logical norms, determined in advance. Despite Kant's progress, 
Heidegger does not want to conform to the Kantian transcendental 
subject which, for the first time, becomes aware of objects as 
distinct from private impressions. Even Heidegger's predecessor 
and teacher, Husserl, conceives of a subject as a thinking "I", 
caught in the object-subject relationship which can only possibly 
be illuminated or activated in terms of consciousness i.e. 
intentionality. Heidegger realizes that Husserl arrived at a 
deceptively simple model of consciousness where every instance 
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of consciousness presumes both a subject and an object; i.e. we 
infer that the same textual object can exist in the consciousness 
of both author and reader - a consciousness which emerges during 
the reading act (Kochelmans, 1967: 31). It is in the light of 
his challenge of the notion of language and his critical 
rethinking of metaphysics that Heidegger (1993:160) develops a 
different or new way of thinking about the subject and the object 
and their implication for the act of meaning construction. 
3.3.3 UNITY OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
Beyond the "subject-centred" Cartesian-Kantian view, Heidegger 
(1993:230) in a critical way, pushes the question of how there 
can be a notion of truth if it is conceived of as the 
correspondence between our thoughts (or the content of our 
consciousness) and the outside objective world. Heidegger's 
approach contrasts sharply with that of Descartes 1 s of an 
external world which exists via representations, in that he 
argues that one cannot be in the world without knowing that 
world. In fact Heidegger (1993: 134) prefers to drop the notions 
of subject and subjectivity as much as object and objectivity, 
for such concepts, according to him, only emphasize and reinforce 
the dualism of subject and object and, of the problematic of what 
seems to be an unbridgeable gap between them. 
In our concerns of the reading act we can inf er that Heidegger 
departs from what he believes to be the unmediated acts of the 
subject, i.e. Dasein - i.e. being-in-the-world. In contrast to 
his predecessors this notion of being is for Heidegger prior to 
the notions of subject and object. In meaning construction 
Heidegger wants to re-engage the world (contrary to the Cartesian 
worldlessness) as an ontological property of Dasein: 
"The more the world is embraced, namely, the 
more penetratingly the conquered world is 
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exposed, i.e. the more objective the object 
appears by so much more is the world 
subjective" (Heidegger, 1950: 85-86). 
Heidegger's significance is to assist us to abolish our view of 
a subject who campaigns for legitimate meanings of the external 
world. The subjective side of the world is for Heidegger as much 
necessary for Dasein as the objective side of subjectivity. 
Taylor (1993) argues that the Heideggerian subject becomes 
therefore an "engaged agency" who confronts the world in the 
concrete world. More than constituting purely a sovereign 
"engaging agency", Heidegger advocates that the subject should 
be discovered in what he believes to be the deeper layers of 
reality than in mere substantiality, for ultimately the subject 
cannot be expressed merely in terms of what we regard as 
substantiality or subjectivity: 
11 Self and world belong together in a single 
entity Dasein. Self and world are not two things 
(they) are the basic determination of Dasein 
in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world" (Heidegger, 1982: 297). 
The implication therefore is that the subject cannot exist 
logically and ontologically only as a subject but also has the 
capacity to transcend towards the textual objects which is a 
process he refers to as a "passing over" to the world (Heidegger, 
1993: 145) . The Heideggerian concept of the world therefore 
passes completely over into the domain of Dasein. In what seems 
to be a tautological approach, Heidegger emphasizes that, 11 ••• 
the existing things that we call "human beings" are possible in 
their being only because there is (es gibt) a world" (quoted in 
Olafson, 1987:72). Whereas Nietzsche, in his radical Umwertung 
of the subject-object, still resides in the realm of a stark 
dichotomous state of struggling against each other to increase 
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their power, Heidegger, surpasses this and proposes a closing of 
the gap between subject and object. In the reading act this 
would mean, we assume, that there cannot any longer be a 
sovereign, master-mind reading subject who manipulates, controls 
and imposes meaning on an awaiting textual object. We can deduce 
that the subject engages the objective side of his subjectivity, 
as much as the textual object engages the subjective side of his 
objectivity. For the first time, we encounter in Heidegger a form 
of discourse in which the object seems to be as "alive" and 
responsive as the subject (Heidegger: 1950:86). 
Taylor (1993: 317) elucidates and argues that Heidegger's 
critical attempt to "ontologize all rational procedure" is to be 
found in his non-conformity between subject and object, which 
ultimately, effects transcendence. In the reading act, we assume 
that Heidegger would seek to avoid the pursuit of objectivity in 
the subject's subjective impressions and argues that subjects 
project their existence into the world in terms of the 
possibilities within the design or projection that they make of 
ourselves (Heidegger, 1993:329). 
3.3.4 EXISTENTIAL POSSIBILITY IN THE READING ACT 
Heidegger's radical departure from the Cartesian representationa-
lism continues in terms of the Husserlian notion of intentionali-
ty, viz. that Dasein can only be meaningful if it occurs as 
being-in-the-world. This idea of concrete situatedness with 
others (Heidegger, 1993: 53) facilitates our human understanding 
not only of others but also of ourselves. The early Heidegger 
forever still adheres closely to the Husserlian demand to "return 
to the things themselves" , which embodies a demand of us to 
relinquish all laissez-faire constructions or even accidental 
discoveries, for we ought to let our "seeing" be guided by that 
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which reveals itself immediately. The implications are that only 
in this way, are we as reading subjects, if we draw on 
Heidegger's view, able to penetrate the meaning and foundation 
of the phenomenon as gleened from the world. (Heidegger, 1993: 
29) . 
If Husserl insists, as Heidegger also does, that the phenomeno-
logical approach should discard all preconceived logical and 
epistemological constructions, their ultimate aims however prove 
different. For Husserl phenomenology still remains essentially 
a method, whereas Heidegger (1993: 53) has come to regard it as 
existential possibility. In a sense Heidegger proves to be very 
Platonic because he regards the phenomenological "seeing" as "to-
let-be-seen" which is the being of Dasein which is concealed or 
that which was once revealed but has slipped back into oblivion. 
The implications for reading is that Heidegger attempts to argue 
how meaning is "revealed" in a non-correspondence way between the 
subject and the world or, in our case, the textual object. 
The notion of possibilities (Heidegger, 1993:329) is crucial for 
the reading act. It is used in the context of the world as a 
Verweisungszusammenhang - a referential context. The latter does 
not represent mere logical possibilities, nor are they 
necessarily reducible to other causal possibilities, although 
they are closely related to the latter (Olaf son, 1987: 41) . 
Heidegger's notion of language, or more accurately, his view of 
speech and discourse, becomes relevant for meaning construction, 
for it is through the process of possibility that Dasein 
discloses itself. Whereas Nietzsche goes no further than to 
problematize language as an incompetent tool to construct 
meaning, Heidegger proves to be more rigorous in his approach. 
Language becomes the medium which facilitates the temporal 
unfolding of the being of Dasein in meaning construction. 
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Heidegger (1993:53) departs from the Platonic notion.of being 
(Sein) in which he regards the notion as being thoroughly 
temporal (zeitlich). It is within this relationship or medium 
of language that temporality holds the possibility of what 
Heidegger calls the "opening up" (entschlossen) of being. Sein 
and Zei t becomes an indissoluble couplet, for as subjects we live 
time and its only within this process that we can fully grasp 
Heidegger's claim that phenomenology is only possible in relation 
to ontology (Heidegger, 1993: 35). In Heidegger's words, language 
is the "house of being", language exists prior to being and it 
is therefore constitutive for Heidegger of the pre-reflective 
consciousness for all being which is to emerge(Heidegger, 
1993:60). We infer that in the reading act this pre-reflective 
consciousness Dasein (which is not a subject) and its capacity 
for communication, holds the promise of potential (Seinkonnen) . 
Meaning construction may occur beyond the concrete reality of 
Dasein where an entire realm of possibilities resides ("Hober als 
die Wirklichkeit steht die Moglichkeit") (Heidegger, 1993: 38). 
In contrast to a literal and stable reading of an objective text 
where meaning is rendered immediate, Heidegger's clarification 
of the subject-object would defer meaning construction from the 
immediate reality ( Wirklichkei t) to the possibility (Moglichkei t) 
which can be achieved in terms of a process Heidegger (1982: 314) 
calls disclosure or uncovery. Nietzsche saw this possibility as 
the working of power quanta which increase or decrease. Compared 
to the Cartesian logical conception of meaning where nothing 
mediates in the act of representation other than the processes 
of enumeration, intuition and deduction in a worldless context, 
Heidegger, beyond his predecessors, postulates a notion of 
ontological meaning which exists in language prior to the 
constitution of subjectivity and the objective world, the 
engagement with each other slowly "releasing" a disclosure or 
uncovering of the meaning of being human. In this way language 
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is prevented from being used to represent content and used as a 
"tool-kit" whenever needed. 
3.3.5 DASEIN AND DISCLOSURE/UNCOVERY IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
Heideggerian phenomenology is significant for our concerns of the 
reading act, since it pursues the essence of subjective and 
objective phenomena down to its ground in a way that is made 
evident in the "self-showing" of phenomena, a process Heidegger 
(1993: 37) conceives of as hermeneutics. We can infer that his 
phenomenological ontology aims to return to the original entities 
of the reading subject's experiences and, as a result, clarify 
these data by delineating the constitutive structures of its 
make-up. Such perceived entities, Heidegger argues, are always 
prior to our human logical and epistemological theories about 
them. By unlocking the essences of these perceived entities 
Heidegger believes we are able to postulate a comprehensive 
"reading" of such phenomena. Like in the case of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger (1993: 38) conceives of numerous possibilities which 
make up the construction of meaning, precisely because we can 
infer that reading is no longer a process where the authoritative 
reader extracts meaning from the text. Moreover, to achieve 
this disclosure in reading, Heidegger is helpful since he does 
not want to linger in the Husserlian realm of consciousness 
(intentionality), but pushes back to what he regards as a pre-
cognitive awareness through which the, in our case, subject, 
already understands itself as being fundamentally limited to its 
world (vorbegriffliches Seinsverstandnis) (Heidegger, 1993: 197). 
Heidegger's significance resides in the fact that, unlike 
Descartes, Kant and even Nietzsche, he enters a territory of 
consciousness which none of them ever dreamt of. Language is 
opened up into which it is possible that the subject takes an 
ontological position as he engages with the world (Heidegger, 1993: 
53) . 
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For the subject to perceive something as an entity, according to 
Heidegger, would in fact mean to grasp it as actually existing 
(in contrast with what does not exist). As a result, what readers 
are capable of doing as Dasein is to transcend such entities 
toward their being as entities and therefore toward the world. 
Every act of what Heidegger calls "disclosure" or opening up 
(Erschlossenheit) of being transcendental is in essence - an act 
which Bourdieu (1988:60) sees as nothing more than Heidegger's 
reinterpretation of Kantianism. This view seems not valid since 
Kant never problematized language as Heidegger did, for it is 
only through language, in this world that the subject constructs 
meaning, according to Heidegger. 
The presence of entities moreover is always provided with a con-
text of possibility and choice which determines the disclosure 
but also that which defines the practical meaning of the state 
of the world that will ensue (Heidegger, 1993: 329). The choice 
that comes with the dynamics of possibility, seems to express 
the non-static presence of entities that can be un-covered. For 
Heidegger it is a matrix of possibilities generated by Dasein ab 
initio. In this sense Dasein is expressed by the historicity of 
human existence, rather than by a particular theme or event 
(Heidegger, 1993:53). We can infer that this view of Heidegger 
destroys the assumption of meaning construction as being a 
package of pre-ordained meanings which the subject unpacks. 
Rather, language becomes the "breeding ground" in which numerous 
possible meanings are encountered as subject and object 
reciprocally reveal themselves to each other. 
In the act of uncovering of possibilities Heidegger moreover 
ushers in the concept diaphanes (i.e.transparent), not in the 
sense of a medium of transmission, but in the sense of "laying 
out" (Auslegung) - i.e. representing an interpretive act which 
is regarded by Heidegger (1993: 153) as an ontological modality. 
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We conclude thus that instead, of an authoritative subject, 
subjects himself in the reading act in order to postulate a sense 
of identity and meaning, it will require that this will also 
require an object objecting its presence in the construction of 
meaning as well. Subjects will therefore be truly human in and 
through the world of things. This act of becoming human in the 
reading act would not suggest an easy acquiescence into the realm 
of things but is rather dependent on the variety of choices that 
possibility holds, which at the same time, becomes revealed or 
disclosed. We rely on the possibility of disclosure which is a 
result of Heidegger's departure from the polarization of subject 
and object - a position which is facilitated within the all-
encompassing medium of language. Nietzsche was still trapped in 
this polarization of subject and object and was not able to close 
the gap between them. Heidegger (1993: 60) however problematizes 
language as a "pre-consciousness" for which we believe the 
subject and the text are to become one. In this Heideggerian 
sense, language is not deployed as a tool to create subjects and 
objects, for language pre-exists these notions already. The 
implication is that language rather represents the "womb" which 
supports an embryonic reading eco-system for meaning to emerge. 
Within this creative embryonic condition subjects-with-their-
objects partake in a process which we borrow from Heidegger as 
"laying-out". 
3.3.6 LAYING-OUT AS MEANING-CONSTRUCTION 
Heidegger's thinking assists us to circumvent the simplistic view 
of reading which relies on the decodif ication and literal process 
between subject and object. The "laying-out" process assists us 
in a dimension of reading which none of Heidegger's predecessors 
could entertain. Heidegger's view of "laying-out" (Auslegung), 
as an act of meaning construction resides within his broader 
ontology which is centred around the question of the meaning of 
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being, constituted in a "space" where both truth and falsity 
become possible. (Heidegger, 1982: 314). This view of truth-
falsity is close to Nietzsche's - which depended on the increase 
or decrease of power quanta of the subject-object exchange. 
Heidegger however no longer entertains the gap between subject 
and object as Nietzsche did. 
Like with Nietzsche, the Heideggerian concept of "truth" however 
does not apply to its usual application with regard to the truth 
of its "subject matter" (Sachangemessen) (Heidegger; 1982), but 
rather where the notions truth and falsity become possibilities 
in terms of which we can infer how readers define themselves in 
the world. If there were no Dasein, there would be no truth, and 
there would consequently be no falsity either. We can argue that 
in the reading act this does not suggest a mere relativist 
position. Heidegger only asserts that things are the way they are 
- they are uncovered. (Heidegger, 1982:314). As subjects we are 
therefore compelled to engage with our worlds, for if it was not 
the case, life would be "false", i.e. devoid of meaning. Laying-
out the uncovered, in the here-and-now, brings out a sense of 
being which is also a sense of meaning. 
The link between Dasein and truth is for Heidegger the same as 
the link between subject and object. Dasein of necessity, 
mediates the relationship between being and truth: 
"Being (not entities) is something which "there 
is 11 only insofar as truth is. And truth is 
insofar and so long as Dasein is. Being and truth 
"are" equiprimordially". (Heidegger, 1993: 230). 
For our understanding of the reading act the above view has to 
be placed in the context of Heidegger's treatment of language and 
discourse which lends itself to multiple ways of authentic or 
inauthentic modes of personal existence. The authenticity and 
inauthenticity of being is a critical contribution in Heidegger's 
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critique which contrasts starkly with the mechanical views of his 
predecessors. Rather than focussing on the almost crude 
representational or logical powers of words as in referential 
theories of reading, we can rely on Heidegger's rejection of the 
subject-object dualism means that all traces of asymmetry in the 
relationship between word and object would have to disappear. 
The result is that there is no sense in which the word stands for 
the object or for the entity it utters. Meaning construction 
within the reading act can only makes sense in terms of subjects 
and objects engaging authentically with each other. 
We thus go beyond the referential status of language, based on 
Heidegger who argues that language can only be possible when 
there is a disclosure or laying-out of the objective world, 
making language as discourse itself a modality of that disclosure 
of meaning (i.e. language as the house of being) (Heidegger, 
1993: 160). 
We also deduce that in the "disclosing" act of meaning 
construction the act of "making explicit" or "laying out" of 
being, occurs in a "non-referential way" in terms of what 
Heidegger calls "interpretation" which is a much more explicit 
or comprehensive notion than understanding. He believes that 
laying out is the process of understanding leading to 
interpretation, for the greater the measure of explicitness of 
being that is generated between subject and object (Dasein), the 
more the meaning of the text impacts on the "truth" or "validity" 
of the interpretation. Laying-out (Auslegung), according to 
Heidegger, is likely to assist the interpretive process not only 
in terms of understanding (Verstehen) but also in terms of 
feeling (Befindlichkeit) and discourse (Rede) - indispensible 
notions which Heidegger uses in his own peculiar way. Here 
Heidegger proves far more explicit and specific than Nietzsche 
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who only asserts that the subject makes meaning with his whole 
being. 
Firstly, understanding (Auslegung) for Heidegger (1993: 160) 
becomes an ontological quality or act of uncovering entities. 
In the reading act we conclude that the latter act presupposes 
a very clear articulation of the world, making "understanding" 
an implicit and tacit notion of interpretation. In fact 
understanding, for Heidegger, to use his own terms, "passes over" 
into interpretation, and since understanding becomes what he 
regards as reflexive, there is no single cut-off point between 
itself and interpretation. Understanding thus constantly 
projects itself towards what Heidegger sees as the possibilities 
of Dasein (Heidegger, 1993: 145-46). The progress made by 
Heidegger is that he ushers in the reflexive component, which we 
believe assists the reading act, which none of his predecessors 
have done. 
Secondly, feeling (Befindlichkeit) presents, for Heidegger, a 
concept which it seems he has not quite sufficiently worked out. 
He appears to be grappling with the notion of feeling which is 
not able to operate without understanding. (see Olafson,1987). 
While Heideggerian concepts must be conceived in ontological 
rather than epistemic terms, it does not suggest that Heidegger 
repudiates knowledge altogether. According to him (Heidegger, 
1982) the phenomenological tradition seems to appreciate the 
epistemic status of feelings more favourably. Heidegger's 
contribution to the rethinking of representation is that he 
wishes to abolish the notions of subject and object which exist 
in opposition. Therefore, since the subject, in his view, no 
longer has feelings about things or issues, the "subject's" 
feelings rather transcend over to the "object" in the world 
(Heidegger, 1982) . Rather than having 11 subjective 11 feelings 
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"about" things, Heidegger ontologizes such feelings in that 
Bef indlichkei t comes to be a process of an uncovering or 
disclosing the possibilities (which we believe) subjects are able 
to actualize in this world. (Heidegger, 1993: 134). We can thus 
conclude that while the feelings in the reading act is someone's 
feelings, these feelings are to be grasped in language rather 
than emotions as such. Language is the ontological dimension and 
therefore feelings take on an ontological quality. 
Thirdly, discourse (Rede), for Heidegger, constitutes the very 
inception, medium and fulfilment of interpretation. Discourse 
or language constitutes Dasein (Heidegger, 1993: 148) and, at the 
same time, expresses a form of understanding of the entities in 
the text that it uncovers. In Sein und Zeit, at least, discourse 
is regarded as a modality of laying-out in meaning construction 
and shows at every point that it is both presupposed and embedded 
in existence. This can thus imply that the subject is effectively 
barred from gaining quick and direct access to meaning in the 
text. Heidegger meticulously constructs the various dynamics of 
meaning construction in terms of language in which the subject 
gains meaning which becomes revealed. 
We can therefore safely infer that the bridging of the gap 
between subject and object in our concerns about the reading act, 
derives from Heidegger's engaged process of understanding, 
feeling and discourse (not necessarily in that order) in terms 
of which meaning becomes not merely a process of literal 
correspondence of words and meaning, but rather that it is 
repeatedly transcending over from subject to object, from object 
to subject - thus eliminating the false divide between them. 
Language fn its rule-guided nature, in the Cartesian sense, where 
the reade\r shapes the meaning of a text, has been abolished to 
a form of discourse which engages a whole process of "struggling" 
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laying-out between subject and object. 
Heidegger's later contribution to the notion of language is 
directed at a "showing" (Zeige) , i.e. bringing first what is 
present into its presence and even when unspoken or silent would 
nevertheless show the presence and therefore the meaning 
attributed by the subject-object couplet. Heidegger (1993) 
therefore achieves the unitary essence of the subject and the 
object all in a shared world (Mitsein). He emphasises that this 
unity already exists but needs to be brought forth or revealed. 
We conclude that the presumed non-dichotomous presence of the 
reading subject and text as object already exists (in language) 
prior to being so that what occurs in the reading act emerges as 
an activation or sensitizing on the part of the subject to listen 
to language which, if it becomes appropriated and becomes 
disclosed, will show itself. We also conclude that the direct 
exchange between subject and object has been interrupted in order 
that literal inferences of what truth and knowledge is, can be 
problematized. The latter is achieved in terms of relying on 
Heidegger's postulation of the notion of "passing-over". 
3.3.7 THE PASSING OVER OF THE READING ACT 
Heidegg r's radical contribution to our understanding of the 
reading act lay in his reconceptualized understanding of 
It is in terms of language which pre-exists, all forms 
that he reconceptualizes the traditional notions of 
subject 'vity and objectivity. Nietzsche has reconceptualized 
subject 'vity, but Heidegger problematizes objectivity without 
which h believes there cannot be any subjectivity. The "passing 
over" d amics between reading subject and textual object becomes 
a "circular" process of constant revealing or disclosure to 
produce meaning. The circularity is at least an improvement on 
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the one-way process between subject and object. (Heidegger, 
1993 :445). 
While it can be argued that this circular position may constitute 
an impasse, Heidegger sees this as his "ontological shift" in 
that this mode of understanding forms the most fundamental 
characteristic of the subject's being in the world. Heidegger's 
"hermeneutic turn" of transcendental phenomenology thus attempts 
to marry his critique of metaphysics and his critique of language 
where speech and being becomes the final congruence of expression 
and meaning (see especially Derrida, 1976: 160). Ingram (1984: 
64) recognizes in Heidegger a hermeneutic holism of subject and 
object, especially when the understanding of entities becomes our 
concerns in reading. In the reading act, the "meaning" of the 
text would be determined by situating it within a not-yet-
completed sequence of events in a coherent totality by way of an 
anticipatory completion of the narrative. Nietzsche's working 
of power quanta is still conceptualized in terms of the subject 
and object being separate. Heidegger, it seems, achieves 
"coherence" (not to say that conflict does not have to be 
resolved) of subject and object. Within this reconceptualized 
coherent.totalityJmeaning construction illuminates or renders 
understanding of the subject, bringing the past, the present and 
the future together (Heidegger, 1993: 53). It would therefore 
seem, especially in the light of the co-determinative nature of 
future, that projected possibilities which do not facilitate 
understanding will fail to establish the subject's self-identity. 
We can infer that Heidegger's merit lay in the temporality aspect 
of meaning construction. It is in terms of time that the meaning 
of who the slbject is and what the object is, becomes apparent 
{Heidegger, ~993:53-54). This is a great step forward in the 
construction of meaning, because none of his precedecessors 
envisaged possibility or potential as a temporal mode to make 
meaning. 
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The subject lives humanly according to Heidegger only by 
constantly projecting himself onwards, realizing new 
possibilities of being. In terms of passing over, the 
reciprocal reinterpretation of the world (in the text) and self 
(Auslegung)which transpires as a result of this critical 
disclosure, it is a process which is only possible in terms of 
his notion of historicity (Heidegger, 1993:33). We infer thus 
that instead of a sovereign, authoritative subject who acts as 
the supreme knower and interpreter, Heidegger elevates our 
understanding of meaning construction by his emphasis on 
projection, rather than extraction. This notion of projection 
is a co-operative form of being of object and subject over time, 
(deferred) through language. The pioneering aspect of the 
ontological act of reading is described by Rorty (1970: 317) as 
only being possible "within the parameters of a shared 
discourse". This "shared discourse" however does not appear to 
depend on anypody' s sharing (whether subject or object) but 
rather "letting understanding happen" in terms of how they have 
been antecedently taken by their Dasein in the world to happen. 
The implications of this in furthering our understanding of the 
reading act is letting language speak and not the reading subject 
or textual object in the first place. This pioneering notion of 
Heidegger will have major consequences for the construction of 
meaning as will be noticed for example with Derrida.The 
implications of Heidegger's concern was not in the first place 
to determine the subject's nature and intentions but clearly to 
problematize the notion of disclosure which pre-exists all 
meanings, including our concerns of the meaning of the reading 
subject. 
In meaning construction, Heidegger's view of subjectivity and 
representation ("non-representation")probably ultimately proves 
contrary to his initial faith in the primordial objectivity of 
perceived phenomena, for he too sees no way out of 
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the pervasive context of subjectivity, which constitutes as a 
result, its own ontological ground. It is clear that Heidegger 
nevertheless initiates a radically new perspective in that he 
decentres the Cartesian subject and the dominance of 
representationalism by emphasizing the "passing over" between 
subject and object in discourse. As a result he advanced more 
than all his predecessors in that he challenged Husserl's 
doctrine of an absolute subject as a metaphysical postulate by 
placing the subject with the object in a not-yet-completed circle 
of events in which already-established meaning becomes 
increasingly explicit. 
Despite the fact that the subject and the object passes over and 
shares with each other, there appears a fair measure of 
"stability" in Heidegger's reconceptualization of subjectivity 
and representation. This at least refutes the simplistic one-way 
representationalism from subject to object. In the act of 
meaning construction this sharing or "showing" between subject 
and object seems only possible in terms of Heidegger's pioneering 
notion of pan-linguistic ontology which, in a seminal way, is 
expressed in the "transcending attempts" that may become possible 
between the separate, albeit interactive subject and object. 
Heidegger's merit in this study resides in his attempts to get 
out of the cul-de-sac of referentiality in our concerns about 
reading by addressing not who or what gives meaning but rather 
how meaning is constructed. His critical attempts to get rid of 
subjectivity and objectivity, if not completely successful, is 
achieved by setting language up before anything and in terms of 
which meaning becomes revealed over time. Heidegger at least 
averted the unproblematic and quick attempts to extract meaning 
from a text in predictable ways and to be used as a recipe for 
replication for that which is, strictly-speaking, non-replicable. 
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3 . 4 . MERLEAU-PONTY'S IN-BETWEEN OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
3.4.1 THE CRITICAL RESTART OF THE READING ACT 
Merleau-Ponty (1966) presents what he believes to be a more 
concrete exposition than Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" and he 
wishes to move beyond what he regards as the explanatory impasses 
of idealism and empiricism. His version of phenomenology 
attempts to refocus our attention on an almost immediate and 
primitive contact with the world, and by doing so, attempts to 
reject the naive view of objectivity of a world-in-itself and 
the belief in some absolute subject who gives meaning. As a 
result of this Merleau-Ponty in his re-evaluation of the reading 
act seeks to negotiate what he calls an "ontology of situations" 
in which he seeks to overcome the perpetual problems of the 
Cartesian subject-object dualism in a different way than 
Heidegger. This version of anti-Cartesian and non-
intellectualist thinking he challenges in The Visible and the 
Invisible (1964) . Merleau-Ponty essentially argues, that 
Heidegger has failed to render an adequate description of what 
precisely is to be understood by the expression 11 being-in-the-
world11. He moreover argues that most of the problems which 
Heidegger had left untouched, could be solved at the level of 
perception, for it is at this level that meaning really 
originates (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 9). Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
perception is completely tied up with his view of the body (corps 
propre). 
3.4.2 THE STATUS OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S CORPS PROPRE 
Whereas Husserl emphasizes intentionality and Heidegger Dasein, 
Merleau-Ponty' s challenge for consciousness is the notion of 
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situation, i.e. being phenomenally situated in the world. He 
argues that the reader's primitive contact with the world is 
through the body (corps propre) - a body which is conceived 
beyond an empirically-discernible object. It rather constitutes 
a phenomenal body which situates the subject in the world. 
Merleau-Ponty (1964: 89) reflects on the consciousness of the 
body which for him signifies a "certain landscape". This 
landscape, however, does ·not represent a physical locality but 
rather a mode by means of which the phenomenal body perceives 
and, at the same time, is part of the world, for "I" have a " 
rigorous awareness of the bearing of my gestures or the 
spatiality of my body which allows me to maintain relationships 
with the world " (Merleau""1Ponty, 1964: 89). The body's 
"mediative" function, especial;Ly in terms of the extremes of 
idealism and materialism operates simultaneously as object and 
subject, i.e. as a physical being and as a mode of consciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty, like Nietzsche, therefore argues that we read with 
our whole being. 
For Merleau-Ponty, therefore, the subjective and objective 
aspects of the reading situatio~ cannot be isolated, since there 
cannot be purely subjective pherlomena because they all seem to be 
embodied or incarnate in the body- subject. In this regard 
Merleau-Ponty (1964: 319) also seems to equate incarnate with 
concretize. The reading subject and the world are both 
concretized in the present situation so that the subject is " 
identical with my presence in the world and to others, as I am 
now realizing it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 340) . My body, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, is thus nothing but that very situation insofar 
as it is realized and actualized in this world - an emphasis 
which Merleau-Ponty believes is very different from that of his 
predecessors. 
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Kockelmans (1970:274) underscores Merleau-Ponty's view that the 
subject is not pure consciousness which enables everything to 
unfold, but rather represents an experience of "struggle" in 
which Merleau-Ponty suspends the notions of consciousness or 
projections (in themselves or as objects). There are only "fields 
of intersection" via the body and wherein subjectivities are 
integrated (Merleau-Ponty, 1964 :227). These "fields of 
intersections" become the embryonic state of reading as discourse 
or as language is for Heidegger. Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
moreover sought to avoid the use of the concepts of subject, 
body, consciousness and cogito. However for the construction of 
meaning he seems to have to employ them to emphasize the "field 
character" of his notion of "subjectivities" which postulates 
nothing else than the possibilities of situations. This 
corresponds with Heidegger's "existential possibilities" in which 
Dasein discloses itself. These seem to be overlapping 
similarities between the two philosophers, but which ultimately 
prove differently. 
In the reading act the incarnated body-subject becomes the "field 
for being" in and with the world, which means that all existence 
or being constitutes a pre-reflective experience, brought about 
by the perceptual body-world relationship (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 
239) . As Heidegger posits the notion of Dasein as being tied to 
temporality, Merleau-Ponty similarly emphasizes the temporality 
of the body-subject which engages in a continual process of 
readjustment with others. In the reading act, instead of 
producing a definitive meaning, Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
consciousness posits not an "I think" but an "I am able" (Kwant, 
1993) . This view of "I am able", we will notice, holds the 
possibilities of producing multiple perspectives of multiple 
subjectivities, a notion which forms the foundation of Merleau-
Ponty' s variety of phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 83). 
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Different to Nietzsche, with Merleau-Ponty, for the first time we 
encounter the notion of "multi-subjectivity" a view which 
defies the solitary, sovereign subject initiated by Descartes, 
! 
lwhose thinking seems to go beyond himself "as a person". 
Merleau-Ponty, in contemplating the human subject, also goes 
beyond Heidegger's subject who clearly operates vis-a-vis a 
reciprocal object in a mode of "passing over". Merleau-Ponty's 
"thoroughly-human" reading subject, in terms of its "concreteness 
of body", suddenly seems to have within it also the capacity to 
be both subject and object - as we will notice. This is a 
different unity of subject and object in the case of Heidegger. 
This "multiplicity" stance of subjectivity holds numerous and 
exciting possibilities for our understanding the reading act - a 
stance which changes the notion of literal and often 
representational approach to reading. This new shift has very 
much to do with how Merleau-Ponty (1964: 227) conceives of reader 
as a body-subject, acting as a "field of intersection". 
3.4.3 THE BODY-SUBJECT AS PERCEIVING PERCEPTIBLE IN READING. 
For Merleau-Ponty consciousness is not necessarily present as an 
absolute transparent reality because at the level of perception 
the knowing subject expresses himself as a reality that exists 
between a true in-itself and a pure for-itself (Kockelmans & 
Kisiel, 1970). Merleau-Ponty seems to conceive of consciousness 
as an all encompassing or total project which includes time as 
well as the world which is to appear to people: 
"It is necessary that consciousness be a 
global project of time and the world 
which, in order to appear to itself, in order 
to become explicitly what it is implicitly, 
that is to say consciousness needs to develop 
itself into multiplicity" (Merleau-Ponty, 
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1966: 485). 
In terms of our rethinking of subject and object and, for the 
purpose of meaning construction, like Heidegger•·s subject, 
Merleau-Ponty (1964: 214) believes the body-subject as "field" 
can only express its full being in terms of the presence of the 
other. For Merleau-Ponty textual objects are only conceived as 
full correlates of subjectivity, since the textual object unifies 
the reading subject's perceptual capacities. Merleau-Ponty 
(1966:320) argues that " ... the thing is correlative to my body 
and in more general terms, to my existence, of which my body is 
merely the stablized structure. 11 
object structure (eg. the text in 
Since each experience of an 
front of the reader) is an 
articulation of subjectivity as a whole, it has a central place 
in the structures that constitute the reading subject. The body-
subject, as reader, is what Merleau-Ponty (1964: 30) calls a 
"perceptible", who discovers subjectivity in the "intertwining" 
of the different senses. Merleau-Ponty argues that the idea of 
accidental relationships and experiences in the reading act are 
nonsensical, since the experience of reading in reality is the 
result of the reading subject's full co-existence with that text 
at its "maximum articulation" (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 367). 
Within this "totality" of "maximum articulation" and inter-change 
of experiences, the objective reality ("flesh of the world" as 
Merleau-Ponty calls it), unites with the body-subject as 
perceivable perceptible. I as reading subject perceive a reality 
which perceives itself, for what I am interiorly is also out 
there in the world, and what is in the world is also in me: 
11 
••• the world is wholly inside me and I am 
wholly outside" (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 407-
408. 
In shifting the boundaries of our understanding we encounter here 
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with Merleau-Ponty a completely new view with regard to the 
reading act in terms of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty 
appears to close the gap between subject and object differently 
to Heidegger in that the object and subject become completely 
intertwined. The "inextricable" closing of the divide between 
the subject and the "object" in the reading act, surpasses the 
form of closing of the divide which is suggested by Heidegger. 
Heidegger, as we noticed, speaks of a "passing over" between 
subject and object, and the other way round, whereas Merleau-
Ponty merges them completely, which suggests that every reading 
subject already has the text within himself, as much as I, the 
reading subject, which "exists" within the textual object. 
However, this way of looking at Merleau-Ponty 1 s notions of 
subjectivity and objectivity, in a way, suggests a form of 
meaning construction which is far more integrated than a form 
which still attaches itself predominantly either to a subject, or 
predominantly to an object. 
Ultimately we all (object and subject) appear to communicate more 
intimately since we all constitute "perceiving perceptibles 11 -
the same "flesh of the world" makes us see and perceive (Merleau-
Ponty, 1966: 347). Since consciousness, according to Merleau-
Ponty, makes the world appear, there can be no in-itself outside 
of a perceiving consciousness. We can thus conclude that in the 
reading act, when I encounter the other within my field, I see 
him as one like myself because he is another potential focus of 
the same dimension, i.e. I see another potential perspective of 
my own which is in fact actualized by another - this is the 
radical, new perspective proposed by Merleau-Ponty. 
For Merleau-Ponty (1973: 4 o 7) the reading subject "acts" 
essentially as a field for what he calls "mutual compenetration" 
with the real world, for no matter how rigorously we penetrate 
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into the reading subject, we al ways find the world, the real 
world in it (We choose the world and the world chooses us") . 
This view is different to Heidegger's notion of "disclosure" of 
meaning in the "passing over" through language. Merleau-Ponty's 
view naturally gives rise to what Waldenfels (1981: 28) calls 
"perceptual circular determinations" in as much as Rorty (1970: 
317) refers to Heidegger's view as a "shared discourse". 
Waldenfels's (1981) conclusion may not be completely correct in 
the sense that Merleau-Ponty argues that we do not perceive 
others as object bodies, nor their actions as physical processes. 
What we do experience in the reading act is that others are 
available to us in the same way as we are aware of ourselves, as 
body-subjects. This means we as readers perceive the other as a 
source of situations and his gestures visibly present us with 
"intentions" (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 352) and structures whose 
subject-side and object-side are not necessarily readily present 
or expressed: 
"I point to a world around me which already 
speaks, just as I point my finger toward an 
object already in the visual field of others" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 6-7). 
We thus infer that the closing of the gap is not a solitary 
subject passing over to a solitary object in the act of meaning 
construction, but that both have a dimension of the other within 
themselves spawning the notion of a multiplicity of 
relationships. 
3.4.4 MULTIPLICITY OF RELATIONSHIPS IN THE READING ACT. 
It is clear that the progress that Merleau-Ponty (1964)has made 
is that both the subject-side and the object-side of the 
encounter of subject-object relationship in the reading act have 
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implications for understanding the text in a much more expansive 
sense. The way the notion of Merleau-Ponty' s subject is 
reconceptualized, suggests that texts (as objects) have a visible 
(readable) and invisible (unreadable) side. This new perspective 
on the idea of the "visible" and the "invisible" is clearly a 
major shift in our understanding of the reading act and of the 
construction of knowledge. The reader is able to read "more" and 
"differently" than sticking to a mere literal words and therefore 
a single reading of a text - a view which is made possible by the 
notion of reversibility (as we will shortly see), for to see is 
at one and the same time to feel oneself seen (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964:136) 
Since the visible in the reading act cannot be grasped without 
the invisible, in as much as the invisible cannot be grasped 
without the visible, the body-subject seems to have no existence 
without the recognition and affirmation of other body-subjects or 
objects. As readers we therefore encounter a multiplicity of 
relationships for which Merleau-Ponty (1964) uses the 
illustration of the "chiasm" metaphor (a figure of crossed lines) 
which illustrates not mere complicity of parties but ontological 
dependency, since the elements of the chiasm have their identity 
only within the unity of the reading act. Contrary to Spinoza's 
attempts to deduce from the unity of a being an infinite number 
of modes and essential attributes, Merleau-Ponty in a radical way 
initiates with a reading being that is outside itself and expands 
into multiplicity in its pursuit of unity. The idea of chiasm 
which Merleau-Ponty proposes is marked by a constant process of 
renewal between the subject and object in the act of meaning 
construction: 
II self-consciousness ... is founded upon 
a series of exchanges between subjectivity 
and situation in which the polarities of 
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means and ends, and question and answer, are 
continuously established and renewed" (Merleau-
Ponty, 1973: xxxii). 
Being, therefore, becomes conscious by unfolding itself into a 
multiplicity expression of presents (situations) which is 
essentially the coming to be of consciousness or "making visible" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 487). The act of "making visible" in the 
chiasm of the reading act moreover characterizes many subjects 
who share the same "landscape" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 89) in which 
the one does not exclude the other but rather multiply because it 
is in the opening up reading procedure by which, as body, I am 
exposed to the world in the text - a much more expansive view 
than that of Heidegger. 
The process of opening up in the reading act phenomenon is 
important to Merleau-Ponty's notion of subjectivity. Since the 
subject, according to Merleau-Ponty, can only partially perceive 
himself, the body-subject is not as visible to himself as are the 
other entities in the field. Therefore, in the reading act, by 
experiencing the other in a reading situation, I experience 
another perspective; thus in a disruptive way I perceive myself 
from the object-side. As reader I become more visible to myself 
in the reading act - an act which is perpetually delayed (Taylor, 
1987: 68). This delayed action for meaning (including meaning of 
self) hopes to prevent any quick access to truth and knowledge. 
The challenge of the notion of subject as embodied in the body-
subject field is thus pivotal to being. Merleau-Ponty advances 
further than Heidegger for, epistemologically there can be 
several subjects (because of several clearings in several 
situations) , for ontologically, Being clears or opens itself 
perspectively. Merleau-Ponty argues that within this clearing 
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field readers constitute a field of Being or a field of 
experience and "I am all that I see, an intersubj ecti ve 
field" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 227) . This new emphasis on the 
intersubjective replaces the opposition stance of subject-object 
which holds sway in the literal varieties of reading which marks 
a dominant reader giving meaning to the text in terms of the 
"sense" he makes of the words and sentences. 
We can thus deduce that the challenge of intersubjectivity, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, is inextricably coupled to the 
process of making-visible. The multiplicity of making-visible or 
clearings enlarges the reading subject's grasp of himself, 
making his status as "structurer" or "revealer" clearer to 
himself. This multiplicity dynamic in the reading act clearly 
does not propose a smooth re-production of different perspectives 
but rather what Merleau-Ponty calls, a continual restructuring 
and readjustment of the body-subject vis-a-vis the situation in 
terms of a continual struggle to address ever new "means and ends 
and questions and answers" (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: xxxiii). 
Restructuring in this sense, impacts on Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
reversibility. 
3.4.5 REVERSIBILITY OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
Merleau-Ponty's contribution to the notion of meaning 
construction seeks to address the old problem of representational 
theories, where the sovereign subject interprets the object 
(text) , not in the Nietzschean manner of perspective-building but 
rather as the constant restructuring of the multi-subject over 
against the object - the latter contains already part of the 
subject. Merleau-Ponty' s view also proves much more illuminating 
than that of Heidegger, precisely because of the more radical 
rethinking he invests into the notions of subject and object. 
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For Merleau-Ponty (1964:89-90) every subject already has an 
object side as every object already has a subject side - making 
the closing of the gap between subject and object almost 
"unnecessary". Subjectivity and objectivity intersect - never 
reducible to the differences it simultaneously joins and 
separates. The body is forever entre-deux. 
Two or more reading subjects may, for example, hold radically 
conflicting opinions or derive their entire approach from 
different cultural worlds, but Merleau-Ponty believes that as 
reading subjects, we perceive the same thing because we share the 
same "thrown" and "primordial structures" that open us to these 
phenomena in the first place, for " the world is what we 
perceive ... The world is not what I think, but what I live 
through" (Merleau-Ponty,1966: xvi-xvii). 
Contrary to the referential views of language, the textual 
schemata, in the reader-subject, are not ready-made but must be 
constructed in the present. In the reading act, it is through 
the text that the "spatial position" of the other is given to me 
as reader as a possible position of my own, and conversely, my 
own past and future are given to me as reader as the other 
potential selves or the present fields of the other - these two 
temporalities are not mutually exclusive. For Heidegger there 
has to be a "passing over" from subject and object, and vice 
versa. Merleau-Ponty changes this position by "doubling-up" the 
process so that each position (subject or object) has both 
positions. Reading, for Merleau-Ponty, suggests that the 
opposition of the presence of subject-object and object-subject 
merge in their encounter or structure, leading to a form of 
intersubjectivity that consists in the intertwining of the two. 
Merleau-Ponty's notions of spatiality and temporality are 
essentially inseparable conditions for communication. As 
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indicated earlier, the spatio-temporal "clearings", he refers to, 
are not all that straightforward procedures in the reading act 
but must rather unravel in a struggle for a multiplicity of 
clearings in a continually renewed intersubjective field 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 515). 
The notion of "reversibility of meanings" is Merleau-Ponty' s 
radical contribution to the reading act which, according to him, 
is to be created in the total engagement of reader and text, in 
terms of their respective temporality and spatiality (Merleau-
Ponty, 1966: 485). As body-subjects, readers approach the text 
that already speaks in as much as the textual structures which 
engage our cognitive structures, which is the pre-reflective 
state of our existence. The "maximum articulation" (Merleau-
Ponty, 1966: 367) of our inter-change results in meaning which 
emerges as the reverse side of what the text depicts (Merleau-
Ponty, 1966: 515). Heidegger also conceives of the text that 
already "speaks", but meaning is only "disclosed" on the one side 
of subject-object encounter, whereas Merleau-Ponty develops a 
double side, i.e. the reverse side. 
In the textual engagement Merleau-Ponty (1964:13) believes that 
signs assist the reading subject to construct meaning in terms of 
an already existing larger reality of meaning. This is a far cry 
from the notion of a divine, sovereign reader subject who takes 
it upon himself to make meaning of a text. For Heidegger the 
world, the object remains concealed in all revelation, while the 
Merleau-Pontian view is that the world, the object portrays a 
more diverse phenomenon, at once both visible and invisible. The 
reader is thus not a divine decipherer, for"··. he is one of the 
visibles, capable, by a single reversal, of seeing them - he who 
is one of them" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 134) . Although Merleau-
Ponty insists on the reversibility of the object-side and 
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subject-side of perception, in terms of his corps propre, the 
reading subject seems nevertheless to be significantly paramount, 
for it constitutes the very"··. fabric into which all objects 
are woven, and it is at least in relation to the perceived world, 
the instrument of my comprehension" (Merleau-Ponty, 1966: 235) 
(own emphasis) . 
Merleau-Ponty's new perspective of the ontology of reversibility 
essentially characterizes an indirect or intra-ontology (between 
subject-object and object-subject) which undercuts the opposition 
of subject-object. This appears to be a sweeping resuscitation of 
nature, both human and nonhuman, subject and object, i.e "my 
flesh" and " the flesh of the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1966). He 
posits an ontology which hinges (chaniere, jointure) in what he 
regards as the in-between and consequently destroys the 
opposition between consciousness and being, subject and object, 
ego and alter ego (see Waldenfels, 1981:29). The notion of 
chaniere proves significant in the reading act when the subject 
tries to ideate reality via the text. What follows is a de-
intellectualized readjustment of focus outside (reverse-side) of 
the text but, at the same time, this is sufficiently shaped by 
schemata to prevent the reader from total freedom of choice 
("arbitrary interpretation") . The process of meaning construction 
is therefore initiated with the schemata of the text which 
encapsulates certain aspects of a totality that the reader must 
assemble: it is in the act of assembling (perception) that the 
subject will occupy the position set out for him (Merleau-Ponty, 
1966: 169) - a view Merleau-Ponty believes is more adequate than 
Heidegger's being-in-the-world. The simplistic view of the 
reader assuming an outside position to the text and imputing 
meaning into the text, has clearly been decentered by Merleau-
Ponty. The reader rather becomes part of the meaning 
construction events than being the master of them. 
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The literary exchange between subjectivity and an objective text 
in meaning construction is best likened to two mirrors which 
Merleau-Ponty holds opposite each other, producing two infinite 
series of images which do not belong exclusively to the one 
mirror or to the other (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 139). Apart from 
this picture analogy of language, language essentially does not 
express meaning, for according to Merleau-Ponty, meaning 
ultimately emerges from the reverse side of the phenomenal world 
so that this form of "negativity", to use Iser' s (1978: 228) 
phrase, produces a twofold structure of (i} the cause of the 
deformation and (ii) the potential which is the basis for 
communication a process which in terms of Merleau-Ponty' s 
notion of temporality is continually renewed and recreated. In 
the reading act this historical "creation" of meaning and its 
ensuing dependent perceptions are, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
opaque because the act of perception is not as transparent as 
intellectual conceptions. This marks Merleau-Ponty' s anti-
intellectual stance. Meaning construction therefore becomes a 
dialectical activity of making explicit what is latently present 
in the incarnated cogito (Gras, 1973: 6). This view contrasts 
with Heidegger's "passing over" in the process of "showing" 
between the subject and the object. For Merleau-Ponty (1964:216) 
meaning already exists but is brought out on the reverse side of 
each of the subject and object: " ... the visible is pregnant with 
the invisible." 
In the reading act the reversibility of the act of constructing 
meaning allows each reading subject (in terms of the notion of 
intersubjectivity) to achieve a degree of recognition and self-
identity. This happens in terms of a dialectical relationship 
with the other, for "There is this constitution and correlation 
of the other and myself as two human beings among all human 
beings" (Mallin, 1979 :266). In addressing the schism which 
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exists between subject and object, Merleau-Ponty, in a far more 
profound way than Heidegger, also critiques the significance and 
depth of being human. The reading act, whilst always geared 
towards the purpose of creating meaning in terms of the textual 
object, also reflects for Merleau-Ponty the act of remaining in 
touch with the world of things and people, and moreover 
developing a profounder understanding of what and who we as 
readers are. Who and what we are as reading and communicating 
subjects is continually being questioned and revised as we 
influence our worlds and are being influenced by the world: 
3.4.6 
" ... that the things have us, and that is not 
we who have the things ... That it is being 
that speaks within us and not we who speak of 
being" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:194) 
THE READING ACT AS THE FIELD OF INTERSECTIONS. 
Despite his strong plea for equivalences within and between the 
object and subject, Merleau-Ponty appears as though he is not 
able to escape the prominence sensing, perceiving of the subject 
since in the ontological interaction with the objective reality 
the benefits of this inevitably seems to accrue to the subject. 
The "I am" is dominant in his claims of reversibility when he 
asserts, " I am part of a world that is experiencing itself. I 
am the world experiencing itself through his body" (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964:136) In the "struggle" for meaning construction in 
reading there is a battle between what is explicit and implicit, 
between revelation and concealment. This is a different struggle 
than that of Nietzsche's where more and more perspectives are 
generated depending whose power (the subject or object) is more. 
Merleau-Ponty's (1964:216) strugg].e reveals the depth of the 
reading: 
" ... the visible is pregnant with the 
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invisible, ... to comprehend fully the visible 
relations one must go unto the relation of 
the visible with the invisible". 
The reading subject is compelled to act upon what is concealed 
in the text and this action is objectively controlled by what is 
revealed. Iser (1978:169) says of Merleau-Ponty's struggle for 
meaning in the in-between: "Blanks and negations both control the 
process the blanks leave open the connections between 
perspectives in the text, and spur the reader into coordinating 
these perspectives - in other words, they induce the reader to 
perform basic operations within the text" . We no longer have the 
view of an outside position of the reader peering into the text 
and inputs meaning. In Merleau-Ponty's view, the reader already 
exists within the text as much as the text already exists in the 
reader: 
"There is a body of the mind, and a mind of 
the body ... that which is sensed and that 
which senses" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:259). 
The notion of "alienation" between subjectivity and objectivity 
is the departing point in reading and is regarded as Merleau-
Ponty' s "constructivist" phenomenology, i.e. the basis from 
whence meaning gets constructed. Although Merleau-Ponty 
(1964 :257) follows the imperative "back to things" he applies 
this primarily to "back to the subject" and treats "back to the 
text (object)" as another sensing consciousness, which implies 
that meaning is neither extratextual nor intratextual. This is 
the difference in Merleau-Ponty (from Nietzsche and Heidegger), 
that meaning exists "everywhere" but in the act of perception we 
activate "fields of intersections" in and between ourselves as 
readers and texts as object to construct meaning. For Merleau-
Ponty (1964: 227) meaning is constructed only in a contextual 
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framework of compenetration ("fields of intersections") of both 
subject and object. The active "construction" of meaning 
characterizes a reading subject who acts both as an agent of the 
reading action and of the reaction in the text. This reaching 
for the "content" of the text beyond the reader' s subjective 
consciousness is a shift Merleau-Ponty hopes will overcome the 
tendency of nilly willy interpretation or misinterpretation by 
constantly battle with textual objectivity in the field of 
intersection. We may argue that Merleau-Ponty thus ushers us into 
a more critical position of why we ought to reject the naive 
notion of "pure" objectivity of a world-in-itself on the one hand 
and faith in an absolute mind of a fickle reader on the other. 
Merleau-Ponty (1964:1640 reiterates this view: 
"The visible can thus fill me and occupy me 
because I who see it do not see it from the 
depths of nothingness, but from the midst of 
itself". (own emphasis) 
The progress which marks Merleau-Ponty's rethinking is his acute 
awareness of a form of objective subjectivity that cannot operate 
without its subjective objective counterpart. In fact he accords 
the objective text with the same consciousness to respond towards 
the reading subject and in this way is ahead of Heidegger by 
postulating a new notion, i.e. of a multiplicity of subjectivi-
ties. This is Merleau-Ponty's attempt to close the false gaps 
between subject and object, people and things. He grappled with 
this "compromise" when he claims that, "Precisely what has to be 
done is to show that philosophy can no longer think according to 
this cleavage; God, man, creatures ... " Merleau-Ponty (1964:274). 
This is also a powerful statement of his commitment to humanism. 
However, this seminal view of the phenomenon of multiple 
subjectivity is derived from a view of subjectivity which is 
"located" (and constantly renewed) in the in-between of the 
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traditional proble-matic subject-object dichotomy as well as the 
in-between within the subject-object and the object-subject -
making doubly sure that it is not an exclusive and authoritative 
text imposing on a separated reader or a mastermind reader 
imposing meaning on the text. 
This constant process of compenetration (constructivism) gives 
rise the multi-ple subjectivity which arises from the reading 
act. Whereas Heidegger assisted our thinking by decentering the 
subject from its meaning-giving and referential status, Merleau-
Ponty goes further in what he believes to be a profound ontology 
which hinges between subject and object in a mirror-like 
compenetration. This is the basis of analysis of perception in 
the reading act: "The field of all fields or the totality wherein 
all the sensibles are cut out" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:214). This 
field of intersections prevents any quick acquies-cence into a 
literal meaning which the reader "thinks" the text conveys or 
which the reader feels to be the "correct 11 meaning. Every 
reading act has to be placed within the field of intersec-tion to 
counter-balance the text and the reader. 
In his attempts to create a new and refreshing approach to 
reading, Merleau-Ponty thus de-subjectivizes the reading subject 
and de-objectivizes the textual object in order to counter the 
problems that ensue from the dualism between the subject and the 
object which also gives rise to possible arbitrary 
interpretations. In order to do this he seems to have no option 
but to execute this process from the perspective of the reading 
subject. In doing so, Merleau-Ponty, renders his "field of 
intersection" approach to reading with an intersubjective 
objectivity where the reader and the other in the text are both 
regarded as "human" (i.e. subjective). Abram (1988:103) comments 
quite rightly that Merleau-Ponty, by " ... shifting the prime focus 
144 
of subjectivity from the human intellect to what he called the 
"body-subject" or the "lived body" ... uncovered the radical extent 
to which all subjectivity, or awareness presupposes our inherence 
in a corporeal world". This is Merleau-Ponty's radical 
difference in regard to Heidegger's notion of subjectivity, that 
he probes a more expansive notion of subjectivity, on the reverse 
side of our reading experiences, allowing more perspectives to 
flow from the reading of a text. 
Merleau-Ponty sought to de-intellectualize the notions of 
subjectivity and representation by resuscitating the inextricable 
human bond between the subject and object, the human and 
nonhuman. As opposed to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty shifts by 
dislodging transcendence as a particular attribute of the human 
body and returning it to the world of which his body is but a 
single expression. The ensuing epistemological results is a more 
coherent and in-depth construction of the interactive visible and 
invisible that the reader experiences. Merleau-Ponty' s 
reincorporation of the "real " and "human" into the perceptions 
of which the subject is part, in a way, prepares us for Gadamer's 
emphasis on the historical dynamics which he deems indispensable 
for meaning construction. 
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3.5 GADAMER'S UNIVERSAL SUBJECTIVISTIC APPROACH TO MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION. 
3.5.1 THE SHIFT IN HERMENEUTIC READING 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have both pointed out that in the 
reading act language cannot be used as a mere tool for 
communication but that it rather embodies being and ontological 
meaning for the reader. Therefore, their return to the pre-
dualistic view of subjectivity and objectivity seeks to challenge 
the autonomy of textual authority and the manipulative or 
controlling subjectivity of the reader. This view, as we will 
notice, is also emphasized by Gadamer (1976) in terms of what he 
regards as the "universality of the hermeneutic" problematic, 
which is in turn reiterated, although differently, by Ricoeur 
(1974) in what he calls the "conflict of interpretations". Their 
concerns are all directed at understanding the status of the 
reading subject, vis-a-vis the textual object, as it occurs in 
and through language. They all seek to avert the problematic 
position of the reader, using language in a manipulative way, to 
be the master of the meaning construction event. Kristeva's view 
that our understanding of meaning construction, as it occurs in 
terms of language, must necessarily be based on our understanding 
of subjectivity. This trend of thought is pursued in the 
tradition of Gadamerian hermeneutics as well. 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty clearly demonstrated a form of 
reading which is in the first place always being-in-the-world. 
In their respective ways they argue that as readers we are human 
subjects o~ly because we are, in a practical way, bound up with 
others wi 1hin a material world. The world moreover does not 
constitute an object "out there" which can be rationally analyzed 
by a contemplative reading subject, but we emerge as reading 
subjects from inside a reality which we can never fully objectify 
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and which of necessity encompasses both subject and object. 
Within this reality which remains potentially inexhaustible in 
its meaning, the subject-object dualism, as separate-functioning 
conscious~-nesses, has been radically dethroned. The world or the 
text as dbject is therefore no longer simplistically dissolved 
into mental images which construct complete and homogeneous 
meanings !for readers to apply in various situations. 
! 
I 
To expan1 our perspective of the reading act and refocus on 
! 
another <aimension of the role of language, subjectivity and 
I 
I • 
representation, we find it extremely insightful to focus on 
Gadamer' sl hermeneutics. The meanings which are derived from a 
hermeneutlic reading, however, is not a message that has been 
I 
decoded ih what is regarded as "interpretation", i.e. "put in" by 
a writer,! which has to be "fished out" by the reader/hearer/ 
critic" I (Cornis-Pope, 1992: 4-5), but it rather entails 
i 
"receiving" an interpretation by letting the past question our 
I 
present 9oncerns and as a result make all our understandings 
productiVf= (Eagleton, 1986: 71. See also Newton, 1990; Ray, 
1986). the ultimate aim therefore of "... a hermeneutically 
i 
successfuil. reading is to do away with reading altogether" (de Man 
in Jauss,I 1982 (b) :xi). Meaning and interpretation becomes the 
I 
"framewor~" of hermeneutics, and it is in this context that we 
I 
need to e~pand our discourse of subjectivity and representation. 
! 
If subje~tivity "inhabits" discourse, hermeneutics becomes a 
! 
framework! change the dynamics of interpretations. The critical 
i 
interplay! between textual object and reader subjectivity becomes 
the proce~s in which modifications and reversals of meanings that 
! 
have beenl derived from inside a text becomes affected by general 
meanings !outside this context. In this way hermeneutics would 
I 
assist o~r thinking in rejecting the notion of a divine reader 
I 
who unillaterally extracts meaning from the text more 
i 
particularly that a specific text holds a specific meaning which 
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has been pre-ordained in its intentions. 
This shift in hermeneutic thinking proposes a different 
understanding of the Cartesian representational thinking. In a 
sense the "hermeneutic circle", as we will notice, becomes 
another critical hypothesis for the reading act and parts of that 
circle are the dynamics which either falsify or verify the 
hypothesis (Schmidt in Bredella, 1989: 27). This hermeneutic 
structure within which the reading subject's beliefs are 
rethought and revised, their assumptions shed, inferences 
developed, etc. becomes the frame of reference in which an 
expanded notion of subjectivity is actualized. Historically, the 
intentions of hermeneutics has also not remained static. 
Gadamer, for example, believes that his critical version of 
hermeneutics should be placed in a wider or almost different 
context than mere literary interpretation, since textual meaning 
on its own does not possess meaning in the ordinary sense, 
precisely because textual meaning can exist independently of the 
subject's consciousness (see Newton, 1990; Chen, 1987). But how 
exactly does Gadamer's critical hermeneutics further our insights 
with regard to new boundaries of the reading act? 
3.5.2 GADAMER'S UNIVERSAL PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
Gadamer's universal philosophical hermeneutics pursues the idea 
of understanding primarily in historical terms and ultimately, 
like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, in ontological terms. In doing 
so Gadamer seeks to go back to Heidegger's insistence on 
historicity and the situatedness or "thrownness" in the world 
(Heidegger, 1982), which cannot be overcome by any scientific 
attempts or be further reduced to a transcendental level. In 
terms of being-in-the-world, Heidegger places historicity at the 
very foundation of the objective sciences - a view which 
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Gadamer's subjectivism in the reading act, as we will see, cannot 
easily embrace. Gadamer depends on Husserl who rejects 
empiricism, and positivism, but argues that Husserl's critique of 
objectivism does not go far enough in order to understand the 
intricacies of meaning construction. (Frank in Hoffman, 1989: 
27) . For the act of meaning construction, Gadamer emphasizes the 
notion of being-in-the-world as being closely connected to the 
reader's human existence and all subject-object relations 
(Kurzweil, 1980: 87; Hekman, 1983: 208). Gadamer, emphasizes the 
Husserlian view of different life-worlds as themselves being 
varieties of what he sees as a more "basic universal structure". 
The illuminating background to Gadamer's thinking to reading is 
the fact that phenomenologists penetrate below the different 
world-views and different opinions to a transcendental 
subjectivity where an original and non-historical meaning resides 
(Kochelmans, 1967). Gadamer rejects this, since for him this 
strategy involves nothing more than an alienating process. In 
terms of being-in-the-world, the Gadamerian act of meaning 
construction seeks to go beyond reconstruction of the author's 
intention. The inevitable ever-changing context of the world-
text interaction is essential for our understanding of people. 
The hermeneutic question is therefore inseparable from applying 
and adapting the "meaning of the text" to the concrete situation 
of the reader (see Knapp & Michaels, 1987: 52). To shift the 
boundaries and limitations of the representational theory of 
literal textual transmission, we need to look at Gadamer's notion 
of truth since this will clarify his notion of subjectivity and 
representation in the reading act. 
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3.5.3 THE NOTION OF TRUTH IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
In Gadamer's critique of reader-text interaction he rejects the 
foundations of positivism, not necessarily to restore the 
subjective/ objective dichotomy, but rather to collapse it by 
grounding the reading act in a keen awareness of historical 
conditions - a view which is influenced by his concepts of truth. 
This is a different sense of truth than that of Nietzsche's, 
where truth is spearheaded by power quanta between subject and 
object. 
Contrary to the reader's desire to attribute "truth" to the text, 
Gadamer rather wants to focus on sentences, for whether something 
is true or not does not alter the reading subject's belief that 
the linguistic description presented in terms of the reading 
event is accurate as it stands. (see Ingram, 1984). Therefore, 
in attributing "true" or "false" to any sentence, neither 
contributes nor subtracts from the description that the sentence 
offered of the objective reality. Gadamer, however, is clearly 
not concerned with the semantic status of "truth". The latter 
emphasizes a split between consciousness and the assertion that 
embodies the result of its act (Howard, 1982: 123). Truth rather 
inheres in a "··· givenness that is not itself the object of 
intentional acts" (Gadamer, 1970: 216). This immediately puts 
the divine reader out of action in believing that he can use 
language as a tool to extract the meaning from the text. Meaning 
construction, according to Gadamer; can seldom be proved 
objectively true or false, for ontologically its truth resides 
rather in its power to deepen the reading subject's self-
understanding which, in turn, opens up a new realm or heightened 
sense of self-perception (see Hoy, 1982: 49). 
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While the reading subject generally-speaking seems always bent on 
trying to "find" the truth in a text, Gadamer believes that truth 
rather finds us. The notion of "objective" understanding is, 
according to Gadamer, an illegitimate remnant from 
Schleiermacherian hermeneutics. Gadamer' s "new" hermeneutics 
diverts from the truth content of a text to rather explore the 
intentions behind it (Gadamer, 1960:87). He therefore diverts 
from the question of validity to the question of method. This 
approach averts the temptation of validating quick 
"interpretations" of a text and rather to find ways to 
"problematize" our sense-making attempts in reading. In what 
Gadamer regards as "textual interpretation" , the process of 
disclosin or revealing of meaning, is fundamental to the 
decipheri g or hermeneutic process in the reading act - a notion 
which re ts on Gadamer's understanding of what he calls 
11 linguist'cality 11 • 
3.5.4 THE LINGUISTICALITY OF UNDERSTANDING 
ading act the subject operates squarely within the 
framework of language, a view Gadamer shares with Heidegger and 
nty. Since language embodies "Being that can be 
understoo " (Chamberlain, 1990: 8-9), the ontological significance 
of lingui ticality (Sprachlichkeit) for Gadamerian hermeneutics 
overestimated. As all understanding in the reading act 
for Gada er is linguistic, he analyzes language in order to 
clarify "interpretation" or meaning construction. Since all 
interpretation for him is also linguistic and all understanding 
interpretation, it would mean that"· .. all interpretation takes 
place through the medium of language" (Gadamer, 1976: 350) . This 
appears to be a different notion of Heidegger's view that 
language is the "house of being" in which meaning is constructed, 
or in Merleau-Ponty' s case where meaning already pre-exists 
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subject and object interaction. 
Gadamer follows the later insights of Heidegger into the 
linguisticality of understanding and ontology. Gadamer believes 
that "language constitutes the hermeneutical event proper not as 
language, whether as grammar or as lexicon, but in the coming 
into language of that which has been said in the tradition: an 
event that is at once assimilation and interpretation" (Gadamer 
in Schrift, 1990: 4). Contrary to the earlier representational 
forms of hermeneutics (for example, those of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey) where language is regarded as a tool to "convey" meaning 
to the reading subject, Gadamer's hermeneutics ushers us into the 
ontological significance of language - a view which has already 
been initiated by Heidegger. In his view of the reading act 
Gadamer, places great emphasis on the "historical placing" or 
tradition of linguisticality. The very act of "coming into 
language" in the tradition constitutes what Gadamer calls the 
"structural moment" of interpretation of a text: 
"Linguistic interpretation is the form of all 
interpretation, even when what is 
interpreted is not linguistic in nature 
We must not let ourselves be confused by 
these forms of interpretation which are not 
linguistic but in fact presuppose language" 
(Gadamer, 1976: 360). 
The implication of the above view is that the reading subject's 
interpretations are not necessarily his individual 
interpretations alone but have decided historical roots. This 
means that they are themselves already the result of 
interpretations within a tradition. The textual object is handed 
down to the reading subject in what is regarded as a fusion of 
previous opinions about it, i.e. a harmony of voices, as Gadamer 
(1976: 245) often puts it, to which we as reading subjects add 
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our own. The construction of meaning for Gadamer is therefore 
clearly not a matter of relating parts of the text to the whole 
(and vice versa) in an objective manner, but rather the process 
within the "hermeneutic circle" which relates to the thing or 
textual object itself. It is particularly Emilio Betti and .E.D. 
Hirsch, the major spokespersons for "objective hermeneutics", 
that criticize Gadamer for what they believe to be a form of 
subjectivism and re la ti vism in his approach of meaning 
construction. They criticize Gadamer for inserting the subject 
into the hermeneutic circle of tradition, constructing a form of 
hermeneutics which is unable to distinguish between correct and 
incorrect interpretations and thus yielding to form of 
relativism (Bleicher, 1980: 27-47). This is not quite tenable, 
as we will notice. 
Looking back, Gadamer's concept of linguisticality differs from 
Schleiermacher's distinction between psychological and 
grammatical interpretation, precisely because the former operates 
on a different notion of truth. Schleiermacher argues on the 
basis of a conventional semantic version or representational view 
of truth and therefore regards psychological interpretation as 
being higher than grammatical interpretation. According to 
Schleiermacher, the art of hermeneutics consists in the sovereign 
reading subject, as sole interpreter, putting himself both 
objectively and subjectively in the position of the author 
(Mueller-Vollmer, 1985: 83). For Schleiermacher, therefore, the 
meaning of each objective text must be determined by the 
objective text itself, as the product of the author. 
Schleiermacher focuses on the individuality (Gadamer, the 
universal) of an objective text. Schleiermacherian grammatical 
interpretation complements meaning construction by fixing the 
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exact meaning of the author's words and eliciting a comprehension 
of the language used by the author, while psychological 
interpretation complements grammatical interpretation by 
exploring the life-context in which the text was produced. Even 
Schleiermacher's inclusion of psychological divination of meaning 
construction does not satisfy Gadamer (1976: xiii) . Gadamer 
wants to move beyond the representationalism postulated by 
Schleiermacher. The latter obviously still operates with 
language as that "ill-designed instrument" (Chomsky, 1972:10) 
which wishes to verify an objective reality. 
Contrary to the representational mode of viewing the reading act, 
where language is used as a linguistic tool, Gadamer conceives of 
a subject who "creates" meaning in terms of Sprachlichkeit i.e. 
in terms of a process of "mediation" or the translation of past 
meaning through the present situation. Gadamer thus argues that 
is people who use language and people who give or ascribe meaning 
in terms of a historical consciousness. Instead of having direct 
access to the meaning of a text, the reading act is mediated via 
a historical consciousness in terms of language. 
Within the ambit of linguisticality, understanding emerges as an 
event in which neither the reading subject nor the textual object 
can be thought of as being truly autonomous constituents. It is 
language which seems to assist the process of mediation of past 
and present, but language as such, should not be conceived of as 
purely an objectified notion, i.e. language is not to be used in 
a tool-kit manner to manipulate, evaluate or infer meaning in the 
Cartesian sense of logical referentiality. It is language itself 
that which speaks to us (Gadamer, 1976:274). Language in this 
sense, becomes a form of universal subjectivity which engages in 
a critical rapport with the reading subject. Contrary to 
Schleiermacher' s methodological concerns, Gadamer emphasizes that 
154 
the textual object is not approached as the author's intention 
but rather in a way that the object addresses itself to the 
subject and to which the reader responds with his own words . 
Gadamer "regresses" from Merleau-Ponty's subject-object and 
object-subject engagement of the reading act, and goes back to 
Heidegger's circular "passing over" between subject and object, 
but emphasizes the historical aspect in his conception of 
linguisticality. This form of "circularity" or dialogue 
constitutes what Gadamer refers to as "the conversation between 
past, present and future, and seeks patiently to remove obstacles 
to this endless mutual communication" (Eagleton; 1986: 73) . This 
view corresponds with Heidegger's temporal notion of historicity. 
Whereas Heidegger's view seems to be now and the future, 
Gadamer•s reading experience is always backward-looking, in the 
first place. 
The subjectivistic reading hermeneutics of Gadamer implies that 
there cannot be any external objective language, for " the 
linguistic nature of the human experience of the world does not 
include making the world into an object" (Gadamer, 1976: 426). 
This notion of language which wishes break with the limited 
assumption of being a stable representation of an intention 
(either the author's or the reader's), contrasts strongly with 
that of Dilthey. Dilthey, for example, operates in a very 
definite external and objective form of language in a logical 
tool-kit and representational way. This form of language 
facilitates a sense of empathy and transportation which hopes to 
complement the subject's experience of the meaning intended by 
the author. 
The histor~cal and social setting which tends to condition the 
author's language and mood can, according to Dilthey, be captured 
with greater clarity especially if the reader "possesses 
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extraordinary talent" (Dilthey in Mueller-Vollmer, 1985: 161). 
Language for Dilthey is therefore dead, serving nothing more than 
an instrumental purpose to re-enact the author's intentions in 
terms of neatly-packaged representational principles. 
Gadamer takes note of Dilthey's question of the possibility of 
historical knowledge which raises the question of how a the 
reading subject will come to know objectively that which has been 
subjectively created in the reading act. Dilthey falls into the 
psychologistic trap of seeking to reconstruct . the historical 
course of events in a process of rediscovery. 
to avoid the problems of psychologism 
He seems however 
associated with 
Schleiermacher's hermeneutics by directing understanding towards 
the reconstruction of the historical product (whether event or 
object), rather than toward the reconstruction of the state of 
mind of the author. This one-way representation of meaning still 
encompasses the reader's projection and gazing upon the literary 
object. This view is resonated in terms of the early 
Wittgensteinian picture and referential theory of representation 
- where the reader is always outside the text, operating in the 
guise of a strange mix of "subjective-objectivity" (see Rickman, 
1976: 6). 
In trying to reconceptualize a revised and more expansive notion 
of reading, Gadamer seeks to move to the subjective domain where 
the language of the textual object is re-enacted within the 
reading subject itself. For Gadamer (1960:273) language, like 
for Heidegger, therefore acts as an a priori horizon, enclosing 
a mode of being as meaningful understanding. Like with Kristeva, 
Gadamer thus accords language as "language" in terms of the 
reader's subjectivity and understanding himself as reading 
subject. Only being that can be understood is regarded as 
language (Gadamer, 1976: 450). However, the linguisticality of 
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understanding is also the concretion of what Gadamer refers to as 
the "effective historical conscience". Language only operates 
within the subject through history, as opposed to Heidegger where 
history works through language. 
3.5.5 THE HISTORICALITY OF UNDERSTANDING IN READING 
For the construction of meaning the historicality of understand-
ing, according to Gadamer, relies on the "rehabilitation" of the 
notions of "prejudice" as well as "tradition" -.two Gadamerian 
notions which cannot be separated. Gadamer's historicality of 
understanding has been fore-shadowed by Heidegger's concept of 
fore-structure (Vorgriff) of understanding, i.e. that the 
understanding of a text is made possible by· the prejudices of the 
reading subject's epoch which discloses and constitutes being 
(see: Connolly and Keutner, 1988: 19). While the normal use of 
"prejudice" has been normally deemed anathema to the use of one's 
logical and reasoning faculties, Gadamer wishes to reinstate the 
idea of a prejudicial approach to understanding the text which, 
according to him, has nothing to do with blind obedience but 
rather with self-knowledge (Gadamer, 1976: 264). The "historical 
womb" thus facilitates the critical "harmony of voices" (Gadamer, 
1976: 245) for the meaning-making process. 
The status as well as the critical task of the reading subject, 
according to Gadamerian universal reading hermeneutics, is to 
evidence the historic moment in the comprehension of the world 
via the text. In fact the reader is dependent on and tied to 
prejudice (Vorurteil), for not only is such knowledge handed down 
in history but it is moreover part of who the reader is now. 
There is thus no contradiction for Gadamer because ultimately the 
reader adds his own voice to this historical reverberation of 
events. Prejudice acts as anticipatory mechanism for the future 
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(see especially Bernstein, 1983: 140-141). The reading subject, 
in a quasi-predetermined way has been "programmed" by the 
conditions of his tradition. Gadamer' s contribution to our 
insights about reading is that the reader's seeing might be a 
"subjective" reading, but this seeing has been initiated in the 
objective domain of tradition. It's not its content that is 
historically true or false, but the process how we add our own 
voices to the text. 
Gadamer claims that since all interpretation is, of necessity, 
prejudiced it can no longer be possible for subjects to appeal to 
final guarantees of "objective" understanding such as an author's 
intentions. Prejudice and prejudgment are connected, for the 
subject has already placed his meaning in a certain way 
(Vorgriff) . There cannot therefore be any neutral stance in 
terms of which the "real" meaning of the text emerges. Gadamer 
(1960: 239) links prejudice (Vorurteil) and judgment (Urteil) in 
order to avoid any objective understanding in the Cartesian 
sense. All understanding essentially involves projections of 
meaning that arise from the subject's own situation and in fact 
goes beyond the observable "facts" - a view which is contrary to 
the referential theories which are compelled by the facts that 
the reader sees. 
Furthermore, Gadamer argues that the reading subject would 
generally attempt to understand the textual object by being 
sensitive to the newness or otherness of textual content but, at 
the same time, tries "to be aware of one's (reader's) own bias, 
so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus 
be able to, assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings" 
(Gadamer, 1976: 253-4). In fact the reader's subjectivity 
encounters or engages the text ' s subj ecti vi ty in a domain in 
which each reveal their individual character. This type of 
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literary intersubjectivity is reminiscent of Heidegger, except 
that Gadamer places it in a tradition of creating new and fresh 
insights. It is evident that the reading subject's being is 
paramount for Gadamer, for the text's subjectivity can only be 
realised in terms of the reader's, as the latter relies on the 
language of the text in order to render himself existential and 
real. We encounter here, like in the case of Merleau-Ponty, a 
"sharing" of intentions and of being between subject and object, 
except that Gadamer' s "sharing", while dependent on language, 
depends completely on the historical conditioning effects 
thereof. 
It is clear that Gadamer seeks to withdraw the subject from the 
blind cul-de-sac of merely matching ideas with their 
corresponding objective events or facts. His contribution to the 
understanding of the reading act is to realize that language, in 
itself, cannot fulfil the job of producing meaning. Language in 
fact rather becomes a mode of being when the reader understands 
the tradition in which he seeks to understand himself. The 
question of how subjective such prejudged projections might be, 
needs to be contextualized in terms of the reading subject's 
objective being-in-the-world (Heidegger's thrownness), which in 
turn must be located in the structure of involvements in history. 
Zavarzadeh & Morton (1991: 167) regard Gadamer's "prejudices" as 
the bedrock founding elements of subjectivity - a mark of the 
subject's organic unity. Achieving this unity (via tradition) 
becomes the mediated process in which the reader "struggles" and 
ensures that he does not acquiesce into quick solutions and pat 
- off answers as to what the text is supposed to mean. 
3.5.6 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADITION AND TIME 
Gadamer argues that the historicality of understanding is not 
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" so much ... an action of one's understanding but as a placing 
of oneself within a tradition, in which past and present are 
constantly fused" (Gadamer, 1976:274). Gadamer believes that it 
is only in this continuing chain of time that the reading subject 
constructs understanding, because it is only in the filtering out 
of legitimate prejudices, i.e. the dialectical process between 
the "otherness" and "familiarity" in the text, that understanding 
emerges for the reader. Gadamer follows Heidegger by locating the 
subject within his understanding of historicity. But Gadamer 
moreover sees this construction of meaning, like Merleau-Ponty, 
as a continual restructuring of different and oppositional 
perspectives. 
What is at work in the reading act is what Gadamer calls 
"effective history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) by which he means the 
operative force of the tradition over those subjects that belong 
to it, so that even in rejecting or reacting to it, they 
nevertheless remain conditioned by it. In the reading act, 
understanding as a form of self-perception, emerges in that 
temporal distance that exists between the subject and the text as 
well as the subject and the act of his own placing within his 
tradition of ideas and knowledge. Gadamer points out that this 
effective-historical consciousness is essentially a state of 
being rather than a state of consciousness, for "long before we 
understand ourselves in retrospective reflection we understand 
ourselves in self-evident ways in the family, society and state 
we live in" (Bleicher, 1980: 108-109). This is actually not a 
nilly-willy subjective act but rather a decisive dimension of 
effective history. Gadamer rejects the idea that the text may 
contain pre-ordained meaning, for I am not looking at an 
objective body of information in the text, but part of me (like 
Merleau-Ponty's view) is already in the text through my 
tradition. According to Gadamer (1976: 53) the status of 
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subjectivity becomes almost a "distorting mirror" so that self-
reflection is nothing more than a flicker in the "closed circuit" 
of historical life. "Making sense" of the text thus means 
struggling to establish ever new meanings of myself as reader by 
reflecting in the "mirror-text". This is not just before or in 
front of me, but more importantly, in me. 
In the reading act the Wirkungsgeschichte thus encompasses a 
significant framework for the constructive and dynamic range of 
possibilities of understanding in which the reading subject 
places himself in his own concrete situation. Even the reader's 
faculty of reason, according to Gadamer, is itself grounded in 
this tradition so that it also constrains the wilfulness of a 
purely "subjective" reading of a text. It is not that the 
subject adopts the views of his textual object in understanding 
it, but rather that an openness to the possible truth of the 
object is the condition of understanding. This openness is 
achieved in the reading encounter by constantly "sharing" in this 
"mirror-text" in which I am trying to understand myself. The 
subject does not place himself, according to Gadamer, in a 
restrictive horizon but seeks to widen his own perspectives in 
terms of the openness the textual object extends to him (Gadamer, 
1976: 55) . 
3.5.7 THE FUSION OF HORIZONS IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
Like in the case of Heidegger's Moglichkeit, the possibilities of 
being open to the text culminates in what Gadamer refers to as a 
fusion and contamination of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) - a 
condition to construct ever new meaning (see Mueller-Vollmer, 
1985: 271). He equates the degree of consensus which derives 
from the hermeneutic understanding with the notion of the fusion 
of horizons. This implies a form of dialogic consensus and 
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sharing which symbolizes the integration of the reader's 
historically-determined concerns with that of the textual object. 
This hermeneutic Verstandigung may also include disagreement: the 
subject simply agrees to disagree. Although the reader cannot 
break out of the tradition, he may still hold substantial power 
to shift within the tradition and emphasize other elements of the 
tradition. Despite the seemingly directive power that the subject 
possesses in the reading dialogue, Gadamer regards the fusion of 
horizons as geared towards producing what he refers to as 
equality and active reciprocity between subject and object. 
Gadamer therefore concurs with Merleau-Ponty in realizing that 
the reading act is one where there is a battle between what is 
explicit and what is implicit, within the tradition. This 
process, according to him, is mediated and maintained in language 
(Sprachlichkeit) and temporality (Wirkungsgeschichte) , in an 
endless process of mutual conversation. Instead of grasping 
immediately what a text contains, the reader is compelled to act 
upon what is concealed in text and defer meaning by placing it in 
the tradition for clarification. 
This subject requires the object, not so much for its content but 
for his own placement and movement in the chain of historical 
time - a process which Gadamer attempts to divert from the pure 
representational theories of foundational hermeneutics. Contrary 
to the latter, Gadamer adds his critical voice to that of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who effectively argue 
against the view of a sovereign and controlling subject who has 
direct access to the "meaning" of a textual object. While his 
predecessors see this "sharing" of subject and object in the 
reading act as a form of ontological "struggle", Gadamer rather 
emphasizes a smoother ontological process of fusion within the 
nurturing ambience of tradition. This view is clearly 
reminiscent of Heidegger's "passing over" between subject and 
162 
object. Every textual object thus according to Gadamer addresses 
itself differently to every subject so that the hermeneutic 
situation in the fusion of horizons, readers will not reconstruct 
a meaning originally intended by an author, but rather seek to 
let the present mediate the meaning in the chain of time. The 
placement and movement in time, seems to allow the subject the 
freedom to derive and construct an inexhaustible amount of 
possibilities for different perspectives. Within the horizons 
of the present, here-and-now, the subject therefore engages the 
challenge of the object not so much to construct content but 
reconstruct ever-new understandings (see Cornis-Pope, 1992: 24). 
3.5.8 READING AS THE CREATIVE RECOVERY OF MEANING 
Gadamer would like us to believe that his notion of the subject 
does not ~njoy absolute centre-stage status since it only fulfils 
the role of a cog, albeit an important cog, in terms of his own 
meaning-cpnstruction in the historical chain of events. As a cog 
I 
always en$ages in a series, Gadamer's obedient dialogical subject 
operates, like all other subjects and objects, within the 
multiplicity of pre-established prejudices and effective 
histories! to creatively "recover" the meaning that is appropriate 
for him. !The reading subject becomes the "site of knowledge" and 
informs, according to Zavarzadeh & Morton (1991: 167) t 
contemporary cognitivism. In a sense we experience in Gadamer 
a new form of interdependent-subjectivity, with fused horizons, 
seeking to exploit the possibilities of openness in which each 
subject can come into his "own" . Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
presented very stark theoretical notions of multisubjectivity, 
whereas Gadamer's notion of subjectivity seems to posit is a very 
real subject, connected to traditional consciousness. The text 
as object is supposedly encountered very idiosyncratically by 
different subjects only in that tradition. 
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This different view of the subject contrasts with the 
mathematical Cartesian subject that operates in a closed 
referential context of precision. The "non-referential" nature 
of the Gadamerian subject is possible in that he cannot seem to 
operate effectively outside of the language of the tradition. In 
the reading act the Gadamerian subject seems to struggle only 
with his own traditions to render himself a critical agent of 
himself and his life-world. While Gadamer's hermeneutics 
proposes a subject that is not completely in control of his world 
and of himself, he does so for the sake of wider historical 
concerns of humanity, debunking the notion of a self-sufficient, 
individualistic subject immersed in his own concerns. What we 
encounter here is the "historical" or "traditional" Gadamerian 
subject that has been conceptualized to pursue ever-new and 
def erred meanings of the world and of himself in order not to 
fall prey to the abuse of the object in a "usable" and 
superficial way. 
Gadamer's enlightening insights have been postulated to assist us 
in this study in rejecting the view of language a.s being a 
11 scientific tool" which is susceptible to comprehensive 
description and coherence. Gadamer' s concerns lie more with 
tradition and history, rather than language per se. However, the 
notion of language serves as an important, albeit critical, 
medium in which he proposes the ontology of a dependent reading 
subject, placed in the chain of time. In order to prevent any 
"wild reading" the historically-conditioned Gadamerian subject 
constructs meaning, 
watchful eye of an 
in a very "disciplined" manner, under the 
equally historically-conditioned object. 
Gadamer renders the invisible aspects in the text visible by 
recovering the invisible meaning through an ontological 
"historical filter" - not as an easy deciphering process but 
rather as a critical process of seeking to creatively harmonize 
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the voices of the textual object and that of the reading subject. 
If Gadamer place great emphasis and value on tradition to ensure 
that no quick fixes are involved in meaning construction, Ricoeur 
initiates a form of "hermeneutics of distanciation", 
the same purposes in meaning construction in 
individualistic style of course. 
to ensure 
his own 
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3.6. RICOEUR'S METHODIC APPROACH TO MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
3.6.1 RICOEUR'S POINT OF DEPARTURE 
In contrast to Gadamer' s "historical subject", Ricoeur focuses on 
the status of the subject as a "thinking reflective subject" and 
in an anti-Cartesian manner attempts to argue that the reading 
subject does not grasp itself in an immediate intuitive grasp, 
since the truth of the "I think therefore I am" abstraction is 
unassailable. This view has critical implications for the status 
of the reading subject since the notions of being and thinking 
are both mediated only by actions. For these acts the subject 
must, according to him, first lose himself in order to find 
himself (Ricoeur, 1973: 88). This would imply that the reading 
subject cannot just discover or construct the meaning of the text 
as something which exists there. It rather unfolds in concrete 
conditions in which the pursuit of self-understanding becomes 
patent: "··.the relation to the world of the text takes place in 
the relation to the subjectivity of the author, and at the same 
time the problem of the subjectivity of the reader is displaced" 
(Ricoeur, 1990: 328). 
Whereas traditional reflexive approach of Descartes views the 
subject as foundational, Ricoeur seeks to desubjectivize the 
subject. The subject, in its own right cannot act as the 
controller and designer of knowledge. It is only in and through 
language that the subject becomes aware of himself. For Ricoeur 
there can be no self-understanding which is not mediated by signs 
and symbols and texts via what he calls the distanciation of 
language (Ricoeur, 1991: 15). Ricoeurian subjectivity thus 
proves to be a transparent notion, which in an indirect manner, 
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i.e. via language, ultimately comes to self-understanding. As 
with Gadamer, language constitutes also for Ricoeur a crucial 
element for understanding his views on subjectivity and textual 
interpretation. 
3.6.2 RICOEUR'S VIEW OF LANGUAGE IN THE READING ACT 
It appears that Ricoeurian thinking has been greatly shaped by 
Husserlian phenomenology where the intentionality of the reader's 
consciousness coincides with that of the meaning of human 
existence. Ricoeur, considers the activity of reasoning as 
embodying a form of hermeneutics, i.e. a reading of the "hidden 
meaning" in the text that unfolds into a more expansive form of 
meaning. Ricoeur argues that human existence " ... becomes a self-
human ... only by appropriating his meaning which first resides 
"outside" in words in which life of the spirit is objectified" 
(in Reagan & Stewards, 1978: 106). Ricoeur seems keenly aware of 
the fact that words and sentences cannot simplistically just be 
used as a scientific tool to produce meanings that have been set 
up in advance. Ricoeur (1976: 13) challenges the structuralist 
. 
reductionist approach to language and reminds us: "Language do not 
speak, people do". He concedes that we need what is regarded as 
the "language system" in order to speak as well as the literary 
conventions in order to write but they are only virtual. It is 
rather people who read and write because they have specific 
intentions to express. Without rejecting what Kristeva (Oliver, 
1993: 5-8) calls the abstract dimension of language (i.e. the 
rules and structures), Ricoeur (1976) appreciates the significance 
of the material dimension of language, for it is only in terms of 
the latter that we will be able to adequately address the subject-
object dilemma in the reading act. 
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For the purposes of meaning construction Ricoeur refers to the 
"appropriative character" of language which plays an important 
role in Ricoeurian hermeneutics. Like Heidegger, he regards the 
ontological dimension of language as being significant for the 
subject's self-understanding. Ricoeur, at the same time, as 
noted, appreciates the objective side of language which he 
believes could assist the process of deciphering the symbols and 
signs, i.e. that language goes from manifest textual content and 
meaning to latent or hidden meaning (Ricoeur, 1976: 20-21). The 
discipline of hermeneutics, in Ricoeur's view, is thus concerned 
specifically with symbolic texts which have the potential for 
multiple meanings and this would ultimately mean that there can 
be no universal canons in the representational fashion for 
understanding and interpreting texts (see Palmer, 1969: 44). The 
role of language in what Ricoeur calls "interpretation", is very 
specific in that "· .. there [can be] no self-understanding that 
is not mediated by signs, symbols and texts, in the last resort 
understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these 
mediating terms" (Ricoeur, 1981: 15). Language per se, cannot 
therefore be regarded as a stable and smooth representation of an 
author or reader's intention. Unlike Gadamer where the 
appropriation of language itself constructs meaning, Ricoeur 
believes that language appropriation actualizes meanings already 
produced but which has to be "freed" by the critical reading 
subject (Ricoeur, 1973: 83). In the reading act, how exactly is 
the meaning freed? It would seem as though Ricoeur's subject is 
endowed with the potential ability to "activate" any forces within 
the subject-object encounter to construct meaning. Like Merleau-
Ponty who argues that meanings that exist in the "field of 
intersections" as the appropriative dynamic, Ricoeur sees the 
signs and symbols which mediate meanings which the reader has to 
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activate. 
However, if the reading subject, according to Ricoeur, comes to 
self-understanding only through the mediation of language, 
contrary to Heidegger's view, Ricoeur argues that the hermeneutic 
arch which grounds the subject in the present, precludes any short 
cuts to immediate self-understanding (Ricoeur, 1976: 32). This 
is Ricoeur's contribution to the development of our insights of 
reading, that the meaning-giving process is no quick, direct 
access to meaning. He believes that the subject can only arrive 
at any self-understanding through the hermeneutic interpretations 
of symbols that are able to mediate, i.e. by a process of 
deciphering hermeneutically the meanings contained in myths, 
symbols and dreams constructed by the subject's imagination. This 
critical first step in the process is a dialogical one which has 
to be succeeded by the hermeneutics of distanciation (Ricoeur, 
1976: 32). Like in the case of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, 
Ricoeur also seeks to delay the possibility of any 11 direct 11 mode 
of seeing on the part of the reading subject. Ricoeur however 
wishes to take what he believes to be a 11 more methodic" approach 
in terms of how readers should view the relationship between the 
subject and the object in the reading process. Instead of 
11 closing 11 the gap between subject and object, as Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty do, Ricoeur methodologically emphasizes the divide 
or distance in order to problematize the act of meaning 
construction more profoundly. Beyond their mere 11 dialogical 11 
relationship there resides, he believes another gap or phase of 
distanciation between the subject and the object before any 
meaning can be arrived at. This is a significant point in reading 
theory since . Ricoeur (1973: 88) does not regard this 11 distance 11 
between reading subject and textual object as a 
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vacuous void, but rather that it becomes the creative point for 
ever newer and different shades of meaning. 
3.6.3 THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE AS DISTANCIATION 
The Ricoeurian key concept of 11 distanciation 11 is significant for 
the notion of textual interpretation and meaning-construction 
since it is only in terms of distanciation that the text and the 
reader's subjectivity can be expressed within the hermeneutic 
arch. Ricoeur (1976) prefers the concept textual discourse to 
textual message since the former holds the expansive promise of 
mediation in the encounter that occurs between speaker as hearer 
(Lawlor, 1991: 83) . He moreover argues that language as discourse 
is only conceptualized in terms of the hermeneutical "method" of 
distanciation, a view which contrasts with Gadamer's emphasis on 
historical consciousness, for "... it would have been equally 
possible to begin, not with historical consciousness but 
rather with the interpretation of texts in the experience of 
reading ... " (Ricoeur, 1981: 301). Ricoeur's view is that of a 
methodological distanciation rather than a historical 
distanciation. This "distant" subject vis-a-vis the "distant" 
object marks a reality that neither of them can claim an 
authoritative voice in which the correct meaning is endowed. 
What becomes significant for Ricoeur is the immediacy of the 
reading experience which is strategically followed by a more 
delayed understanding of the textual object, the latter of which 
requires to be mediated. What essentially emerges is the notion 
of "being for the text", in that historical consciousness as a 
form of temporal distanciation, fulfils nothing but a lingual 
experience. Ricoeur (1981: 326) concurs with Gadamer, that if the 
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textual object is to be mediated for being, distanciation of 
necessity has to include temporal distance. Instead of fervently 
pursuing the closure of the divide to achieve a greater quality 
of meaning construction, Ricoeur highlights the distance between 
subject and object to avoid the controlling influence that they 
may exercise. This "distance" in the reading act resonates with 
Gadamer's because the textual object is not merely grasped in an 
intuitive or introspective way but rather in an indirect way which 
becomes, the act of meaning construction. The space of the 
reading act thus becomes therefore a creative terrain in which the 
reader's subjectivity surfaces, but only in so far as the temporal 
distanciation of the objective textual grammar surfaces. 
According to Ricoeur, the textual object assists the subject to 
reconstruct meaning for himself in his own context. It appears 
that the self-reflexive subject requires the text in order to 
problematize the act of meaning construction. 
Despite Ricoeur's insistence on the mediative function of signs 
and symbols, the role of the subject remains prominent. Ricoeur 
"balances" the act of meaning construction in arguing that the 
reading discourse can only be realized in a temporal manner, via 
a complex set of indicators such as pronouns (being self-
referential) and this process is always about something, i.e. a 
message which is exchanged (Ricoeur, 1971: 186-7). This self-
reflexive act of reading becomes a precondition of successful 
appropriation of the text. It seems that Ricoeur's contribution 
to reading is the emphasis on language which is "alive" 
(reflexive) but this "liveliness" is activated by "remote control" 
by the reading subject. The dialogical "remote control" 
relationship between subject and object, according to Ricoeur, 
marks the beginning of the process of hermeneutics for dialogue. 
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However, it is not a negative manipulative form of control but 
only serves as a stepping-stone to give effect to existential 
subjectivity. Ricoeur puts the challenge: " ... the freeing of the 
written material with respect to the dialogical condition of 
discourse is the most significant effect of writing" (Ricoeur, 
1973: 83-84). Ricoeur, in a sense, almost foreshadows Derrida by 
giving writing a life and will, for writing triggers (over 
distance) the reading subject into following the traces of ever 
greater meaning. Ricoeur clearly, initiates readers into the 
process of methodological distanciation in which reading becomes 
more than dialogue or exchange. In fact the reading act embodies 
an act of "freeing" or an ct of liberating the given, i.e. the 
subject and the object. What Ricoeur ultimately envisages is 
something different which has come about as a result of the 
subject and the object sharing with each other. The subject and 
object encounter each other with their own baggage of traditions 
and intentions which, according to Ricoeur, is no guarantee that 
they will remain in tact. Ricoeur seems to want to escape the 
Gadamerian bondage of tradition which guides the reading act. 
In problematizing literal representationalism, Ricoeur's 
hermeneutic circle wants to escape "sameness" which conditions the 
reading act and rather welcomes difference (alienness) as the 
creative ground for reading. 
The Ricoeurian hermeneutic circle therefore encompasses a creative 
process of what is called "appropriation", which is essentially 
making that which is foreign and alien, one's own. Appropriation 
for Ricoeur moreover symbolizes the divide of distanciation from 
the author's intentions and the situation, for"· .. appropriation 
is quite the contrary of contemporaneousness and congeniality: it 
is understanding at and through distance" 
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(Ricoeur, 1973: 87) .It would seem therefore that it is ultimately 
the subject who "constructs" understanding by allowing the reading 
act to permeate through temporal distanciation, via the 
appropriation of the object. This "non-referential" or indirect 
stance excludes a quick and simplistic view of meaning which is 
typical of literal reading. Ricoeur's thesis that the 
appropriative character of language, however, resides not only in 
the realm of understanding as maintained by Heidegger and Gadamer, 
but also at the level of what he calls "explanation" - a view 
which clarifies his methodic approach to the reading act. 
3.6.4 EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE READING ACT 
In an attempt to expand new insights into the dynamics of the 
reading act Ricoeur attempts to overcome the Diltheyan dichotomy 
between explanation and understanding, and as a result relies on 
Habermas' notion of depth hermeneutics (reconstruction) . (see 
Colburn, 1986). Essentially Dilthey' s psychologism suffers, 
according to Ricoeur (1976: 23) from "non-dialogical one-
sidedness" which emphasizes the divine sovereign attempts. 
Ricoeur believes that the reading subject engages both the notion 
of explanation and understanding as a dialectical couplet, which 
operates as "· .. relative moments in a complex process that can 
be termed interpretation" (Ricoeur, 
1981: 126) . Ricoeur 1 s view of understanding and explanation 
moreover attempts to evade the seduction of both prejudice 
(Vorurteil) and tradition which governs Gadamer• s pursuits of 
meaning construction. 
In the reading act this complex dialogical process is expressed 
at an epistemological as well as ontological level, yielding 
knowledge about an object or event and a sense of being in the 
subject. According to Ricoeur, this dialecticism of explanation 
173 
and understanding does not represent the Dil theyan 11 thicket of 
psychologism", but contrary to Dilthey's view, Ricoeurian 
understanding of the textual object does not mean understanding 
the author behind the object, but " ... what is being talked about, 
the thing of the text, namely, the kind of world the text unfolds 
as it were before the text" (Ricoeur, 1981: 131). Ricoeur 
therefore emphasizes the pre-established meaning of the reading 
encounter which unfolds in each reading act through appropriation. 
The reading subject has the capacity to appropriate meaning, 
according to Ricoeur, wh~ch has already been produced, but this 
needs to creatively be actualised in his personal situation. It 
is clear that the reading subject does not use language in a tool-
kit fashion for whatever his need at the moment would be, and as 
a result, automatically usurp the textual meaning, but the meaning 
makes him what he makes of it. This added ontological dimension 
of language, as is the case of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, is to 
be experienced in an indirect manner, in those concrete situations 
in which the subject finds himself, affected by things while at 
the same time knowing that he is not at their source. 
Ricoeur's "indirect" view of the reading act maintains that the 
reading subject can only understand himself in the light of the 
textual object but only to the extent that "· .. the text is not 
closed in upon itself but opens onto the world which it 
redescribes and remakes" (Ricoeur, 1981:131). The text, in a 
sense, becomes a subject in that it "breathes" as much as the 
reading subject, yielding a sense of the ontological potential of 
the textual object. The potential capacity for the constant 
revision and remaking of the world speaks of a reciprocal 
ontological bond between textual object and reading subject. Like 
Gadamer, Ricoeur proposes a reading subject that is not completely 
in control of his world (text) or of himself. The world and the 
subject are mediated through signs and symbols. In the reading 
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act the Ricoeurian linguistic subject engages in the process of 
both explanation and understanding by actively initiating a 
process of reconstructing the internal dynamic of the textual 
object by opening up worlds which express possibilities of being 
and which allows for meaning construction and ultimately self-
understanding. This "opening-up" of meaning 11 thrives 11 on the 
difference and alien positions of object and subject. 
3.6.5 THE ACT OF INTERPRETATION AS RESOLVING CONFLICT 
Crucial to our understanding of the subject-object dualism which 
usually marks the logical representational theories of meaning 
construction, is the ontological dimension of self-understanding, 
which has been underscored particularly since Heidegger. In the 
hermeneutic tradition Gadamer confers a historical consciousness 
on his notion of self-understanding of the subject. Ricoeur 
acknowledges and in fact highlights the non-traditional and non-
identical as the creative tension between reader and text. It is 
this "non-correspondence" between them which prevents the reader 
from seeking an immediate and literal correspondence between words 
and meaning. It is in this encounter that conflict has to be 
"resolved" in order to make meaning. 
Ricoeur's notion of self-understanding emerges in the space of 
textual discourse during which appropriation (Aneignung) reduces 
the estrangement (Verfremdung) and, as a result, requires from the 
subject serious internal self-critique. 
of reference is what he regards as 
For Ricoeur the language 
the self-reference of 
discourse: "Discourse refers back to its speaker at the same time 
that it refers to the world" (Ricoeur, 1976: 22). Instead of a 
one-way representationalism from reader to text, there is a "push-
pull 11 dynamic which marks the creative tension between subject and 
object. In the reading act this "push-pull" process, the subject 
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needs to distance himself from himself, for at all levels in 
hermeneutics, the act of distanciation and appropria-tion becomes 
a condition for understanding (Ricoeur, 1973: 88}. 
The dynamics of meaning construction for Ricoeur entails more than 
only coming to terms with the interpretation of symbols, since the 
text mediates the relation to the subject. Like Gadamer's subject, 
Ricoeur's subject does not "construct" understanding for being, 
but engages in a process that the subject himself experiences. 
It is not only what meaning is constructed but more particularly 
how meaning is constructed. It is only in the interpretation act 
of conflict that Ricoeur (1973} argues that self-understanding can 
pass via the detour of understanding the cultural signs in which 
the self documents and shapes itself, for ". . . interpretation 
"brings together", "equalizes", "renders contemporary and 
similar", thus genuinely making one's own that what was initially 
alien" (Ricoeur, 1971: 119}. Like with Heidegger, Ricoeur views 
the reader as an "engaging agent" to develop the substance of his 
own subjectivity - a subjectivity which is based of using the 
alien and foreign to understand and identify itself. 
Ricoeur moreover seeks to transcend the "purely subjective" nature 
of the interpretation act because unlike Dilthey, he methodically 
incorporates the notion of cultural and historical appropriation 
into the act of interpretation. Ricoeur's merit resides in the 
fact that he uses objective (i.e. that which is external to the 
subject} to define the subjectivity he claims for himself. He 
moreover attempts to go beyond the purely referential process of 
regarding interpretation as an act on the text to an objective 
interpretation that would be an act of the text - motivated by the 
"foreign and alien". The foreign and alien of the subject vis-a-
vis the object already speaks of separation and fragmentation as 
the basis upon which new and different perspectives of meaning can 
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be generated. This non-referential thrust of the action of the 
text and reader is an important development in Ricoeur's 
understanding of the act of interpretation. As a result, the 
creative action of the text with the subject, i.e. the 
interpretation of the context, lies at the very heart of what 
Ricoeur calls the "hermeneutic arch", i.e. the final brace of the 
bridge which anchors the arch in the ground of lived experience. 
Ricoeur (1976: 30) argues that "The text's career escapes the 
finite horizon lived by its author. What the text means now 
matters more than what the author meant when he wrote it". This 
is Ricoeur's main thrust, that there cannot be any external and 
stable message for a text, for in every reading, it becomes a 
unique creation. Ricoeur believes that his view is far from an 
arbitrary point of view, since 11 appropriation loses its 
arbitrariness what the interpreter says is resaying that 
reactivates what is said in the text" (Ricoeur, 1971: 124). The 
creative reading subject in the hermeneutic arch creates and 
discovers according to a very methodic and disciplined way what 
the active texts presents and, as a result, reconstructs the 
meanings himself whilst constantly also revising his own meaning 
for being. 
3.6.6 THE ACT OF INTERPRETATION AS IMAGINATIVE ENTERPRISE 
Another dimension of Ricoeur's insights into the reading act is 
that the textual object seems only real in as much as it is also 
imaginary since " the subjectivity of the reader comes to 
itself only in so far as it is placed in suspense, unrealized, 
potentialized" (Ricoeur, 1973: 88) . This is reminiscent of 
Heidegger's "not-yet-complete" stance to the reading act. Within 
the suspended hermeneutical arch of a potentialized text, the 
reading subject encounters the process of constant remaking of its 
own being and reality and "... as reader, I find myself only 
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losing by myself. Reading introduces me into the imaginative 
variations of the ego" (Ricoeur, 1973: 88). Ricoeur' s 
understanding of the reading act seems to thrive on loss, 
alienation and separation in order to achieve gain, togetherness 
and wholesomeness of understanding and being. Ricoeur thus does 
not depart, in the first place, on the basis of totality and 
coherence- seeking of meaning. Ricoeur moreover envisages the 
"alienated" reading subject in practical rather than logical/ 
theoretical terms and he therefore postulates a subject which is 
not fixed and stable but can develop and change in and through the 
creative encounter with the "alienated" text. The subject 
experiences, according to him, an imaginative variation by playing 
the role of subject to the text's ideal meaning. These 
imaginative variations allow for a form of understanding which is 
to be as much disappropriated as appropriated. The very nature 
of imagination entails "not immediately within grasp" but has to 
be gained through hard work. 
The metaphors or narratives constructed by imagination in the 
reading act provide the subject with imaginative variations of the 
world and, as a result, offers him the freedom to conceive the 
world in new ways. This opportunity for multiple reading also 
marks for Ricoeur a site of "struggle": "The right of the reader 
and the right of the text converge in an important struggle that 
generates the whole dynamic of interpretation. Hermeneutics 
begins where dialogue ends" (Ricoeur, 1976: 32) . In this way 
Ricoeur's progress seems to go much further than that of Gadamer. 
The Gadamerian subject has to be brought in line with the dialogic 
of the tradition of its Wirkungsgeschichte, whereas Ricoeur 
proposes another level of "struggle" in which the subject would 
only be "permitted" to have a fuller understanding of the textual 
object and, as a result, of himself as being human - it is not an 
act that can be guaranteed. 
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3.6.7 THE APPROPRIATION AND DISAPPROPRIATION OF READING. 
Instead of pursuing coherence of meaning and ultimately being, 
Ricoeur deems appropriation and disappropriation to be of equal 
significance for meaning construction. In the reading act these 
new ways of "seeing" and "interpreting", in Ricoeur's thinking, 
is part of the continual revision and remaking of the textual 
object w ich the reading subject could "inhabit". Ricoeur's 
intentio is not a "disclosing" act of reciprocal "passing over" 
between ubj ect and object as is the case with Heidegger but 
rather a struggle in which the "incoherent" and "unfamiliar" is 
appropriated to make meaning for the subject. This process is 
never guaranteed despite the attempts of imagination, for the 
"incoherent" and "unfamiliar" of the object may disappropriate and 
prevent meaningful understanding of the text. True subjectivity 
may thus remain unrealized (Ricoeur, 1973: 88). Ricoeur however 
does not exclude the possibilities of projection when the reader 
interprets the textual object. In fact he believes that it is 
"· .. at the moment when a new meaning emerges out of the ruins of 
literal prediction that imagination offers its specific mediation" 
(Ricoeur, 1981: 172). Imagination is thus part of Ricoeur's 
methodic strategic seeking to appropriate meaning. 
In rethinking the act of meaning construction, the appropriation 
of meaning is therefore the creative challenge to resurrect deeper 
meanings out of the dead "ruins of literal reading". It is 
important to note that this sense of imagination constitutes a 
mediative method or strategy rather than content, which coincides 
with the Kantian notion of schematism. Ricoeur considers the role 
of imagination as embodying a decidedly ontological paradox of the 
process of creation-as-discovery since, " ... through the recovery 
of the capacity of language to create and recreate, we discover 
reality itself in the process of being created ... " (Ricoeur, 1976: 
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215) . Out of the ruins of the manipulative words of the text the 
reader experiences a "conflict of interpretation" in discovering, 
but at the same time, creating meaning on the basis of the 
differences between the reading subject and the textual 
object. (Ricoeur, 1973 :4). The "recovery" of meaning in a 
constructive sense is meaning that already exists, except that the 
reading subject appropriates it in his terms, his world, his 
being. 
In a sense Ricoeur concurs with Heidegger in that the subject 
engages with the object to project an already-established meaning 
in his own context. Instead of pursuing a direct and quick route 
to meaning, Ricoeur infuses the mediative mechanisms of signs and 
symbols. Despite the differences that have to be overcome the 
self-reflexive Ricoeurian subject seemingly enjoys centre-stage 
in the constructive, albeit imaginative, task of creating meaning. 
The "struggling" subject is confined to the discourse of its 
counter or alter-ego as embodied in the text. Ricoeur seems to 
usher us into the notion of the subject deconstructing himself via 
the text, and as a result averts direct access to the 
understanding of the author's text. This form of reading, as a 
result, fosters a constantly renewed critical understanding of the 
textual object and of self. This critical understanding clearly 
thrives on difference and alienness, rather than familiarity and 
sameness as is the case with Gadamer's idea of the reading act. 
Ricoeur's contribution for the understanding of the reading act 
seems to reside in his attempts to avoid the practice of a 
sovereign and master-mind subject acquiescing into a "quick or 
simplistic understanding" of the text but rather engaging in a 
process of fragmentation and difference - a view foreshadowing the 
post-structuralist view of reading. In their hermeneutical 
pursuits both Gadamer and Ricoeur seek to dethrone the 
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authoritative voice of the subject by rendering the 11 discovery-
recovery11, a sharing process. However Gadamer's subject becomes 
an obedient subject operating under the yoke of tradition whereas 
Ricoeur's subject operates under the yoke of discipline, i.e. a 
"methodic pursuit" of IT\eaning which operates essentially as a 
temporally creative divide between subject and object. The 
Ricoeurian approach, like that of his predecessors in the persons 
of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer, postulates a reflexive, 
human subject, who no longer presumes to act as the sole definer 
and creator of meaning but constantly has to re-engage with the 
object, in terms of which his own subjectivity is constantly being 
remade and redefined. Ricoeur' s decided contribution to the 
reading act is what Eco(1976) later refers to as the "structural 
bias" of both subject and object. This methodic distance between 
them, rather than pursuing their similarity and complementarity, 
seeks to overcome the "circularity" which gripped Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. The Ricoeurian notion of 
"appropriation and disappropriation", embedded in the "conflict 
of interpretations", is the bedrock for the reading subject to 
constantly deconstruct himself, his opinions and biases - in order 
to make meaning of the text and of himself. Ricoeur therefore 
introduces a sense of indeterminacy, paradox and instability in 
the reading process in order to avoid being fooled and trapped by 
the smooth surface that words and sentences tend to lure the 
reader with. The Ricoeurian "appropriative function" of the 
reading act effectively problematizes the reproductive tendency 
that language may exercise in meaning construction. 
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3.7 THE SHIFT IN NEW PERSPECTIVES OF THE PIONEERS. 
It has become clear that while the pioneers of the new 
perspectives in reading, in the persons of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and Ricoeur, seriously sought to postulate 
new and other perspectives for the dilemma entailed in the 
separation of subject and object in the construction of meaning, 
they remain nevertheless intensely aware of the "opposition 
stance" of the notions and functions of subject and object. 
Heidegger introduces a "passing over", Merleau-Ponty a "field of 
intersection", Gadamer a tradition of sharing and Ricoeur an 
appropriation of the unfamiliar, between the reading subject and 
textual object. Nietzsche's seminal critique of casting doubt on 
the Cartesian - inherited "truths", posing under the neat and tidy 
guise of correspondence between language and meaning, marks the 
critical onset of rethinking the subject-object in a very specific 
context, i.e. the context of language. Language enabled all the 
pioneering thinkers to challenge the validity of "truth" and 
therefore allowed them to question whether the content of a text, 
in a logical correspondence manner, can convey meaning. 
Their attempts at rethinking the solidly-wedded couplet viz. 
language and subjectivity, initiates a reconceptualized 
understanding way of meaning construction and the validity of its 
epistemology. Contrary to the logical powers of words in the 
literal representational theory of Descartes and Kant's 
transcendental subject, which leaves the thinghood of the textual 
object uncontested, we encounter in this chapter a revised 
position of where the reading subject and textual object, 
together, in varying ways, are being held responsible for meaning 
and knowledge construction. The sovereignty of the transcendental 
subject and the empirical autobiographical subject are challenged 
to make way for an active sharing and committed subject who, for 
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the first time, becomes human in and through the joint endeavour 
with the object in a concrete world. This is evidenced in 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's Dasein and In-the-world notions, 
Gadamer's tradition and Ricoeur's imagination. This concrete and 
humane experience (in-this-world) in language, imputes a reading 
subject into an already existing world of things and meanings and 
not the other way round. Whether this being-in-the-world is 
experienced in a process of transcending over to each other 
(Heidegger), struggling in the in-between (Merleau-Ponty), 
acquiescing into a tradition (Gadamer), or grasping temporal 
distance between subject and object (Ricoeur), they all ultimately 
seem to realize the "struggling" or "conflictual" complexities 
which are involved in dismantling of the notion of mastery and 
control of texts and fixed messages. What these pioneers achieve 
in their respective theories is challenging the simplistic notion 
of an authoritative reader who assumes an "outside position" (of 
the text) and putting content and meaning into the text in terms 
of his personalized intentions and conventions. Nietzsche 
initiates the pioneering attempts in this study in order to 
"restart" the problematization of the reading act and all its 
notions of language, truth and validity, and to reassess all this 
from a position of doubt. 
It has become clear that these respective authors effectively 
problematize the validity and truthfulness of meanings derived 
from the reading act by highlighting the notion of alienation and 
disappropriation between the reading subject and textual object. 
The reader, as a result, is only likely to progress to a more 
valid and expansive understanding of the readings he engages in 
by "letting language speak", from which the numerous possibilities 
of meaning derive. Instead of contending with a self-assured and 
definitive understanding of the text, Heidegger furthers our 
insights by honing the creative "passing over" of disclosure 
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between subject and object. Merleau-Ponty argues that his 
creative "field of intersections" minimizes the false alienation 
which exists between subject and object. Gadamer embraces the 
"non-negotiable" fusion of historical horizons of subject and 
object for greater depth of interpretation, while Ricoeur 
emphasizes the potential "I am able" status of the reading subject 
in terms of the constant ebb and flow of appropriation and 
disappropriation in an imaginative state of recreation. 
The pioneers have also initiated the critical process of 
deconstructing the identity of a monolithic understanding of the 
reading subject. Their critical contribution to the understanding 
of meaning construction is that there cannot be any immediate and 
direct access to "the meaning" of a text which holds for all 
eternity. Understanding the "mediative dynamic" in the various 
theories prove illuminating, for it is as a result of these 
creative mediative mechanisms, which operate in and through 
language that these theorists not only cast understanding on the 
meaning production process but also on the notion of subjectivity 
itself. Contrary to the limited view of the monolithic stability 
of identity that marks the manipulative reading subject, they 
effectively challenge a unitary nature of the subject who operates 
from an outside position vis-a-vis the object. Beyond Descartes 
and Kant, we experience with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur a multi-subjectivity where the reader (in his 
many readings of a text) constantly recreates his own 
subjectivity. They introduce therefore the notion of a 
multiplicity of subjectivities, experienced by the reader which 
is constantly being renewed and redefined in terms of their 
potential and the potential of the textual object. The 
advancement of this "multiplicity" notion challenges the single 
smooth reading which the text has in mind. In fact, we have 
become aware of the multiple perspectives that a single text may 
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engender a view which is a far cry of the smooth 
representationalism of the theoretical and logical subject. 
While these philosophers have made tremendous strides since 
Descartes and Kant in presuming the non-dichotomous presence of 
subject and object in the process of meaning construction, they 
seem nevertheless to have got stuck at that level. They 
essentially develop a circular and reciprocal conditioning process 
with the assistance of language. However, Ricoeur pushes this 
circularity mode into a new dimension by emphasizing the 
dissimilar and unfamiliar of the subject and object. Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer have been directed almost exclusively 
in eliminating the spurious gap that exists between subject and 
object (searching for similarity and concurrence) and, in the 
process, established an ontology and meaning which can only occur 
with others in a concrete world. The mediative in-between zone 
has become the driving force behind their new thinking, conferring 
on the traditional subject (in the form of the flesh-and-blood 
reader) a more human status, despite the case that they seem to 
make out for equivalence or equity between subject and object. 
Their reliance on language (as a tool) to invoke tradition or 
imagination to add value beyond its rule guided status, is 
patently obvious. The new thinking operates within the boundaries 
of language-dependence (which is naturally typical of their epoch) 
is to construct an understanding of subjectivity, and what seems 
to be its natural extension, objectification. Objecting (like 
subjecting), despite efforts to demonstrate the contrary, 
essentially remains the reading subject's prerogative, precisely 
because language or discourse is still regarded as a human 
fabrication. The notion of language as being "the house of 
being"(Heidegger) or language preceding all existence (Merleau-
Ponty), remains a hypothetical design to accommodate the reader's 
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concerns to bring together things that are of ten not of our human 
making (objects), together with our own human intentions and 
wishes as persons. 
All of the theorists highlight the subjective or subject-side of 
the textual object which allows the reading act to become an act 
of sharing, disclosure and dialogue, rather than a one-way 
process. This "reversibility" (Merleau-Ponty) and "harmony of 
voices" (Gadamer), and "appropriation" (Ricoeur) of meanings, 
broadens the scope of interpretation in the reading act 
tremendously. Every sovereign voice (be it the text or the 
reader) can be counter-balanced. Knowledge construction and 
meaning-giving in the reading act, despite the co-determinative 
attempts of subject and object, takes on a new dimension in that 
all attempts at understanding a more valid rendering of reading 
can only be but one valid perspective in discourse. This 
discourse unfolds in a mediative way in historicity (Heidegger), 
clearings of situations (Merleau-Ponty) , tradition (Gadamer) and 
distanciation (Ricoeur) . Because the gap or divide (which is very 
real in the reading act) has been ontologically problematized, 
these theories have redefined the "nature" of reading subjectivity 
and language, and the ultimate shades and depths of meanings of 
texts. Co-determination, sharing and disclosure, despite their 
dissimilarity, has been the operative mode of these pioneers - a 
position which will eventually raise the ire of a new group of 
radical theorists, who seek to push the limits of understanding 
reading and meaning construction to an increasingly revolutionized 
state of non-dependence and non-contextuality - in which language 
or linguistic traces or systems assume a life of their own and, 
as a result, radically reviews the very necessity of subjectivity 
(or objectivity) for being responsible for the construction of 
meaning in the reading act. 
In order to do justice to or dilemma in this study, viz. 
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understanding the intricacies of language and the nature of 
subjectivity vis-a-vis the text, we need to explore a broader and 
perhaps more comprehensive view of these issues as embellished by 
the "new" masters in our next chapter. It may mean that the 
selection of the initial two theorists dealt with still stand with 
one leg in the camp of the "pioneering masters", and the other 
stretching towards the "new masters". Methodologically this may 
suggest a transitional phase which ultimately ushers us into the 
more integrative and transformative view - ultimately giving us 
a more comprehensive picture of the reading act. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUBVERTING THE PIONEERS: THE "NEW" MASTERS. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In radicalizing the boundaries of how we conceptualize the 
reading act, our point of departure suggests more than the 
inevitable fact that many writings prompt conflicting readings. 
This concern leads to the further critical question of whether 
any reading, whatsoever, should be acceptable and valid, or 
moreover whether each text should allow only one absolutely 
valid reading. In the previous chapter the authors/theorists 
variously grappled with the question of whether the reader can 
match or pair off parts of the text with objects which were 
before the eyes of the writer. For example, the scientist who 
seeks to read "realistically" or scientifically may think that 
unless such matching or pairing is possible, he will not be 
able to give sense to his claim that science tells us how the 
world is in itself, apart from our human needs and desires. In 
this study clearly, we do not wish to make this latter claim, 
since we accept all "uses" of language - including scientific 
theory construction - as ways of gratifying such needs and 
desires. Our concern in this chapter is whether there is a "way 
the world is in itself" and if so, how does it get constructed, 
other than by means of precision-seeking representationalism. 
The authors in the previous chapter had already initiated views 
of "non-representional" ways of thinking and reading and 
methodologically emphasize the whole idea of truth as accurate 
representation is no longer being tenable. In this vein 
Davidson (1989:165), on the notion of the conflictual nature of 
188 
interpretation, states: 
"Beliefs are true or false, but they 
represent nothing. It is good to be rid of 
representations, and with them the 
correspondence theory of truth, for it is 
thinking there are representations that 
engenders thoughts of relativism". 
Davidson's statement about the origin of thoughts of relativism 
is elaborated when he suggests that representations are 
relative to a scheme, eg. a map represents Mexico, but only 
relative to a mercator, or some other projection. We take this 
point to be that we should restrict the term "representation" 
to things like maps and codes - things which we can spell out 
rules of projection in reading which "match" objects with other 
objects, and thus embody criteria of accurate representation. 
Heidegger, Gadamer and others in the previous chapter have 
extended the notion of representation beyond these ideas, i.e. 
the picture of language use as a matter of obedience to rules 
of projection, and semantical theories - as descriptions of 
those rules. What the reader and the author shares, to the 
extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so 
cannot be a language governed by rules or conventions known to 
the reader and author in advance. This prompts Davidson 
( 1986: 445) to conclude that " ... there is no such thing as a 
language, not if a language is anything like what many 
philosophers and linguists have supposed ... We must give up the 
idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language 
users acquire and then apply to cases". This "giving up" of the 
traditional conceptions of language which influences the 
structure within which the subject and his representations 
occur, is precisely the radicalization of meaning construction 
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that this chapter wishes to address. The reading "experience" 
may even suggest an attempt of "crashing" the centrality of an 
authoritative reader who insinuates that the construction of 
meaning had been the result of an interactive process between 
itself and the world which the writer by means of language had 
postulated in the text. The authors in the previous chapter had 
already, and successfully, argued the point that this 
reciprocal sharing and exchange between reader and text is far 
from mere duplicating of signified meaning of content. Their 
pressing concerns have been the action within reading - which 
already alluded to the fact the reading act, as opposed to 
interpretation, the latter of which relies heavily on the uses 
of language (which Davidson denounces) comes about, is the 
further focus in this chapter. In other words, what other 
possibilities exist in order to make that which is invisible in 
meaning construction, visible. Can this action succeed by still 
clinging to the usual understandings of language, subjectivity 
and representation? Or is reading perhaps nothing more than 
what Derrida (1976:159) refers to as an attempt to expose its 
failure because"· .. in that search for the signified which we 
put in question, not to annul it but to understand it within a 
system to which such a reading is blind?" 
This radical way of looking at the reading act implies 
reviewing in a fundamental way how we deploy our 
"indispensable" notions of subject, object and language in 
terms of schemes which either approach the text's meaning as 
determined by its origins or, that which believes it transcends 
its origins. While these two views are not reconcilable in a 
logical sense, they are nevertheless important (in 
juxtaposition) in order to grasp some understanding of the 
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theoretical difficulties of attempts at a fusion between the 
two which risk, as with Wolfgang Iser' s (1978) version of 
reception theory, falling between two stools. Since every text 
therefore comes into being as a result of a complex interplay 
of factors and issues, each text appears to pose a major 
challenge to the reader. Reviewing therefore our assumptions of 
the subject in of terms new theoretical developments of 
language, inevitably engenders assumptions of the author and 
reader vis-a-vis new dimensions given to ·the virtually 
irreconcilable assumptions of the traditional assumptions of 
subject and text. At the same time, in order to subvert the 
monopology of literal meaning as displayed in contemporary 
society, our assumptions of the text becomes radically revised 
in terms of the generally-accepted consumerist view of the text 
as object. In other words, could meaning also derive from 
"elsewhere" or "imported from without" rather than within the 
usual subject-object reading discourses so eloquently 
postulated by our authors in the previous chapter. Newton 
(1986:35) clarifies: 
In discourses constituted by a limited set 
of interests generate the constraints or 
"grammatical structures" essential to the 
existence of meaning. But if literary 
discourse is not constituted by any set of 
interests other than the desire to 
interpret, "literal" meaning is an 
incoherent concept. Meaning is not 
generated from the within the discourse 
but imported from without .. " 
Beyond the "limited set of interests" of the human reader as 
subject interacting (whether via history, social conventions, 
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1 inguistics structures, etc. ) with the text as object, we 
propose to examine the possibilities of reversing or subverting 
the above position by looking at the author as not necessarily 
being a singular writer of a text, in as much as regarding the 
reader as not being simply the subjective giver of meaning vis-
a-vis the textual object in which meaning has been imputed and 
where meaning is defined. 
This radical break-away means, on the level of theory, that 
representation is contrasted with a conception of the text 
which, emerging as it did within the general framework of eg. 
structuralism, makes language the dominant and determining 
factor; the text becomes merely a space of language, a space 
in which language is produced and transformed rather than being 
used (in a tool-kit fashion) to represent o~ express anything 
outside itself. The tricky question of meaning, the relation 
between signifier and signified, becomes redefined as a set of 
operations which are internal to the text - but also beyond. 
Our reconceptualized view of the reading act, as envisaged by 
the new masters, attempts to seek meaning outside of the 
written text, between words, sentences, pages and even between 
and among texts. The intra as well as extra dimensions of 
reading, even in scientific reading, imports enormous 
dimensions into the quality of understandings we would arrive 
at - generating with every reading newer and more dimensions of 
understanding. Against this extraordinary notion of 
multiplicity and indeterminacy of reading (in the scope of 
meaning construction) the new masters in the persons of Eco, 
Letman, Barthes, Lacan and Derrida, propose to explore new and 
yet critical depths of reading, opening their peculiar 
understanding of the nature of language, of subject and object 
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rendering the reading act a richness which remains 
challenging, as pointed out by Barthes (1986:35): 
"There is no structural obligation to 
close my reading: I can just as well 
extend the limits of the readable to 
infinity, decide that everything is 
finally readable (unreadable as this 
seems), but also, conversely, I can decide 
that in the depths of every text, however 
readable its conception, there 
remains a certain 
unreadable" . 
measure 
is, there 
of the 
The new masters, in engaging with infinity and the unreadable, 
set out to challenge and in many instances overthrow the 
repressive "structural obligations" that determine the 
construction of meaning in reading, for this involves nothing 
more than what De Bolla (1989:240) describes as having to deal 
with"· .. more than simply readers and texts; at its base it is 
concerned with the place of the subject, how it is constructed 
and who or what can be said to own it. When the question being 
addressed· is: should one become the person of the author, 
thereby relinquishing one's own personality, against the 
possible personation of the author, appropriating the person of 
the author to oneself, the stakes that are being played for are 
very high indeed." The critical challenge of meaning 
construction posed in this chapter proves to be even more 
complex when we consider the different "uses" in contemporary 
society to which the various readings of the text newspapers, 
reports etc. may be put. How ought people to read them? When 
the co lexity of the notion of the subject and human knowledge 
idered, we clearly realize that the reading act cannot 
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proceed along superficial lines 
Having explored the act of 
as prescribed by recipes. 
reading in the various 
phenomenological and hermeneutical ways in the previous chapter 
by the various authors, we realize that the pursuit of a 
"deeper meaning" of the text has further possibilities to 
"excavate" and construct meaning along other routes. Despite 
the numerous points of convergence in emphases and shades of 
accents of constructing the place and role of subjectivity, and 
demonstrating the work of language, to produce many (other) 
readings of a text, this chapter wants to pursue a more 
comprehensive framework in order to encourage more 
comprehensive reading that would enrich readers far more 
substantially. 
To what extent is this transformed reading (beyond dialogical 
reading) achieved in the radicalization of subjectivity and 
views of language in the projects of Eco, Lotman, Barthes, 
Lacan and Derrida? Beyond the restrictive literal/reproductive 
ways of reading (and the more or less sophisticated variations 
thereof), the new masters seek to unshackle reproductive 
reading's repressive nature in order to pursue the 
"uncontrollable multiplicity of ambiguities" (Johnson, 
1977: 156) which could become a more tenable framework for 
meaning construction than that of the repressive nature of mere 
literal reading. By doing this we are able to get beyond what 
Maurice Blanchet (1982:189) rejects as the interpretive or 
communicative model of reading. Instead, we hopefully will 
arrive at what Derrida (1981:63) argues as "reading is 
transformational". This is the manifest challenge to the pre-
established and fixed identities of reader and text in the 
thinking of the new maters. This is also strangely, the threat 
to reading, 
according to 
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i . e . knowing how to 
Blanchot (1982:96), 
precisely, not knowing how to read. 
opening up of the reading act 
read, but paradoxically, 
"knowing" to read is, 
In order to explore the 
beyond its dialogical, 
communicative function, Umberto Eco seems to be an appropriate 
starting-point, pursuing the 11 unlimited semiosis" dynamics of 
reading. 
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4.2 ECO'S STRATEGIC SYSTEMIC CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING 
4.2.1 SEMIOTICS AND THE READING ACT. 
The critical discourses of the pioneers in the persons of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and Ricoeur 
effectively challenged the complexity of the reading act which 
assumed that "a meaning" exists in the text and that it is the 
task of the reader to "resuscitate" that meaning. In doing 
this they brought an entire new dimension to the understanding 
of reading in redefining the role of language, subjectivity and 
representation. Following their worthwhile pursuits are the 
new critics who seek to radicalize their efforts. Umberto Eco, 
as our first critic, is one of those theorists that have 
initiated a new conceptualization of the reading subject who 
operates in terms of radically different understandings of 
language - at least different from Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and 
Gadamer. In seeking to rethink what thinkers since Descartes 
have done to clarify the reading act in terms of clear subject 
and object interactions, Eco ushers us beyond what was 
generally regarded as dialogical and ultimately "circular" 
theories. Amidst the plethora of semiotic theories that 
abound, Eco postulates one which specifically advances our 
understanding of reading subjectivity and representation, which 
lays, among others, the foundations for what is later to become 
known as the post-modernist theories of "textual 
interpretation" . 
In critically exploring new horizons for our understanding of 
the reading act, semiotics, as a form of ". . . intellectual 
curiosity about the ways we represent our world to ourselves 
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and each other" (Sless, 1986: 61) introduces us to an exciting 
and certainly a valid approach to the act of reading. It is 
evident to us when we as readers attempt to distance ourselves 
from our usual means of constructing meaning and understanding 
and seek to also examine how the semiotic approach to textual 
understanding and meaning construction opens new pathways for 
us. The strategic act of 11 distanciation 11 from the world 
signifies a form of "structural bias" (Eco, 1976) in terms of 
which we survey our world as represented in the text and 
semiotics, as a result, seeks to clarify what this "structural 
bias" means to us as reading subjects. 
Despite the significant developments that have been made in 
theoretical and applied semiotics (see Noth, 1978) it would 
appear that there is as yet no complete consensus on what is 
generally understood by semiotics. Also the historical 
development of semiotics cannot simply be taken as a chronicle 
of past and present events since a chronicle contains no 
explanatory comment beyond the mere factual documentation (see 
Eschbach & Trabant, 1983). In terms of meaning construction it 
is generally argued that semiotics, as a specific science of 
signification, wants to clarify our understanding of the 
complexities of the "systems of communication" in general, and 
the "procedures" of the reading act specifically (see Sless, 
1986; Eco, 1990; Eco, 1992; Calinescu, 1993; Cornis-Pope, 
1992). 
Notwithstanding the rich and various understandings we have 
developed about semiotics, there also seems to be an 
irreducible quality about its nature in that any statements 
about users, readers, signs or texts in the reading act, can 
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never be proclaimed in isolation from each other. A claim 
about the one would of necessity contain implications for or 
about the other. Therefore central to semiotics is the theory 
of processes as well as structures (see Ray, 1986) which 
inevitably integrate. In this sense semiotics introduces a 
11 new language" of theorizing and different approach to meaning 
construction as those of the pioneering thinkers in this study. 
Since semiotics does not regard the analysis of signs and 
signification in language and text in a linear and 
straightforward fashion, we have to grasp the process of 
textual interrogation whereby the textual message is 
problematised and as a result transposed from the readable text 
which essentially constitutes the written word. Such signs are 
generally problematised in what is regarded as "discourse" and 
this process of "transportation", as a result, renders the 
status of the sign dynamic, i.e. as having movement or life 
within it. In the reading act this dynamic movement moreover 
occurs from one level to another, trom place to place, from 
system to system, from text to reader, from reader to text and 
from text to text - a systemic approach which is different from 
the thinking of the pioneers' notions of ontology and 
intersubjectivity in the reading act. 
Eco (1990: 32) refers to the unfolding of the reading act as 
what he regards as the ideal process of "unlimited semiosis" 
where every content (or object) is an expression 
(representation) which is interpreted by another expression 
endowed with its own content, and as a result, potentially 
reproduces ad infinitum. This Piercean notion of "unlimited 
semiosis" which Eco invokes in his new thinking of reading by 
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no means implies a form of indeterminancy and vagueness of 
interpretation. It rather implies a semiotic structure or 
system in which it produces, with the reading subject, many 
possible meanings. Eco attacks the notion of deconstructionism 
which "exploits" the notion of unlimited semiosis and hence 
seems to hold licence in any "arbitrary" interpretations of a 
text. (Collini in Eco, 1992: 13). Eco already introduces to us 
new notions of "process", "systems" and "structures" to clarify 
what he regards as being peculiar to the act of meaning 
construction. These new notions "facilitate" the exchange or 
endless movement between the reading subject and textual 
object. This Ecoine approach to reading is an escape from the 
predominant "circular" approaches of the pioneering masters. 
It seems that a form of metamorphosis is effected as a result 
of this endless movement in semiotic discourse, which 
inevitably impacts on "the subject's understandings" of a text 
(see Merrell, 1985; Gillan, 1982; Eco, 1976). The potentially 
many renditions of understandings which in fact "tells us 
nothing about the text or about reading" (Rorty in Collini, 
1992: 19) clearly wishes to escape the grip of from a narrow, 
monolithic or reproductive stance of meaning construction. 
Semiotics, as a result, advances a new debate, vis-a-vis the 
pioneering thinkers within reading discourses, for "If there is 
no longer temporal linearity ordered in causal links, then the 
effect may act on its own causes" (Eco, 1992: 33). This is the 
challenge of the notion of tradition, historicity and other 
reciprocal or causality factors used by the pioneers of the 
reading act. According to the "aims" of semiotics, the textual 
object ultimately embodies a structure of messages and what are 
called "message traces" which seem to have a socially-
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determined unity. The many or multiple messages have to be 
read, according to Eco, in discourse by the reading subject who 
is not merely an observer from the outside, but in fact 
participates on the inside of the text (Sless, 1986) . Eco 
clearly advances to the notion of discourse as marking a 
certain space in which the subject and object "operate", rather 
than the language habitat advanced by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur. Eco's concept of discourses however does 
not suggest any "wild" reading but unfolds in the framework of 
systems and networks. Here we encounter a new move which seeks 
to supersede the linearity of relationship or at best the 
circularity among subject and object in the construction of 
meaning in reading. 
4.2.2 SEMIOTICS, SYSTEMS, NETWORKS AND MEANING 
Contrary to what can be considered the limited literal 
representational view of the referential theories, semiotics 
does not wish to embrace a process of deciphering or decoding 
of textual signs but rather one which involves among others a 
sharing process. In fact, the reading subject has to 
participate on the inside of the discourse of the text, i.e. it 
has to be part of the textual dynamics, while the text as the 
objective structure, "invites" a form of understanding that 
"solicits" the construction of meaning, and this process can 
only happen within discourse. Since discourse usually tends to 
embody the social processes in which texts are embedded, and as 
a result are engaged, semiotics requires that the system, in 
which discourse unfolds, be examined in a special way. In 
contrast to the older pioneers who entertain a sharing or 
disclosure of a "subject" with and "object", we now deal with 
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"systems" in discourse. According to semiotics, a system is 
constantly being reconstructed and reconstituted in the textual 
object and it is this dialectical process between and within 
text and system which unfolds in discourse, and which is 
constituted beyond the literal reading of a text (Hodge & 
Kress, 1988: 5-6). 
As it is evident in those theories of reading that do not wish 
to proceed in a smooth linear and literal representational 
fashion, semiotics also encounters the inevitable risk of 
experiencing what is regarded as "disruption" - a process which 
is inevitable because" ... the sign is everywhere and nowhere. 
Each utterance on the part of the subject precipitates the 
relocation of the sign along the axes which in a static sense, 
defines its relations with other signs in language as a 
totality" (Gillan, 1982: 6). This unity or totality is not the 
usual coherence-seeking model as in the literal construction of 
meaning, but must be grasped as a dialectic network or system 
within which the reading subject's interpretive consciousness 
and self-understanding will come to play an important role. 
The reading subject therefore inevitably pursues an interrupted 
dialectic in terms of what can be regarded as a re-reading 
which has already been implied in the first reading (see 
Cornis-Pope, 1992: 22). The so-called first reading which is 
typical of the representational mode of reading is essentially 
sequential, often superficial and mimetic. It is only with the 
so-called second reading that the subject, according to 
semiotics, engages in the semiotic transformation that leads 
through the heuristic reading: "A second, reflexive, 
comparative, retrospective reading makes the subject discover 
that the sequence must be seen rather as a network or system, 
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which converts its constitutive components into multiple 
variants of a single representation" (Cornis-Pope, 1992: 22). 
The seriality or chain procedure in fact entails the discourse 
which seeks to subvert simplistic, literal reading of smooth 
meaning construction. 
The newness of Eco's approach is that semiotics seeks to 
suggest that the existence of a textual object is only given 
within the chain of responses that it elicits. This chain of 
responses however operates within the confines of the 
signification of the text. But to signify within discourse is 
to be subject to interpretation or transposition to another 
level or to another sign. According to the semiotic approach 
it is ultimately in the nature of the sign to "expose" itself 
to the interpretative process, i.e. a process which always 
continually pursues the reinterpretation of other signs within 
that discourse. 
Eco introduces a "new" language viz. that the object signifies 
(rather than represents) . If representation could be construed 
as implying a literal message in language, signification 
suggests understandings that are not apparent at face value but 
should rather be "exposed" in discourse. In the reading act, 
discourse, for Eco, implies a particular strategy on the part 
of the reading subject and the textual object and what 
happens to these two entities. 
4.2.3 ECO'S STRATEGIC APPROACH TO READING 
Central to Eco's semiotic th,,~ory is the notion that any theory 
of meaning must involve a theory of processes as well as one of 
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structures - a two-pronged approach which wants to address both 
signification and communication (Eco, 1976: 8) . Eco's all-
encompassing systemic view considers all human activities as 
residing within what he calls a "semiotic profile" and as such, 
semiotics is to be regarded as the critical examination of 
all cultural processes as processes of communication. A motor-
car, for example, can be a sign which signifies social status, 
but at a physical or mechanical level it has no communicative 
function. If, according to Eco, an object has no communicative 
value it cannot be regarded as being semiotic. Eco (1976: 7) 
moreover emphasizes that in meaning construction the notion of 
sign and its referent"· .. is everything which can be taken as 
significantly substituting for something else". This 
"something else" does not necessarily have to exist physically 
or actually be somewhere physically at the moment in which a 
sign stands for it. 
It has become apparent that Eco's theory of semiotics focuses 
primarily on understanding the aesthetic text, rather than a 
reception theory. While the aesthetic coding process seems to 
be focussed on itself, there nevertheless remains a great deal 
of ambiguity. As noted, the reading act seems never just to be 
a smooth and straightforward procedure but will inevitably 
presuppose disruptive and conflictual rather than simplistic 
cooperative mechanisms (Parret, 1983: vii). This has become 
particularly clear with Ricoeur (the "conflict of 
interpretation"). As such, aesthetic ambiguity in the reading 
act, for Eco, always necessitates the need to interrogate the 
systems and subsystems in the reader's discursive practices 
with the textual object, the action of which nudges the reading 
subject into a "new awareness of the world" (1976: 269). The 
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purpose of this new awareness is to transport the reading 
subject to a sense of what Eco calls 11 cosmicity 11 , i.e. an 
endless process of moving beyond the limited interpretation of 
meanings (see Hawkes, 1977: 141). Although he does not depart 
from his notion of the ambiguity of the aesthetic text, Eco 
(1979) later redirects his focus essentially .to the 
significance of the strategic role of the reading subject - an 
aspect of his semiotic theory which sheds greater light on the 
question of representation and subjectivity. The notion of 
subjectivity will be illuminated by examining Eco's notion of 
the "model reader" who operates in a "semiotic profile". 
4.2.4 ECOINE SEMIOTIC READING 
Establishing a firmer grip on the phenomenon of reading, Eco's 
(1979: 5) understanding of the textual messages has to be seen 
in terms of "communicative intercourse" which comprises a 
network or system of different messages, depending, of course, 
on the codes and action encountered at different levels of 
signification. 
follows: 
The model reader encounters the process of 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
sender----7coded----7channel----7 text as~---'l)~address---7 interpreted 
'~ text expression text as 
'~ 
codes 
subcodes 
'~ 
-
L efforts to reconstru.ct 
sender's codes 
content 
~ ,, context~<~~.codes 
sub codes 
\I 
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In any semiotic discourse, as it unfolds in the reading act, 
level 1 in the above scheme depicts the first reading of the text 
and level 2 the rereading phase in which the model reader 
"searches for the text" in a pluralistic "construal" of meaning 
(see Armstrong 1990: 23). Whilst Eco visualizes the first 
reading in a linear fashion, he also, at the same time develops 
the reconstruction process of reading in terms of his semiotic 
consciousness. The model reader's semiotic consciousness of 
"metalinguistic activity" (Eco, 1990: 54) seeks to interpret the 
textual object in terms of social, cultural and philological 
codes and subcodes - a process which, by contrast to the literal 
representational theories, is not linear but disruptive. The 
disruptive process inherent in meaning construction has to be 
seen in the context of the fact that every text designs its own 
Model reader. We encounter, for the first time, contrary to the 
"circular discourses" of the pioneering masters, "processes" 
which are regarded as being disruptive in the reading act. This 
has implications for meaning, though differently, as for Ricoeur. 
This disruptive nature of the discourses which results from the 
subject's encounter with the reading of signs, has far-reaching 
expansive and multi-perspective consequences for the construction 
of meaning and epistemology. All of this is very much tied to 
Eco's view of the model reader. 
4.2.5 THE NOTION OF "MODEL READER" 
In Eco's systemic approach to reading the notion of the model 
reader seems to be a purely hypothetical construct which is 
engaged in a continuous process of building and revising meanings 
or to use Umberto Eco's terms " of ceaselessly making 
forecasts and taking "inferentials walks", or of constructing 
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provisional frames within which the text acquires motivation, 
coherence and meaning" (see Calinescu, 1993: xiv) . In this 
context "inferences" imply an act of elaboration which occurs in 
discourse between the reading subject and the textual object. 
The potential of "many meanings" is clear. 
Eco argues that for every text the author deploys a series of 
codes to make the text communicative, for he assumes that the 
codes that are used would be shared by the author's model or 
possible reader. In fact the author has " to foresee a model 
of the possible reader, supposedly able to deal interpretively 
with expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively 
with them" (Eco, 1979: 7) . It would appear that contrary to the 
controlling, master-mind subject, Eco projects a different type 
of subject in the image of the text. The textual subjectivity -
a shift in thinking - "master minds" - the reader in the reading 
discourse and as a result, postulates a hypothetical construct 
for subjectivity. This is a form of subjectivity which is 
"initiated" not from the human side of reading but from the 
system and network's side of the discourse. It is clear that Eco 
still has concerns for the "communicative" dimension of reading. 
When Eco asserts that every text potentially "designs" its own 
model reader he implies that many texts seeks to "produce" 
essentially two model readers, viz. the first level we encounter 
a naive reader who understands the text semantically and the 
critical reader who is supposed to appreciate the way in which 
the text says had been intended (Eco, 1990: 55). The "naive" 
model reader corresponds with the type of 11 referential reading" 
of the narrator or author, whilst the "critical" reader, 
according to Rorty, "beats the text into shape" in the 
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reconstruction phase (see Eco, 1990: 56). The reading text, 
according to Eco, is designed in such a way as to attract the 
attention of a critical reader. The human reader is required to 
be a subjectivity of excellence (in terms of being critical) in 
order to interact with the demands of the textual subjectivity. 
In terms of a more qualitative understanding and reading of a 
text, it would seem that Eco assumes a"like-minded" reader and 
author who both continually construct more codes and subcodes in 
the reading act. It moreover seems that Eco circumvents the 
danger of creating the idea that reader and author construct 
similar meanings in this process by making his model reader a 
logical rather than psychological or epistemological construct. 
This view of Eco does not however detract from the fact that the 
reading subject potentially can become an "authorial projection". 
The author of the text, according to Eco, always envisages a 
possible "ensemble of codes" embodied in the reader that would 
communicate a mode of signification (Eco, 1979: 7) . In the 
construction of meaning this semiotic view of the model reader 
is moreover defined in terms of whether the subject engages in 
an open or closed text - a notion which is prerequisite for the 
reading act, for the subject reads a text as it is in the sense 
.it was designed to read and this may include the possibility of 
reading the text in order to yield expansive interpretations 
(Collini in Eco, 1992: 10). 
4.2.6 CLOSED TEXTS 
It appears as though Eco endows the average reader with an 
essentially "receiving status", for often the intended textual 
codes are not shared by the reader. Eco therefore, envisages 
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closed texts as those texts which are potentially able to seduce 
the most naive reader along a predetermined path, structuring the 
text, as a result, inflexibly. Contrary to the literal 
representational theories where the text becomes manipulated by 
the reader' s wishes the Ecoine closed text assume an "active" 
role. For Eco closed texts have a potentially wide audience 
since " they presuppose an average reader resulting from a 
merely intuitive sociological speculation in the same way in 
which an advertisement chooses its possible audience" (Eco, 1979: 
8). The result is often the development of potentially 
"ideological" interpretations. Eco, it appears, shares the 
Barthesian notion, "ideological", to describe personal and 
idiosyncratic codes of interpretation. It becomes apparent that 
Eco' s closed text has been structured according to a rigid 
project and fails thus to take the shifting perspectives of the 
reader into account (Van Zyl, 1982: 72) . The closed text elicits 
an uncritical reading and what can be regarded as a "riverruns" 
approach (Eco, 1992: 24) which may not yield what can be assumed 
to be a "reliable" reading. 
4.2.7 OPEN TEXTS 
In terms of the Ecoine version of "unlimited semiosis" (Eco, 
1990: 32) open texts endow the critical reading subject with a 
paradoxical sense of restrained freedom since the author had 
predetermined, as it were, its interpretation (Eco, 1979: 9). 
The reader seems strictly-speaking governed by authorial, lexical 
and syntactical codes and therefore " ... the text is nothing else 
but the semantic-pragmatic production of its own model reader" 
(Eco, 1979: 10). Eco seems to confuse the issue by sketching a 
paradox of open textual reading which is on the one hand precise, 
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and yet, on the other, flexible. This Ecoine scientific approach 
towards the reading subject, by implication, establishes the text 
as the interpretive subject: " ... it will be only the text itself 
- such as it is made - that tells us which kind of reader it 
postulates" (Eco, 1979: 10). On the other hand, Eco emphasizes 
the "disruptive" essence of the reading act in that every act of 
reading remains a "difficult transaction between the competence 
of the reader (the reader's world knowledge) and the kind of 
competence that a given text postulates in order to be read in 
an economic way" (own emphasis) (Eco, 1992: 68) . In terms of 
meaning construction the closed text unambiguously implies "using 
the text" as opposed to the open text which is "interpreted" in 
terms of a complex strategy of networking of systems., along with 
the reader's "social treasury", i.e. cultural conventions (Eco, 
1992: 67) . Here we encounter a throw-back particularly to 
Gadamer - except that it is strangely not strictly-speaking a 
dialogical process. How does what Eco calls the "picnic" unfold 
where the reader "brings the sense" to the text as the location 
of the picnic? (Eco, 1992: 24). 
4.2.8 ECO'S INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES IN THE READING ACT 
In his new insights into the interpretative strategies in the act 
of reading Eco seems quite "prescriptive" that there will be 
clear lines of demarcation on the expression plane (the author 
and textual expression) and the content plane (the actualized 
intentions and extensions of the reader) . Whether a text is read 
in a naive or critical way, both these strategies, according to 
Eco, are already inscribed within Eco's textual strategy. In 
fact Eco (1984: 50) regards his model reader as an accomplice to 
the author's game. Eco allows, strategically, the author of the 
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text to escape, by letting the systems and networks "fend for 
themselves" in the encounter with the reading subject. The 
author "dies", according to Eco, but leaves his indisputable 
legacy in the aesthetic text so that although the author has been 
pronounced dead, his presence is nevertheless acutely felt in the 
"textual strategy", the latter of which is regarded as a metaphor 
in order to interpret the signs in the text. Contrary to the 
phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches where the subject, 
despite the argument that it has the equal status of the object, 
somehow still "calls the tune", Eco wishes to put the text 
strategically in charge to ensure that as many possible readings 
are generated. The text generates a type of discourse which one 
would dare-say, expresses more reliable and quality meaning than 
that constructed by the manipulative and fallible human subject -
although Eco's systemic approach renders both equally responsible 
for the numerous readings that must be "produced". It appears 
that Eco's attempts to put the sovereign attempts of divine 
meanings, imparted of the human subject out of action, out of 
action, is by creating a backdoor for the author to put signs, 
systems and networks in charge to deal with the meaning 
construction, by co-opting the human reading subject. 
In his reconceptualized reading act the move from the expression 
to the content plane of the text, the ideal text, according to 
Eco, is provided with a system of nodes or joints to establish 
the first reading at which point, the cooperation of the model 
reader is expected and or elicited. At each level the reader has 
to deal with a metalinguistic activity of subcodes which 
"mirrors" understanding of textual content - a process which co-
opts the reader's 11 social treasury" . In fact, mirrors, according 
to Eco, do not interpret but merely reflect (for the sake of 
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clarity) in order to enhance the critical reading discourse (Eco, 
1984: 207-208). We have come to trust mirrors, according to Eco, 
since they assist the reader to make "connections in a continuous 
process of coming and going" (1979: 14) . In the construction of 
meaning our perception in the mirror could potentially also be 
wrong but if it is a "reliable reading" of the text, Eco believes 
that misreading can occur, adding to the many potential 
perspectives a text is able to produce. Despite Eco progress in 
terms of n~wer perspectives in meaning, he nevertheless harks 
back to "reliable readings" - seeking "matching". 
This notion of "misreading" forms part of what Eco regards as the 
re-reading phase of the reading act in which the model reader 
searches for the text in his attempts to construe valid meanings 
(see Armstrong, 1990: 23). Eco reiterates that the model reading 
subject is not the only one who makes "only right" conjectures, 
for " a text can foresee (own emphasis) a Model Reader 
entitled to try infinite conjectures (Eco, 1990: 58-59). 
The role of the reading subject is that of "overcoding" in order 
to contextualize the text socially but, at the same time, he is 
able to decode when dissonance and discrepancy is encountered. 
In an almost mechanistic way the reader suspends his disbelief 
and waits for more semantic information to emerge at another 
level. Eco however attempts to soften his behaviouristic slant 
by arguing that " no text is read independently of the 
reader's experience of other texts" (1979: 21). This exciting 
form of intertextual dialogue is also a form of textual 
overcoding which almost enjoys greater privilege than personal 
overcoding: " books always speak of other books and every 
story tells a story that has already been told" (Eco, 1984: 20). 
"Meanings" in the various systems and networks used by different 
authors in different texts 
appropriated by the reader. 
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"already exist" but has to be 
The subject's personal experience 
also seems to be encapsulated in a textual status, whether of the 
present reading or any other past reading. What we experience 
with Eco is a hypothetical "extended" or super subject which 
extends across the production system of the reading act, rather 
than necessarily being confined to one space, be it reader, 
system, history, culture, etc. They do seem to have different 
degrees of weighting for meaning construction. 
On the other hand, what also emerges in Eco's theory is a 
stronger case for a "textual subjectivity" rather than an 
exclusively "reader subjectivity", for although the author may 
be "dead", Eco celebrates his presence at the picnic: "There are 
[also] quotations of which the author is aware but which should 
remain ungraspable (own emphasis) by the consumer" (Eco, 1990: 
88). However much Eco values his "reliable" readings and 
"misreadings", the semiotic or critical reader remains within the 
horizon or space of textual expectations in the series of 
interpretations. For example, meaning, according to Eco, is the 
correlation of an expression unit as well as a content unit, both 
of which are appreciated only through a further unit, i.e. the 
cultural unit, which depends on a further unit, and so forth (see 
Ray, 1986: 125). These infinite dialectical processes unfold in 
terms of systems which are decidedly different from the circular 
dialogues of subject and object of the pioneering masters, in 
which the communicative function of reading is still paramount. 
It is also clear that Eco's reading subject is inescapably 
"designed" by and adheres within the textual network/system. The 
text as a form of subjectivity, continually transforms its 
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denotations into new connotations, as " ... none of its items stop 
at their first interpretation, contents are never received for 
their own sake but rather as the sign-vehicle for something else" 
(Eco, 1976: 274). This act of permutation embodies what can be 
regarded as Eco's "non-representational" approach of the reading 
act, i.e. it recreates a continual deferral of closure, focussing 
the reader's attention on the semiosis process in the reading act 
itself. In fact the reading subject fulfils an important cog in 
the semiotic process by keeping the semiotic possibilities alive 
and if we daresay, "in tact". 
What clearly emerges in Eco's contribution to the reading act is 
that the reader subject becomes an embodiment of the author's 
projected strategy. This is confirmed by Eco's insistent claim 
that "· .. it is correct to let a text speak by itself about its 
semiotic strategy" (1979: 40) (own emphasis). This view clearly 
renders the reading subject an instrumental "ensemble of codes", 
for it is only possible to "invent freely", according to Eco, if 
the reader, paradoxically so, experiences constraints. The 
"reader" and "author" also seem to emerge as nothing more than 
generalizable theoretical constructs, focussing more on systems 
and levels, rather than human readers interacting in a concrete 
social environment (see Hodge & Kress, 1988). Eco's view of 
interpretation therefore falls squarely within the ambit of 
"essentialism" an approach which seeks to which explain 
interpretation and reader experiences purely in terms of 
linguistic and text-structural features. 
4.2.9 
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CONSTRUCTING READING THROUGH STRUCTURAL BIAS AND 
FREEDOM 
In trying to postulate a more solid critique of the reading act, 
Eco, as the "forerunner" of the "new masters" in this study, at 
the same time, as a transition theorist in this study, paves the 
way to the post-modernist assumptions of representation and 
subjectivity. His critical attempts to celebrate the "infinity 
of the text" as a form of subjectivity, in terms of the 
aesthetics of seriali ty, rather than the modernist view of 
aesthetic value is the onset of a form of meaning construction 
that entails, theoretically-speaking, infinite meanings. Eco's 
notion of the act as a strategic process of semiosis adheres in 
a kind of dynamism that is clearly a form of textual subjectivity 
so that"··· it is the "infinity" of the process that gives a new 
sense to the device of variation. What must be enjoyed ... is 
that a series of possible variations is potentially infinite" 
(Eco, 1990: 98). 
The human subject in the person of the reader, while still 
crucial, though not central to meaning construction, becomes 
anticipated by and "used" by the textual subjectivity. Like in 
the case of music, the reader merely fulfils the role of the 
pianist who plays the musical score and yet, every performance 
(i.e. every reading), proves to be different and therefore, 
renders different possibilities or reinventions of legatos, 
staccatos, and so on. It may not be the correct rendition or 
correct interpretation of that score, but there may be other 
"variations" which can be "enjoyed" by the reader (Eco, 1990: 
98). From the "outside" of the text the reading subject needs 
to get into the "inside" - which seems to have been already quasi 
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predetermined. In the reading act it is a matter of how he gives 
and re-gives expression to that inside i.e. the structural bias 
of the text. It is not so much a dialogical circular process or 
an inbetween connection as with phenomenology and hermeneutics 
but a deliberate strategic projection of what the text may ender 
readable. 
The Ecoine systemic understanding of the interaction of the 
subject and the text becomes a continuous process of producing 
and reproducing, via disruptive networks, in the "network 
continuum" i.e. it is a cyclical, periodical and regular pattern 
of narrative changes. The creative process of transposition of 
narrative changes and meaning appears to be executed under the 
watchful eye of the reader subjectivity to ensure that the 
"vagueness" (and hence biased interpretations) of textual message 
does not degenerate into what Eco calls "unreliable reading". 
Eco, in a way, seems to be standing with one foot in each world, 
the new and the old. He still strongly pushes for the structural 
bias of the systems and networks which direct the reading act, 
yet this is a process which occurs in the domain of the reader's 
"ensemble of codes" - in his cultural context. The construct of 
the open text acts as the pivotal location of many possible 
interpretations and fulfils the role of a subjectivity which is 
responsible for the production of the semiosis of meaning. This 
varied and incessantly plural construction of meaning does not 
reside at the origin or root of the process as in the literal 
representational theory but must, according to Eco, be seen as 
a potential and ultimately transitory end of every reading act. 
Every reading is therefore a reading that has begun and continues 
to be reread. Eco's notion of subjectivity and representation 
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therefore seems to necessarily embody theoretical pivotal 
constructs operating continuously, in a trans-itory process of 
constructs, including the subject and object which marks the 
beginning of discursive practices prevalent in post-modernist 
thinking. The absolute pursuit of the final concepts like 
"subjectivity" and "meaning" is clearly anathema if we wish to 
expand our horizons and insights into the process of meaning 
production. Eco starts to argue in his semiotic approach against 
the notion of a conventionally accepted "stable" and "finite" 
notions of subject and object. If the "text" is normally 
regarded as the object, in Ecoine thinking it appears that the 
text could now very well become the subject, albeit a logical 
theoretical subject. The usual flesh-and-blood subject is also 
rendered nothing more than a semiotic profile of codes, operating 
in a system which strips him, as it were, of ontological 
concerns. Eco's ultimate thrust seems to be primarily one of 
questioning epistemological reliability. He challenges whether 
the text produces, in discourse, with the theoretical reader and 
aesthetic text, a reliable, or many reliable meanings. This 
obsession may prove limiting. Eco advances our thinking of the 
reading act and proposes a rigidly structured hypothesis of 
subjectivity and representation which within what he calls the 
"constrained freedom" of textual interpretation. In making a 
case for "constrained freedom" which emerges from the structural 
bias of the reading act, Eco, at the same time reconceptualizes 
the stability and coherence-seeking function of language (or 
discourse) as well as that of reading subject and textual object. 
Beyond Eco's more-or-less mechanistic semiotics which, 
theoretically, challenges most of our concerns of meaning 
construction, Lotman proposes another dimension of semiotics 
which focuses with greater explicitness on the human concerns of 
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meaning production in a way that also advances our understanding 
of the reading act. Lotman, like Eco, proves to be transition 
theorist, from the pioneers to the more radical theorists among 
the "new masters". 
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4.3 LOTMAN'S CULTURAL SEMIOTICS IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
4.3.1 POINT OF DEPARTURE 
In contrast to Eco's systemic semiotics we may reflect on another 
variation of strategic challenge to the reading act, viz that of 
Lotman's cultural semiotics. We encounter with Eco and Lotman 
the onset of approaches that both seek to move beyond the 
concerns of the accepted smooth interactions of subject and 
object in language. "Meaning construction" becomes a notion 
which is more and more reserved for strategic interpretations in 
a particular systemic encounter. We have observed Eco's 
functional and systemic approach, and how this opens the way to 
a trend of discourse which becomes structured in a semiotic 
profile, operating in a social context i.e. in a social treasury. 
This approach in semiotics is very much accentuated by the 
Moscow-Tartu group, for they embrace the thesis "··· that all 
human activity [is] in the elaboration, exchange and retention 
of information by means of signs " (Lucid, 1977: 5) . 
Voloshinov, for example, seminally initiates the significance of 
socio-cultural semiotics by juxtaposing the notion of mind and 
society with his dictum: without sign, there is no ideology 
(Matejka, 1978: 162). Since language embodies the mediation of 
signs in the construction of meaning it would appear that 
semiotics and subjectivity, inevitably pre-suppose each other -
a view which Jurij Lotman, the literary historian, uses as a 
springboard to revisit the interaction among text, language and 
culture (see Shukman, 1978: 195)in his cultural semiotics - and 
hopefully advance our understanding of a more comprehensive 
"practice of reading." 
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4.3.2 LOTMAN'S VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 
Lotman regards language essentially as a system of communication 
- a signification system which is inconceivable beyond the domain 
of real human and cultural action. For him every system in the 
construction of meaning therefore whose aim it is to establish 
communication could be regarded as language. This view 
constitutes a significant view for understanding Lotman's 
semiotics, since language for him, which is deployed in a 
semiotic sense (i.e. in an active social system) cannot be 
similar to its ordinary usage (Lotman, 1977) . 
Besides the assumptions of natural and artificial languages, 
Lotman also wishes to highlight secondary languages which he 
refers to as secondary modelling systems. He regards the latter 
as implying more than the deployment of natural language, for 
" in as much as man's consciousness is a linguistic 
consciousness, all types of models erected as super-structures 
on that consciousness, can be identified as secondary modelling 
systems" (Lotman, 1977: 9-10). This 11 interiorized 11 notion of 
language is no arbitrary disposition when it comes to meaning 
construction but has decided limits with interiorized cultural 
values and understandings. 
Lotman seeks to argue that secondary modelling systems embody 
semiotic systems which are expressed in very dynamic, yet 
critical, interactive discourses between text and reading 
subject. Eco saw these discourses as also embodying conflictual 
mechanisms which function in a rather "predetermined" process of 
clarification. Lotman moreover characterizes the interpretive 
process as an inevitable act of tension which " amounts to a 
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victory in which the sender and the receiver overcome ... "noise" 
or distortion caused by the difference between their semantics 
or phenology" (Lucid, 1977: 10). Lotman therefore also rejects 
the easy and smooth acquiescence of a reader into a particular 
meaning that a text may have. Overcoming in the reading act what 
Lotman calls "noise" already implies the second level reading of 
rereading, beyond the literal reading of words and sentences. In 
the reading act, which departs from the simplistic and basic 
encoding-decoding process, Lotman emphasizes the need to explore 
the balance of what he calls redundancy and uniqueness - two 
notions which create a form of essential tension in the reading 
discourse. The reading subject communicates via a "struggle" 
with the text precisely because the latter represents another 
(different) subject, whom it speaks of, and this ensuing 
interactive exchange "··· is valuable precisely insofar as it 
issues from another person and does not duplicate what is already 
known to me" (Lotman, 1974: 95-96). Lotman's concerns seem still 
primarily trapped in the communicative domain of reading and 
meaning construction. 
Lotman consequently rejects the simplistic pursuit of 
"commonality" or "likeness" between object and subject, like in 
the case of Ricoeur, for it is precisely their dissimilar 
dispositions and characterization that render them ultimately 
communicable in discourse. According to Lotman, a condition of 
complete sameness of reader and author would theoretically make 
communication in the reading act irrelevant. Like in the case 
of Eco, we encounter the reading act as inherently bearing a 
"disruptive capacity", if any reading is to be valid and credible 
in terms of what understandings can be constructed. Therefore, 
for the two parties to "communicate", in the dialectic of meaning 
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construction, they must be dissimilar enough to stand in need of 
a " conscious semiotic act of decipherment in their 
signalization" (Letman, 1974: 96). This view entails Lotman's 
notion of "oppositional relationships" which forms the basis for 
creating a "relational structuralist mode of thinking" (Shukman, 
1978: 196). Instead of quick-fix or literal grasps of meaning, 
the delayed process inherent in Lotman's semiotics thrives on 
opposition and alienation - a view traced back to Nietzsche and 
Gadamer. 
At a social level Letman seems to operate on the basis of 
"equivalent but different" which, although it implies opposition, 
both text and reader can be rendered mutually translatable. 
This is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's view, but Letman operates 
in terms of signs and networks in his semiotic approach. 
Lotman's stance of "mutually translatable" implies that meaning 
construction could be a matter of degree since the more complex 
the structure of the message (i.e. cultural complexity) the more 
individual its interpretation (Letman, 1974: 97). Letman 
concedes that the individualization of interpretation could lead 
to semiotic catastrophe. Letman moreover seems to concur with 
Ecoine thinking, i.e. whereas Eco foresees an "unreliable" 
reading of a subject who strays too far in his "inferential 
walks" (Eco in Calinescu, 1993: xiv) from the text, Letman 
cautions any walk which wanders too far off the historical and 
cultural codes (Letman, 1977: 25) . Here Letman is again 
reminiscent of Heidegger and Gadamer who see the subject as 
operating under the yoke of tradition. 
With regard to the progress of his semiotics towards reading, it 
appears as though the parameters of the Lotmanian semiotic 
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network is clearly defined, for despite the complexities of 
differences between the reading subject and the textual object, 
Letman insists on the idea of conserving what he regards as the 
unity of opposites, for, according to him, each semiotic 
mechanism is a coincedentia oppositorium. This means that it is 
only in the intersection that opposites establish a whole. It 
is at the intersection where meaning is composed of contradic-
tory, yet complementary subsystems. Thus, according to Letman, 
the I-HE system of external communication, complements the I-I 
system of internal communication, and vice-versa. Neither of 
these systems are self-contained, but oscillate historically in 
the reading discourse {Letman, 1970a: 100). Lotmanian meaning 
construction is therefore executed in terms of a conflated socio-
cultural subj ecti vi ty, "masquerading" via an individual, personal 
subjectivity. In order to clarify Lotman' s view of meaning 
construction as encapsulated in the reading act, it is 
necessary to highlight his understanding of the "extra-text". 
4.3.3 TEXT AND EXTRA-TEXT 
Lotman seems to experience difficulty in defining how he 
generally understands the concept "text", for it neither 
represents a work of art nor exactly a mode of reality. However, 
it seems that he feels more comfortable in conceiving of a text 
in terms of its bonding with social communication: "· .. it [the 
text] has no meaning . . . for the man who would like to deal with 
the text totally apart from all its extra-textual relations" 
{Letman, 1977: 50). 
On the other hand, his notion of "extra-textual" in the reading 
act seems somehow easier to define. It is the embodiment of all 
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historically determined artistic codes which render a text 
meaningful, and these codes have become inscribed in the 
subject's linguistic consciousness. It is thus the extra-textual 
elements which attempt to bond the reading subject and the object 
in the reading act (Lotman, 1977: 50) . Lotman is keenly 
reminiscent of Eco who tends to "structure" all subcodes and 
subsystems in that he (i.e. Letman) regards the codes, i.e. the 
extra-textual element as necessarily following the cycle. In 
contrast to Eco, Lotman would want to present a very flexible 
hierarchy mechanism to facilitate any entry-point in the reading 
act. Eco envisaged a model reader who is "foreseen" by the text 
narrator, whereas Letman "accommodates" the reading subject so 
that access in various extra-textual relations will depend on 
which genre, style, age or author the "text" has come to be 
associated with. The question arises how the extra-textual 
dynamics in the reading act impact on the representational or 
meaning-giving stance between textual object and subject? 
4.3.4 INTERPRETIVE POSSIBILITIES IN THE READING ACT 
Lotman 1 s systemic approach postulates various interpretation 
possibilities in terms of which a text could be interpreted but 
does not exclude the possibility that the author can produce 
certain texts which are oriented towards readers• perspectives. 
These perspectives, however, do not suggest mere literal reader 
acquiescence into the projected text, for all "semiotic 
discourse", according to Letman, is only established in textual 
interrogation in the discourse itself. Within the reading 
discourse the "problem of misunderstanding or misreading" occurs, 
for according to Letman, such misreadings inevitably inhabit all 
comprehension (1977: 12). Textual conflict, misunderstanding 
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and what Lotman calls "textual dissonance" is the indispensable 
core around which the relationships in the message are shaped. 
The reading subject certainly by no means has immediate and 
direct access to the meaning of text. For Lotman, the 
possibilities of comprehension of textual codes resides in the 
"intermediate zone", which is responsible for subduing the 
starkness between comprehension and non-comprehension. Central 
to this process of meaning construction is the reading subject 
with his linguistic consciousness who, amidst the 
problematization of textual discourse, firstly has to establish 
a "common cue" in terms of their dissimilar foundations. Lotman, 
like Eco, seems not able to disengage himself from relative 
"correctness" , "clarity" and for sharing of understanding in the 
act of meaning construction. Lotman argues that, according to 
the "aesthetics of identity", the reader has to create a "new", 
and often more personalized interpretation (1977: 24) - leading 
to a rereading of the text. Contrary to Eco who seems to give 
great prominence to a textual subjectivity, Lotman foresees an 
active reader subject who with his linguistic consciousness 
dialectically proceeds according to opposites and differ-ence, 
in order to construe his own meanings. The Lotmanian "extra-
text", like Gadamer's Vorurteil (prejudice), assists to render 
the meaning more personalized, more unique. 
The personalized result of textual-code interrogation in the 
reading act is in fact a personal-cum-social process of 
recodif ication or rereading which the reader creates by imposing 
his own extra-text within that historical-social context. This 
is the most pronounced difference between Eco's essentialism and 
Lotman's more "humane" semiotics. Lotman seeks to postulate an 
intersectional and cross-sectional systemic process whereby the 
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author's text enters into a complex systemic network of 
personalised extra-textual connections. It would seem to be 
primarily the reading subject's attempts to arrive at a "simpler" 
text than the one the author in his 11 authorial tendency" had 
tried to create - giving greater prominence to what Lotman calls 
"reader tendencies" (Lotman, 1977: 296). The "unlimited 
semiosis" (Eco, 1992: 32) results antithetically (as opposed to 
linearly) in the construction of meaning, but can be limited 
systemically by the commands of the intersection of reader 
subjectivity and textual subjectivity. 
To grasp the conceptualization of subjectivity and representation 
we notice, for the possibilities of interpretation to emerge, it 
becomes evident that Lotman yields to what appears to be a 
relativistic position in terms of the opposition between text and 
extra-text. For depending on the creativity or imagination of the 
reading subject, he may, according to Lotman, "distort and 
creolize" the text. The human reader, no doubt, will want to 
grasp the text in terms of familiar canons - which are socially 
and historically established - mixing his own "personal language" 
with that of the text: 11 this creolization has its own laws 
of selection ... the theory of the mixing of languages ... is 
bound to play a major role in a reader's perception 11 (Letman, 
1977: 25) . The textual 11 struggle" may not always be that 
difficult, for the reading subject's playfulness will always tie 
in with the textual object's language. Letman does temper 
somehow his socio-historical view when he argues that meaningful 
interpretation only occurs at the intersection of reader and 
authorial language, and where any possible non-intersection may. 
occur, this ought to be relegated to the domain of the distorted 
and creolized. This misreading may not necessarily be wrong 
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because it is inevitable and necessary in the reading of any 
literary narrative. It in fact forms the sub-textual messages, 
which Lot man believes, in turn support the textual messages. 
Once again we notice Lotman's bent on the communicative function 
of reading, in which the subject establishes his identity and 
purpose in life. 
What Letman refers to as sub-textual messages or sub-textual 
codes constitute the very essence of the extra-text and the 
extra-text as a result, proves sine qua non for the reading 
subject's interpretative reconstruction of the textual object. 
The implication of this is that the dynamic interpretation and 
meaning is ultimately guided by what appears to be extrinsic 
socio-historical factors rather than exclusively extrinsic-
intrinsic relational factors a view which gives rise to 
Lotman's notion of tension. This creative stance is very much 
in keeping with his view of oppositional relationships. This is 
also a deferred process by which meaning is created and is 
ultimately not as oppositional as Letman might suggest, for in 
the final analysis, we are all products of very specific 
socialized behaviours - and whilst we are all very different and 
individual - we somehow do concur on many issues as well as the 
ways we see things. Lot man does, however, concede that the 
construction of meaning in the reading act the process of 
interrogation depends very definitely on the degree of creativity 
and imagination of the reading subject. The result is that the 
plurality of infinite conjectures in meaning construction, 
according to Letman, is limited to the "mixing of languages" 
(Letman, 1977: 25), rendering themselves mutually translatable. 
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The type of reading that occurs in the intersecting and cross-
secting zone of text and reader, signifies for Letman what he 
refers to as the "ontological tight-rope" of obviating the 
differences between the reading subject and the textual object. 
This communicative process of dynamic oscillation of seeking to 
come to grips with the dissimilar and the different within the 
reading subject's socio-cultural world, renders a viewpoint which 
has been generally ruled out by the positivists. Schukman (1978: 
201) argues that Lotman•s attempt to clarify the act of 
interpretation is nothing but an attempt to ameliorate cultural 
and individual opposites. This implies that in the reading act 
the textual narrative as object becomes encoded at least twice: 
once into natural language and any number of other times into the 
codes of the historical epoch, style or genre in which it may be 
written. The second act of rereading, beyond the literal text 
seems almost pre-determined, for it shall be, in order to be 
reliable reading, in terms of the socio-historical extra text of 
the reading subject. The emphasis is still on the controlling 
subject's pursuit of correctness and reliability. It follows that 
the text would seem to be at the mercy, as it were, of the 
reading subject, who in turn, is absolutely inseparable from his 
cultural codes. Like in the case of Gadamer, the cultural codes 
embodied in the Lotmanian reading process, act as the regulating 
force (in terms of the many levels of meaning) and constantly 
pursues a meaningful intersection between a "demanding" reader 
and text in a way that would enrich the reading subject's own 
meaning in life. 
4.3.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL READING IN OPPOSITION 
Whereas Eco proposes a very structured and strategic notion of 
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subjectivity, leaving little, if any, meaningful recognition to 
be accorded to explicit personal forces which impact on the 
reader, Lotman seeks to postulate an emphatic socio-cultural, 
contextual approach of a less theoretical-mechanistic subject. 
Like Eco, Lotman acknowledges the creative "oppositional" forces 
that separate the subject and object - conflictual forces which 
become the very discourse in which meaning gets constructed. 
This introduction of the idea of discourse into their systemic 
semiotic approaches apparently hopes to disengage us from seeking 
the prominent and or traditional positioning and functioning of 
the subject or the object. Lotman, like Eco, still retains the 
great divide between subject and object - a divide which is 
rendered communicative in a "new language" of shared discourse. 
In order to achieve his goal Lotman, like Eco, prescribes very 
definite parameters in which reading is to be constructed. The 
parameters of levels and codes (which also have predetermined 
cultural, social flavours, etc.) are, at the same time, rendered 
flexible in that the subject can overcode. The result is the 
continues creation of many subsystems (oppositional-cum-
complementary subsystems) , allowing one meaning to succeed 
another. 
Lotman's contribution to the understanding of the reading act is 
looking at the way infinite semiosis operates, i.e. to 
problematize the circularity mode which exists between subject 
and object, and without necessarily seeking to close the gap 
between them, rather posits hurdles that have to be overcome. 
As opposed to strict representionalism which posits meaning 
ultimately in and through the object, where that meaning is also 
defined, Lot man defers meaning in terms of which many more 
meanings can be generated, depending on the creolization that 
occurs between subject and object. Given this rendition of 
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subject and object, we encounter a creative ongoing process 
(typical of semiotics) of deferral from closure or completion. 
This introduces a new frame of thinking to us to, viz. a notion 
of a textual-reader engagement that engenders multiple-readings 
of that engagement. However, achieving these multiple readings 
is only possible under clear instructions, not of who fulfills 
the subject or object role but how the discourse between them 
gets structured. This suggests, if not a radical view at least 
a view, of the reading act which is beyond the easy decode-encode 
process, no matter how compelling the facts are. In a way Eco 
and Lotman are still operating in a clear subject-object polarity 
structure, each side of the polarity still remaining trapped in 
clear expectations of themselves and the other, to challenge the 
meaning--making process entailed in discourse. As a result, they 
seem not to have gone substantially far enough to rethink the 
very existence and positioning of subjects and objects, which up 
till now, have been central and in fact sine qua non to the 
construction of meaning as our stable and secure epistemological 
base. The act of reading is still firmly trapped in the mode of 
re-presentation of the text itself. 
Ultimately the goal or telos of reading for Lotman, like for Eco, 
operates in terms originaryprinciples, codes and levels, making 
the "correctness" and "reliability" of the many new 
interpretations (as opposed to "readings") somewhat always patent 
and predictable. These interpretations are "easily" possible 
through language through which the subject's discourse is 
exchanged with that of the textual discourse. 
Beyond this view of "reading as an exchange process",i.e. the 
interpretive attempts the subject, we proceed to a more radical 
group of thinkers who seek to unburden (Blanchot, 1981:93) the 
reading act of any author, and making the reading act a dangerous 
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experience. The re-evaluation of the author and subject starts 
to take on new dimensions with Barthes for whom there is no 
"structural obligation" (Barthes, 1986:35) in reading at all and 
in which we constantly deal with that certain amount of 
unreadability which makes our readings possible. 
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4.4 BARTHES'S LIBERATION OF WRITING AS MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION 
4.4.1 BARTHES'S SUSPICIOUS APPROACH 
In understanding the dynamics of the reading act as exchange 
between subject and object, Eco and Letman emphasized the notion 
of multiple reading which we derive from their respective 
semiotic approaches. This idea of multiple readings seems to be 
taken even further by Roland Barthes, and in doing so, he 
postulates a different understanding of subjectivity and 
representation which is to be grasped beyond the stable 
categories of subject vs. object, i.e. reader vs. text. Barthes 
initiates a creative, yet critical mode of thinking (followed by 
Derrida) which, it seems, is difficult to "classify" (see Culler, 
1983; Haar, 1992; Wood, 1992). This would probably be in line "-
with Barthes' s own claim that no interpretation can claim 
absolute authority. For, as seminal writers respectively of 
post-structuralist and post-modernist thinking, Barthes and 
Derrida specifically seek not to take any philosophical position. 
Whether they succeed in achieving this remains to be seen. 
However, despite Barthes's strong protest of endorsing a 
particular theory, his work has flourished in a sense without him 
- a process that would be consistent, as we will notice, with his 
pursuit of "plurality" and "dissemination" in the reading act. 
This "escape" into "plurality" is the liberating process to 
combat the attempts to set a priori limits on interpretation: " 
. . . what is at stake is not just authorship, but authority" 
(Moriarty, 1991: 2). Resonant with Nietzschean thought, Barthes 
too insists on approaching all values, language and communication 
with the utmost and justified suspicion. Barthes, in debunking 
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any claim to authority, even doubts whether we should speak of 
"reading" at all: 
" I do not know if reading is not, 
constitutively, a plural; field of scattered 
practices, of irreducible effects, and of, 
consequently, the reading of reading, meta-
reading ... " (Barthes, 1986: 34). 
It is precisely this notion of approaching the reading act as 
nothing but "a reading" of what it could possibly entail, that 
sets Barthes apart from all the aforementioned thinkers, the 
"pioneering" and "new" masters in this study. "New" liberating 
space is to be created, away from the circular frame of inferring 
from the author's or text's history, beliefs, values (although 
critically) but seek evidence from outside the text to construct 
meaning. This is an escape or unburdening from an authorising 
agent as well. This creative way of rethinking the reading act 
has very much got to do with the exercise which Barthes (and 
later Lacan and Derrida) initiates, viz. that of the 
deconstruction of all the "constitutive parts" of reading. 
Barthes goes back to Nietzsche to reclaim the notion of fiction. 
The identity of reading or the reader or the author is nothing 
but fiction. But, according to Barthes (1976(a): 62) to explore 
identity as a fiction means staging oneself or the reading act 
not as a unity - a singular "character" - but in the plural. 
This critical practise of dis-unity may very well become, 
according to what Barthes calls a plural, scattered or even 
chaotic exercise in reading. Within Eco and Lotman's semiotic 
schemes there appears still a large measure of "order" and "clear 
practices" of what transpires between the object and subject in 
language. Like Nietzsche, Barthes too regards language and its 
communicative function as a "dubious enterprise" (in Lavers, 
1982: 36) and since it constitutes nothing more than "myth", it 
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has to be deconstructed and even displaced. This notion of 
displacement as a way creating disunity and disruption, puts 
Barthes substantially, in another bracket than his predecessors 
in thought who pursued "reliability" and control. Reading cannot 
be a smooth practice, even if the route of a "semiotic profile" 
is followed as in the case of Eco and Lotman in which "reliable" 
readings are to be ensured and which are to be communicated, or 
at least articulated. 
4.4.2 BARTHES'S POINT OF DEPARTURE TO NON-REFERENCE 
Barthes takes his cue from Saussure who conceptualizes the act 
of writing as a late cultural arrival, a supplement to speech, 
which embodies an external instrument (in Leith, 1983: 34). The 
act of writing for him therefore does not inhere in language and 
can therefore easily be excluded, for if we must have writing, 
it should be phonetic, i.e. it should mimic and incarnate speech. 
Barthes (1964: 9) in his quest to "pursue" meaning adopts 
Saussure as his point of reference but clearly develops his own 
semiology which he believes includes all signs, " ... whatever 
their substance and limits; images, gestures, musical sounds 
objects, and the complex associations of all these ... ". They all 
constitute, if not language, at least systems of signification. 
In this sense we notice Barthes' s concurrence with Eco and 
Letman. However, Barthes ultimately proves to be way ahead of 
these theorists, for according him, to say "I" is to attach 
signifieds to oneself, to provide oneself with a biographical 
duration, subject oneself imaginarily to the intelligible, 
signify oneself as object of a specific distinction and to endow 
time with meaning (Barthes, 1975: 68). 
In understanding the act of meaning 
regards the intelligible systematic 
construction, Barthes 
character of social 
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signification as an important mode of "representation" which 
bourgeois society gives itself (see Coward and Ellis, 1977: 26). 
This form of social signification has become, over time, part of 
our language usage and Barthesian semiotics as a result, attempts 
to unravel what is called the "myths" contained in the dubious 
nature and use of language to construct meaning. According to 
Barthes (1980: 125), myths embody nothing more than "frozen 
speech" which tends to "stiffens reality" and, as a result, makes 
"itself look neutral and innocent" . Barthes' s therefore wishes 
to expose the way how habitual significations in meaning making 
have attach themselves to everyday objects and practices so that 
these ideological significations have come to be accepted as 
natural and common-sense. In relocking our notions of language 
and subjectivity, he initiates his critical view in terms of what 
he calls the "disentanglement" of these practices which is 
important for us in terms of understanding his theory of 
"interpretation" - a concept, which we will see, he absolutely 
challenges (see Culler, 1983: 17). 
In rethinking the entire act of meaning construction, Barthes 
wants to engage in a form of writing which prevents the 
solidification of his discourse on reading, the subject, the 
author, and the meaning, which coalesces into a central and 
controlling truth: "my whole little universe in crumbs; at the 
centre what?" (Barthes, 1978: 96). 
Barthes' s challenge to literal representationalism in and through 
language is furthermore illuminated in his distinction between 
the practice of connotation and denotation. He clarifies the 
signifying function of language with an example of a black 
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soldier saluting the French flag, i.e. a denotative sign which 
generates secondary meanings such as colonialism, nationalism, 
militarism etc. In contrast to this, Barthes argues that 
connotations generally serve as an "agency of ideology" or what 
he calls "myth". Myth, in the reading act, essentially 
encourages on the part of the reading subject a constant mis-
recogni tion, both of the world and itself. This "misrecognition 
process" in reading is valuable in order to interrupt our usual 
"interpretation" of events. It also challenges the assumptions 
of subject-object exchange. Barthes moreover believes that 
connotation, as a secondary operation, constructs a denotation, 
for" ... it is a determination, a relation, ... a feature which 
has the power to relate itself to anterior, ulterior ... to other 
sites of the text" (1975: 8). Barthes refers to the "other sites 
of the text" which may be the seeds for constructing the many 
"other readings" which characterize the "scattered" (i.e. 
"incoherent") nature of the reading act and it is these 
elements which are not evident in the literal reading of a text, 
for if the speaker tries to hear himself speak he can only 
produce "another aural science, another fiction" (Barthes, 1978: 
170). The traditional exchange between subject and object is, in 
itself, a fictitious assumption. 
In trying to understand the dynamics of meaning construction 
Barthes cautions that we should not confuse connotation with the 
association of ideas, since the association of ideas (i.e. the 
link between subject and object) refers to the system of a 
subject, while connotation entails a correlation which is 
immanent in the text: " connotation makes possible a 
(limited) dissemination of meanings spread like gold dust on the 
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apparent surface of the text" (Barthes 1975: 8-9). Barthes 
already seeks to displace the sovereignty and centrality of the 
reading subject, acting in terms of his subjective intentions and 
conventions vis-a-vis an object. Barthes grapples with a form 
of writing, as we will see, where subjectivity rather becomes an 
effect of language, despite his claim that 11 in the field of the 
subject, there is no referent" (Barthes, 1978: 56). Like 
Nietzsche's re-evaluation of all value-judgements, Barthes' s 
evaluation of the reading act may be a process without a subject, 
yet it presents itself to consciousness as a subjective process. 
However, semiologically, Barthes (1975: 9) views each connotation 
as the "articulation of a voice which is woven into the text" and 
part of establishing meaning is how the reading subject unmasks 
the myth, for the latter merely entails the meta-language, i.e. 
a second order language which speaks of the first. The question 
for meaning construction is how readers "escape" the author's 
reading of the world as encapsulated in words, and become active 
in what Barthes refers to as readers writing their own reading? 
Barthes clarified his liberating procedure of writing vis-a-vis 
reading in his distinction between readerly and writerly texts. 
This distinction betrays Barthes's strong semiotic tendency as 
followed in Eco's systemic reading. This distinction also 
addresses the subject-object polarity dilemma. 
4.4.3 READERLY AND WRITERLY TEXTS. 
In terms of establishing personal "meaning" in the reading act 
there does not seem to be any direct access to and the enjoyment 
of meaning as is the case in the literal representational 
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approaches. The Barthesian approach seeks to follow, like the 
pioneering thinkers, an indirect and even disruptive route of 
constantly delayed meaning according to a qualitative but also 
fundamental distinction which is drawn between readerly and 
writerly texts. Barthes' s view of "delayed meaning" proves 
qualitatively different to that of Gadamer and Ricoeur, for they 
expound their views in terms of their understanding of language 
and the functioning of language in terms of history (Gadamer) and 
method (Ricoeur) . They also pose their view in terms a clear 
subject-object polarity-for-exchange modes. Barthes, by contrast, 
expounds his notion of "delayed meaning" by distinguishing the 
writerly text from the readerly text in order to unburden the 
reading act of author (object) origins. 
Barthes regards the readerly text as nothing more than a 
transcript of reality which pre-exists and succeeds that reality 
and it therefore seeks to control what Barthes refers to as the 
"play of signification" by subduing every textual element to its 
transcendental meaning. Readerly texts in this case appear 
somewhat reminiscent of Eco's closed texts, for they incarcerate 
the reader in a purely idle (i.e. uncreative) and usually 
consumptive status. As readerly texts always seek to attain 
coherence, unity and homogeneity in the reading act, they are 
associated with rules which limit the number of oppositions which 
come to play in the act of interpretation (Barthes, 1986: 31). 
Writerly texts, by contrast, embody creative texts, and rather 
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than being pre-established representations of a reality or text. 
They are texts which are characterized by what Barthes calls the 
infinite, albeit disruptive, play of signifiers (Barthes, 1975: 
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5), i.e. a text "created" by the reader: " ... the writerly text 
is ourselves writing before the infinite play of the world" 
(Barthes, 1975: 5). Such a writerly text liberates the reading 
act and resides at the very core of the reader's acts of meaning 
construction. The writerly text does not claim the status of a 
metalanguage standing outside and above the language of the text. 
It only removes or unburdens the text from the domain of the 
true/false opposition and shifts it towards the domain of 
production, and it blurs the issue of authorship (Moriarty, 1991: 
39). This is Barthes's attempt to try and not even attempt to 
define subject and object, apart from each other. There is no 
division. 
In his pursuit to eliminate authorship of any message, writerly 
texts prove to be essentially reversible, i.e. they have no 
beginning and no end in the conventional sense (Barthes, 1986: 
58). The emancipatory writing process consequently allows the 
reader to access the text at several entry points. The notion 
of "interpretation" becomes therefore an activity of what Barthes 
refers to as the disentangling the multiple writings of the text. 
The writerly text is none other than the critical site of 
disentanglement and unmasking (deconstruction) in meaning 
construction. At the same time, the site for creation and 
writing of my text and therefore myself, that is, yields glimpses 
of myself. This stance proves to be a major shift from Eco and 
Lot man' s reading and ushers us in the beginning of the "autonomy" 
of writing itself. Beyond what is usually regarded as the 
"smooth surface" of representational reading where the subject 
confers meaning on an object, Barthes problematizes his version 
of the "rereading act" of writing as a "chaotic" procedure, with 
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neither any beginning, nor any end. The reading subject's only 
status or function is to be involved in the writing of the text 
to unearth the "other sites of reading", including himself in the 
process of writing or the process of creation without 
"respecting" the text (a la Barthes). The subject who controls 
and manipulates the text becomes irrecoverable from the "reading-
writing" rather than fulfilling the authoritative role of the 
"reader-writer" who imputs meaning into or extracts meaning from 
the text. There is thus no need, whatsoever, to re-present any 
idea "contained" or "extracted" in terms of any perception. 
The readerly text, we notice, remains however a representational 
mode of reading, of readers consuming what is regarded as the 
objective text. On the other hand, the critical challenge of the 
writerly text, in so far as it avoids representation, has value 
for Barthes in that it becomes a process of "production" in which 
the subject becomes the active producer: it is "ourselves 
writing", and not seeking (vis-a-vis an object) a "reliable" 
reading. The readerly also seems clearly constrained by 
considerations of representation: it is irreversible, "natural", 
decidable, continuous, and totalizable. Barbara Johnson (1986: 
441), by contrast, conceives of the disruptive writerly as" ... 
infinitely plural and open to the free play of signif iers and of 
difference, unconstrained by representative considerations and 
transgressive of any desire for decidable, unified, totalized 
meaning. Barthes himself (1975:15) argues that: 
II the affirmation of the plural, cannot 
work with "respect" to the text; the tutor 
text will ceaselessly be broken, interrupted 
... once it is separated from an ideology of 
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totality, consists precisely in manhandling 
the text, interrupting it (lui couper la 
parole). 
Contrary to the pursuits of the pioneers like Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty and Gadamer who emphasized the equity or equivalence of 
subject and object in the construction of meaning, Barthes 
follows Ricoeur 1 s "conflict of interpretation" by emphasizing the 
disruptive play of signifiers which de-totalizes this balance and 
correspondence between subject and object in order that new 
meanings be constantly generated. This "de-totalizing" 
procedure, in the reading act, is a fundamental move away from 
equivalences which ensures that no single meaning of a text 
emerges as the meaning of a text, which is so typical of the 
pursuits of communicative reading endeavours which seek to ensure 
representations. 
In the Barthesian construction of meaning the plurality 
engendered by writerly texts, forms the basis of abandoning 
equivalence of the opposition of subject and object. Barthes's 
view posits a problematization of "the author-function", for the 
question arises how reading is to be distinguished from other 
practices (like dreaming, fantasizing, for example) without 
reference to a previously determined object - whether the latter 
be construed as a meaningful work or as a signifying text? It 
seems that the author-subject is replaced with another notion of 
a subject viz, that of the "scriptor" or that of the reader, for 
" the reader is the space on which all the quotations that 
make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; 
a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. 
Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal ... he (the 
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reader) is simply someone who holds together in a single field 
all the traces by which the written text is constituted" 
(Barthes, 1979: 75). 
Barthes (1986: 131) wants to move beyond the idea of a reading 
subject in which the "empty" subject of enunciation gradually 
accumulates a variety of predicates that constitutes him as a 
person, endowed with a psychology. Barthes clearly wants to 
denounce the foundational or archaeological orientation for a 
teleological one, departing from the quest for totalization or 
closure to the quest of multiplicity - an approach which marks 
constant shaping and reshaping of the reading act in writing and 
not in and through an author or reader. The destination of this 
reading is a process that is constantly re-created and delayed 
in conflict for deeper meanings and perhaps other meanings. 
4.4.4 THE SHAPING OF READING AS WRITING 
Barthes's significant claim that we are not able to liberate 
reading until we have liberated writing is clear"· .. as for a 
doctrine of reading, I have none: a doctrine of writing 
[however] is gradually taking shape" (Barthes, 1986: 33). This 
shaping process as a form of liberation from the values and 
truths of referencing however is not a linear, harmonious process 
but rather a conflictual or disruptive process of creation in 
which the reader writes and rewrites "his own" texts. Readers 
should be liberated in order to become creative and "write" or 
produce their various readings before we can really speak of 
reading - i.e. they should engage in an ongoing process, rather 
than referring to the reading act which is a once-off event in 
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which they have discovered the truth. Barthes' s view of reading-
as-constantly-being- shaped, not by any authority or consenting 
agent, foreshadows Derrida's post-modernist play of traces which 
have already been shaped by Nietzsche's approach of Werden and 
power quanta in flux. 
Given the fact that "writing" becomes an act of production, 
reading and interpretation therefore implicitly represents a 
"non-parasitical activity". This implies that any textual 
reading has to be "produced", i.e. written by the reader himself. 
The "I" is empty outside the discourse of the text but becomes 
full, over and over, each instance it assumes a productive or 
performati ve stance in the reading discourse. The further 
implication is that the "textual message" might not be 
necessarily synonymous with its intended meaning (Barthes, 1986: 
59), for the reader writes and rewrites his own reading: " 
I am not hidden within the text, I am simply irrecoverable from 
it" (Barthes, 1975: 10). In this manner Barthes believes to have 
overcome the "structural obligation" of subjects interpreting 
objects (texts). 
In grappling whether he should still call it "reading", Barthes 
seems to want to move away from the notion of a psychological and 
biographical subject in the reading-writing process to embrace 
a semiotic subject who is situated within the structures of what 
is regarded as the reading-writing process - rather than be 
posited as transcendent to them. The Barthesian reading-writing 
act of meaning construction is to be implicated in the active 
production of such structures but need not be taken as 
foundational to that process: 
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"On the stage of the text, no footlights: 
there is not, behind the text, someone 
active (the writer) and out front someone 
passive (the reader) : there is not a subject 
and an object" (Barthes, 1976(a): 16). 
In writing his own reading, Barthes argues, the "absent" 
authoritative reader assembles a text (as in "message") by 
involving the use of semiological strategies of switching levels, 
horizontally and vertically, (Barthes, 1977: 87), - differently 
to Eco's "present" reader. The result is making the actual 
"textual form" the terrain of re-writing, which can either result 
in the readerly or writerly text. This re-writing process is one 
of switching our level of approaching reading: instead of 
listening to language for what it communicates, the reader 
visualizes it as a substance in its own right, opaque rather than 
transparent (Barthes, 1978: 161). The Barthesian pursuit has 
clearly been a writerly text which seeks to escape the "closing-
off" of a stable and finished text. Therefore, while the 
Barthesian reading subject is situated in and by language i.e. 
within the realm of signification, its extension is potentially 
broader. The speaking subject's pursuit of "wanting to be ... " 
aims to challenge the Cartesian representational view of a 
subject which is reduced to a mere puppet emerging from the 
structural systems. Writing (in this sense the "Text") occurs 
when a row of signif iers is produced so that the ground of 
language disappears from under one's feet, and it becomes the 
insistent play of signifiers that is set up and arranged ad 
infinitum (Barthes, 1976(b): 10-11). Rather than placing the 
subject under duress of a particular strategy (Eco) or culture 
(Lot man) , Barthes' s semiology proposes a following of the "signs" 
243 
in the text to constantly create new meaning, i.e. readers who 
become "deaf" to the use of language (Barthes, 1978: 170). 
Language is therefore none other than for the purpose to "carry" 
the playful signifiers, but otherwise is void of meaning and 
function. For Barthes therefore language facilitates the writing 
of meaning rather than communicating content. 
4.4.5 WRITING AS DISRUPTIVE NECESSITY FOR MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION 
Far from rejecting the subject (and subjectivity), Barthes 
refuses to separate the subject from the social order, and, as 
a result, rejects the notion of a free or autonomous foundational 
subject. The subject rather functions, with the other signs, 
within the writing process. Barthes, (1976(a): 5) argues that 
the text is always a threat to the reader, to the reader's 
settled pattern of subjectivity, as the discussion of textual 
production suggested. 
It is however Barthes' s view of language that if we unmask 
ideology and myth as evidenced in the connotations that stable 
texts inevitably "convey", we in fact celebrate the birth of the 
reader, but at the cost of the death of the author (1977: 148). 
Writing, according to Barthes, can no longer designate a coherent 
master-minded activity of recording, notation, depiction or 
representation, for the "scriptor" does not exist outside the 
scene of writing (see Kerby, 1991: 102). The author must "die" 
and abdicate for the text to begin its own life, a life without 
final closure, without a final signified content. In the reading 
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act this implies that the reading subject has to become part of 
writing his own text, which is not at all a straightforward and 
smooth process, for readers, according to Barthes, are not one-
dimensional but rather constitute what he calls multiple or 
plural subjects. The text, like the erotic, suspends our sense 
of ourselves as unified reading subjects: we have no secure 
identity as receivers of a message, for there is no final 
message. As readers we cannot relate to a message's discourse 
but are only confronted with bottomless possibilities, and the 
multiplicity of voices we hear multiplies our response and 
divides our subjectivity. In this sense we are no innocent and 
decontextualized subjects either which are anterior to the text 
(Barthes, 1975: 10) , for the "I" who approaches the text is 
already, according to Bathes, a plurality of social and other 
voices and texts. According to Barthes, the notion of 
"objectivity" and "subjectivity" are therefore nothing but 
fictitious and imaginary notions, leaving the reader to continue 
to oscillate and shift within, what Barthes refers to as, a 
"galaxy of signifying systems" (Barthes, 1975: 5). The "subject" 
is a dynamic construct of vibrant signifiers. 
Barthes moreover argues that the meanings the reader generates 
are not established by the authoritative will of himself or of 
others but via their systematic mark, for " there is no other 
proof of a reading than the quality and endurance of its 
systematics ... i.e. its functioning" (1975: 10). Barthes'sview 
of reading discourse ushers us into the beginnings of clear post-
modernist mode of reasoning where the reading act becomes a 
"look, no hands!" approach, and where the conventional 
understandings of "truth", including the "truth" of our notions 
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of subjectivity and representation, 
reading-as-writing- approach. He 
have no validity in his 
argues that in meaning 
construction we do no't wish to "rediscover" the truth contained 
in our reading, but rather to escape the binary dialectic between 
a value and its opposite and discover a third notion (which is 
not a synthesis of the first two) but"··· a term that returns 
in a different place, not as a truth, but as a Fiction 
(Barthes, 1978: 92). It is this fiction that has become your own 
personalized writing, i.e. your own reading instead of the 
author's. 
Barthes' s view of "systematics" are "responsible for the fiction 
generated by textual codes within the paradoxical nature of the 
writerly text, because the latter thrives on the free and 
infinite play of signifiers which seem to refuse coherence-
seeking and closure of meaning. The dynamics of the reading-as-
writing process will only occur when the reading subject engages 
in the disentangling (not deciphering) (Barthes, 1977: 147) of 
the plurality of textual codes: "The interpretation demanded by 
a specific text, in its plurality, is in no way liberal, it is 
not a question of conceding "some meanings" - it is a question 
of asserting the very existence of plurality" (Barthes, 1975: 6). 
The consequence is that the construction of the plural text, read 
by the plural subject, remains of necessity, incomplete and open. 
This inevitably would upset the security and conventions in 
everyday life, for the text violates the symbolic barriers on 
which our culture, and therefore our place in it, depends. 
Barthes clearly wants to overcome the barriers or limitations of 
linearity of causality, i.e. the desire to establish who or what 
authority is behind the meaning construction. Barthes thus 
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rejects what Miller (1987) accepts as "decoding" which is an 
ongoing process of seeking explanations, judged on assumptions, 
conventions and standard maxims by which the intentions of an 
actual author might be constructed. 
Contrary to tradition (Gadamer) or culture (Letman), nothing 
mediates (like the signs and symbols of Ricoeur) the act of 
meaning construction. For him it is neither the subject nor the 
text as such. Barthes fervently seeks to avert the reciprocal 
process of circularity where the subject and object constantly 
condition each other in order to construct new meaning. While 
the dynamics if circularity in the reading act does ensure 
multiple readings (like in the case of Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur) , these still tend to occur under very clear and specific 
conditions and, as a result, limits the "openness of the reading 
act. The 11 look, no hands! " shift in Bart hes' s new approach, 
wants the reading discourse to "speak for itself", without 
closure or finality of a subject or object. While the insecure 
text, according to Barthes, is without final closure or without 
a final signified content, its future would seem to rather lie 
with its readers linguistically a reading subject as an 
instance in writing. This decentred status of the anti-
authoritarian subject marks Barthes' s radical contribution to the 
rethinking of the reading act. "Decentred subjectivity" 
underscores the challenge of a self-assured Cartesian subject as 
well as Gadamerian subject operating in a tradition. 
The Barthesian emphasis is unequivocally on the rewriting 
process, executed within the "plural reader" who acts as the 
space and orientation point, in which the reader structurates. 
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A text does not embody a rigid structure but only a productive 
stance of structuration, for 11 ••• a code is a perspective of 
quotations, a mirage of structures, we know only its departures 
and returns" (Barthes, 1975: 20). The reading act, according to 
Barthes, is therefore always disruptive and discontinuous act, 
writing and rewriting of a limited number of decorative variables 
in order to make the familiar, new. The critical task of 
reading-writing will tend to upset easy resolutions in 
information and data interpretation, generating a new textual 
space wherein deeply-entrenched habits of interpretation have 
been tested, resisted, violated and transformed (see Cornis-Pope, 
1992: 29) . This is the essence of the Barthesian "non-
referential 11 view which stubbornly refuses closure of intention 
and completion of meaning, which marked the earlier theories. 
Barthes, by removing his writing discourse from the authority of 
truth, insists that his guiding principle is not knowledge but 
writing (Barthes, 1978: 71). The question of "accurate 
representation" is therefore a non-issue for Barthes since 
signifieds have no origins; they are reversible, they are 
networks which are indeterminable based as they are on the 
"infinity of language" (Barthes, 1975:6). 
Barthes points out that the active writing subject "intersects" 
the text that had already begun, by interweaving and braiding the 
familiar voices or codes in his own writing. In the Barthesian 
view of the reading act, there exists therefore no originary 
"objective" text that would easily or simplistically produce 
uni vocal or literal meanings. The implication is also that there 
exists no notion of intersubjectivity either, for the reader is 
no longer a consumptive subjective agent, communicating or 
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responding to the text's "subjective" meaning. In fact the 
reader is only "free", according to Barthes, to respond to the 
"play of signif iers" (Barthes, 1975: 4) . Moreover, if every "no 
hands" reading embodies a constant re-reading, it implies that 
there has been no first reading of the text at all. As a result, 
Barthes incorporates the notion of "forgetting" into his notion 
of "textual disentanglement" since forgetting, as an affirmative 
creative value, evidences the immense liberty he accords the 
reader subject: "It is precisely because I forget that I read" 
(Barthes, 1975: 11) . The "first" reading is just one of the many 
valid "readings" that a text could possible have - defying the 
notion of any shade of referentiality, i.e. the text and its 
referent. Sharing "a common subject matter" would be put out of 
action and has no guarantee in reading. 
4.4.6 THE DIVIDED/SPLIT SUBJECT IN THE STRUCTURATION OF 
WRITING. 
Since Bart hes challenges the notion of a pre-existing or finished 
text which shares with the reader, there cannot, according to 
him, be an action called "interpretation". What is called 
"interpretation" rather becomes the very "ontological ground" 
which spawns the birth of the reading subject in the process of 
writing. This ontological space however marks a multidimensional 
space of writing, i.e. a space in which a variety of writings, 
none of which are original. These writings as production of 
"meaning" may blend and clash as well (Barthes, 1977: 146) . 
Furthermore, this inter-space between disentanglement and 
creation (writing) is, according to Barthes, not a space for 
arbitrary "interpretation", because textual codes in fact assist 
249 
the reader in disrupting and transforming the text into a 
writerly text. The interpretation of a text " in its 
plurality, is in no way liberal: it is not that of the true, the 
probable, or even the possible (Barthes, 1975:6). Within the 
structuration of the text a divided or split subject becomes 
apparent, i.e. the subject of the readerly text is still outside 
of the text who has to become the subject inside the writerly 
text, operating among the many other signs/codes in the reading. 
In this space, marked by disruption and tension, Barthes (1975: 
19) identifies the semic, hermeneutic, proairetic, symbolic and 
cultural codes - all of which fulfill the "off-stage voices" 
which are the codes in " . . . their interweaving - the convergence 
of voices ... writing" (Barthes, 1975: 20). Barthes envisages 
meanings which invoke other names, other meanings and " . . . their 
conglomeration calls out to be named anew; I name, I unname, I 
rename: thus passes the text: it is a nomination in the becoming, 
a tireless approximation, a metonymic project" (Barthes, 1975: 
17-18). The metonymic dynamic resides in the writing space in 
which the subject, assisted the Barthesian codes, writes. 
Therefore, the pursuit of discovering what the text is really 
about, is a non-start for Barthes. 
As subjects read, the connotations we unearth become, through 
their duration and repetition within the reading, denotations 
from which further connotations need to be derived. This 
oscillating process of discontinuity results in the fact that 
there cannot be any "construction of a text" (Barthes, 1975: 18) 
either in a subjective or objective way in the representational 
manner, but everything signifies continually and in multiple 
times, without any mandate for a final unity. The reading-
250 
writing process, in its unmediated unfolding, interrupts, 
discontinues, continues and transforms the "text" over and over. 
In this process the subject too is compelled to continually renew 
his own identity and meaning in life. Barthes' s contribution here 
is affording readers " a sense of discovery" in which we do not 
have to conform or emulate the behaviour of others. 
In terms of the pleasure of reading as structuration, according 
to Barthes, the text is "manhandled" and "interrupted" (Barthes, 
1975: 15). In a fetishist (rather than sharing) relationship 
with the text, and in creating a sense of suspense, the subject, 
in fact "creates" himself a creation which is marked by 
plurality, discontinuity and explosion. In a sense it is also 
"exploding" the myth of what people think we are or "should be", 
as of ten conveyed or insinuated in the media, advertising and 
educational practices. The homogeneous, neatly-packaged coherent 
sense of identity in Cartesian representational reading, has been 
replaced by Barthes. The "explosion" or "dissemination" of 
texts, according to Barthes, characterizes the play of signif iers 
which reduces and ultimately dispels the quest for final and 
holistic meaning. For what ultimately remains is a reading which 
resides in what Barthes calls the "pleasure of reading". The 
pleasure Barthes speaks of does not refer to the psychological-
biographical pleasure of the reader, but an expressive capacity 
that acts as an impetus within a symbolic and cultural sphere 
(off-stage voices) . It is therefore not only the pleasure of 
consumption but jouissance as an intense, even violent, orgasmic 
form of pleasure. Jouissance is essentially an interruption of 
consciousness, shattering the mirror world of the literal and 
accurate representational reading between reader and text. The 
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"framework" in which the divided subject operates, encompasses 
the past writings (memory) and the freedom of the present within 
which ecriture or writing tries to sustain itself. Within the 
ambit of this "tension of meaning" Barthes (1953: 31) seeks to 
subvert the literal and accurate reading of a text to achieve a 
"zero-degree writing" that would be "free of any servitude to a 
marked order of language" . In other words, it is a form of 
first-hand writing, starting from the attempts of the reader 
himself, acquiescing into a process of structuration that has 
already begun. Therefore, " ... the pristine simplicity of the 
idea of mere interpretation. . . is altogether lost" (Rorty, 
1993:130). 
According to Barthes, by grasping the significance of ecriture, 
the very coinage of the concept "reading subject" therefore 
becomes patently false. What ultimately holds for Barthes, is 
writing, i.e. the functioning or structuration of signifiers and 
not representation. Moreover, what this view seeks to convey is 
that texts which are read in our writing of them, should occur 
on their own merit, i.e. in terms of the structure (albeit a 
disruptive process) of symbolic and cultural codes and not to 
view them representationally as mirrors of a constituting 
consciousness. No symbol (as in Ricoeur's view) mediates the 
reading process. If the literal author is left behind, once the 
text goes public, the writing becomes a confluence of 
intertexuality rather than intersubjectivity. Once the author 
has been dethroned as the origin of meaning, he has been freed 
to allow him to re-enter the experience of reading. Beneath the 
fallacy of the written words there always appear to be more words 
- a form of renaming, unnaming and rewriting that can know no 
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halt. No one, neither author nor reader, can "own" or "control" 
the content. Language and discourse takes on a peculiar 
"subjectivity" operating as the "site of production". It is 
within discourse that meanings are detotalized and 
decrystallized, where the 11 subject" constantly creates and 
recreates itself - a view which suggests that Barthes still 
operates within the shadow of or reference to the notion of 
subjectivity - even if its merely a theoretical construct -
therefore, theoretically, the text is being written endlessly. 
4.4.7 THE ENDLESS TEXT OF READING AS WRITING PROCESS 
Barthes's progress beyond the "new" theorists is quite 
substantial. It has become clear that in rethinking our concerns 
of the subject and representation, Barthes has pushed his own 
version of suspicion substantially further than his predecessors. 
The human subject, who has been "dismissed" out of the equation 
of validating what is regarded as knowledge and meaning, has been 
radically questioned and believed to have been replaced by 
Barthes. We observe however that the human subject, who "reads" 
becomes a semiotic and theoretical point of a subject that 
becomes its own author in order to define and redefine himself. 
Barthes however does not abandon the notion of subject but seeks 
to separate the subject from discourse so that the subject 
becomes an implicate of its discourse. The endless text as 
manifest reading, subverts the attempts of representation by 
foregrounding the workings of language as autonomous - disturbing 
therefore the unity of the reader or writer's subjectivity 
(Moriarty, 1991: 148). Instead therefore of saying "I have 
written", Barthes proposes 11 I am written" (which is not the 
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equivalent of "someone wrote me" (see Caws, 1988: 239). In this 
sense the text or the reading, which can only be produced in the 
present, has profound liberating ontological roots. It is a form 
of subjectivity which can never be a finished product, for we do 
not have to contend with " once-and-for-all" complete definitions 
or views of ourselves - whether views generated by ourselves or 
views imposed upon us. 
In order to escape the dogmatism of representational reading 
where the human subject is the centre of things and is, as a 
result, able to contradict itself, the plural text sets out to 
ensure non-closure of meaning, whether it be a poem, scientific 
manual or charter of rights. Text or reading (which is the 
shaping, undoing and reshaping of the subject) defers the 
signified indefinitely, through an endless process of 
displacement (metonymy) (Barthes, 1986: 58-9). There are no quick 
fixes. Barthes constantly attempts to avoid the possibility of 
unity for the subject, for the divided subject helps to resituate 
and reorientate the dispersion (starring of text) into an 
infinite network of ever-new signs (Barthes, 1975: 6) and as such 
problematizes the reading act as established in terms of truth. 
The radically decentred status of the reading subject would also 
be crystallized so that its "identity" which tends to become 
fixed and predictable would replicate itself in every reading 
of a text. The Barthesian subject, in a way becomes an implied 
subject of the discourse - expressing the possibility of much 
richer participation in multiple text production of books, 
information, our world and, as a result, understanding oneself. 
Contrary to the "systems" of Eco and Lotman, Barthes (1975: 11-
13) prefers to keep the text open, plural (to respect its 
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difference from other texts and other worlds and from itself) -
avoiding freezing a text in order to extract a theme or 
structure, also to avoid reading people as a "typical" this or 
"typical" that. 
Barthes is clearly qualitatively beyond the systemic approaches 
of Eco and Letman, which, despite their acknowledgement of 
"oppositional forces" between subject-object, still operate in 
a polarity structure of meaning construction and "messages". 
Barthes as probably our most critical exponent of the "new" 
exponents dealt within this study hitherto, seeks to take his 
assumptions beyond the limitations of subject-object reciprocity 
and communication. Whereas the author's of "back-to-the-text" 
approaches of the New Critics, who believe in the objectivity of 
the text, seem to stand aloof of the reader's subjective 
prejudices (Seung, 1982: 6) the Barthesian post-structuralist 
approach attempts to redefine the designation of who or what is 
"subject" and "object" differently. For Barthes it is not about 
sharing, communication or certainly not representing. Life 
rather, is an endless text into which we all, readers as writers, 
produce our worlds and our identities - and liberate ourselves 
and our worlds. 
Reading or text "resides" in a broader realm of intertextuality, 
rather than between subject and object. Intertextuality, i.e. 
the relationship a one reading to other readings or texts is 
another dimension of the endless citational process which 
prevents closing on a signified. In fact the "representational 
structure" between subject and object appears to be completely 
displaced. It is however not just a matter of the "text" which 
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now fulfils the role of the traditional human subject. With the 
Barthesian post-structural approach to the reading act the notion 
of "an identity" in a unified way (eg. the reader as subject) no 
longer seem to have any validity, for it is rather the endless 
working or functioning of signs and codes that "produces" meaning 
- even the meaning of who I, the human subject, is. The myopia 
of circularity or reciprocity which is typical of the pioneering 
masters, is redefined in terms of the discontinous and disruptive 
functioning of codes, continually dispossessing the role of the 
reading subject as well as his "traditional" and "typical" 
identity of stability and unity. The capacity of jouissance 
(pleasure) which always belies the reading dynamic, constantly 
subverts the unified image of the self, the text and our world 
(Barthes, 1976(a): 25). 
Barthes' s repudiation of his earlier structuralism (in S/Z) 
corresponds, as we will see in the case with Derrida's 
deconstructi ve understanding of the reading act, is clear in that 
both of them initiate a radical departure from reading to 
writing, arguing that texts are composed of a number of diverse 
and overlapping voices or codes, which in essence is not itself 
anti-structuralist, but rather what would seem to be post-
structuralist and subjectless. It is this Barthesian sense of 
jouissance (suspense in the pleasure of reading) which is the 
fragmentation, the loss, of subjectivity. Barthes complicates 
the ambiguity of jouissance (which temporarily eclipses 
subjectivity) because at another level "subjectivity" as a 
working hypothesis, surfaces again. 
Barthes' s anti-interpretive strategy in meaning construction 
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therefore seeks to show that the text entails a plurality of 
levels of connotation, with denotation having no separate 
existence, the reader defies accurate representation and rather 
dismantles the text's presence and in the process dismantles the 
ego, cogito and consciousness as well. The "I", as a result, 
becomes a plurality of voices or codes which reads the Barthesian 
readerly text. The Barthesian "I" which approaches the text 
according to him, is already a plurality of other texts, of other 
worlds. In the reading act the life of the subject, a 
constituted self is endlessly threatened with, and simultaneously 
seeks, a temporary annihilation in orgasmic reading bliss. While 
Barthes has proven to have substantially progressed beyond the 
communicative polarity structure of his predecessors, his notion 
of subjectivity (unlike the post-modernists, like Derrida) still 
has a context in discourse in terms of which meaning is 
constructed. The Barthesian idea of subjectivity appears to be 
engaged by and in an already existing human reservoir of 
contextual codes and texts. However, this "plural subject" which 
is being written, endlessly, stands outside the text to "clarify" 
textual logic that the text itself is apparently blind to. In 
this way the plural human subject continually dismantles all 
conceptions (including that of himself) in order to constantly 
redefine his world and himself. It is only the irreducible 
language or discourse within the "texte de jouissance" that 
figures utopia in Barthes's discourse of reading. 
In this study Barthes has ushered us into the value and 
significance of displacement in reading - a concept which has 
come to disturb the smooth definition of the location and 
identity of reading. The question is how can we read that which 
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is different from itself or, moreover, can we read differently 
and more profoundly, other than being "true" to a text or to read 
it "right"? In the opening of Le Plaisir du texte Barthes asks 
us to imagine a bizarre creature who has rid itself of the fear 
of self-contradiction, who mixes reputedly incompatible languages 
and patiently endures charges of illogicality. This notion of 
illogicality, and also misrecognition and displacement, becomes 
a very prominent effect (and is taken further) in Lacan' s 
approach to meaning construction in reading. In his 
psychoanalytic reading, Lacan challenges what he regards as the 
dubious assumptions of a coherent and stable identity of the 
reader. Felman (in Bennett, 1995:11) suggests that analytic 
reading is " the reading of a difference that inhabits 
language, a kind of mapping in the subject's discourse of its 
points of disagreement with or difference with itself". 
Therefore, in order to deepen the understanding of reading - away 
from identity (sameness, symmetry) of understanding towards 
difference (heterogeneity, ambiguity) we will proceed from 
Barthes's shift of displacement to Lacan's shift to emptiness as 
a significant component of meaning and understanding in the 
context of this study. 
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4.5. LACAN'S PSYCHO-ANALYTIC EVACUATION OF MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION 
4.5.1 THE DEPARTURE FROM OBJECTIVITY 
As we have noticed with Barthes, the liberating "scene of 
writing" becomes one intense, ongoing act of reading. Nothing 
is here subjected in a simple, unproblematic way to a dominant 
subject, whether identified as author, cogito, archetype, or 
field of knowledge. Hartman (1981:2) argues that lately"· .. we 
have been accustomed to bypass the peculiar entity "self" and say 
that things are subject to language, or language-determined 
indetermination. Even the self, that is, has its boundaries fixed 
or unsettled by language." The centrality of language vis-a-vis 
the analytic assumptions of the unconscious, in the arena of 
meaning construction, is the manifest, radical contribution of 
Lacan in this study. 
Following Nietzsche and Bataille, Lacan wants to take individuals 
to the pre-Oedipal play of desires so that people can continually 
create and redefine themselves, through language, without giving 
themselves through language a fixed unity and therefore a self-
assured sense of authority and authorship. As a result, Lacan 
evidences the most insightful move to interpret Freud's 
unconscious as a language and then interpret language along 
Saussurian lines, as the free play of signs and signif iers 
(differences and identities) without end or unity - the latter 
of which already gained a foothold in the problematization of 
meaning construction by Barthes and Derrida. 
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Our attempts at rethinking and deepening our insights into the 
reading act and the construction of meaning since Descartes, 
would be lacking if we did not also examine the "never-present 
past 11 Lacanian discourse of subj ecti vi ty and representation 
(Lacan, 1977(a); 1977(b)). Lacan returns to language and its 
intertwining implications with subjectivity, but viewed from a 
completely different vantage-point. He encourages us to read 
Freud as if "reading" a dream or symptom, that is, according to 
Freud's own interpretive methods. Consistent with the pioneers 
in this study and more particularly Barthes and Derrida, Lacan 
too rejects the notion of a unified reading subject that has 
virtual direct access to textual meaning and self-identity and 
like Derrida, subjects them rather to the working (Nietzsche) of 
playful signifiers. 
Like Barthes, Lacan also appears to be indebted to the 
assumptions of structuralist linguistics, especially his Freudian 
concerns regarding the subject, i . e . the speaking subject and its 
role as signifier in the context of meaning-giving. In an 
attempt to develop his own peculiar theory, Lacan wishes to read 
Freud and this appears to be the simplest and most important 
thing about understanding him. In Lacan's writings the 
challenges of psychoanalysis are moreover repeatedly made to 
"turn back upon itself" and constantly re-examine their concepts, 
rituals, etc. from the vantage-point offered by their own 
discoveries in their original unsystematized state (Bowie, 1987: 
100-101). For Lacan (1977(b): 31-32) and his grasp of meaning, 
it is important to recognize that the unconscious is not a 
submerged consciousness, a rational system that is somehow 
invisible; it is an entirely other form of reason, logic and 
260 
pleasure one not reducible to those available consciousness. 
This marks Lacan's critical contribution and background to the 
reading act, that it is just so absolutely other than that of all 
the theorists in this study, which in themselves cannot be taken 
as definitive. 
For Lacanian thinking, the notion of "representation through 
signification" is seemingly only fully appreciated in the light 
of his "return to Freud" - a view which encompasses an almost un-
or anti-Freudian view. Contrary to the ego-psychologists who 
argue that the ego contains all the essential elements within 
itself to develop into an autonomous, conflict-free ego, Lacan 
rather, pursues a "non-representational view" of interpretation 
theory which results in what can be regarded as a "re-reading 
of psycho-analysis itself" (Felman, 1987: 9). He criticizes the 
apparent over-systematization, and therefore "objectivist" views 
of all the modes of interpretations of Freud and on the basis of 
this argument develops his own critical understanding of 
subjectivity and representation for the reading act (Bowie, 
1991) . Lacan clearly hopes to demonstrate how the implications 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis, for the reading act, suggests 
"different or other" or even ambiguous ways in which 
psychoanalysis has "transformed" the procedures and strategies 
that would be available to the reading subject. Felman (1995: 
181) suggests that Lacanian analysis, while recognizing that a 
"difference inhabits language", also asserts that the unconscious 
is not just that state which is read, but also in fact 11 that 
which reads 11 • In the framework of this 11 non-objectivist 11 and 
different approach Lacanian recognition of the "unconscious as 
a reader" produces in this study a further dimension of 
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understanding the notion of the reading act as being differential 
(see Williams, 1995: 75; Felman, 1982: 21). For Lacan (1977(a): 
295) the unconscious is primarily structured like a language, and 
to develop his interpretation of the linguisticality of the 
unconscious, he draws extensively on the work of Levi-Strauss 
(1967: 203): 
"The unconscious is always empty - or 
more accurately, it is as alien to mental 
images as is the stomach to the foods that 
pass through it. As the organ of a specific 
function, the unconscious merely imposes 
structural laws upon inarticulated elements 
that originate elsewhere impulses, 
emotions, representations and memories." 
Contrary to Barthes's abandonment of a totalizing binary view of 
social codes, Lacan seeks to approach the reading act primarily 
in terms of Hegel's master-slave dialectic - a parable in which 
the slave can work for the master only by repressing his own 
desires, founded in emptiness, and as a result transcend himself. 
In this context Lacan also refers to Sartre's dialectic of the 
self, its lack or loss and the other vis-a-vis the act of seeing 
and being seen (Hollinger, 1994: 91). The Freudian notion of 
libido, is significant for meaning construction and according to 
Lacan, can explore the world through nothing else but what he 
calls the "scopic drive" (Sarup, 1992: 35). But that drive does 
not only "represent" pleasure-seeking, as with Freud, but is 
inescapably entangled in a signifying system. This productive 
process implicates all forms of "looking", for as the object can 
be looked at, it in turn can look at me - a notion we will later 
examine more closely in terms of how the "empty" subject 
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constructs meaning. 
Contrary to Heidegger's notion of language being the "house of 
Being", Lacan (1977 (a) : 1) argues that there is no pre-discursive 
reality since every reality is already founded in and defined by 
discourse. Lacan (in Critchley & Dews, 1996: 149) remarks that 
no linguist or philosopher can maintain " ... a theory of language 
as a system of signs doubling a system of realities". He argues 
therefore in an "anti-representational" manner that no system of 
signification can be sustained other than by reference to a 
process of endless, playful signification. Dews (1996: 150) 
clarifies that for Lacan II... there are no privileged points 
where language abuts directly onto the real: reference is rather 
inherent in the functioning of a language - however minimal - as 
a whole". Lacan clearly joins the ranks of the new masters of 
grasping the reading act, as a deferred process, whose purpose 
resides not in its use as a logical communicative tool but rather 
in its desubstantialization functioning. This discourse, for 
Lacan, happens among people, as signifiers - which determines the 
space of the subject. 
It is significant for Lacan that the notion of "people" 
essentially is nothing more than signifiers operating as a 
function of speech. This he uses in his re-conceptualized view 
of the subject and therefore favours psycho-analysis precisely 
because of its emphasis on the "lack of being". According to 
Lacan (1977 (a) : 292) the "lack of being" proves essential for the 
conceptualization of language and its "representations". While 
Hegel argues that language harbors an absence that is the result 
of the negation of the sensual immediacy of the "here and now", 
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Lacan (1977 (a): 276) effectively reformulates Hegel's insight when 
he identifies "the word" as "a presence made of absence": 
"Through the word - already a presence made 
of absence - absence itself gives itself a 
name in the moment of origin whose perpetual 
recreation Freud's genius detected in the 
play of the child." 
The absence of the word discloses the nothingness of the thing. 
To clarify their thinking, both Heidegger and Lacan underscore 
the etymological link between "thing" and "nothing" or "no 
thing". For reading the trace is always the trace of a nothing 
(Lacan, (1977(a): 320). He peculiarly argues that man was born 
prematurely since language existed prior to humankind. The 
implication therefore is not what the reading subject "is able" 
to perceive but that seeing has already been determined by 
images. Bannet (in Bracher, 1994,: 25) clarifies that "··· as 
the conscious subject is little more than a mechanism which 
repeats the signifiers and significations already in language, 
so the unconscious is a mechanism which repeats what has been 
repressed". In meaning construction therefore to understand the 
Lacanian notion of "representation" or rather signification means 
exploring the endless, yet playful process that would yield no 
fixed or stable meaning but only to conceal a "deeper gap", i.e. 
a gap of an unconscious system of repressed meaning, rooted in 
Desire. Unravelling the complexities of the psycho-analytic 
processes of the unconscious and signification would be 
significant by illuminating Lacan' s "revolutionized interpretive 
stance a revolutionized theory of reading: a theory of 
reading that opens up into a rereading of the world as well ... " 
(Felman, 1987: 9). 
264 
To arrive at a more comprehensive not ion of reading, Lac an' s 
rethinking of subjectivity in the act of meaning construction 
proposes a deconstructive path in a different way as suggested 
by Barthes and Derrida. His "difference" of approaching the 
usual communicative nature of language and subjectivity resides 
in the recognition of the notions of of gap, absence and loss. 
In a critical stance, as that of Barthes, Lacan which seeks to 
avert or subvert the notion of equivalence and moreover the 
simplistic acquiescence into a substantial centre-stage subject 
manipluating and mastering the textual object. For Lacan the 
notion of the reading subject rather becomes implicated in 
language, acting as a signifier who constantly engages "out of 
his lack of being" to repeat the signif iers already existing in 
language. In this sense Lacan' s notion of subjectivity, in 
contrast to that of Derrida, as we will notice, seems to "re-
engage" the human element in his discourse. 
4.5.2 THE LACANIAN RETHINKING OF SUBJECTIVITY IN MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION. 
It is not unusual in some "reading theories" that the traditional 
notion of Freudian psycho-analysis deals essentially with the 
wishes and desires that are unknown to the subject because they 
only appear in the unconscious. Lacan' s argument, however, 
defies the notion of a unified collection of thoughts and 
feelings which essentially results into an essential split. The 
result of this shift is a decentered and empty subject, away from 
the conception of traditional representationalism. Lacan 
(1977(a): 292) also insists that the rift between the universal 
(the unconscious) and the particular (consciousness) forever 
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splits the subject, thereby rendering transparent self-
consciousness unattainable. As a result of its inescapable 
altarity (the proximity of "difference" and "otherness"), the 
unconscious remains "excentric" to consciousness. In the reading 
act the significance of the "excentricity/eccentricity" of the 
subject calls into question the principles governing our Western 
verifying and totalizing theories, even in those bent on a 
"correct" reading: 
"But Freud's discovery was to demonstrate 
that this verifying process authentically 
attains the subject only by decentering it 
(a le decentrer) from the consciousness-of-
self" (Lacan, 1977(a): 79-80). 
Lacan's excentric subjectivity cannot operate in terms of 
coherent verification but is to be structured by and upon the 
notion of self-division, which would mean that the absent subject 
can never purely be one substantial thing. The subject is never 
equivalent in any coherent way to a particular organisation of 
knowledge either but rather a system or structure which is 
operated by many internal agencies and structured in terms of 
various sub-levels of unconscious organisation (see Alcorn, 1994: 
40-41) . What this means is that because knowledge (within the 
text, the world) can be conceptualized in different ways and in 
different "layers" within the human subject, it may potentially 
produce conflict. Conflict as such, is nothing new to the new 
masters, for its presence in the reading discourse has 
significance for the status of subjectivity and knowledge 
production in an expansive way. The discourse in which the 
"position" of the subject develops, is for Lacan however complex 
- "starting" with the in(famous) mirror stage, when it engages 
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in the reading act. 
For Lacan the mirror stage as the "foundational phase" in meaning 
construction, refers to how infants learn to perceive themselves 
in a mirror (Lacan, 1977(a): 1). The helpless infant who is not 
yet objectively in control of its own movements, perceives in the 
mirror, on an imaginary level, the mastery of its bodily unity 
which it objectively still lacks (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986) . The 
mirror stage is not a mere epoch in the history of the individual 
but an alienating stage in which the ongoing battle of the 
reading subject is being waged. It is significant, according to 
Lacan "human subjectivity" can only be developed at the level of 
language, i.e. the Symbolic Order which can be reached via the 
mirror stage and through relationships which are experienced as 
the "castration complex" (O'Neill, 1989), i.e. being subject to 
the Other and going over into what Lacan calls the Symbolic 
Order. Clearly Lacan is beyond the mere communicative interests 
of language in reading. 
According to Lacan (1977(a): 2) the mirror stage is experienced 
all the time because the reading subject projects before him, as 
his own ideal, the substitute for the lost narcissism of his 
childhood in which he was his own ideal. Beyond his difficult 
theorizing of meaning making, Lacan maintains that the ego is 
developed not so much in terms of Freud's "adaptive role" of the 
ego but rather its misrecognition (meconnaissance) , i.e. the 
refusal to acknowledge thoughts and feelings (Benvenuto & 
Kennedy, 1986) . This condition already foreshadows the division 
or the split, i.e. the beginning of the inevitable plurality of 
subjectivity, as opposed to a single, totalized subjectivity as 
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evidenced in the more representational views of reading. Despite 
Lacan's wish to pursue a different, albeit critical view of the 
reading subject, he does this very much in the context of 
language, for the Lacanian assumptions about language implies 
thoroughly different assumptions of his notion of subjectivity -
assumptions which thrive on the notion of emptiness and of 
difference. 
4.5.3 THE PURSUIT OF DIFFERENCE AND OTHERNESS IN READING. 
In his re-evaluation of reading act the displacement of the 
subject requires of Lacan to place great emphasis on perception 
or seeing. The subject seems to find it easier, according to him, 
to perceive the unity of an image than it is to produce this 
unity in its own body. The sight of another human being, be it 
its mother, or its own mirror-image, becomes the matrix of a 
sense of unity, identity and continuity (Lacan, 1977(a): 2). In 
the reading process this textual Gestalt is, however, held 
together in the mirror in an imaginary way and this reflected 
image increases its fascination power for the reader. It becomes 
clear that such fascination leads to a state of f ictionality and 
self-deception which will ultimately result in an alienating 
effect. The child within the reader is propelled into 
"identification" relations only by acknowledgeing its lack or 
loss. Only at this moment of alienation does it become capable 
of distinguishing itself from the "outside" world and locating 
itself in the world. Only when the child recognizes the concept 
absence, does it see that it is not "one", complete-in-itself, 
merged with the world as a whole and the other (Lacan, 1977(a): 
4 - 5) . In stark contrast to the "smoothness" of words and 
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sentences in literal-reading, Lacan envisages "struggle" moments 
for deeper reading. 
This state of alienation becomes problematic because self-
identity, according to Lacan, derives from the internalization 
of a relationship that is based on heterogeneity and difference. 
The child's recognition of its own image means that it has 
adopted the perspective of exteriority on itself (Lacan, 1977 (a): 
4) . The Lacanian subject emerges through a process of 
differentiation in which it struggles to construct its identity 
by separating itself from otherness (Lacan, 1977(b): 160). It 
is on the basis of this state of difference and alienation that 
the individual becomes a "person" or "human". In contrast to 
Derrida, for example, Lacanian human subjectivity is only 
developed through subjecting oneself to the "Otherness" as 
represented by what he refers to as the Symbolic Order. For 
Lacan, a preliminary form of subjectivity comes into being in the 
"mirror stage", when the child, not yet capable of speech, 
encounters and identifies the (illusory) image of itself as a 
unity, thus entering the domain of the Imaginary (Lacan, 1977 (a) : 
19). But subjectivity is fully attained only through language. 
Language thus does not provide a transcription of reality but 
rather assists with the inscription of subjectivity. 
By advancing into the Symbolic Order, the child confronts 
Otherness in a number of ways (lack, castration, desire), to the 
extent that he recognizes his difference from a world (and a 
linguistic order) which he had not created, and which imposes on 
him the laws of the social order. Williams (1995: 59) maintains 
"· .. so his developing subjectivity comes into being through an 
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experience of power (of the Other ... )". By modelling himself 
on the Other (through the mirror) the child assumes to be the 
other, and by engaging with the "Other" in the unconscious, the 
process of interpretation has been initiated. In other words, 
access to narrative is contemporaneous with entry into the 
Symbolic Order. In an "anti-representational" mode where the 
reader is not in control, the child can only give up its 
alienation by accepting that the other is not within its control, 
being a separate object. The "fullness" and the completeness 
that the child experiences through the maternal supplementation 
of its needs, is interrupted by lack. Away from the self-assured 
status of the reader, from this time on, lack, gap, splitting 
will be its mode of being: 
"Since consciousness and the unconsciousness 
forever stand in tension, there is always an 
unconscious "Other" within the conscious 
subject" (Lacan, 1977 (b): 31-32). 
In the construction of meaning and sense the misrecognition, i.e. 
the refusal to acknowledge thoughts and feelings, constitutes for 
Lacan the cornerstone of the mirror stage. The ego embodies 
nothing but a narcissistic process whereby he can bolster a 
fictitious sense of unified selfhood by finding something in the 
world he can identify with (see De Beer, 1987: 12). This is 
actually no unconscious - it is the "structure" in terms of which 
the reading subject projects outside of himself. This Other 
(which is always in tension with the unconscious) is, according 
to Lacan (1977(b): 29-30) pre-ontological, for " it is neither 
being nor non-being". Like Heidegger's presencing that is never 
present, the unconscious presents the self-conscious subject but 
does not exist as such. As Taylor (1987: 91) says of the 
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unconscious: "Never standing out, the unconscious is always out-
standing", therefore always deferring meaning and complete 
understanding. 
It is this out-standing or absence, its seeking (of the Other) 
that never ends. In the reading act every object of desire puts 
into place a quest or desire which moves relentlessly in a 
process of displacment - which Lacan compares to the metonymic 
play of signifiers. Desire (unlike a pleasurable pursuit like 
that of Barthes' s jouissance) is rather a movement or energy that 
is always transpersonal to others: 
" the subject has to find the 
constituting structure of his desire in the 
same gap opened up by the effects of the 
signif iers in those who come to represent 
the Other for him, in so far as his demand 
is subjectd to them (Lacan, 1977(a): 264). 
Desire thus the very embodiment of differential readings, for 
desire "threatens" to subvert the unity and certainty of 
conscious demand. Desire thrives only in terms of its own 
processes and internal logic - the logic of the signifier. 
The identification process is not directed to an object in the 
representational sense, but is precipitated by a new visual and 
mental experience because an internal organized form of the 
subject is seen projected outside of himself - precipitating the 
split - a split which is totally different from that of Derrida, 
for example, who proclaims: there is nothing outside the text. 
Derrida, as we will see, does not entertain the idea of 
"projection", as Lacan does, at all. But this Lacanian form of 
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projection which happens all the time occurs as a result of the 
"absent subject" , who, in the process becomes split . The subject 
who reads only becomes a subject by continually, everytime, 
"keeping himself" split (to the inside and the outside), being 
absent, i.e. avoiding closure, all the time. 
4.5.4 THE SPLIT FOR DISPLACEMENT. 
According to Lacan, this inside/outside projection (circle) gives 
rise, to the illusion of autonomy. For the construction of 
meaning he argues that such an inevitable circle effectively 
means that neither social conditions nor subjective interaction, 
alone, determine perceptions and sense but rather that, "···its 
roots are to be intrasubjective, deriving from a relationship 
of misrecognition" (Weber, 1991: 14). The empty or absent 
Lacanian subject is therefore trapped in a state of future 
anterior - it will have been the image whose place it occupies. 
For Lacan the self exists in, and consists of a state of absence 
and alienation, not from itself, but from the Other. In this 
delayed condition this "alienation" of the subject leads to the 
"displaced" and the "split" subjectivity which Barthes also 
subscribes to in order to ensure deferred meaning construction. 
For Lacan such an "alienated existence" in the reading act is 
moreover supported by the constancy of Desire. The "I" emanates 
from Desire of the "Other", which is at the same time the cause 
of being and which marks a split. The Spal tung (Spalte = split) 
occurs, according to Lacan, when the child enters into the 
Symbolic Order of language and culture. Language as unconscious 
structure, exists before everything, which would mean that the 
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emerging speaking subject can only be interpreted through 
language in the Symbolic Order. The Spaltung marks a split, 
lending to it a form of discontinuity, which implies that 
language, instead of easy "representing" a constituted, 
harmonious order or representation. It is the repetition of the 
mother's departure as cause of a Spaltung in the subject which 
is a here or there (alternating game) (Lacan, 1977(b): 62-63). 
Because of this discontinuity and alternating of existence 
through language, the conventional views of a sovereign and 
meaning-giving subjectivity do not seem to hold any validity, for 
they have failed to understand that language is inseparable from 
the meaning of existence precisely because language is 
inseparable from the meaning of existence (Lamaire, 1970: xviii) . 
The deployment of language in such discourse thus marks for Lacan 
the opening up for the alienated subjectivity - allowing the 
reader to constantly catch glimpses of himself. This 
discontinuous, albeit playful, functioning of signifiers enables 
the reading subject to develop a sense of who and what he is. 
Like Derridean "traces", Lacan argues for the incessant and 
constant inscription of signifiers, the reader who is constantly 
inscribing and re-inscribing himself in the challenges of the 
reading act. 
4.5.5 LANGUAGE AND THE INSCRIPTION OF SUBJECTIVITY IN 
READING. 
For a more profound conceptualization of the reading act Lacan 
advances in a radical way, ahead of his predecessors in this 
study. He argues that the unconscious which is composed of 
signifiers, which in turn is structured into distinctive, yet 
273 
summable sub-sets and categories. In fact, the structure of the 
unconscious is regarded by Lacan as being identical with that of 
language in its synchronic dimension - a dimension in which it 
is layered within a single class of elements. 
As noticed, the inception or birth of Lacanian reader 
subjectivity is already prevalent in the mirror stage in terms 
of the reader's narcissism, i.e. between the stage of auto-
eroticism and object-love, while itself being taken as a love-
object. In the reading act, this imaginary stage embodies the 
centre of all pre-verbal structures which evolves through a 
process of la Fading into the Symbolic Order. The Symbolic Order 
is comprised of an interwoven network in which signif iers assume 
identity through their differential play (Lacan, 1977(a): 118). 
It is interesting that this fabric of signif iers is not 
constructed by creative subjects, on the contrary, the fabric of 
signifiers is antecendent to and constitutive of very individual 
subject: 
" a play of the signifier, the 
unconscious has already in its formations -
dreams, slips of the tongue or pen or 
symptoms - proceeded by interpretation. The 
Other is already there in the very opening, 
however evanescent, of the unconscious 
(Lacan, 1977(a): 118). 
Subjectivity, therefore, is a function of inscription in the 
textured Symbolic Order. 
In terms of the indirect operating structure of the unconscious 
and its state of desire the signifier acts separately from its 
signification. It is here where Lacan regards the signified as 
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the meaning of an experience that is related in discourse. The 
signified becomes externalized in a universal sense by virtue of 
successive signifiers and is not specifically located anywhere 
in the signifier of the sentence (Lamaire, 1970: 38). Bowie 
(1991: 28) argues that the signified moves beyond society towards 
"··· a vision of universal Discord". In this state of discord 
the subject"· .. is the locus of this want, or lack. That which 
is given to the Other to fill, and which is strictly that which 
it does not have, since it too lacks being" (Lacan, 1977 (a) : 
263) . Lacan sheds light on the "death of the subject" notion 
highlighted by the absence or necessity of a subject by Barthes, 
i.e. the "eclipse" of the reading subject in front of the object 
(text) . Reading is therefore not in pursuit of truth - claims, 
the rules or conventions which are known to the substantial 
reader in advance. What post-structuralists and post-modernists 
allude to in their (mis)perception of the controlling subject's 
death, is nothing less than its emergence, i.e. the subject is 
precisely the void which remains after the entire substantial 
content is taken away. Zizek (1992: 136) argues that"· .. it is 
• this very desubstantialization which opens up the empty space 
(the "blank surface") onto which fantasies are projected ... " 
Whereas Hegel radicalized Kant by conceiving the void of the 
Thing (its inaccessibility) as the very negativity that defines 
the subject, Lacan argues for the very opposite. In the reading 
act nothing has been set up in advance, no subject, no content. 
Within language (the unconscious) the Lacanian subject is ,, a 
barred and barren, crossed-out subject. If the subject is a 
hindrance which has failed status, the same can be said of the 
object, which hinders the subject's full realization. Object is 
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correlative to subject qu.a barred - hence Lacan renounced the 
idea of intersubjectivity. No "correspondence" or sharing 
prevails as may be the case of representational theories or 
variations thereof. 
Whereas the Saussurean view holds that it is the signifier 
(reader/hearer), combined in the sign, that composes the act of 
signifying, Lacan goes further and regards the unconscious as 
"structured like a language", for language effectively combines 
and recombines itself apart from the speaking subject. The 
unconscious, in its mediated-form-language, opens the space as 
it were where the I and the Other can meet. In Lacanian reading 
therefore, instead of a signifier signifying, the signifier 
rather slides. In his radicalization Lacan ( 1977 (a) : 149) 
reverses the Saussurean algorithm and produces a S/s (Signifier 
over signified), where the bar(/) separating the two symbols 
emphasizes the cleavage where the signified is below the 
signifier. Essentially this means that the signified "slips 
beneath" the signifier and as a result, resists the subject's 
attempts to locate and delimit it. (see Sarup, 1992). In 
language use, in the reading act the bar (/) symbolizes moreover 
the mind's detours in "search of meaning". It symbolizes the 
repression of the signified which remains inaccessible without 
the help of analytic techniques, as well as the "private nature" 
of the signifier. Conflict and struggle must be addressed to 
prevent easily-arrived at meanings. The unconscious consists in 
signifiers which have fallen below the bar/barrier, i.e. 
submitted to a repression, preventing them from traversing the 
bar and gaining access to consciousness (Lacan, 1977(a): 126). 
The bar (/) moreover spawns what is called a differential reading 
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process which inhabits the very nature of language (Felman, 1995: 
181). It is in those "feelings of emptiness" that the subject 
desires the Other. The subject as "emptiness" relentlessly 
pursues the other (s) - differently, all the time. This emptiness 
relentlessly prompts more/other readings, resulting in a 
continual displacement of meaning within a signifying chain. 
4.5.5.1. THE LACANIAN SIGNIFYING CHAIN. 
We cannot hope to achieve anything significant through accurate 
representation, so since it would be futile, according to Lacan, 
to search for the signified as subject, we should rather explore 
the relation between signifiers, for it is only in the signifying 
chain that we can catch a glimpse of the human subject. In his 
revised psycho-analytical and "non-representational" manner Lacan 
attempts to repudiate the notion of the signifier as the carrier 
of meaning - it would rather be a case of the differentiation of 
meaning without any signified or significance (De Beer, 1987: 
14) . In this regard Lacan corresponds with Barthes "writing" 
project in the reading act - in which the subject is able to 
"catch a glimpse" of himself. A reading subject does not 
represent an idea by means of a signifier for another subject (as 
held by the sovereign subject who conveys expert or subjective 
opinions to others) ; rather a signifier represents a subject for 
another signifier. The opposite of representationalism happens 
in that it subjects the subject to its dominion: 
"A signifier is that which represents a 
subject: for whom? not for another 
subject, but for another signifier ... The 
suject is born insofar as the signifier 
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emerges in the field of the Other. But by 
that very fact, this subject - which was 
previously nothing if not a subject coming 
onto being - solidifies into a signifier" 
(Lacan, 1977(b): 198-9). 
Instead of a very coherent, ordered pattern in literal reading, 
we find that within this "unlocatable centre" in the chain, Lacan 
demonstrates that there will always remain an irreducuble 
otherness which would never be fully placed - because "· .. the 
letter signifier, can itself not be placed or decided, because 
the letter as a signifier is not a substance but a function - and 
it functions as difference" (Johnson, 1987: 226). The letter 
therefore dictates the indetermination and therefore non-closure 
of any theoretical discourse involved in a reading of a text. No 
subject, no content can ever be difinitive. 
In understanding the reading act, this is however no arbitrary 
act because the chain also limits the speaker's freedom, for when 
the signified appears to be within reach, it dissolves into yet 
further signif iers. The differentiation process in reading which 
occurs within the chain remains essentially fluid and dynamic so 
that any one of its links is able to provide a point of 
attachment to other chains in a missed or lacking reality - a 
reality that can no longer produce itself except by repeating 
itself indefinitely (Lacan, 1977(b): 58). Barbara Johnson (1987: 
227) clarifies: 
"The signifier is an articulation in a 
chain, not as an identifiable unit. It 
cannot be known in itself because it is 
capable of sustaining itself only in a 
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displacement". 
The articulation of this repeated nature of displacement becomes 
the very "basis" of what can be regarded as Lacanian differential 
reading. In his critical vision of differential reading, this 
deferred process of "rings of a necklace", (Sarup, 1992: 47) is 
the self-perpetuating imperative that propels the meaning making 
signifying chain - yielding ever-new plural meanings. Contrary 
to the Saussurean pursuit of equality or equivalence of signifier 
and signified, Lacan attempts to give prominence to the signifier 
(i.e. the unconscious) since it possesses for him the active 
"controlling power" over the signified. This position also 
restrains the arbitrariness of self-evident transition from 
signifier to signified, i.e. from language to meaning as is 
typical of readers claiming that they have succeeded in 
representing what the text itself really represents. The 
differential reading dynamics perpetuates in the chain under the 
watchful eye of the law of the father. 
4.5.5.2 THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW OF THE FATHER IN MEANING 
CONSTRUCTION. 
Along with the use of the Name-of-the-Father, the theme of the 
primacy of the phallus is undoubtedly the most popular theme of 
Lacanian theory. The phallus is not only a signifier but "the 
signifier of signifiers". It governs essentially what is meant 
to designate, as a whole, the effect of there being a signified, 
inasmuch as the signifier conditions any such effect by its 
presence as signifier (Lacan, 1977(a): 690, 692, 693). 
In the construction of meaning the "colonising powers" of the 
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signifier (i.e. the unconscious) over the signified must be 
grasped in terms of Lacan's notion of the Symbolic Order. The 
reading subject's "place" within the cultural context is accorded 
by the "Law of the Father" - i.e. the "Father" signifying the 
symbolic law of culture. In the act of interpretation the 
emergence of the "Father" (in psychoanalytic terms) essentially 
separates the child from the mother's body and drives its Desire 
underground into the unconscious. Lacan claims that the Symbolic 
Order is the Law and the Law is always "the Law-of-the-Father". 
The antecedent linguistic structure within which the reading 
subject is caught, includes all the codes by which a culture 
regulates the system of exchange (eg. psychological, 
sociological, political, religious, economic) necessary for its 
own survival. As a result, the cut left by the Name-of-the-
Father secures culture by continuing wresting the subject from 
the bossom of "mother" nature. 
thus becomes the "springwell 11 
meaning. 
This cut, in the reading act, 
of delayed understanding and 
The future is only present by virtue of his law (i.e. speech), 
and if this speech is recognised by the (m) other, it takes on the 
value of the law. The cultural connection in Lacanian 
"representation" has to be seen as a symbolic act of castration 
which the Father performs on the child - a "debt" that is paid 
if the subject becomes itself and has gained access to the 
Symbolic Order of culture and civilization. In the reading act, 
language (which is the unconscious), directs the subject into a 
pre-existing cultural order so that the status of the human 
subject becomes constituted only in language, and subject to 
language. But in order to achieve this being, the subject must 
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operate in terms of the ongoing dialectical network of a 
narrative of desires, expectations, obligations and values. Such 
an endless plural process of signification, in the signifying 
chain, is regarded by Lacan what he refers to as the point of 
convergence (point de capiton). Sarup (1992: 53) illuminates 
this view: 
"Just as an upholstery stud or button is the 
centre for the converging lines or creases 
on the surface of a taut fabric, so the 
linguistic point de capiton provides a vantage point from which 
everything that happens in a given discourse can be situated/both 
retro-actively and perspectively". 
If a signified emerges, it can only be a product of the effects 
of the signifier. In fact, Lacan wants to destroy the concept 
of signs that "represent" something for somebody, in favour of 
the signifier (and all its anchoring points, i.e. points de 
capi ton) whose pure combinatory strutures the unconscious (Lacan, 
1977(a): 840). As a result, Lacanian theory of the unconscious 
is grounded in an approach to which "the symbol" is "the murder 
of the thing" (Lacan, 1977(a): 104). The "symbol" symbolizes, 
rather than accurately representing a thing, an object. This 
symbolizing or signifying can only really occur at the level of 
the unconscious, i.e. in and through language. 
4.5.5.3 THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING. 
It is clear that for Lacan all language functions on the basis 
of loss or a sense of deprivation and absence, for to engage in 
any form of meaning construction it is to become a victim, as it 
were, of Desire. There is no "easy" route. We have already 
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become aware that language cannot express or represent what "it 
really means" or what I, the subject, mean since we all, as 
subjects, suffer alienation and deprivation. Moreover, the de-
alienation process begins in the reading act in every inch the 
infant emerges into language, and marks the start of Desire which 
becomes human. Lacan thus re-personalizes language (as against 
Saussure de-personalizing it) but he continues to regard language 
the master of the subject. Dews (1996: 151) echoes Lacan: 
"· .. the object is not without reference to 
speech. It is from the very beginning 
partially given in the objectal, or 
objective, system, in which must be included 
the sum of prejudices which constitute a 
cultural community". 
The human subject is thus "produced" and "unified" in and by 
language, so that language ultimately structures all human 
personality and human meaning in a cultural context. This is 
important for deferred meaning construction, for in terms of the 
split subject (the split being between the conscious life of the 
I and the unconscious or repressed desire) the child (the 
dynamics in the reading subject) cannot have direct access to 
reality and its meaning. Language, being the signifier, is 
essentially "empty" and fulfils nothing more than an endless 
process of difference and absence. According to Lacan, instead 
of having accurate and complete understanding and meaning, the 
reading subject will simply move from one signifier to another, 
along a potentially infinite linguistic or signifying chain. This 
is however no "flighty" expedition. The emerging plurality of 
signif iers under the eye of the law of the father can only refer 
to other signifiers, for the subject does not speak any language 
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but is spoken by language a view in which the Lacanian 
decentered subject remains dispossessed and alienated. Readers 
cannot assume to "have" the ability to confer meaning. As these 
empty signifiers move to what Lacan calls "full speech", the 
subject also gradually moves away from the imaginary stage 
(emerging into language) in order to take up his position or 
strategy 
"faulty", 
This is 
in discourse. Never identical with itself, the 
"empty", subject is haunted by an unknowable other. 
what makes the challenge of reading exciting. An 
"outside" that is "inside", this Other hollows out the "place" 
of desire. In the reading act this symbolic register is never 
directly accessible or immediately penetrable to the reading 
subject but becomes mediated through desire in the hollow 
presence of language. Since something is missing, the structure 
(unconscious) of the drive remains open-ended. The drive 
oscillates or alter-nates in an "outward-and-back movement" 
(Lacan, 1977 (b) : 178, 162) . It becomes a discourse in a 
potentially infinite signifying chain, yielding ad infinitum to 
the metonymic world of language. There is thus no representing, 
no decoding, no interpretations; only misreadings, to challenge 
another reading in the unending links of the signifying chain. 
The construction of meaning emerges in terms of the hermeneutics 
applied to the reading text when the unending links inside the 
signifying chain operate, according to Lacan, through processes 
of metaphor and metonymy without the subject himself being aware 
of them. Lacan, in a radical way, conceives of the autonomy of 
the signifying chain from the signified as "··· the incessant 
sliding of the signifying chain over the waves of the signified" 
(Lamaire, 1970: 45). What becomes evident is that ultimately it 
is language and the unconscious that means and not readers or 
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hearers. The drive in this process becomes the erogeneous zones, 
characterized their margin or rim-like structure and the object 
of desire, which is the presence of a hollow, a void (Lacan, 
1977(b): 164, 168). This is an altogether different approach to 
reading as proposed by Barthes' s decentred subject who writes his 
reading. 
For Lacan the decentered self-conscious subject, in terms of the 
reading act, can thus never be identical with itself but seems 
only to embody a sense of plurality in the chain of discourses, 
kept active and activated by the Other (desire) . Desire moves 
relentlessly in a process of displacement that Lacan compares to 
the metonymic play signif iers - a displacement that never comes 
to rest. In the reading act the subject is thus inevitably made 
and remade in this constant encounter with the Other so that what 
is at stake is nothing other than what can be read, i.e. what can 
be read beyond what the subject is supposed to read, because of 
the open-ended prospect of interminable desire of the Other 
(Lacan, 1977 (b): 235). Reading appears to involve "conflict" 
between content and dis-content, temporary fulfilment and 
emptiness. 
4.5.6 THE EVACUATION OF MEANING AS INTERPRETATION. 
The ceaseless emptiness or evacuation of meaning for Lacan 
signals a decisive and constitutive lack at the very root of 
language. The absence of a fixed grounding core of language or 
originary locus implies that the sliding of the signifier over 
the signified is only momentarily arrested in specific contexts. 
The "indefinite sliding of meaning" (Lacan, 1977(a): 126) means 
that if each term is founded on pure difference, and therefore 
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already requires another term to be understood, all terms can 
only be understood relative to language as a whole. It is 
therefore not only the originary locus of language, but also the 
primacy of the text (object) and the reading subject that 
remains, always, uncertain. 
Lacan accords language with supreme power because of its constant 
proximity to what he regards as an unconscious discourse. What 
emerges is that instead of readers reading, Lacan rather 
reinterprets and reaffirms texts reading and re-reading. This 
will be Derrida's thrust as well. The act of "representation" or 
signification as the act of interpretation, would seem to belong 
essentially to the text. While the reader as "interpreter" 
merely reports, textual "interpretation" requires the reader's 
unconscious which not only must be read but in fact which reads. 
It is when the unconscious becomes the locus of the Other that 
the subject ultimately comes to understand himself. Language can 
never have an originary locus. Felman (1995: 184) is very clear 
with regard to the Lacanian act of interpretation: 
"Unconscious desire proceeds by 
interpretation; interpretation proceeds by 
unconscious desire. The unconscious is a 
reader. The reader is therefore, on some 
level, always an analysand - an analysand 
who "knows what he means" but whose 
interpretation can be given another reading 
than what it means. This is what analytic 
discourse is all about". 
The sense of mulitplicity implied in Felman's phrase of "another 
reading" (i.e. rereading) underscores Lacan's almost self-
contradictory assertion that "One gets nowhere with language" 
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(Alcorn, 1994: 23). Lacan's apparent repudiation of "language" 
ties up with the multiplicity and therefore differential reading 
approach which essentially seeks to challenge the basis of mere 
myopic referentiality or always pursuing certitude in fixed 
origins. Reality is thoroughly heterogeneous and plural and 
reading is part of that: 
"The real is not only unknown but is 
unknowable, not only unsaid but 
"unpronouncable" (Lacan, 1977(a): 316). 
Language therefore, like for Nietzsche, is incapable to grasp the 
essence and heterogeneity of life and therefore has no place in 
the Real. Since it neither corresponds to nor represents to the 
Real it only entails a structural system in as far as it "refers" 
to its own dynamic terms and multiplicity of working through 
metonymy and metaphor. Lacan has the psycho-analyst in mind 
(rather than the literary critic) when he urges the former to 
address the fluid ambiguity and multiple meanings of terms, the 
duplicity of language that allows itself to be used in 
indeterminate, open-ended contexts with several meanings at once. 
The indeterminate context in which the unconscious operates as 
linguistic structure thrives on not reality but on desire, i.e. 
a chain of substitution whereby the first (lost) object of desire 
generates a potentially infinite chain of (only partially 
satisfactory) substitutes. Therefore there can be object-ive 
meanings but only desirous meanings, i.e. more of the Other 
meanings. 
In fact, Lacan's return to Freud is a conceptualization of an 
explicit non-referential or indirect view in which textuality is 
to become the plural production of Desire (the Gaze) . For Lacan 
the subject does not "possess" the Gaze, but is in fact primarily 
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constituted by it: "This supremely paranoid concept is an 
important element of the child's growing experience of the world 
as Other, its entry into the Symbolic" (Williams, 1995: 73) . 
Whilst "reading" the text"· .. we are not masterful subjects; we 
- as readers- become the object of the Gaze" (Davis in De Beer, 
1987: 19). Being the object of the Gaze implies potential 
differential (i.e. Other) relationships where the lacking reading 
subject is compelled to constantly return to the Other. By the 
same token the text has no identity or message, since language 
in itself, proves empty: 
"Not that the letter's meaning is subjective 
rather than objective, but that the letter 
is precisely that which subverts the 
polarity subjective/objective, that which 
makes subjectivity into something whose 
position is a structure is situated by the 
passage through it of an object" (Johnson, 
1987: 241) . 
The displacement of the subject (its never "our" readings) and 
its representations of reality, operates inescapably in what 
Lacan calls the S/s relationship where the signified slips 
beneath the signifier and as a result resists being located and 
delineated. The displacement of the sovereign and constituted 
position of the subject moreover means coming to terms with the 
ambiguities of the unconscious so that a psycho-analytic reading 
of a text would also involve "reading" the "unreadable" and 
"nonsense". The notions of the "unreadable" and "nonsense" 
entail the lack or absence upon which Desire thrives. This 
advancement of Lacanian meaning construction consequently renders 
the psycho-analytic mode of reading no easy task, for either the 
sense of discontinuity or lack of meaning in conscious 
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understanding can and should be interpreted II without 
necessarily being transformed into meaning" (De Beer, 1987: 21) . 
Johnson (1987: 240) believes that, "Psychoanalysis is not itself 
the interpretation of repetition; it is the repetition of a 
trauma of interpretation It is the traumatic deferred 
interpretation not of an event, but as an event that never took 
place as such". The depth of this statement implies that 
psychoanalytic reading could have content (and more content) only 
in so far as it repeats the dis-content. 
conflict of what never took place that 
It is the repetitive 
always defers more 
meaning, Other meaning. There is a continuous evacuation of 
meaning as soon as the signifier moves out its concrete relations 
- back into the signifying chain. This signals a constitutive 
lack at the core of language, a lack which marks the absence of 
a fixed anchoring point, the absence of a solid core of meaning 
for any term (Lacan, 1977(a): 276). 
The radicalization of the reading act, according to Lacan, should 
thus be grasped in terms of the plurality of meanings, seeking 
ever new meanings away from origins and coherent sense - an 
approach which constantly presents new challenges to the type of 
reality correspondence mode of representational reading. Beyond 
the pursuit of having a "fixed" constitutive text, what is at 
stake is nothing other than "what can be read". The signified 
or letter's destination is thus wherever it is read, for the 
absence of the word discloses the nothingness of the thing 
(text). As a result, the Lacanian dispossessed subject is 
potentially able and willing to take different "positions" in 
respect to its reception of discourse of the Other - a discourse 
which is present in memory as a free-floating and inconsequential 
thing. This form of reading however, to reiterate, is no 
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arbitrary or chaotic position but rather seeks to escape the 
limited notion that the subject is a sovereign and self-assured 
entity composed, contained, derived from, and imprisoned by 
language. Lacanaian differential reading entails an endless quest 
to signify the annulment of what it signifies - the repressed 
in fact returns in the symptom. Unconscious desire, once 
repressed, survives in displaced ways - repetitive displacements 
and replacements (Lacan, 1972), making for creative repetition 
rather than habitual representations. 
4.5.7 DIFFERENTIAL REPETITION IN THE VOID 
As one of the most original theorists among the structuralists 
of subjectivity and representation, in this study, Lacan believes 
to have subverted and annulled in many ways the representational 
theory of a psycho-realist subject in which an original 
constitutitve subjectivity is presupposed in which meanings are 
made to "belong" to the text. 
It would seem that Lacan's theory of the subject moreover seeks 
to propose a radical solution to the impasse of Freudians and 
poststructuralists, for the Lacanian subject clearly operates 
upon discourse, and discourse operates upon the dispossessed 
subject. Lacan would like us to think that he had effectively 
"dissolved" the centred notion of a subject, producing as a 
result a self-division in order to problematize the singularity 
of agency in interpreting the world and texts. It is evident 
that the Lacanian subject possesses immense capacity for 
repetition, resulting in differentiation which resists the 
ideologized practices of totalization and closure as is often 
subscribed by literal reading. By keeping open the time of space 
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and the space of time, "repetition demands the new" (Lacan, 
1977(b): 59), for the past that is never finished, approaches as 
a future that is never closed. Repetition, in Lacanian meaning-
construction, ruptures the closed circle, beginning and end are 
one. For Lacan "repetition of signifiers" in the unconscious, 
suggests that the past is never present but becomes reversed and 
appears as the future that is always deferred. Alcorn (1994: 37) 
clarifies, that it is a notion of subjectivity which is neither 
mechanical nor sterile, for "· .. the Lacanian subject contains 
unique subject-driven mechanisms that both produce and feed upon 
social discourse in quite unique and particular ways", without 
" ... doubling a system of realities" (Critchley & Dews, 1996: 
149) . It becomes a matter of another reading, and another 
reading will continue when the reading subject interprets out of 
his unconscious (this unconscious being a reader) . The 
differential repetition, out of its need or void, involves thus 
a form of reading propelled by otherness or alterity. 
Lacan's vision is that of the reconstruction of meanings and 
understandings, 
"transindividual 
by the subj ect , according to modes of 
discourse", i.e. the modes of an 
intersubjectivity that would ultimately be broader than that of 
the analytical situation and which corresponds or conforms to 
.. 
laws of that society (Marini, 1992: 48). Lacan believes it is 
an entrance into the "Symbolic Order" that cannot be separated 
from the established discourses and dominant institutions, at the 
time of reading or meaning construction within that historical 
and geographic context. We witness that to escape the ideology 
and consensus-seeking of thinking and knowledge, La can 
unexpectedly dissolves his institution of the French Society of 
Psychoanalysis in 1980 to prevent it being consolidated, so he 
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said, with "a new church". Repetition of newer, profounder 
meaning is spawned by Desire, without ideologizing the latter. 
For Lacan interpretive practice proceeds necessarily by 
unconscious desire - so that reading takes place on both sides 
in order to avert the simplistic literal theory of correspondence 
and reproduction of the words and the thoughts of another. 
Contrary to Derrida's "reading as writing" approach of almost 
mechanical grammata as we will notice, Lacan initiates the almost 
human Gaze, gazing upon the reading subject. The "otherness" of 
the Lacanian contribution to our understanding of the reading 
act, knowledge construction and self-identity, is the 
"conversion" of the human subject in to an "object", being gazed 
upon or read. Without depersonalising the absent character of 
the reading subject, Lacan conceives of the subject that 
constantly returns to there Other in order to be constituted. 
This position does not pursue the typical polarity-cum-
circularity mode of Eco and Letman, but rather that the human 
subject fulfills a "structure", albeit human-social structure, 
of being constantly subject and object. This attempt on the part 
of Lacan seeks to ensure that the reader does not assume a 
constitutive, central position of a masterful manipulator of 
texts. In an altogether different way to the Derridean post-
modernist displacement of the subject in terms of the "ideology 
of the sign", Lacan ushers us into a refreshingly different 
theory in which he co-opts in a future anterior sense the 
unconscious of the subject that is still to be constantly "born". 
The reading text is not an object "out there" but embodies the 
pursuits after the Other which evolves in terms of the 
linguisticality of the unconscious. This will bring about what 
is understood by subjectivity and ultimately a sense of being -
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as human. Lacan's most critical contribution to the radical 
subversion of the self-assured representational subjectivity, is 
that he retains the human element via the Law-of-the-Father. In 
his post-structuralist approach he believes that he has gone 
substantially (literally and figuratively) beyond all other 
efforts to demonstrate that language, as the structure of the 
unconscious, remains empty, relying only on its "productive" 
functioning to constantly search for new meanings of our world 
and of ourselves as humans. Instead of imputing and pursuing 
meaning, Lacan's aim is the desparate evacuation (dis-content) 
of all meanings (including the in(finite) meanings of myself as 
subject), defying any anchoring point and continually allowing 
the sliding of the signifier over the signified which momentarily 
arrested in specific contexts. 
Following theoretically on Lacan, this study focuses on the 
thinking of Derrida, who critically engages our thinking in the 
realm of non-originarity of meaning construction. From Lacanian 
psycho-analytic reading of emptiness which emphasizes otherness 
or alterity, based on alienation, Derrida "systematically" carves 
another interesting, yet radicalized notion of reading, showing 
critical concerns with the deletions, blanks and disguises in 
writing. Texts cannot ever represent anything, neither can 
readers ever decipher anything. In a society that is 
increasingly written, prompts the dilemma of the inertia of 
consumption to demand rather the efficiency of production. If 
today the text is society itself our rejection of the practice 
of consumption (commercial, televised and scientific readings) 
inevitably necessitates the reader's ability to write his 
"understandings", including that of the world and of himself. 
Derrida's quasi - idelogization of the text (not for content) 
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prompts a "following of the traces" of production in which we 
will not fall captive to consumptive myopia which is anathema to 
the transformation of our worlds and ourselves. Our 
understanding of the reading act in its broadest sense will be 
substantially enriched and modified in wrestling with the 
thinking of Derrida, as our final theorist in this study -
pursuing hopefully a more comprehensive view of reading in our 
post-information society which emphasizes the use or application 
of our readings . Does writing precedes reading, or reading, 
writing - is there conceptually any significant difference? This 
is what Derrida, in the context of reading, seeks to address. 
4.6 
4.6.1 
293 
DERRIDA'S GRAMMATOLOGICAL READING 
FROM LANGUAGE TO WRITING 
As starting-point we may reflect on Michel de Certeau who 
contrasts writing with readings in believing that a text does not 
exist except for a reader who gives it signification, for "· .. 
text has a meaning only through its readers, it changes along 
with them; it is ordered in accordance with codes and .. Ruses 
two sorts of "expectation" ... the expectation that organizes a 
readable space (a literality), and one that organizes a procedure 
necessary for the actualization of the work (a reading)" (in 
Bennett, 1995: 133) . It is precisely this kind of approach of the 
de Certeau which Derrida conceives of as establishing a "violent 
hierarchy" of terms which he believes must be reversed. Reading 
and writing (in the traditional sense) do not, according to 
Derrida, peacefully co-exist, which requires therefore that 
deconstruction must " ... through a double gesture, double science, 
a double writing, put into practice a reversal of the classical 
opposition and a general displacement of the system" (Derrida, 
1982 :392). 
Taking Nietzsche and Heidegger, particularly, as his precursors 
in thought, Derrida emerges as a strong critic of the bankrupt 
thinking established in the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian traditions. 
Even the thinking of the pioneering thinkers on subjectivity and 
representation in this study is vitiated by its systems of binary 
thinking, its logocentrism, and its privileging of speech over 
writing. This is Derrida's starting-point for the displacement 
of the old system: 
"For Derrida the binary metaphysical 
system ensnared its victims in hopeless 
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metaphysical traps requiring a thoroughgoing 
deconstruction of philosophy and radically 
new philosophical practice" (Kellner, 1988: 
240) • 
As part of the new masters' attempts of rethinking and in fact 
displacing the notions of subjectivity and representation in the 
reading act, Derrida, like Barthes, has evolved a radically new 
thrust of thinking whose concerns, according to Sellers, are " ... 
no longer that of the writer and the work but that of the writing 
and reading" (in Culler, 1975: 237) . For both Barthes and 
Derrida the concepts of ecri ture and lecture have been postulated 
as a revolutionary means of rethinking the role of the authority 
and authorship as a source and origin of meaning vis-a-vis the 
text as object. Derrida's understanding therefore of the reading 
act which encapsulates clear dimensions of post-modernist 
discourse in meaning construction, is reconceptualized in terms 
of what he calls inexhaustible networks: writing as an 
institution and reading as an activity. The influence of 
Derrida's reference to ecri ture on the other hand should, 
however, not be overstated, for he himself recognizes that it is 
as much a symptom as it is a cause. 
Derrida writes his own peculiar discourse which, like Nietzsche, 
displays a systematic mistrust and abandonment of all forms of 
metaphysical thought. As a result, he postulates a notion of 
reading in which he challenges the validity of human language 
which he believes to be the carrier and manifestation of bankrupt 
and spurious philosophical assumptions. Like Barthes, Derrida 
consequently engages in a peculiar deconstructive process of what 
they call "disentangling" the subject's desire for absolute 
guarantees of certainty and an ultimate, indubitable and assured 
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epistemological foundation for meaning (Derrida, 1976) . Lyotard 
points out that our age can no longer talk about a totalizing 
idea of reason, for there is no reason - but events are evidence 
of rather complex incommensurable teleologies of heterogeneity 
(Featherstone, 1988: 209) . Derrida's idea of "grammatology" 
therefore seeks to depart from the basic assumption of teleology 
and heterogeneity that the sign is without any single definable 
truth, foundation, beginning or end. It is this deconstructive 
assumption of starting with "nothing", including no "subject" or 
"object" which already puts Derrida quite apart from the critical 
discourse of the act of interpretation proposed by the new 
masters. It is evident though that he does stand on the shoulders 
of his predecessors, especially Nietzsche. Heidegger's influence 
too features decisively, for Derrida is a"··. Heidegger re-read 
and retrieved from the narrowly existentialist and humanist gloss 
11 (Johnson, 1993: 1) . 
While it seems feasible to classify Derrida "philosophically", 
closer with Barthes, the former's impact as theorist lies in his 
own critical resuscitation Of Nietzsche, who on his part also 
challenges the notion that certainty and precision of meaning 
occurs in all meaning construction. (see Ryan, 1982; Behler, 
1991; Haar, 1992). In the context of our overall intention to 
examine the role of the sovereign subject in interpretation, 
Nietzsche as precursor to the Derridean assumption of "there is 
nothing outside the text", foreshadows the decentring process or 
"noncentering"of the human subject as the determining centre in 
meaning construction. The "unprotective manner" (Kristeva in 
Nealon, 1993: 84) of everything that fit into the 
representational mode of interpretation, constitutes the point 
of departure of Derrida's outright rejection of the validity and 
trustworthiness of "naturalized" representation and equivalence 
of the subject vis-a-vis the object. These concepts Derrida 
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regards " ... as in principal open to question, or as not enjoying 
the status of absolute, transcendent, self-validating truths" 
(Norris, 1992: 35). Derrida thus continues to argue in terms of 
the Nietzschean deconstruction of causality, viz that causality 
asserts the logical and temporal priority of cause to effect. 
Derrida (1976: 158) proposes that THERE IS NO OUTSIDE THE TEXT 
(il n'y a pas de hors-texte). As a result, Derridean discourse, 
like in the Barthesian mode proposes a process of writing which 
emerges not as the causation or representation of something that 
exists outside it, but as an "inside" ceaseless dynamic which is 
at work as the unending and limitless "play". Derrida agrees with 
Nietzsche and Heidegger that Western culture oscillates between 
polar opposites that produce optimism and pessimism, ideology and 
utopia, in never-ending variations or play (Hollinger, 1994: 
107) . This "play" has been set in motion precisely because of 
the lack of any secured grounding authority, the absence of the 
"transcendental signified" which "at one time or another, would 
place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign" 
(Derrida, 1976: 49). Therefore any account of language and its 
signifying tentacles, which seeks solid foundations, is a 
stillborn attempt. 
In our attempts to grasp the "other dimensions" of meaning 
construction it becomes clear that, Derrida's understanding of 
the role of the subject vis-a-vis textual writing essentially 
presupposes the reading of exclusive nature of textual signs. 
Derrida, like Heidegger, urges us to use the surface of language 
in terms of what he calls a "trace-structure" and he therefore 
tends to give preference to the concept trace to sign (Spivak, 
1976: xvii) , the former of which he believes points at an 
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inarticulate presence. Derrida's critical reading of a "trace" 
conveys the mark of the absence of a presence (as Lacan' s 
"emptiness" of language), the already existing absent presence 
and therefore a lack of an origin (Derrida, 1976: 89). By using 
Heidegger as critical departing-point, Derrida argues that the 
sign is all that is present, presiding in the text and not before 
the text (Derrida in Mortley, 1991: 98). Sign as a reading of 
events therefore cannot be trapped in a pre-established readable 
language - a view Derrida asserts to doubt whether there can by 
any sustainable or coherent reading, crystalized into a 
manageable package of understanding and acceptance. 
In order to grasp how the elusive, effervescent interplay of 
traces/signs operate in Derrida's grammatology, requires 
according to him, a critical re-start, i.e. an attempt to destroy 
or deconstruct the logocentric metaphysics of right/wrong, 
good/bad, pretty/ugly which has become so important shaping 
forces for the traditional representational construction of 
meaning (see Behler, 1991: 6). 
4.6.2 RE-STARTING VIA THE DECONSTRUCTION OF ALL ORIGINARITY. 
Derrida, like Lacan, rejects what can be called the totalizing 
attempts of centred signification which has been legitimized by 
the referential assumptions of the relationship between language 
and reality. The problems of seeking reliability and accuracy 
in representation, according to Derrida, must be read in terms 
of his radical critique of the logocentric application to the 
dynamics of the reading act. Derrida's critique of the 
logocentric paradigm (from Plato to Levi-Strauss) is not only to 
rehabilitate the long-repressed status of writing, but to move 
beyond the everyday understanding of writing - one which is more 
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fundamental to signifying practices. Deconstruction has " ... 
foregrounded the scandalous coexistence of incongruous figural 
pulls within language, but has also tried to render their 
"errancy" and "disjunction" more tolerable by inscribing them 
within the limits of the literary text" (in Cornis-Pope, 1992: 
3 9) . Derrida asserts the potential of deconstruction as a 
critique - a powerful and radical critique - of entrenched and 
unquestioned habits of thought - specifically with regard to the 
general articulations of the theory of writing. 
In "meaning-making" the deconstruction process essentially 
consists of a metaphysics which presents all first causes such 
as material substance, subjective identity or conscious intuition 
as presence (see Norris, 1992; Ryan, 1989). This presence 
generally operates as binary oppositions, like normal/abnormal, 
literal/non-literal or meaningful/meaningless, and the critique 
contained in the deconstruction aims at " upending the 
metaphysical system of oppositions and priorities by showing how 
what metaphysics excludes as secondary and derivative in relation 
to an originary concept ... " (Ryan, 1989: 10) (own emphasis). 
This absence of an origin in Derrida's rethinking of the reading 
act, resonates with Nietzsche's "Alles ist falsch, alles ist 
erlaubt ! " proclamation. The deconstruction process would appear 
to ensure that, by rejecting the validity and legitimacy of 
foundational constructs (like subject, object, etc. ) , we are 
permitted to create freely (i.e. Derridean writing) in terms of 
the presence. This however is not a type of phenomenological, 
perceptual presence but merely suggests that there cannot be a 
fixed body of pre-existing meaning which is determined before the 
text is read. In fact Derrida dislodges the spurious effects of 
the idea of "dualism/polarity" (eg. absence/presence) as 
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Heidegger, for example, suggests when he proposes his 
deconstruction version in the notion of Abbau. The demand which 
inheres the deconstruction of reading (rather than to "make 
sense"), is to stop making sense. 
Derrida critiques logocentrism, since, like Heidegger, he 
believes that Western thought is dominated by the metaphysics of 
persence. This has led to sense-making attempts of logocentrism 
resting on certain dualisms (eg. identity is privileged over 
difference, being over negation, presence over absence, male over 
female, etc.). Difference, absence, madness, the female, etc., 
in logocentrism becomes devalued - hence the promulgation of 
ideas of racism, sexism, 
this view, the result 
colonialism and so forth are all, in 
of what Derrida calls entrenched 
logocentrism. The attempt is none other than to give "the 
picture" or "the standpoint" or to have "mastered" the 
understanding of how the Western world works. If Derrida's 
thinking is to be regarded as postmodern, he would be a positive 
view because " it is a triumph of heterogeneity over 
consensus" (Brown, 1995: 3). Derrida thus "joins" the ranks of 
postmodernists who hold that the consumption of information has 
replaced the production of things, for the media, which used to 
report (or distort) reality, have become reality. How do we beat 
the inertia of consumption and develop an efficiency of 
production of our words and ourselves? 
Although Derridean deconstruction might appear to denote a 
negative operation, it in actual fact embodies an approach which 
aims at the unmasking of phenomenological naivete (see Descombes, 
1980: 79) and Derrida's focus is to deploy it strategically to 
demonstrate how philosophical discourse have come to be 
constructed. Derrida does not just collapse truth-seeking and 
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fictive discourse as fallaciously believed to be his notion of 
deconstruction: 
"Not that I assimilate the different regimes 
of fiction, not that I consider laws, 
constitutions, the declaration of the rights 
of man, grammar, or the penal code to be the 
same as novels. I only want to recall that 
they are not "natural realities" (Derrida in 
Norris, 1992: 37). 
Derrida wants to unmask the distortions and, as a result, applies 
the deconstruction process in the Heideggerian sense of 
Destruktion or Abbau (although differently) as a means"··· of 
gaining access to the mode in which a system or structure, or 
ensemble, is constructed ... historically speaking" (in Mortley, 
1991: 97). The portrayal of reports, images and advertisements 
in the media assumes that that is often a natural part of our 
reality, a natural part of personal identities and social 
relations. Understanding how these discourses have come to be 
constructed will assist us as "readers of the world" to 
deconstruct them as well. 
As meaning, according to Derrida, cannot be enclosed in a sign, 
deconstruction enables the critical possibilities of meaning 
construction to surface within and not before the text. The 
pursuit is not the content which we hope to find in the text but 
a deconstruction of that content, i.e. the dis-content of pat-off 
assumptions and all socially or historically validated 
information and messages which we consume. Strictly-speaking, 
deconstruction is not a process of dismantling of the structure 
of a text, but rather its dis-content, i.e. a demonstration that 
it has already dismantled itself. Derrida's restart, like that 
of Lacan, is from "nothing" - without origin, for it is only by 
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de-totalizing and evacuating our thinking that we can begin to 
write. 
We notice that Derrida's vocabulary is primarily one of excess, 
and he refers in this regard to Descartes's cogito which is the 
zero-point (nothingness) from which both sense and non-sense are 
derived, it exceeds any actual worldly totality, it is: 
"... precomprehension of the infinite and 
undetermined totality ... this margin of the 
possible, the principled, and the 
meaningful, which exceeds all that is real 
... a singular and unprecedented excess - an 
excess in the direction of the 
nondetermined. Nothingness or Infinity, an 
excess which overflows the totality of that 
which can be thought" (Derrida, 1978: 56-7). 
For Derrida the "undetermined totality" becomes the "ground" for 
possibility and ultimately infinity. The Derrida's notion of 
presence has been wedded to the infinite process of 
deconstruction, for Derrida's complaint is that objects, 
systems, words and signs are usually fallaciously connected with 
presence. He opposes in fact the distinction between absence and 
presence, and this is in fact the "new" dimension in Derridean 
thought. He moreover argues that Western thinking has become 
fixated by the smoothness and deceptive infallibility the word, 
as something that represents truth and accuracy. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the opposition that we conceive between writing 
and · speech, for writing is usually assumed to be the 
representation of speech (Derrida, 1973: 77) - a view Derrida 
radically challenges. 
According to Derrida, in order to avert the assumed unquestioned 
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placeholding status of representational fallacies of the 
logocentric tradition, deconstruction ushers his "new" thinking 
into an erasure process in the form of a slow "reading" of the 
text which verily subjects the text to a rigorous analysis, that 
is to say, it deconstructs it. For Derrida this form of critique 
hopes to demonstrate the immanent contradictions of how the text 
has come to depend on claims that have come to be regarded as 
true and foundational. In a strange way Derrida argues that the 
indeterminate and infinity in writing, while it exceeds any given 
totality, is also "finite" in that it "inhabits" that very 
totality. Put another way, the system, totality or structure is 
neither finite nor infinite: 
"A structural totality escapes this 
alternative in its functioning. It escapes 
the archeological and the eschatological and 
inscribes them in itself (Derrida, 1978: 
123) . 
In any reading therefore, while the deconstructive reader cannot 
inscribe from the "outside", of the text, reading on the "inside" 
of the text does not prove safe either - a view that requires 
clarification with regard to the notions of polysemy and 
dissemination, especially since there are no archeological 
grounds, neither any eschatological vision in Derridean writing. 
In reading this writing demonstrates Derrida's rejection of 
subject/object, text/reader, presence/absence dualisms. These 
dualisms have clearly impacted on the entrenched social issues 
of racism, sexism, colonialism and cultural oppression, as we 
will notice. Friedman (in Featherstone, 1988: 23) points out: 
" ... cultural pluralism may be the western 
experience of the real postmodernization of 
the world, the ethnic and cultural 
pluralization of a dehegemonizing world 
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incapable of its former enforced politics of 
assimilation". 
In our attempts of understanding our world and to develop "truer 
dialogue" beyond the hegemonizing and homogenizing pursuit of 
seeking "the truth" in a totalizing understanding of a message 
or text, requires to engage in Derrida's embrace of the notions 
of polysemy and dissemination and avoid control by socially or 
politically determined meanings. 
4.6.3 POLYSEMY AND DISSEMINATION OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION 
To pursue meanings which do not "belong" to the text and to break 
out of the hegemony of socially constructed and controlled 
knowledge, Derridean deconstruction proceeds by means of what he 
refers to as displacement (decentring) , i.e. reversing the 
entrenched structure of domination and displacing or dislodging 
the system in which and through which reading occurs. 
Deconstruction moreover seems to also impacts on the notion of 
dissemination, for Derrida distinguishes the latter from polysemy 
in that polysemy problematizes all di vine origins and rather 
emphasizes a multiplicity of meanings which derive as a result 
of the deconstruction process - a form of multiplicity of meaning 
which is embedded " within the horizon of grouping, 
gathering together" (Derrida in Mortley, 1991: 97). 
Contrary to polysemy, dissemination in reading seems to exceed 
the multiplicity of meaning and meaning itself, for like the 
Barthesian concept, Derridean dissemination "··· disrupts the 
circulation that transforms into an origin what is actually an 
after-effect of meaning" (Derrida, 1981: 21). Johnson (1993: 
138) clarifies Derrida's position: 
"The inscription of the code, be it 
linguistic, genetic or otherwise, is never 
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simply present as static script, but is 
perpetually affected by an element of 
indeterminancy, so that the code is in a 
state of continual transformation". 
There cannot be any "divine author", as an originator of the 
text, neither a "sovereign reader" who decodes the text. It is 
rather a process of manhandling and transforming the text, for 
it is "starred" (Barthes) in the same way as the text, according 
to Derrida, is "scattered". Rather than pursuing a coherent, 
closed reading Derrida (as also demonstrated by Barthes and 
Lacan) sees interruption, disturbance. and dissolution as making 
the reading act far more richer and comprehensive. 
This transformation act of dispersion in the dissemination 
process embodies a type of power which is synonymous to the 
deconstruction of the writing, causing disruption and 
discontinuity and often resistance. For Derrida dissemination 
adheres and operates within his notion of textuality (there is 
nothing outside the text) giving particular impetus to an endless 
"opening up" of a"··. a snag in writing that can no longer be 
mended, a spot where neither meaning, however plural, nor any 
form of presence can pin/pen down ... the trace" (Derrida, 1981: 
26) . Even the subject becomes implicated as a trace in its own 
writing, which constantly transforms itself among the movement 
(like Lacan' s signifying chain) of other traces (Deleuze and 
Guattari (1984). Lash (1988: 323) comments in this regard: 
"This mobile positioning of the subjectivity 
is in itself political in that it leaves 
space for alternative forms of identity 
construction as well as the toleration of 
"difference" in identity construction". 
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The "resistance" of socially/politically constructed roles can 
thus be challenged in the process of deconstruction. The 
"different" and plural effects of the mobility of the 
dissemination process yield immense scope for heterogeneity and 
multiplicity of textual "interpretations" only because it is in 
this dispersion and ceaseless process of incompleteness that the 
writing of one's own text (i.e. it's "interpretation") can occur. 
Viewing the writing of the text in this way, Derrida, like 
Barthes, challenges the act of "interpretation" and seems rather 
keen on the effects that the interplay of traces induces, clearly 
focussing on the Nietzschean forces or powers which assist in 
what Derrida calls the disentanglement of signs. Imagine bill 
boards, slogans, advertisements etc. being "disentangled" for the 
"messages" they carry. The process of disentanglement implies a 
critical disavowal and eschewing of established patterns and 
content of thought, institutionalized interests and ideologies 
of entrenched ends. Derrida would share in the deconstruction 
and dissemination of these truths which are, ultimately, only 
fictions or myths: 
"The real political task today . . . is to 
carry forward the resistance that writing 
offers to established thought, to what has 
Already been done, to what everyone thinks, 
to what is well known, to what is widely 
recognized, to what is "readable" to 
everything which changes its form and make 
itself acceptable to opinion in general 
The name most often given to this is 
postmodernism" (Lyotard, 1988: 302). 
In reading life as text, implies reading against the established 
thoughts of life's institutions in order to arrive at other 
meanings as well. Over and above the de-institutionalizing 
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attempts of deconstruction and dissemination, Derrida also 
emphasizes his rendering of differance - an act in which the text 
deconstructs itself and the reader becomes the witness 
(experiencer) . According to Derrida, the de-establishing bent 
of deconstruction proposes that instead of having a relation of 
reference and equivalence, the relationship of signifier and 
signified becomes unequivocally marked by excess and incessant 
difference: The signifier always exceeds the limits of meaning 
set by the signified and enters a chain of "difference" in 
signification, which proves to remain "unmasterable". (Derrida, 
1976: 23). Difference, or the repetition by difference, is the 
condition of the system, but it requires a support, it must be 
written (violently, in Derrida's estimation) into some structure: 
" the scriptural "metaphor" thus [comes 
into play] , every time difference and 
relation are irreducible, every time 
otherness introduces determination and puts 
a system in circulation" (Derrida, 1981: 
163) . 
Derrida's attempts to avert the smooth logicality of literal 
representationalism with its ensuing results of masterable and 
self-assured meaning which is to be unlocked, or the truth that 
is to be extracted from the text. The chain of "difference" in 
signification rather leaves the reader with a sense of 
"nothingness", "helplessness", in which he cannot seek to 
control, manipulate, master, and replicate the ultimate meaning 
of any text - a view which is far from that of Eco and Lotman who 
operates "with" an indispensable systemic subject to construct 
meaning. Meaning is never "immediately" within grasp and 
immediately mastered. A deferred process would be necessary, as 
experienced in Derrida's notion of differance. 
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4.6.4 DIFFERANCE AND DIFFERENTIAL READING 
According to Derrida the absolute "mastery" and "control" of 
meaning as in the quest of literal and referential reading, we 
need to challenge it as is an illusion of our traditional 
logocentric metaphysics. Rather than being self-present and 
proving to be mathematically determinable, meaning posits a 
constant drift of differance, the construction of differing and 
therefore def erring - an unresting referral of one sign to other 
signs in an infinite process of deferment which deflects the 
pursuits of "masterability" of the ultimate and final meaning. 
Differance, "which is neither a word nor a concept", is, 
according to Derrida (1982: 7), the "non-original origin" of all 
differences and every self-assured form of identity. Readers 
cannot assume to "have" the divine ability to confer meaning. 
Dif ferance is intended to underscore two contrasting dimensions 
of differer: temporization and spacing time and space 
interweave, differance is the "matrix" of all presence and 
absence: 
"It is because of differance that the 
movement of signification is possible only 
if each so-called "present" element ... is 
related to something other than itself, 
thereby keeping within itself the mark of 
the past element, and already letting itself 
be vitiated by the mark oI its relation to 
the future element And it is this 
constitution of the present, as an 
"originary" and irreducibly non-simple 
synthesis of marks, or traces, that I 
propose to call archi-writing or arche-
trace. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing 
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(and) temporization" (Derrida, 1982: 13-14). 
Derrida resists being dogmatic, even when writing about the dis-
content in reading which always seeks deferment. According to 
Derrida, differance is conceived as being neither active nor 
passive but rather "productive" and like a hinge, differance 
provides a re-attachment between things and, as a result, veers 
towards sameness (Derrida in Mortley, 1991: 99). In a 
paradoxical way this sameness also speaks of otherness for the 
sake of heterogeneity. Essentially the concept differance, as 
it is employed in the now of the writing process, embodies in 
itself what is referred to as the "system" of writing in whose 
heart the origin is inscribed as the locus "Differance 
represents nothing other than the infinite repetition of meaning 
which does not consist in its duplication or in a way of always 
distancing itself ... Differance is bidding, appeal, request, 
seduction, imploring, supplication. Difference is passion" 
(Nancy, 1992: 39). This means denouncing duplication and 
displacing the "smooth reading" of a text for easy meaning 
construction with a great measure of "struggle". No quick access 
to any form of meaning is possible, but like Ricoeur's "conflict 
of interpretation" Derrida's "subject-less" writing of the 
reading is an endless process, never ever full completed. Like 
with Lacan, Derridean writing is forever spawned by t~e Other 
(the Writing) - ensuring newer and more profound understandings. 
In the reading act Derrida argues that language must therefore 
be seen as a system of signs acquiring its signification neither 
by the authority of a human subject, nor by the reference of a 
reality located "in a text", but only by virtue of its 
differential properties. These qualities are what Saussure calls 
semiotic values that produce meanings that are essentially 
"differential" rather than "referential". Derrida is way beyond 
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linearity, for there is no "subject" and no "object", no 
opposites but only interactions of disparate traces or grammata 
of which the subject is part of. Differance enables the reading 
subject to realise his "place" or "places" in the grand text of 
life itself - without having to acquiesce into practices against 
his will. 
In a way the Derridean notion of differance represents the 
Barthesian jouissance which embodies the pleasure which forms the 
off-stage voices in the Derridean grammatology. In the reading 
act, if the delay tactics of deferment that differance inspires, 
creates a sense of expectancy in the reader, Derrida emphasizes 
that this delay would be a necessary temporizing factor: 
"Temporizing is spacing, a way of making an interval, and here 
again the idea of dif f erance the ideas of spacing and 
temporization are inextricably linked" (Derrida in Mortley, 1991: 
100). In Derridean writing the metaphor of inscription points 
and makes evident the necessity of the localization of difference 
or determination, its passage through (but not its presence in) 
the space of this world. It is the element of play or non-
finalization in the system that is the condition of its survival 
towards the unanticipated and incalculable possibilities of 
reading (compare Heidegger's "Higher than actuality stands 
possibility"). 
In keeping with what appears to be Derrida's "shifting" style and 
differential practice of constant "erasure" (including the 
redefinition of the subject) to construct anew, he seeks to move 
beyond differance to the concepts of "trace" and "dissemination" 
which are inalienable from the Derridean concept of writing as 
the most viable practice of reading. 
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4.6.5 INTERPRETATION AS WRITING WITH ERASURE 
Writing a text operates in a totally different framework of 
validating assumptions - a process, according to Derrida, which 
is different from comparing our beliefs with the facts, these 
latter conceived as existing "out there" or as belonging to a 
realm of pre-given objective truths against which to test our 
various propositions, world-hypothesis, ontological commitments, 
structures of linguistic representation or whatever. Therefore, 
Derrida's notion of interpretation is very firm when he attacks 
the notion of so-called strategic thinking - people who pronounce 
viewpoints that seek " ... to monopolize this discourse from a 
standpoint of accredited expertise" (Derrida in Norris, 1992 :39). 
To clarify his view of the reading act beyond the idea of 
validating an informed and assured subject operating vis-a-vis 
an object, Derrida (1979:264) points out that there are two 
interpretations of the notion of interpretation: "The one seeks 
to decipher, dreams of deciphering, truth or an origin which is 
free from freeplay and from the order of a sign, ... The other, 
which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms free-play 
and tries to pass beyond man and humanism" . Humanism holds 
vested interests of controlling distorted facts and statistics, 
and influencing socially-constructed meanings and identities of 
people. 
Without entrenching the traditional master-mind centre of a human 
subject "understanding" the text, the Derridean challenging 
notion of "freeplay" drives or generates the " sense-making" 
procedures in the reading act in which ever changing 
constellations emerge. Hollinger (1994: 107) in observing 
Derrida's Nietzschean view of the noncenter, argues that the " ... 
centre (and the subject) as metaphysical, as the centre of being 
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and presence, is rejected without nostalgia and regret, but is 
kept as a 11 function" , as a formal placeholder of some sort 11 • 
This displacement of the human subject by Derrida has been 
consistent as with Barthes and Lacan. 
It is rather the notion of ecriture, writing, that fulfils the 
most crucial, "productive" dynamic in Derrida's interpretive 
strategy. For him there exists only one form of writing in the 
reading a:ct which is essentially the embodiment of a single 
transcendental experience of writing which can never be equated 
to the object of any experience (see Nancy, 1992: 37). This 
form of writing occurs through differance and which is the 
condition of the possibility of presence and absence, as well as 
being and nonbeing; it is neither present nor absent: 
"Never present without being absent, 
differance is an unrepresentable before" 
(Derrida, 1982: 21). 
This Derridean notion of "unrepresentable before" contains within 
it the element of constant erasure in order to avoid meanings 
from crystallizing in ideologies, monopolies and entrenched 
worldviews. Every ideology, every short-sighted attempt of a 
monopoly of ideas, every worldview has to be tested, re-evaluated 
and even displaced in order to ensure non-finalization of 
"accredited expertise" (Derrida in Norris, 1992: 39). If reading 
"succeeds", it in fact fails, for reading is excess, and there 
is always a "double writing" (Derrida, 1982 :392) which never 
ends. 
Derrida has succeeded in regarding reading beyond the notion of 
a "text representing" an unproblematic, transparent instance of 
writing in which reality stands behind its truthfulness. He in 
fact shifts our perspective to engage in the text as a narrative 
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of its own textuality (diffe-rance) . Life, as text itself, 
claims its materiality as a network of signifiers: 
"In this sense the materiality of 
language is only the f lipside about their 
claims about life being a "text" (Lash, 
1988: 332). 
For this purpose the creative process of writing ensures that the 
text becomes an extended commentary upon its own textuality, for 
" there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida, 1976: 158) . 
In Barthes' case, we noticed, there is still the recognition of 
a semiotic subject that is the result of a writing discourse that 
unfolds, but in Derrida's case "... there is no constituting 
subjectivity. For this reason the privileged ego [is] ... to be 
submitted to a process of dismantling and dispossession" (see De 
Beer, 1982: 12) . Dispossession of authority, authorship or 
reader status (which is erasure) is equally congruent with the 
deconstructive dis-content of text-writing for greater and more 
expansive reading. 
In this.radical process of dismantling, Derrida (1976: 46) also 
seeks to deconstruct the subjectivity of the reader as the 
absolute foundation or origin of "writing for meaning". 
According to him a new grammatological knowledge emerges when the 
written text is elevated as the pre-eminent locus of textual 
interpretation, for " language bears within itself the 
necessity of its own critique" (Derrida, 1978: 254). It is clear 
that Derrida is compelled to preserve the self-sufficient notions 
of "text", "sign" and "presence" while, at the same time, 
attempting to challenge them. He nevertheless remains adamant 
that no matter what the context, it cannot rule text, i.e. a 
place of interiority cannot be maintained in an exterior field 
precisely because context is not really "outside" the text at 
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all. In this context Derrida is far ahead of the circular and 
conditioning effects of subject-object of Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, Gadamer and Ricoeur. Derrida seems to preserve the space 
of interiority of the text by writing so that no historical or 
other personal or social notions of context can reign in the 
significations of the text. Here too, Derrida is substantially 
ahead of Eco and Lotman, and certainly too in terms of Barthes's 
"no hands" approach. Clearly Derrida seems to not only theorize 
far beyond the semiotic strategies to reading proposed by Eco, 
Lotman and Barthes - but in fact he theorizes differently. Like 
Lacan, Derrida does not attempt to establish identities for 
readers or for reading - these are barriers to reading. 
The pre-eminence of Derrida's writing in the interpretive 
strategy, as a result, off-centres the role of the reading 
subject as well as the act of reading, which means that Derrida 
has no option but to confront writing with writing, and the only 
way around this is the deletion of a traditional concept to 
propose a radical conception of the concept, writing in erasure. 
(Derrida, 1976: 18-19). The process of writing occurs in no 
other way than in terms of constant, albeit playful, erasure and 
substitution. Playful erasure constantly ensures the disruption 
of reading. 
4.6.6 PLAY AND DISCONTINUITY IN WRITING. 
In keeping with Barthes's pursuits to overcome ideology, Derrida 
argues that for the writing of the text "to occur", means letting 
the traces enter the infinite play of traces and this happens as 
dissemination allows signs to explode, i.e. to interact with 
other traces. Play is an attempt to "escape" the totalization 
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(which for Derrida is nothing but a useless and impossible 
endeavour) of a reading: 
" ... non-totalization can ... be determined 
in another way: no longer from the 
standpoint of a concept of f initude as 
relegation to the empirical, but from the 
standpoint of the concept of play ... in a 
field of infinite substitutions" (Derrida, 
1978: 289). 
In reading play becomes the "inexhaustible field" - a centre 
which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. Having 
circumvented the circularity theories of "passing over" 
(Heidegger) , "field of intersections" (Merleau-Ponty), 
"tradition" (Gadamer), "the mediation of signs and symbols via 
appropriation" (Ricoeur) and even the "cultural codes" (Eco) and 
"extra-code" (Letman), Derrida abolishes all polarities or 
binaries and opts for an "inexhaustible field" of infinite 
substitutions to playfully write the text. The reader has no 
direct jurisdiction over meaning, for only traces can refer to 
other traces (Derrida, 1976: 232). 
While there are visibly differing degrees or levels of linguistic 
play between and indeed within different texts, this does not 
mean that the obviously "playful" texts are less "rigorous" than 
their more soberly scientific or classical counterparts. In the 
reading act, traces as signifiers, can only be defined by their 
relation to other signifiers so that the "structure of writing" 
can be described, according to Derrida, as the sign under 
erasure. In this way Derrida ensures the condition of the 
discontinuity and fragmentariness of a "broken text" (Barthes, 
1975: 15) in order to yield a manifold or plural text. It is in 
writing, according to Derrida, that the plural text will be 
broken, interrupted or erased - yielding a multi-dimensional form 
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of reading which is free from referential bias, whether the bias 
of the regime of the subject or that of the object . These 
constructs, according to Derrida, have been put out of play from 
the very outset. 
This pioneering use of erasure proposed by Derrida occurs in 
play, for within the dynamic structures of the traces/signs, the 
reading subject has "lost" himself. The reader can now only 
speak in so far as he is willing to follow the grammata of 
writing, patently mooting the idea of an autonomous, creative 
subject as the origin of the text. For Derrida, it is only 
within and among the relations of traces to other traces (through 
temporization) that plural meanings are likely to occur. This 
plurivocity is likely to be present in every act of reading, 
whether the reader wants to assume it or not, " it dictates 
your discourse irrespective of your wishes" (Derrida in Mortley, 
1991: 105). Having witnessed the development of the mathematical 
logical subject or Cartesian ego, we now witness in Derrida the 
"fall" of all the subsequent variations of representational 
thinking. Even within his generation of postmodernism Derrida 
seeks to break further ground. It would appear to be different 
thinking/writing that Derridean postmodernism calls for - a 
discourse which focuses on both inside and outside the 
problematics of representation. 
The traces writing should be thought of as manifest differential 
vibration (which are without support and unbearable), and can 
only come from the outside. Texts that inscribe the altarity 
(difference) of this outside serve as "a kind of cabal or cabala 
in which the blanks will never be anything but provisionally 
filled in, one surface or square always remaining empty, open to 
the play of permutations, blanks barely glimpsed as blanks 
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(almost) pure spacing, going of forever and not in the 
expectation of any Messianic fulfilment" (Derrida, 1981: 383). 
It is clear that the act of "interpretation" as the play of 
continuous permutations, according to Derrida, cannot occur from 
the sovereign reader's point of view, for the reader as a sense-
making and centred concept no longer exists. In fact there 
cannot be a human centre in the first place but rather a textual 
starting-point where the repeated reading of the discontinuous 
working of grammata enables readers to catch what Derrida 
believes are pluri-glimpses of the textual meanings. In this 
decentred reading act it is through deconstruction and 
dissemination that readers follow the numerous entry-points into 
the text. The text "comes" and "departs", depending on the 
quality and sustenance of the deconstruction process. As a 
result, this "non-linear" pursuit of meaning marks an important 
feature of Derrida's approach. It is by following the endless 
play and interplay of signs through blanks even that the reader 1 s 
own selfhood becomes as vulnerable to textuality as the text 
itself (see De Beer, 1982: 13). For no longer does a self-
assured reading subject, despite the oppositional forces or 
"traces" he has to conquer, define himself in terms of coming to 
terms with the textual meaning. 
For Derrida the "making" of textual meaning is irrecoverable in 
the textual functioning, for the author resides in the text and 
not before the text: "The names of authors or doctrines have 
no substantial value. They indicate neither identities nor 
causes" (Derrida in Burke, 1993: 121). With no identities or 
causes, always suspended between and within the conflicting play 
or forces, the crypt remains utterly paradoxical. It is "the 
exterior in the interior" - the interiority of the exteriority 
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that turns everything outside in and inside out (Derrida, 1986: 
214) . The "Crypt" metaphor is what Derrida explains as what "one 
would say of the transcendental or of the repressed, the 
unthought, or the excluded - which organizes the ground to which 
it does not belong" (Derrida, 1986: 187). Here Derrida concurs 
with Lacan - the conflict between the self-conscious and the 
unconscious which marks the "site" of meaning production. The 
production of meanings only occurs in re-reading conflicting 
textual traces, which means a text is no longer a finished corpus 
of writing as an "exterior" or some content "contained" in a 
book, but an "exterior-interior-exterior-interior" "differential 
network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something 
other that itself, to the differential traces 11 (Derrida in Bloom, 
1979: 83). This is, after Barthes and Lacan the most radical 
shift in thinking regarding "representationalism" encountered in 
the development of various discourses in this study. The switch 
in thinking is one away from the accuracy of representation, to 
the infinite play of traces. 
4.6.7 THE INFINITIZATION OF TEXT IN DECONSTRUCTION 
Derrida demonstrates to have progressed substantially beyond the 
assumptions of those theorists who equally and justifiably seek 
to challenge the idea of "a divine message" which is extracted 
from the text by a sovereign reading subject. Even when they 
have proposed their own critical and revised notions of 
subjectivity which is at work in the exterior-interior network 
of the text, producing manifold or plural meaning, Derrida, along 
with Lacan, believes he had pushed the most critical limits in 
that he has gotten rid of basically everything foundational, 
referential or contextual in the reading act, including that of 
subjectivity. 
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While Barthes is clear on what he conceives of as his version of 
the plurality of texts written by the "subject" and who is 
defined in and by the writing, Derrida quite differently would 
have little to tell us about language but certainly a great deal 
about writing. This is precisely what Derrida hopes to "expose", 
viz. the grand hopes of modernity and the impossibility of 
continuing with the myopia of their totalizing theories (Lyotard, 
1988). He therefore argues that writing about writing helps to 
deconstruct the grand hopes of the Kantian way of looking at 
things an approach which is substantially different to 
Barthes's "de-binary thinking". Derrida believes that he has 
established a new thinking order, i.e. a new form of infinite 
writing and this, by implication, would change the way we 
conceive of ourselves as subjects and acquiesce into a new mode 
of meaning construction which is void of the compelling social 
labels which debilitate life conditions for many people in 
contemporary society. Derrida seeks to reject the totalizing 
notion that texts portray in any form of binary subject-object 
representation, i.e. that it points to a signifier outside the 
text, but argues that a text, as a galaxy of signifiers, does not 
entail a structure of signifiers, i.e. the reading act does not 
operate in terms of "respecting" the text but of ceaselessly 
breaking it up, maltreating it and ultimately preventing it from 
speaking. While Habermas (1987) attacks this revolutionary 
theorising as masquerading neo-conservative ideology, Derrida's 
intention, like that of Barthes and Lacan, is to debunk all 
ideology, and therefore to present a radical critique of the 
previous (modernist) social order. 
Derrida's infinite writing as reading, it appears, is performed 
by the subject-less written traces, themselves which results in 
grammatological reading of systematic "mind-less", as it were, 
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crossing out of the arche and the radical transformation of 
general semiology. This apocalyptic, if not revolutionary, 
stance of Derrida is intended to disrupt and displace the 
dominant frozen conceptualities of our day. Derrida speaks of 
a "radical trembling" which is "played out in the violent 
relationship of the West to its other, whether a "linguistic 
relationship" ... or ethnological, economic, political, military 
relationship etc." (Derrida, 1982: 134-135). This seemingly "no 
hands" process, according to him, starts with a persistently 
infinite deconstructing operation of "life as text", which 
leaves the text bare and unburdened by the need to represent at 
all. The literary, military, economic, etc., aspects of life 
portray the "wider" text and therefore how we deal with the 
literary text, is no different to how we deal with the broader 
socio-political issues this notion of the "text" marks 
Derrida's major contribution to meaning construction. This 
maverick "non-representational" view must, of necessity, 
radically open the text again and again, ad infinitum, to 
multiple interpretations, which at the same time, inevitably 
leads to a considerably vulnerable position. In the tradition of 
Nietzsche, Derrida only sets out to castigate dominant 
foundationalisms, not just in the aesthetic and literary realm, 
but similarly refuses to accede to the consensus-seeking 
certainties of notions of unconditional ethics and realist 
"mirror-of-nature epistemologies" (Lash, 1988: 311) . Writing 
thus appears infinitely inalienable from the text itself, which 
means that the text quasi anticipates the subject's reading of 
it by incorporating that reading within the play of its already 
ongoing textuality (see Newton, 1990: 78). 
For Derrida action or production, as embodied in the play of 
signifiers, has sought to destroy all essentialist thought, and 
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as a result, leaves nothing to flourish but infinite free play, 
i.e. language has to learn to revel in the dispersive free play 
the suspended multiplicity of signifiers affords - without an 
obsessive unified centre or expectation of any "Messianic 
fulfilment" (Derrida, 1981: 383) . Although Derrida warns against 
the habitual temptation to "divinize" the textual code, he may 
seem to succumb to the lure of philosophical system-building 
himself, specifically of constructing yet another transcendental 
idealism. The trace which reads the text comes across as an 
apparently soul-less subject among many subjects, including the 
human subject. The deployment of "subject" or "codes", however 
remain nothing but empty blanks which provisionally (and 
infinitely) fill in the blank spaces - for writing - only to be 
deconstructed again and again. It could be argued that Derrida 
is not particularly into system-building but he appears not able 
to discard the implications of referential logic which he wishes 
to deconstruct, for thinking in reality is not a separate 
activity from the structuring process, since it usually supposes 
a thinking subject. In an interview with Kristeva Derrida (1981: 
24) emphatically declares: 
"Deconstruction, then, cannot aim to rid us, 
once and for all, of the concepts 
fundamental to Western rationalism, but 
only, again and again, to transform [them], 
to displace them, to turn them against their 
presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other 
chains, and little by little modify the 
terrain of our work and thereby to produce 
configurations". 
Derrida's infinitization of traces continue to play i.e. to 
ensure that crystallized ideologies of thinking become 
transformative in constantly displacing what has become natural, 
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true and accepted in the media, institutions and social 
conventions. 
4.6.8 THE "PURPOSE" AND "CONTEXT" OF READING. 
While Derrida appears to had shifted radically, compared to his 
equally critical predecessors, he relies, like them, on the 
"tools" and "constructs" to deconstruct those limiting 
representational structures in which the reading act has come to 
be incarcerated. Essentially, Derrida's transformative "anti-
interpretive" strategy (via displacement) has set out to 
endlessly break up the text in order to prevent is 
"naturalization" by what has been so vigorously pursued by the 
representational modes of reading. The Derridean text, where the 
reader's only recourse is to the marks on the paper, or in our 
social world, these marks are ironically "demarcated" into 
blanks, spaces, margins, i.e. a grapho-centric model - suggesting 
what appears as an almost depersonalized and acontextualized act 
of reading. This however proves not to be the case, as we have 
seen, because he has consistently insisted on the political (and 
not neutral) character of transformative deconstructionist 
practice. In fact, "no politics without language", he claims: 
"His politically "codable" stands on 
neocolonialism, women's liberation, and 
apartheid, for instance - have shown him to 
be ... on the "progressive side" (McCarthy, 
1991: 146). 
The radical decentring of the "Derridean" subject is therefore 
always in pursuit of a political function of largely unconscious 
differential relations, unfolding in social spaces and historical 
times, never being completely master of what he says or claims: 
"The subject, and first of all the conscious 
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and speaking subject, depends upon the 
system of differences and the movement of 
differance (Derrida, 1981: 29). 
Derrida's deconstructionist view of "there is nothing out-side 
the text" will thus not find a secure meta-position of 
foundationalism beyond the text itself, to stabilise itself (see 
Newton, 1990: 78). This view puts out of play before the game 
even begins every source, norm, control or indicator in the 
logocentric and binary notions of subjective or objective use and 
experience of language. The text, paradoxically, appears to have 
an extraordinarily "controlled" space or context to structurate 
signs and codes so that texts are not arbitrarily read. All such 
agencies like cogito, ego or subject are relegated to the status 
of fictions, because they are generated in the name of infallible 
language, and are therefore constantly being dissolved by 
deconstructive analysis. It is clear that while Barthes's view 
of subjectivity still operates within a cultural-coding 
"context", Derrida's operates without a Cartesian-Kantian 
foundational context - including without the context of the 
master subjectivity itself. Taylor (1987: 302) brings a clearer 
perspective in arguing that the " empty tombe does not re-
present the presence of renewed life but 11 is 11 the sign of the 
impossibility of presence an impossibility that "is" the 
infinite proximity of the nonabsent absence of death. This 
impossibility is the strange apocalypse itself. The Impossible 
draws near with a "Come", which, paradoxically, never comes". 
According to Derrida, this "Come" cannot come from the voice of 
a signifying, "I" but is only derivable, i.e. it drifts (Taylor, 
1987: 302-303). The only "context" for Derrida therefore is "the 
infinite proximity" of a void or absence, in order to transform 
our readings into a constantly new presence. 
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The radical post-modernist departure of Derrida's thinking from 
his precursors, leads to a "split" in how he perceives the 
reading act and its "derivable drifts", as suggested by Taylor, 
in the construction of meaning. This "split" in Derrida's case 
exists in the text (there is nothing outside) and there appears 
therefore to be a double text, the first text contains fissures 
or traces, which render indications of the second one, and 
between the two texts there is no synthesis, no fusing into one 
at all. The second text is also not "opposite" to the other but 
rather that which appears to be its counterpart. Derrida's "non-
representational 11 assumptions plays therefore a double game, i.e. 
they feign obedience to the tyrannical system of rules while 
simultaneously laying traps for it in the form of problems which 
it is at a loss to settle. The heterogeneity and inf initization 
of meanings is however possible because of the signifying 
possibilities which are attendant upon the inscription of 11 ••• 
a kind of autonomous (super-compossibility) of meanings" 
(Derrida, 1978: 18). In other words, it is an infinite play and 
simultaneous substitution of traces which, according to Derrida, 
is always already determined. 
4.6.9 THE SIMULTANEITY OF NON-ORIGINARITY AND REPETITION. 
While Derrida (like Barthes) regards the intentions of 
.. 
phenomenology as being imprisoned within the "closure of 
representation 11 , he patently rejects the notion of a self-assured 
subject who writes the textual representations according to his 
own and many other codes in the grammata. Whilst Barthes retains 
the foundation of subjectivity, albeit in its plural foundation, 
and Lacan insists on the pursuit of the Other in terms of the Law 
of the Father, the Derridean reading subject is not surpassed but 
is manifestly absent from the very start. It appears that the 
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"absence" of a dominant biographical subject is, at the same 
time, equivalent to the "presence" of an impersonal 11 trace" 
subject. This implication of a "new subjectivity" of Derrida, 
if you wish, announces the "play of differences" within the 
blanks and spaces over the pursuit of a foundational, originary 
and centred subject who controls meaning. These traces weave 
and interlace in the infinite writing process, so that Derrida 
writes of "weaving and interlacing"; 
" ... two tactics: the first does not change 
terrain but turns what is implicit in the 
founding concepts and the original 
problematic against those very concepts ... ; 
the second involves continuous change of 
terrain, placing oneself outside of, and 
affirming an absolute break with those 
concepts and problematic" (McCarthy, 
1991: 149). 
The repetitive significations or inscriptions, according to 
Derrida that differance has activated in a signifier in the past, 
remain active as traces in the present as they will in the 
future - except that this "history" does not exist outside the 
grammata as a context for interpretation of new meanings. 
Derrida's "non-referential" view therefore embodies a process 
which in its own way, seems no less dependent on an origin, 
ground and end, than the metaphysical system he deconstructs. 
Abrams (1979, 431) argues that "· .. the closed chamber of texts 
for which he invites us to abandon our ordinary realm of 
experience in speaking, hearing and understanding language", 
represents nothing else but a "sealed echo-chamber". However, 
Derrida sees his notion of inscription as being a crisis, not as 
a simple or single "grounded" moment at all, but rather that it 
is both instance and insistence, for "This crisis has always 
325 
(already) begun and it is indeterminable" (Derrida, 1978: 62). 
This crisis or inscription is not "sealed in" or "locked up" but 
in fact is free in its own "eccentric circulation" in terms of 
what Derrida refers to as non-originarity and repetition: 
"Death is at the dawn because everything has 
begun by repeating themselves, by doubling 
themselves There was immediately a 
double origin plus its repetition" (Derrida, 
1978: 299). 
Unlike the views of Eco, Lot man and Barthes, Derrida 1 s non-
originary excessive system embraces and dis-embraces on a 
continual basis paradoxes, contradictions and incoherencies that 
may impact on the text since his re-evaluation of metaphysics 
already excluded the stable, totalized and coherent subject. Here 
Derrida may concur with Lacan who speaks of an "unlocatable 
centre" in the chain so that there will always be an irreducible 
otherness to prompt newer and newer meaning. The implied 
Barthesian subject who "constructs" the reading text is 
contrasted with Derrida 1 s writing where " one risks 
ceaselessly, confirming, consolidating, relifting, at an always 
more certain depth, that which one allegedly deconstructs 11 
(Derrida, 1978: 135). All origins have already been in a process 
of deconstruction, including the subject trace - a process which 
marks its already ongoing textuality. 
The writing of a reading almost takes on an anthropomorphic 
tendency of a "human" subject to dismantle and at the same time 
assemble, produce, construct and write a plurality text which 
disorganises " ... the entire inherited order and invading the 
entire field." (Derrida, 1981: 42). The Derrid~an reader, it 
would appear, is merely invited to gaze at the Nietzschean 
affirmation (Bejahung) of the play of the world, i.e. the process 
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of becoming. This "eccentric circulation" of endless play of 
textual traces, including the subject trace, however is without 
security, just chance a referral and deferral system of 
signification which remains "unmasterable" (Derrida, 1975: 23) . 
Derrida's significant contribution to "reading theory" is his 
brand of writing of "recurrences without representation" as Scott 
(1987: 97) calls it: 
"Meanings perish and repeat on the 
meaningless surface contacts among things. 
Meanings do not penetrate to a centre. They 
do not represent something beyond their 
reach and in whose standing likeness they 
occur. They refer to themselves only". 
The unmasterable character of Derrida's assumptions of the 
reading act, radicalizes all hitherto critiques in this study, 
for Derrida believes not only that he has "withdrawn language 
from the world" (Blanchot, 1982: 26) but that he has withdrawn 
and displaced subjectivity, which is the corollary of language, 
as well. Derrida's dictum "there is nothing outside the text", 
as has been pointed out, does not necessarily refer to books or 
documents, but to "con-texts", to the entire real-history-of-the-
world. However, he does not suspend reference to history, to the 
world, to reality, to being at all (Derrida, 1988: 136). 
Derrida's remarkable progress beyond even the views of the new 
critics of subjectivity in this study therefore "inscribes" 
traces which operate as a "deconstruction from within" (Fairlamb, 
1994: 82), i.e. his insistence on deconstruction's relentless 
questioning of the authority of perception and thought discovers 
the heterogeneous conditions of significance, the conditions of 
both theoretical coherence and deconstructive play. Moreover, 
Derrida's profound insights of the understanding of meaning 
construction is that his writing also relentlessly seeks also to 
327 
destabilize the distinction between theory (of deconstruction) 
and deconstructive practice; reflexively questioning 
deconstructive authority in the same way that he questions 
theory, the latter of which may pursue "clarity", "coherence" and 
"guidelines" in everyday life. For Derrida, ultimately, the end 
of analysis is (the) impossible, for the repressed always returns 
to render hollow the magisterial claims of a self-conscious 
subject. In the same way Lacan pursues the desperate evacuation 
and dis-content of all meanings, including the infinite meanings 
of myself as subject. 
4.6.10 CONCLUSION 
By concluding with Derrida's unmasterable, yet exciting and 
excessive prospect of "reading", we have incorporated into this 
study a considerably comprehensive view of the reading act which 
increasingly places (and replaces) every locus of centrality, 
origin and causality into constant radical question. Beyond all 
neat theorising that remains bent on representing and so doing 
affords the "natural" basis for mastery and control (whether by 
the language) , Derrida excessively unburdens all presuppositions 
that seek to certralize and totalize our thinking, but, as its 
inevitable corollary, to trace the traces for constant renewal 
and transformation of reading itself and how we trace the act of 
reading. For as much as we as readers become aware the assumed 
oppositional stance in thinking and socializing, Derrida's 
insistence on the "double nature" of all things, edges us to not 
only reverse those practices but also to displace them, all the 
time, to actualize readings of ourselves and our taken-for-
granted practices posing as "natural realities". Things-are-the-
way-they -are need not be that way, for new and deconstructed 
ways of looking at them burst those "totalities" and 
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"coherencies" in order to open up another way of thinking and 
reading {in excess), for this is the way it always has been, 
"which exceeds all that is real" (Derrida, 1978: 56-7) . This 
excess however cannot be done from the outside of the text-of-
the-world, in an authoritative way, and neither can we assume 
that it is safe to read our text from the inside, for nothing is 
static or either -or. The reality of the events of life and the 
events of ourselves " ... disrupts the circulation that 
transforms . .. " (own emphasis) (Derrida, 1981: 21) . We are all 
transforming codes in the entire reading of life, irreducible to 
finite origins, destinations - always unrepresentable, 11 ••• always 
remaining empty, open to the play of permutation ... 11 (Derrida, 
1981:383). Derrida's critical contribution to reading is none 
other than to push us to reconceptualize our potential to subvert 
all precision -seeking representationalism and naturalized 
assumptions, despite all conflict, and make us realize how we can 
view them differently, in challenging and fulfilling ways. 
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4.7 THE RADICALIZATION OF THE NEW MASTERS~SUMMARY 
The fundamental transition from the pioneering masters towards 
the new masters gains gradual, albeit qualitative, momentum with 
Eco and Letman whom, as we have noticed, continue to operate in 
very clear subject-object polarity modes of meaning construction. 
Their merit however resides greatly in the fact that their 
approach of displacement seeks to disengage our reading discourse 
from the prominent and/or traditional positioning of the subject 
and object. It is a structural or systemic impasse, entrenched 
in truth claims, which demonstrates to be varied in a rich 
ambience of cultural, social and historical codes. The new 
masters do rely heavily on the productive working of disruptive 
networks (Eco) and creolization (Letman) in order to void direct 
representationalism. While credit is given to the "other side" 
of reading (contained in the text), the reader's "ensemble of 
codes" tends to filter delayed and indirect meanings. Eco and 
Letman evidence still a restraint form of reading occuring in a 
continuous, circular process of semiosis - the precursor for 
traces and signifiers which we encounter in Barthes, Lacan and 
Derrida. Whereas as the pioneering masters' "pure", "circular" 
positions of subject-object attempted to concretize these 
constructs in-this-world, Eco and Letman introduce a flexible 
mode of.playfulness, appreciating particularly dissimilarity and 
difference in order to critically contribute to misreading as 
being a natural part of all reading. Eco and Letman, however 
beyond the pioneering masters they may have advanced in terms of 
reading codes as discourse, still seem to veer to the level of 
the "intersection" of a subject and object which are constitutive 
forces of substance, content and definition. Being products of 
their times, their logocentric attempts obviously rely on their 
predecessors but ultimately prove nevertheless seminal in 
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appreciating the increased value of "multiple readings" which 
seek to problematize the circularity mode of subject-object, 
constantly seeking deferral from closure. They are able to 
inscribe multiple readings precisely because they have started 
to unburden the text from it author and authority, and therefore 
liberating the writerly text for more expansive meanings. The 
substantiality and content pursuits of their theories, on the 
other hand, still incarcerate their thinking in the quest for 
system-building and totalizing of personal and social knowledge -
thereby limiting the unmasterable character of the reading act. 
Our understanding of the reading act or of reading as such, vis-
a-vis the role of subjectivity becomes substantially radicalized 
with the introduction of Barthes and Derrida's notions of writing 
as well as Lacan's emphasis of the unconscious as a writer. This 
is a first, emphatic attempt to break with the problematic 
logocentric approaches of their predecessors. In seeking not 
only to rethink and re-evaluate the proximity of the notions of 
subjectivity and language, but in fact radically displacing them 
- they effectively demonstrate that there is no need for the 
polarity structure of subject-object, or even the need for any 
intersection between them. This abandonment of the intersection 
between subject and object is of major significance in terms of 
the new masters because this, methodologically, declares the 
death of representation. Because there cannot be any 
representation, it means the demise of the colonising powers of 
the signifier as well. Language, without denouncing its validity 
and role, cannot act as a transcription of reality for Barthes, 
Lacan and Derrida. Subject and "object" are equally useful in 
terms of the workings and shifting of traces and signif iers but 
cannot be "traced" or "signified" anywhere. They have no 
substance and consistent value, other than being inscribed into 
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the working dynamics of language. The advances made by Barthes 
and Derrida is by replacing/substituting the "one or two way", 
or "linear" or "circular" structures inherent in the meaning 
construction procedures of the pioneering masters, for discursive 
practices. Strictly-speaking neither the reader, nor the text 
"has" the ability to confer meaning - therefore there cannot be 
any representing, any decoding or any interpreting. Trusting 
therefore the playfulness of traces, grammata and signifiers, 
leads us to forgetting or amnesis of who are in charge. Amnesia 
becomes the "grounding force" for production. Language which re-
presents or tends to mean anything has no grounding or originary 
locus. Meaning, for the new masters always remains absent or, 
at best, uncertain. The pursuits of play and production impact 
in a critical way on the differentiality of how they conceive of 
language, its infinite functioning and ultimately its non-
solidifyng effects in reading, meaning construction and self-
definition always patent. 
Rather than being preoccupied with the "distance" or the "in-
between" of subject-object in meaning construction, Barthes, 
Derrida and Lacan seek to usher the creative notion of absence 
and nothingness into their excentric/eccentric discourse which 
becomes the radicalized point of departure for overcoming any 
frozen, ideological reading in which the subject has seemed to 
master the textual subject. All that remains are blanks and 
spaces, but no positions, polarity and beacons. "Less is more" 
seems to be the thrust of these structuralist, so that what 
propels the transformation of meanings is Desire and Pleasure. 
These notions are the "mechanisms" to prevent closing off of 
meaning which direct consumptive readings. Because of the 
castigation of the notion of equity or equivalence of subject and 
object, the reading act becomes a disruptive or discontinuous 
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procedure - learning "to live" with emptiness, the void and non-
originarity of meaning construction. How this "discontinuity" 
differs from the previous notions of the pioneers, including Eco 
and Lotman, is not differences between author and reader but 
rather the dispossessed nature of the discourse itself. The 
alienation and emptiness of discourse is taken to its ultimate 
consequence in Lacan's notion of the "faulty" subjectivity which 
has never been born. This absence is precisely the embryonic 
space of meaning, in contrast to the presence advocated by 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and other thinkers in this study. 
The ensuing readings of "a reading" had become the de-totalizing 
procedure upon which discourse thrives. Their discourses refuse 
to acquiesce in practices that will lead to consensus-seeking 
certainties of unconditional realism and ethics. A text cannot 
be "mastered" by anyone, i.e. a process which would entrench or 
monopolize ideas and ideologies. Subjectivity, as a result, is 
no longer a controlling "outside agency", but is constantly being 
recreated as a "site of production" (Barthes), or becomes woven 
into the grammata (Derrida) or even becomes a signifier in the 
chain of signifiers (Lacan}. As a result of the subversion of 
subjectivity, which is no longer an agency but rather a site of 
production in language, Barthes, Lacan and Derrida, in their 
respective ways, decentre the notion of a reading subject which, 
of necessity, becomes a split or divided entity and which has to 
cope with the inside and outside of the "text". There is however 
no longer an "objective text" either, but it is rather a matter 
of the subject that is being written (Barthes), the "subject" is 
regarded as being part of the galaxy of signif iers following 
other grammata (Derrida) and the subject which entails a 
structure in which the reader still has to be born (Lacan) . This 
uncertain and vulnerable position would therefore mean that any 
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"reading" has to cope with the "unreadable" and possibly also 
with "nonsense" in producing the manifold, differential readings 
that a text could entail. What the radical theorists awake in 
their readers is not unconditional "re-presenting" of presence 
but bringing the reader in closer proximity of an infinite state 
of nonabsent absence. This vulnerable, risky and luring prospect 
of dispossession of content and personal authorial power 
displaces the hegemonic sense of certainty, not that values and 
beliefs have no certainty or validity, but making its reader 
aware of what they have, what can be achieved (alterity) and 
making, as a result, more desirable decisions in a world that has 
become increasingly multifaceted and complex. 
The critical shift in perspectives of post-structuralism and 
post-modernism suggests a decentred subject (that is if we are 
still to speak of "a subject") which constantly in a 
dispossessed and alienated position, almost renders them 
depersonalized precisely because they have been deconstructed. 
Contrary to the earlier pioneering thinking, 11 deconstructive 11 
thinking as a deliberate strategy, has never been problematized 
other than to speak of the "conflict of interpretations". The 
transforrnative value of deconstruction does not only deconstruct 
content but also dis-content, i.e. enhancing the ability of 
looking at the multiple ways of writing our reading. For 
ultimately they believe there cannot, strictly-speaking, be any 
"interpretation of a text" but rather a discourse in which many 
differ-ent possible readings are infinitely generated - including 
different readings of ourselves as "readers". It is precisely 
because we have discourse, rather than substantive agencies 
(subject and object) that writing can deconstruct itself to 
achieve endless difference, without entrenching duplication. 
This "letting discourse deconstruct itself" is the gap or opening 
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for discourse to destabilize all thinking, ideas and expertise 
which seek totalization, finalization and validation of beliefs 
and practices in an otherwise utterly diversified world society. 
Because of the new masters' contemptuous suspicion and consequent 
suspension of a separate or outside position of the reader vis-a-
vis the object, they have effectively subverted the quest of 
sense-making meaning which seeks to penetrate to a centre to seek 
coherence, objectivity and accuracy of knowledge construction and 
of the finite identities of readers. What the new masters have 
moreover demonstrated is to critically re-site the reading act 
in which a playful (albeit serious) reading constantly "awakens 
other voices" (Levinas in Greisch, 1991: 68). Because meaning is 
always absent, no meaning can "belong" to a text. Since the new 
masters have argued in favour of displacing the epistemic 
boundaries which hinge on the limited subject-object dichotomy, 
they have opened the production of their "text" by radical 
disjunction to achieve a "wider" and even another reading than 
the one constructed in terms of the sovereign centred reader's 
volatile and idiosyncratic intentions. This discursive 
disjunction has been particularly achieved by Barthes, Lacan and 
Derrida, because of their displaced notions of subjectivity which 
persistently attempted to refer to the shifting reality of 
discourse - where subjectivity is seen as purely a discursive 
effect of reading. 
The new masters, moreover, in problematizing the level at which 
we perceive the "proliferation" of interpretations (Ormiston & 
Schrift, 1990: 4) , force the boundaries of reading beyond 
originarity or closure so that every reading becomes purely a 
pre-reading, to be followed by a re-reading, and so on. This 
golden thread of inf initization of the new masters has led to a 
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broader and more critical interpretive strategy which allows 
readers to appreciate "the remainder" of language (Lecercle, 
1990) which focuses on another side of language. Precisely 
because readings (rather than interpretation) has been made 
unmasterable, readers have been forced to read the " other sides" 
of reading, in the margins and the blanks. There is patently "no 
recipe", no blueprint for reading, for it is when we creatively 
have stopped trying to make sense that we start reading. 
Unreadable as this other side may be, they engage every reading 
experience to dehomogenize all conformist logical content to be 
continually re-read and transformed. Critical readers will 
therefore be enabled to develop the risk-taking capacity to push 
the limits of how they could possibly succeed in constructing 
meaningful knowledge that would advance their insight into the 
quality of their personal and social interactions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
UNSHACKLING THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING IN READING. 
5.1 RETHINKING READING: INTRODUCTION. 
Chapters 3 & 4 of this study have steadily examined how "theory" 
sets out to not only describe, but ultimately to "control" our 
reading practice. From the legislative presence of an object and 
a subject embroiled in various shades of representation and 
interpretation in Chapter 3, to the steady removal of all things 
dynamic to the extent that the very idea of excess "legislates" 
our reading practice in Chapter 4, it has become clear how the 
attempts of a 11 real 11 and "valid" (or even integrative) reading 
which is represented by and in the theory, has changed with 
alarming rapidity, but also with fundamental depth of insight. 
From the obsessive text orientation which must always be 
represented and mastered, to the summoning up of all counter 
forces which "destroy" and as a result produce at the scene of 
reading, we observe a remarkable array and intensity of theory 
construction. The common investment of all the respective 
theorists in this study, is their tendency to "theorize" their 
own peculiar contextualizing discourses, and a further 
distinguishing feature of all their respective theoretical 
discourses is that they seem continually placed in tension with 
their primary purpose, i.e. of delimiting a space of reading 
which it sets out to construct purpose of meaning. Therefore, 
whether we in fact have a "reading theory" is a concern which 
poses many counter questions. In fact the new masters postulate 
increasingly an unambiguous disavowal of any "theory" pertaining 
what they encapsulate in the volatile notion of "reading". We 
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are mindful in this study, however, that the pursuit of whatever 
"reading theory" cannot merely be a description of the rules for 
good or valid reading but rather that it becomes implicated in 
the larger theoretical, social and ideological discourses which 
shape the "space of the subject". 
From Decartes to Derrida, in this study, the implications of a 
"reading theory" merely describe particular facets of the reading 
act and its corresponding (or absence of) rules or theory. These 
have always been attempts of theorizing a particular set of 
assumptions and practices surrounding primarily the subject, but 
by implication, also the status and validity of representation 
vis-a-vis the object. These attempts have led to particular 
illuminating perspectives of the subject, language and therefore 
reading. Our concerns have been validated in that theorists 
grappled with whether the reading subject mimics the thoughts of 
someone else in the text, expressing as a result their theories 
of the distinction that is being made between the reading subject 
who reads, the subject being read and the person who writes. 
This is crucial, in differing degrees, for the theorists since 
the reading act articulates the boundaries between subject and 
text in both the process of writing and of reading. The result 
of these concerns informs their respective views of how the 
subject, and its place in the reading act is constructed. This 
proves a highly charged operation, given ultimately how they 
conceive of the nature of language, i.e. when they consider the 
"different uses" to which the reading of a text may be put. 
The elements of reflexivity and production which undergird the 
"reading theories" of the pioneering and new masters 
respectively, serve as significant unfreezing mechanisms for 
addressing the rigidity of strict representationalism which seeks 
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accuracy and monolithic meaning. Reflexivity imports a frame of 
reference which exceeds the boundaries of reproductive reading 
and therefore opening up new possibilities in the areas of 
knowledge, information and reading. In terms of reflexivity , 
the meaning which ensues from the reader will not be the final 
and complete meaning, for the gravity of reading may also reside 
beyond the "abilities" and potential of the text. On the other 
hand, reproduction imports a frame of reference which challenges 
reciprocity in favour of the irreducibility of meaning. This 
frame of reference had reinforced a modified orientation to 
meaning in which space is constantly created where the reader may 
move beyond the fixed boundaries of the text. This creative 
orientation certainly reaches a point where the reading subject 
is no longer the consumer of texts but rather a producer of 
texts. The apparent opposition between reflexivity and 
production, while dealt with methodologically as "separate" in 
this study, is a fallacy. To characterize reading solely in 
terms of textual production is also to overlook the important 
question of elements of representation. What this study 
illustrates is that the text also, at certain moments, produces 
the fallacy of an origin outside itself, i.e. an assumed reality 
which it is representing. 
As a way forward, and to facilitate the understanding of the 
theoretical implications of an integrative and certainly a more 
comprehensive "theory" or reading, it would be clarifying to 
grasp the schematic analysis and orientation of both the 
pioneering and the new masters. This orienting schema enables us 
to have insight into the reflexive and productive dynamics which 
provide the space of how we read, beyond the celebratory 
reverence for and power of the written word which usually tend 
to enclose pre-dated meaning of textual content. 
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5.2 THE ORIENTATION OF THE PIONEERING MASTERS TOWARDS 
READING. 
Chapter 3 initiates Nietzsche's seminal injunction of doubt for 
rethinking the status of the subject in its separated status from 
the textual object. Heidegger, Merleau- Ponty, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur' s concerns with the human subject (as opposed to a 
theoretical subject) in this world has, at the same time, brought 
about a critique of the role of language in terms of which 
meaning is constructed. The discourse that emerges is a form of 
meaning construction in which the present reading subject is no 
longer in absolute control of a passive textual object from which 
meaning is extracted. Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur usher into their thinking the significance of the notion 
reflexivity, i.e. the exciting prospect of the textual object 
which becomes "self-conscious" of itself and "designates" itself 
an active and "come-alive" role in the text. This distinctive 
form of reflexivity or self-awareness and reciprocity occurs in 
terms of the thinkers' understanding of language. Their 
strategic abandonment of pure representation precipitates the 
toppling of the sovereignty of the subject and, in the process, 
they attempt to eliminate what they regard as the fallacious gap 
or opposition of the subject and object. It is also evident that 
their respective critiques have been clearly as a result of their 
concerns with ontology, language and meaning. Even within a 
specific tradition eg. phenomenological reading, Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty creatively proceed and arrive at "different" ends. 
Similarly, in hermeneutic reading, Gadamer and Ricoeur prove 
different. In order to assist our summarizing and therefore 
facilitate a creative schematic way of unpacking their rethinking 
of the earlier Cartesian and Kantian tradition we may look at 
their different positions in terms of their: 
point of departure 
mode of consciousness 
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mediative function and meaning 
reflexive mode 
production of meaning/interpretation 
5.2.1. READING BASED ON REFLEXIVITY, TOWARDS PLURALITY OF 
MEANING. 
5.2.1.1 PHENOMENOLOGICAL READING. 
HEIDEGGER'S MERLEAU-PONTY'S 
HERMENEUTIC CONSTRUCTIVIST 
PHENOMENOLOGY PHENOMENOLOGY 
1. Phenomenologi- 1. Dasein is the 1. Situation is 
cal :goint of departure point. the departure 
de:garture. Dasein is linked point. Situa-
to language in tion is linked 
temporality. to the immedi-
ate primitive 
perception that 
is effected 
through the 
body. 
2. Mode of con- 2. Language is the 2. The body as 
sciousness. "house of being" phenomenal body 
which exists be- is the primary 
fore being. mode of con-
"Seeing" becomes sciousness, 
paramount to striving for 
complete onto- transcendence. 
logy. 
3. Mediative func-
tion and mean-
ing. 
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3. Language is the 
mediative func-
tion, for lan-
guage releases 
the possibili-
ties for dis-
closure of 
meaning. 
Meaning occurs 
when reader en-
gages with text 
in Dasein. 
3. The body is a 
mode which be-
comes the medi-
ative function 
with the world, 
reflecting on 
prereflective 
experiences. 
There is an al-
ready larger 
reality of 
meaning before 
the textual en-
gagement. 
Meaning occurs 
in the in 
between of rea-
der and text. 
4. Reflexivity 
Mode. 
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4. The reader and 
text remain in-
complete until 
they together 
engage in the 
circle of re-
flection. How-
ever the not-
yet-complete 
circle resides 
in a greater to-
tality of past, 
present, future 
constantly invo-
king a recipro-
cal reinterpre-
tation of the 
world. 
The reflexivity 
of understanding 
(Verstehen) and 
feeling (Bef ind-
lichkeit) leads 
to interpreta-
tion (Ausle-
gyng). 
Reflexivity oc-
curs in language 
which in fact 
predates the 
subjectivity of 
reader/author. 
4. The focus is on 
temporality and 
reflecting on 
prereflective 
experiences. 
The perceptual 
circular deter-
mination is 
when the reader 
as perceiving 
perceptible en-
gages in a mu-
tual compene-
tration with 
the world. 
This reflexi-
vity constantly 
restructures 
the reader and 
text's con-
sciousness. 
The visible and 
"invisible" is 
necessary for 
constructing 
new meaning. 
5. Production of 
meaning/inter-
pretation. 
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5. Production of 
meaning is pos-
sible in terms 
of historicity 
(in the circle, 
and illumina-
tion of 
showing (Zeige) 
Interpretation 
starts with see-
ing (phenomeno-
logy) but takes 
a hermeneutic 
turn and the 
hermeneutic ho-
lism becomes on-
tology where the 
reader constant-
ly engages in a 
reciprocal rein-
terpretation of 
the world. 
(Auslegung) . 
5. Production of 
meaning is a 
constant strug-
gle, producing 
meaning on the 
reverse side of 
what the text 
actually de-
picts. 
Continual re-
structuring and 
readjustment 
towards inter-
pretation. 
The multipli-
city of rela-
tionships with-
in the circular 
reflexivity 
(chiasm) faci-
litates a see-
ing of all 
sides. This new 
ontology of re-
versibility 
hinges in the 
in-between of 
subject/object, 
consciousness/ 
being. 
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5.2.1.2 HERMENEUTIC READING 
1. 
2 . 
Hermeneutic 
point of 
departure. 
Mode of 
consciousness 
GADAMER'S UNIVERSAL RICOEUR'S METHODIC 
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
HERMENEUTICS 
1. Being in-this-
world is in 
pursuit of 
truth; a truth 
which is bent 
on gaining 
deeper self-
understanding. 
All under-
standing is 
linguistic and 
all language is 
interpretation, 
mediated by the 
past, present 
and future. 
2. Language is all 
consciousness. 
Language is sub-
j ecti vi ty. It 
is not objecti-
fied but rather 
speaks to us; it 
is a priori and 
as such is a 
mode of being 
qua meaningful 
understanding. 
1. The subject is 
a thinking, re-
flective sub-
ject grounded 
in temporality, 
who first has 
to lose him-
self in order 
to find him-
self. 
Self-under-
standing is not 
found but 
should be dis-
covered via 
language as an 
appropriate and 
mediative force 
2. It is in lan-
guage that the 
subject experi-
ences being. 
This immediate 
experience in 
language has 
another (fur-
ther) dimen-
sion, viz that 
of the media-
tion for self-
understanding. 
Through distan-
ciation and the 
reconstruction 
of the text the 
reader disco-
vers himself. 
3. Mediative 
function and 
meaning. 
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3. Mediation occurs 
where the sub-
ject places him-
self in a tradi-
tion (circle) 
where past, pre-
sent and future 
fuse. Effec-
tive-history 
(Wirkungsge-
schichte) is the 
dialectic be-
tween openness 
and tradition. 
Language ope-
rates through 
history and by 
resuscitation 
prejudice (Vor-
urteil) we me-
diate an aware-
ness of self and 
others. 
Language assists 
the mediation 
process in terms 
of past and pre-
sent, giving ex-
pression to 
meaning. 
3. Mediation oc-
curs in terms 
of two dimen-
sion of lan-
guage. The 
subject disco-
vers himself 
indirectly via 
signs and sym-
bols; but lan-
guage is also 
ontological 
through appro-
priation. Lan-
guage is dis-
tanciation (in-
direct) and 
through appro-
priation the 
reader renders 
the alien and 
unfamiliar, 
familiar and 
understandable. 
Language appro-
priates meaning 
which already 
exists. 
The reader also 
creates meaning 
through imagi-
native varia-
tions of the 
world. The 
latter offers 
him new ways of 
seeing. Imagi-
nation offers 
mediation 
rather than 
content. 
4. Reflexivity 
Mode. 
346 
4. The subject 
realizes its 
essence in lan-
guage by placing 
itself in a tra-
dition where 
past, present 
and future fuse. 
This reflexive 
mode is histori-
cal when my pre-
judice (Vorur-
teil) i.e. who I 
am is recipro-
cated with the 
newness of 
otherness in the 
text. 
The continuing 
chain of time is 
effected in lan-
guage when the 
self comes into 
contact with the 
other (fusion of 
horizons). 
The fusion is 
for self-under-
standing. 
The hermeneutic 
circle is his-
torical, i.e. 
placing myself 
in a tradition 
of dialecticism 
between openness 
and tradition. 
4. Distanciation, 
as a hermeneu-
tic method is 
effected in 
language when 
the reading is 
followed by de-
layed or media-
ted action for 
a meaning that 
already exists. 
Language de-
ploys indica-
tors such as 
pronouns (self-
referential) to 
enhance the 
process of ap-
propriation, 
i.e. making 
what is foreign 
/alien, one's 
own. 
The hermeneutic 
arch is tem-
poral, i.e. 
grounding an 
already exis-
ting meaning of 
my own expe-
rience. 
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5. Production of 5. The Wirkungsge- 5. The reader does 
meaning Linter- schichte (effec- not "produce" 
:gretation. tive-history) any meaning but 
becomes the pro- rather under-
ductive frame- goes a process 
work of new pos- himself by 
sibilities for "bringing to-
understanding. gether" in the 
hermeneutic 
Language becomes arch the text 
the breeding and his lived 
ground for a experience. 
dialogue between 
past and present Through imagi-
for interpre- nation and ap-
tation which is propriation he 
also self- renders cont em-
understanding. porary that 
which is alien 
and effects 
self-under-
standing. 
5.3 THE ORIENTATION OF THE NEW MASTERS TOWARDS READING. 
Chapter 4 marks the attempts of the new masters who seek to 
critically subvert the assumptions of the old pioneers, who 
despite their major progress since Descartes and Kant, still 
operate in very definite categories of "subject" and "object". 
The pioneers seem to be trapped in the dilemma of a clear 
circular position of subject and object which is manifestly 
concretized in-this-world. The new masters cast radical 
suspicion on their predecessors by going back to Nietzsche and 
usher us into perspectives of post-structuralism and even post-
modernism where the very reference to the notions of "subject" 
and "object" are radically questioned. Whereas the pioneers had 
been successful in highlighting the reflexivity of the textual 
object, Eco, Lotman, Barthes, Derrida and Lacan emphasize the 
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notion of plural texts in order to subvert a single monolithic 
or continuous meaning. The emergence of "plural text" occur 
differently for the respective authors. Essentially it has to 
do with questioning and negating the notions of "subject" and 
"object", and the legitimacy of language, particularly with 
Barthes, Derrida and Lacan. The plurality of meaning implies 
that a text is not read as "a" representation of reality but 
rather as productive discourse which results in meaning which is 
irreducible to any object or event. It is only Eco and Lotman, 
who seem to be the "transitional thinkers" to the new masters 
because their endless semiosis pursues a systemic reading within 
the signs of cultural and historical codes, but ultimately these 
are mediated via "intertextual power" (Eco) and the dynamic 
process of "creolizing" (Lotman) the text. 
In their respective ways Barthes, Derrida and Lacan pursue an 
approach to the reading act as a rather vulnerable enterprise in 
which meanings are produced, subverted, validated but also 
displaced. Lacan, in a dramatic way, evacuates meaning from the 
external "void" of the unconscious. The notion of "chaos" seems 
to gain greater momentum with the new masters. The idea of 
plural texts assumes therefore a different nuance in Eco and 
Lotman's semiotics, than is the case in Barthes and Derrida's 
writing as deconstruction and displacement, and as is ultimately 
in Lacan's "emptiness" in psycho-analytical reading. In terms 
of a schematic way of unpacking their subversion of the old 
masters, we may look at their assumptions in terms of: 
point of departure 
mode of consciousness 
mediative function and meaning 
plural textuality 
production of meaning/interpretation. 
5.3.1 
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READING BASED ON PLURAL TEXTS, TOWARDS IRREDUCIBLE 
MEANING. 
5.3.1.1 SEMIOTIC READING 
1. 
2. 
Semiotic 
point of 
departure 
Mode of 
consciousness 
ECO'S STRATEGIC 
SEMIOTICS 
1. All human acti-
vity resides in 
a "semiotic pro-
file" which is 
entrenched in 
cultural proces-
ses of communi-
cation. These 
processes are 
important for 
their communi-
cative value. 
2. Semiotic con-
sciousness is 
characterised by 
the interplay of 
disruptive so-
cial, cultural 
and philological 
codes/subcodes 
which lead to 
either closed or 
open readings of 
a text. 
LOTMAN'S CULTURAL 
SEMIOTICS 
1. Semiotics and 
humankind pre-
suppose each 
other, emphasi-
zing the inter-
action between 
text, language 
and culture. 
Every system 
whose aim it is 
to communicate 
is regarded as 
language. 
2. Man's con-
sciousness is a 
linguistic con-
sciousness upon 
which all se-
condary model-
ling systems 
are construc-
ted. Semiotic 
systems are 
part of these 
constructions. 
Conflict and 
disruption oc-
cur when the 
"noise" between 
semantics and 
phenology is 
eliminated. 
3. Mediative 
function/ 
meaning 
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3. Open texts, 
which are go-
verned by lexi-
cal and syntac-
tical codes act 
as nodes or 
joints to medi-
ate ("mirror") 
to the model 
reader how he 
should construct 
meaning. Textual 
mirrors (not in 
representational 
manner) assist 
readers to make 
connections in a 
continuous pro-
cess of coming 
and going. 
The author is 
dead but his 
traces are there 
in the form of 
modes and signs 
to mediate new 
meanings. 
3. The actual text 
is a framework 
of codes and 
subcodes. What 
really facili-
tates mediation 
if the "Extra-
text" , i . e . the 
embodiment of 
historically 
determined 
codes which are 
enshrined in 
the reader's 
linguistic con-
sciousness. 
Flexibility ex-
ists in coding/ 
sub-coding to 
render access 
to extra-tex-
tual relations 
easier. 
The reader's 
extra text and 
the authors 
codes have to 
be dissimilar 
in order to fa-
cilitate the 
decipherment of 
their signali-
zations. 
4. 
5. 
Plural 
textuality 
Production of 
meaning/in-
terpretation 
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4. The critical 
reader creates 
new open texts 
by overcoding 
his own personal 
codes, for books 
always speak of 
other books and 
every story that 
has already been 
told. 
The plurality of 
texts is embed-
ded in inter-
texts based on 
what the text 
that is read 
speaks of. 
5. The model reader 
(a logical ra-
ther than psy-
chological con-
struct) produces 
meaning when he 
lets the text 
speak about its 
own semiotic 
strategy. This 
dialectical "ex-
changed" (inter-
preted) process 
for the meaning 
occurs in terms 
of the reader's 
own internal 
"ensemble of 
codes". This is 
the only way the 
reader creates 
freely for his 
own being. 
4. The reader has 
to deal with a 
complex syste-
matic network 
of extra-tex-
tual connec-
tions. Many 
texts may be 
"creolized" 
creating many 
individual 
texts. 
The greater the 
dissonance the 
more individual 
a text. The 
reader con-
stantly recodi-
fies in that he 
imposes his own 
extra text in a 
creative way. 
5. Oppositional 
relationships 
between the 
reader and au-
thor are re-
sponsible for 
creating mean-
ing. Beyond 
conflictual re-
lationship the 
intersection 
between the au-
thor and rea-
der's differen-
ces meaning is 
produced. This 
intersection is 
the ontological 
tight rope for 
the reader. 
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5.3.1.2 LACAN'S PSYCHO-ANALYTIC READING. 
1. Point of 
departure. 
1. 
2. Mode of 2. 
consciousness 
There is no pre-discursive reality. 
The Lacanian libido ("scopic drive") 
entails Desire which is not a 
pleasure-seeking drive but one that 
is linked to a signifying system. 
All reality is founded in discourse -
based on reciprocal signification, 
i.e. the person can look at an object 
or text and the object/text can look 
at/grasp the person. The ensuing 
subject of the "look" (Gaze) is 
nothing more than a function of 
speech. 
It is a consciousness of the 
unconscious. As it is only language 
which exists, there is a lack of 
being. All seeing has already been 
determined by images. 
All consciousness is rooted in 
Desire. In the mirror stage the 
reader perceives his image - an image 
which is still lacking. The 
consciousness of the mirror stage, 
which is experienced all the time, 
holds together a picture that the 
reader projects and desires. 
This leads to difference and 
alienation. By modelling himself in 
terms of the Other, the alienated 
self consciously experiences a 
fictitious sense of a unified 
selfhood, seeking something he can 
identify with. 
3. Mediative 
Function/ 
Meaning. 
4. Plural 
textuality. 
3 . 
4 . 
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Meaning resides in the gap and in 
Desire. In the mirror stage of 
narcissism, language becomes the very 
basis of mediation. However language 
operates indirectly, for direct 
access to reality is not possible. 
Language is empty and only functions 
in terms of a potentiality endless 
process of searching for meanings. 
The signifier does not embody the 
carrier of meaning. The signified 
slides beneath the signifier and 
resists the subject's attempts to 
locate/delimit meaning. 
There is no fixed text, for meaning 
evolves to conceal a gap - the gap of 
the unconsciousness where repressed 
meanings dwell in Desire. Plural 
texts are produced in the endless 
process of signification in the 
signifying chain. Texts are produced 
as vantage-points, likened to 
upholstery studs on the taut canvas 
of life. 
5. Production of 5. 
Meaning/ 
Interpretation 
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The production of meaning adheres in 
the unconscious signifying chain. 
The reader constructs/produces mental 
experiences inside himself in terms 
of his unconscious. This is achieved 
by way of pictures he projects 
outside himself. This circular 
process is the "anti-representa-
tional" basis where neither social 
conditions nor internal feelings 
dominate. This intra-subjective 
production is achieved in the 
unconscious. 
Assisted by the Law of the Father 
(the cultural context) , the subject 
is ushered into the symbolic order. 
This achievement of being and 
therefore subjectivity occurs in the 
dialectical network of narrative 
desire - producing an ongoing process 
of plural significations. 
The signifying chain is likened to 
rings in a necklace, a self-
perpetuating imperative that propels 
the endless interpretative practice. 
The latter signifies true being in 
the Symbolic Order of language and 
culture where being succeeds language 
in the converging point where all 
lines of discourse cross. 
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5.3.1.3 WRITING AND DISPLACEMENT IN BARTHES AND DERRIDA. 
1. Point of 
departure. 
BARTHES'S STRUCTU-
RATION OF WRITING. 
1. Barthes chal-
lenges langua-
ges. All lan-
guage signs are 
myths which 
freeze speech 
and make things 
look natural and 
innocent. Pur-
suing any under-
standing means 
unmasking these 
myths. 
DERRIDA'S 
GRAMMATOLOGY. 
1. Derrida chal-
lenges language. 
Language signs 
are without 
truth, f ounda-
tion, beginning 
or end. This 
means a restart 
to destroy or 
deconstruct con-
ventional meta-
physics, includ-
ing the notion 
of text, lan-
guage, author 
and reader. 
2. Mode of 
consciousness. 
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2. Consciousness 
and subjectivity 
are imaginary 
concepts. Au-
thors and rea-
ders are plural 
"subjectivities" 
so that both 
entities embody 
nothing else by 
a plurality of 
codes approach-
ing the text is 
already a plura-
lity of codes 
and other texts. 
Everything is 
plurality and 
flux which has 
already begun 
before the rea-
der reads. The 
reader merely 
enters this pro-
cess by inter-
weaving and 
braiding fami-
liar voices/ 
codes into his 
writing. 
2. Consciousness 
and subjectivity 
are fallacious 
concepts. There 
is nothing out-
side the texts. 
All that exists 
are textual 
signs or traces 
which maintain 
an inarticulate 
presence. 
In fact, traces 
have their own 
subjectivity in 
relation to 
other traces, in 
the text and not 
before the text. 
3 . Mediative 
function/ 
meaning. 
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3. Writing is our 
only form of me-
diation, not in 
a harmonious way 
but in a disrup-
tive way. 
The text in it-
self has no 
meaning but by 
unmasking the 
myths in the 
text the reader 
rewrites his own 
text. There is 
no pre-existing 
text but by per-
sonally re-crea-
ting the text 
the reader cre-
ates his own 
ontological 
space during 
writing. 
The function of 
signif iers is 
not that of sub-
jectivity but 
the result of 
the constant 
flow of writing. 
This "interpre-
tation" of tex-
tual codes is 
mediated by the 
use of hermeneu-
tic, symbolic, 
cultural, proai-
retic and semic 
codes - a con-
vergence of 
voices in wri-
ting. 
3. The sign is all 
that is - in the 
text, in circu-
lation and 
transforming the 
text where no 
meaning can be 
pinned down. 
There is no real 
"mediative" pro-
cess but rather 
a displacement 
process. Dis-
placement embo-
dies a dislod-
ging of the sys-
tem through the 
process of de-
construction - a 
process which is 
neither present 
nor absent. 
Deconstruction 
therefore does 
not mediate, it 
obviates the 
process of dif-
ferance which 
is not an active 
or passive pro-
cess but a pro-
ductive tempori-
zation or spac-
ing of textual 
traces. Writing 
is only con-
fronted with 
writing and no 
cultural or any 
other intuitive 
enterprise. 
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4. Plural 4. Every step is 4. The displacement 
textuality. from the outset process is dis-
already a plura- seminationary in 
lity of codes that it inter-
and other texts. rupts and "scat-
As writing is ters" the text. 
primary, the 
decentered sub- This discontinu-
ject acquieces ity and fragmen-
into the play of tariness of the 
signif iers where broken text is a 
off-stage codes plural text 
(cultural, sym- which also po-
bolic, etc.) tentially be-
"star" the text comes an erased 
into multiple text. The mul-
writings and un- tiplicity of 
derstandings. "meaning" is em-
bedded within 
the horizon of 
grouping/gather-
ing of textual 
traces. 
5. Production of 
Meaning/Inter-
pretation. 
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5. Writerley texts 
are produced as 
a result of the 
infinite play of 
signifiers. The 
texts, written 
by the reader 
are reversible 
(no beginning 
nor end) . 
"Interpretation" 
is not an act on 
the subject's 
part but a means 
of multiple wri-
tings being un-
ravelled. 
As a plural sub-
ject the birth 
of the reader/ 
writer acquieces 
into the func-
tioning of sig-
nif iers. The 
plaisir/pleasure 
of reading helps 
to interrupt the 
plural produc-
tion of the text 
5. Since there is 
nothing outside 
the text, writ-
ing produces 
its own writing. 
Dissemination 
obviates hete-
rogeneity and 
multiplicity 
through the in-
terplay of 
traces. 
Dif f erance as-
sists with the 
productive pro-
cess of "opening 
up" the text in 
an indirect way. 
This "produc-
tion" is only a 
disentanglement 
through, erasure 
and creation. 
The reader mere-
ly follows the 
grammata of wri-
ting - a shift-
ing process 
which eludes 
certainty and 
stability. 
Having gleened the analysis of the orientations of the pioneering 
as well as the new masters, above, in terms of the modes of 
reflexivity and production, we have become aware of reoriented 
frames of reference which hope to transcend the notion of reading 
as a mere conventional modality for communication. The 
postulation of the reflexivity and production analysis expresses 
an extension of the relation between theory and practice of 
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discourses which seek to create other and more meaning. This 
concern of theory and practice, in this study, wants to highlight 
the determining (as well as non- or undetermining)effects of the 
subject' s entry into the realm of meaning construction. The 
interdependence of language and subjectivity, in terms of an 
integrative approach of all the theorists in this study, takes 
on an almost universal equivalence in which subjectivity is 
linguistic. The epistemological and ontological implications of 
this hold significant developments and conclusions in terms of 
what we may draw from Chapters 3 and 4, for they deal, albeit 
differently, with the uncertainty of the assumed authority of 
reading, the implications of the "other side" of reading, the 
written and unwritten text, and what will be the effects of 
restructuring reading. 
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5.4 THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE AUTHORITY OF READING. 
In the context of this study it may be said that every object 
modifies its reader in as much as every reading modifies its 
object, but what emerges from our previous chapters on reading 
is that the entire act of meaning construction entails certainly 
much more than that. It has become evident that the reader can 
take neither the position of the author, nor solely its own 
position, for what gets "invented" or "produced" in our reading 
engagements with texts is more often than not something different 
from what had been "intended". Ultimately there cannot be any 
"common concerns" shared by reader, author and text. 
The major battles between alternative readings of texts, vis-a-
vis representational/literal readings, seem like battles of what 
is regarded as important and how such readings subsequently 
occur. The question of what is really important in reading will 
only come to prominence when it is suggested that one reader has 
been "successful" in a task at which other readers have "failed" 
the task of "authoritatively" representing the text more 
accurately than other readers have represented it, according to 
some agreed-upon scheme of projection. In particular it suggests 
that, that reader has succeeded in representing what the text 
really is about. 
The problematization then of this uncertainty of meaning 
construction has been evidenced in the notions of "representation 
of" and "interpretation as". At various stages and levels, this 
study moves increasingly away from the assumptions of pristine 
simplicity and naivety of the idea of pure representation in 
reading - a sense of reading which is not only altogether lost 
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in our complex social interactions but in fact becomes dangerous, 
insensitive, short-sighted and in many cases quite ludicrous. 
Even the dubious notion that a "fair" or "faithful" 
interpretation may be found wanting and fraught with endless 
difficulties of how meaning is produced. Literacy and competence 
of language use, is but one example. From the young pre-school 
child to the most advanced scientist or astute politician, for 
example, reading is preceded, and in complex ways facilitated by, 
oral and visual communication, which constitute the multifarious 
"authority" that texts invariably never cite. Manguel (1995: 6-7) 
states: 
"The astronomer reading a map of stars that 
no longer exist; the Japanese architect 
reading the land on which a house is to be 
built so as to guard it from evil forces; 
the zoologist reading the spoor of animals 
in the forest; the card player reading her 
partner's gestures before playing the 
winning card; the dancer reading the 
choreographer's notations .. the Hawaiian 
fisherman reading the ocean currents by 
plunging a hand into the water; the farmer 
reading the weather in the sky - all these 
share with book-readers the craft of 
deciphering and translating signs. . . And 
yet, in every case, it is the reader who 
reads the sense ... We all read ourselves and 
the world around us in order to glimpse what 
and where we are. We read to understand, or 
to begin to understand. We cannot do but 
read." 
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If we read in order to begin to understand, an essential function 
of such reading would challenge another essential question of how 
we read, for no matter how well we claim to read on the level of 
following the rules of language, we ultimately remain "at sea" 
in terms of what meaning is given or derived from texts (of all 
sorts). Given all the risk involved, what we as readers, do know 
is that we have invested (time, energy, focus, pleasure, moods, 
intelligence) in a text, but what we do not know is what else has 
been invested (by whomever or whatever), along that path of 
meaning construction. Our study evidences that all constructing 
of meaning has also brought about various dimensions of 
restructuring by way of various modes of production. In the 
complex processes of all significant (and not so significant) 
interactions, we certainly do not just remain docile consumers. 
Reading restructuring, as we assume it to occur in the reading 
act, 
this 
implies changes, reorganization and transformation. It is 
uncertainty which pervades our reading and which 
necessitates the constant restructuring of reading. 
Most texts in contemporary society attempt to facilitate 
communication flows, images, messages, networks and the like -
all being potentially interactive. With regard to the 
technological revolutions and information flow (and explosion) 
in our day and age, Castells (1989:1) poses the challenge: 
"The unfolding promise of information 
technology opens up unlimited horizons of 
creativity and communication, inviting us to 
the exploration of new domains of 
experience, from our inner selves to the 
outer universe, challenging our societies to 
engage in a process of structural change". 
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Therefore, the "new domains of experience" that are inevitably 
precipitated by how we read, locationally, cannot reside in the 
investment of accurate representationalism and the mere readable 
space (literality) - hence the uneasy and uncertain disposition 
of reading. This study has clearly demonstrated the various 
kinds of theoretical assistance offered in the thinking of 
significant theorists, of liberating reading from its crisis of 
its representational inertia. 
The challenge is liberating reading from pure representationalism 
and to transform the limiting, sterile implications of the 
objectification and direct "sentential reading" (Meyer, 1983) of 
a text, in which the reader is likely to construct and ultimately 
consume meaning contained a text. The niggling question is 
whether information and meaning are crystallized in books, data 
banks, files and documents - or whether they float elsewhere. 
This "elsewhere" of meaning construction seems to become the 
bedrock of "unfreezing" the text from the totalizing and 
hegemonic attempts of readers, whether for personal, social or 
political gain. Complex transformations occur in the process -
the origins of which we cannot often fathom. 
Any adequate understanding of "where else meaning resides" and 
is being constantly defined, and moreover how such meaning gets 
constructed, tends to inform our views of a "theory" of reading. 
This "technical" postulation of a theory also entails an entire 
ever-expanding spectrum of other assumptions, eg. which habitual 
assumptions compound our understanding of language, subjectivity 
and representation. Against the bleak background of viewing the 
otherwise rich texture of the reading act in a productive 
informational society, as a one-way process of meaning-
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construction, would seem to be rooted in the fickle endeavours 
of the reader to solidify a sense of coherence, objectivity and 
accuracy. This is a position this study wishes to dethrone. 
This daring task of the restructuring of reading has very much 
to do with whether reading (as opposed to decoding or 
interpretation) is not perhaps, inherently, confusing, and 
therefore allowed its status and "domain" to blossom without 
reading itself. To begin with, there transpires a need to engage 
in the restructuring of reading which seems to occur beyond only 
"using" certain elements of representation, to integrate other 
productive elements too in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
reading. This process starts with reflecting on the 
indispensable "other side" of reading, as has been inc·reasingly 
and ultimately radically "propagated" by the new masters. 
5.5 THE "OTHER SIDE" OF READING. 
The "labyrinth of interrogation" in reading (Freund, 1987:6) has 
become critical in order to challenge the limited and sterile 
tendency of objectification which adheres in the direct or 
sentential reading (Meyer, 1983) of a text. Information 
ultimately seems not just to exist in texts but rather inhabits 
the "experience" whereby the symbols in the text, document or 
file are transformed into experience and action in and amongst 
people (see Bunch, 1990). On the one hand, information 
potentially seems to have either an informing or reinforcing 
effect on what is generally known, or believed to be known by the 
reader, or on the other, it may transform and alter (McGarry, 
1981) . 
It is clear that the persistence of specialization of information 
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in different fields is inevitably always exchanged with, or 
transformed by the outer world, and is not merely received by a 
consuming subject as typified in the decodification act. The 
"ability" or potential of information to be read 
transformationally and in a programmed way, lies at the very 
heart of understanding blanks, spaces, margins, i.e. enabling the 
"other side" of reading to speak. It is by acknowledging this 
emptiness and absence in reading which leads to creative 
modification and change in the material basis of things and the 
development of the entire social organization of our age. 
The significance of the reading act in terms of reading the 
"other side", is best illustrated with the example of whether the 
reading of fairy-tales, which is supposedly regarded to be open 
to the interpretive delights or fears of the reader, is at all 
tenable. It would appear that the productive dynamics of the 
reading act, or whatever type of document or writing, be they 
policy documents, minutes of meetings, advertisements, poetry, 
laws, sermons or detective stories, potentially precipitate what 
can be regarded as conflicting readings - eluding the idea of a 
placidly totalized, complete and homogeneous view of 
"interpretation" and "meaning". Even if the meaning of "meaning" 
in these documents "naturally" elude readers, to what extent do 
such readers fall back upon their own attitudes, experience and 
language or their disagreements about language which may reflect 
deeper disagreements in world-views (Thurley, 1983). This has 
become evident in the different shades of accents of reading with 
regard to phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstructionism, psycho-
analysis, post-structuralism, in this study. 
The outcomes of the critical restructuring dynamics of reading 
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have proven to be theoretically inconclusive and ongoing. The 
validity of the homogenising effects of literal reading discourse 
is recognized but given its logical, rule-guided nature, we need 
to beckon "another side of language" which could possibly deal 
with the uncontrollable or the unknown dimension of reading 
which seeks to eschew pre-selected meaning in the text. This 
theoretically inconclusive "other side" of meaning in the reading 
act is what usually escapes or eludes the literal consumptive 
passage of information between subject and object. This moreover 
has meant that there is possibly "more" to the reading act than 
is involved in the decodification or decipherment of a text and 
that this "more" or "other" dimension of reading is not 
necessarily predictable, obvious and patent in its content, and 
therefore readily accessible - which confirms our suspicion that 
the reading act requires that we engage our discourses with that 
which is either under the surface of words or does not exist in 
the text at all. 
The fundamental significance of reshaping our organizations, 
policies, governance etc. has also deeply modified our new ways 
of thinking, even if no precedent existed. This vulnerable, yet 
exciting challenge of constantly setting new precedents implies 
critically addressing the written (objective) as well as the 
unwritten (absent) text. The written text as "hard content" is 
normally taken to be the literal dimension of the text which is 
usually controllable by the reader in terms of the recognition 
of words, their use and their social meanings. The unwritten or 
absent textual content tends usually to be uncontrollable and 
therefore problematic to the reader in so far as there are no 
actual content, object or word which guides the reader's attempts 
in meaning construction. 
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The "other side" of reading is not usually complementary to the 
visible, readable text either. This uncontrollable, "unreadable" 
variant text (Felman, 1977:143) is that other side which the 
reading act has to "produce" (as opposed to consume) in order to 
develop a more comprehensive or even alternative or variant 
meaning of the text. It is the creative significance of this 
"other side" which thinkers in Chapters 3 & 4 attempted to 
demonstrate in order to escape the constricting impasse of 
unilateral extraction of content from text into the head of the 
reader. In the reading act the structurally determined capacity 
of letting the text be "processed" (whether by itself, myself or 
ourselves), generates innovative knowledge, productivity, 
economic, social and personal development. This process is 
however dependent upon, and superseded by, the constant luring 
by and convergence of the unwritten text in meaning construction. 
It is not the intersection or the hierarchization of the two 
texts but rather the lure of the difference in orientation 
towards continuous, different readings - which precipitates the 
"uncontrollable multiplicity of ambiguities" (Johnson, 1987: 156) . 
5.5.1 THE ORIENTATION OF THE WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN TEXT IN 
MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
It has become sufficiently clear in this study that reading a 
text and a reading of a text need not be equivalent: the latter 
may consist in a selection in whichever way or a restructuring 
of the readings obtained from the text. Therefore, in terms of 
the competitiveness of meanings or the plurality of different 
readings that a text structures, i.e. a single text generates, 
there seems to emerge at least two texts present in any reading 
of a text, i.e. the written ("contained" in language, in the 
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text) and the unwritten text (the reader's inference and 
interpretation) . The niggling question is whether the separation 
of the written and unwritten text isn't an unnecessary 
distinction, and therefore making the barriers between them 
superfluous so that the reader essentially resides inside the 
text in as much as the text insides the reader? (Poulet, 1980: 
42) - a position that subverts the deeply-rooted oppositional 
stance of text as object and reader as subject. 
Although all textual reading occurs through language, it does not 
imply that the robotization of language adheres in some sterile 
conceptual realm. Language, besides facilitating a medium for 
meaning construction, action and purpose, undeniably also shapes 
that social and personal action and purpose. We are radically 
challenged by the unreadable space of the unwritten text which 
inscribes a "labour of production" according to Barthes and, 
which essentially demands that the reader must start to "write" 
himself, i.e .... add something to the text in order to read it" 
(Scholes, 1989: 5) . The emerging deregularized nature of "other 
side" of the text must be "produced" or written either by the 
subject, or by the object which reads. We moreover realise that 
texts, which are usually written in a particular way, invariably 
influence the detour process of production and de-territorializes 
the outcome of that reading. We may, for example, consider a 
reading which is related to some industrial and labour or 
environmental and a scientific conflict. 
The question is what conceals or constitutes the unwritten text 
and how is it concealed or shaped? If an environmental group 
distributes pamphlets, the essence of which protests against the 
mining of kaolin in an environmentally sensitive area, are they 
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merely protesting or are they informing and educating at the same 
time? If a trade union disseminates information about an unfair 
dismissal of workers, are they not at the same time making an 
economic and political statement? While it seems that the notion 
of the "text" is caught up in the dilemma of the "reading" and 
the "writing" act, we come to realize that the "text" in fact 
merely becomes a textual space or methodological hypothesis, 
("Knot of discourses") (De Bolla, 1989: 322) i.e. a de-totalizing 
and de-territorializing strategy which cuts across the crude 
traditional distinction of reading and writing, for: 
"The problem is not to move from the notion 
of writing to that of reading, nor from a 
theory of literature to a theory of reading. 
The problem consists in changing the level 
at which the "literary object" is perceived, 
in other words, in changing the level of 
perception so that writing and reading are 
conceived and defined together" 
1979:39). 
(Harari, 
This articulation of "changing perspectives or levels of seeing", 
underscores the need to restructure the opposition between 
"subject" and "object", as demonstrated in Chapters 2 & 3. The 
redistributive space between the written and unwritten text 
inevitably falls within the "multiple determination" framework 
of meaning construction (Ricoeur, 1974), which suggests that 
meaning must be emancipated in the act of synthesis, interaction 
and deletion, i.e. unmooring it from the scriptural place. 
The sovereign subject therefore would appear to no longer be the 
sole controller or designer of meaning, but rather that the text 
articulates its own practice as a reader. It is however the case 
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that the usual notion of texts as objects and humans as subjects 
may be different in their restructured orientation or how they 
are perceived, and this reading inevitably precipitates chaos or 
conflict in the reading act. Despite the insistence of 
hermeneutics that there should be meaning, Kristeva (1990) argues 
that there need not be any meaning at all. The fervent need for 
or pursuit of meaning appears merely the subject's need to 
reassure the self. But any wider and transformational reading 
which occurs between, among and beyond subject and object in a 
chaotic or a "non-linear" fashion, creatively exacerbates 
inevitable conflict in terms of what Lecercle (1990: 5) refers 
to as the "proliferation of chaos" - i.e a discursive space that 
is necessary for multiple perspectives in meaning construction. 
5.6 THE CELEBRATION OF CONFLICTUAL READING FOR INFINITIZATION 
OF MEANING. 
In this study our reconceptualization of the mutually 
transformative and conditioning effects of subject and object in 
the construction of meaning, could imply that interpretation can 
potentially never be brought to an end. This emerging 
inf initization of interpretation may moreover impact on another 
interpretation and another interpretation " ... within the system 
of discourse" (Ormiston + Schrift, 1990: 17). This appeal to 
reading, which is more than comprehension, would prove to hold 
the inevitable possibility of conflict between the subject and 
the object or one reading and another reading in discourse. The 
violent rupture of the "smooth surface" of the literal or 
reciprocal reading, is creatively reading beyond the debilitating 
constraints of decodification which would entail a struggle 
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between the written and unwritten text. This requires the 
reshaping action of both subject and object as illustrated in 
Chapter 3 particularly, or a destratified dynamic which resides 
beyond the monopoly of polarity structures of subject-object, 
as illustrated in Chapter 4. 
It has become clear that it will not only be the crude efforts 
of a sovereign and stable subject who is " . . . in a profound 
struggle with the author" (Blanchot, 1982: 193) but also the 
assumptions that authors could potentially have direct access to 
their meaning, which speaks of an "illusion of freedom" (Spivak, 
1981: 673). These illusory assumptions could inevitably and 
quite rightly give rise to the conflict in reading. Malpas 
(1992: 137) argues that interpretation is not just a single 
representational, coherent dialogue involving a stable speaker 
and interpreter; it is a space of strange freedom, disguised by 
its obviousness in, "··· a process which in a sense comprises 
a number of dialogues: between speaker and interpreter; between 
the interpretive theory and other theories, between one's 
interpretation of her surroundings." These disguised and 
obscured discursive possibilities, all constitute infinite 
"oppositional narratives" (Chambers, 1991: 3) to unburden and 
unfreeze the rigidity of habitual relations and associations in 
the reading act, and produce an unpredictable plurality of 
meaning (Belsey, 1980: 52) . A wider depth of variety or 
different intensity of meanings and nuances is always likely to 
ensue by reading the written text or readable text also in terms 
of the interminable variant of the unwritten text or unreadable 
text. This means risking the accomplished controlling power of 
the subject and the divine, albeit violent, power of the word and 
search for affirmative spaces within and beyond other discursive 
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practices that may be implicated in reading discourse. 
The rupturous and critical assumptions of "conflictual 
interpretation" do not engage a negative or an unusual position 
as it would seem. For it is in the reconstructive act of 
interpretation that the endless transposition of meanings would 
be made clear, for 11 • • • there is nothing surprising in this: 
interpretation begins with the multiple determination of symbols" 
(Ricoeur, 1974: 14). The excessive multiplicity of meanings, 
moreover, as irreducible rereading, does not propose an arbitrary 
or wild construction of meaning either, but could only be reread 
within the "structure" or "traces" within which different 
readings may be possible. This dispersive, de-totalizing pursuit 
of multiple reading (which is the result of conflictual reading) 
could at the same time prove challenging in view of the fact that 
the reading act 11 opens the work by means of radical 
disjunction to the freedom of its communication 11 (Blanchot, 1982: 
197). This has been evidenced in the semiotic, post-structural 
and post-modernist reading discourses. It is this slit or 
disjunction of the reading subject and textual object, as well 
as a disjunction in each of them, which we risk "losing" if we 
revolutionize our reading practice. 
This disjunction in discourse, moreover, has meant the radical 
loss or dispossession of both subjectivity and representation as 
grounding features in knowledge-construction. The 
epistemological as well as ontological issues in reading have 
remained important but they seem to be read within another 
context, even if that context is a vacuum or a space of emptiness 
as Lacan suggested. The infinitization of meaning has ensured 
that "knowledge" does not itself summarily get authorized in 
"frozen" and "debilitating" reading and thus reinforcing the 
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hegemony of logical representationalism. 
The challenge of dispossessing the crude practice of the rational 
individuality of the subject who "uses" the text as some 
blueprint or recipe to construct meaning - a position which is 
perhaps nothing less than a reductive, naive and simplistic 
reading of a text. Escaping the "natural privileged slant" and 
"programming" bent of literal reading, we have examined why we 
have generally come to grossly underestimate {or perhaps 
overestimate) the status and abilities of the reading subject on 
the one hand, and the distorted servility of the textual object 
on the other. What has also become clear, in this study is that 
we cannot continue to enjoy the deceptive pleasure of considering 
texts as complete, final, usable or even replicable objects -
manipulated by sovereign subjects {De Beer, 1992; 1993; Iser, 
1978) This would be extremely foolish on the part of an all 
resourceful subject on the one hand, and obscuring and disguising 
the liberating potency of the text on the other. The creative 
orientations and outcomes of the restructuring of the reading act 
had opened up all conditions of influence, rather than myopically 
consolidating the austerity of the text or the subject. 
The extent of the discursive effects the reading act is 
"evident" by assessing to what degree the readable text of the 
resourceful reader becomes integrated, modified and transformed 
by the indispensible resourcefulness of the textual discourse. 
Ormiston and Schrift (1990: 4) speak of the overall "circulation" 
and "proliferation" of interpretations which ensue as a result 
of the subject and object encounter in modes of production and 
modes of rereading. The only sense of "stability" is constant 
change, resulting in the constantly restructured affirmation of 
layers and layers of interpretations. Both subject and object 
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"represent" a fiction, i.e. if we believed they were substantive 
and at the root of things. All that we can hope to have is to 
invoke a dispossessed "subject" or "object" which is ceaselessly 
modified and always tentative - allowing it to constantly change 
and transform perspectives of production. A particular 
perspective is but another perspective of another perspective ... , 
de-institutionalizing any monopoly of knowledge and meaning. We 
are to "smash language in order to touch life" (Lash, 1988: 322) . 
Therefore the decommodification and ultimate expropriation of 
language, subjectivity and representation has set us on a 
burgeoning course to celebrate reading as essentially rereading. 
At this critical juncture in the history of our society, the 
pseudo-fabric of "stable significations" in policy documents, new 
drafts/laws, the constitution, ministerial reports, 
intergovernmental treatises etc, need not necessarily depend on 
anything stable and as already present and cast in iron. Before 
any document or report is read by anyone, it has in fact already 
been read by everyone and it this present, preliminary reading 
which effectively only guarantees many more creative readings. 
The loss and dispossession of "final readings" attains its 
presence as merely a reading in a constantly restructured space, 
opened by this unique reading. Each time this reading manifests 
a first reading, and paradoxically, a rereading. This expansive 
framework of reading therefore assumes a refocused, and in fact, 
a restructured view of what reading had always become to be 
assumed - a discourse constantly in transformation of itself. 
5.7 REFOCUSING THE RESTRUCTURING OF READING. 
The rethinking of the act of reading (and the integration of 
other elements) and its inevitable concerns of language 
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subjectivity and representation, becomes part of what we believe 
can be the "imaginative project of reading" which this study had 
wished to pursue. We have sought to question whether the neatly-
packaged ingredients that we consider as "constituting" the 
reading act, is simply the only way or the most appropriate way 
to grasp and appreciate the potentially dynamic (reactionary) 
capacity of the reading act. Such an orientating exercise of 
questioning clearly starts with the very "nature" of the notion 
of "reading" itself. Barthes (1986: 34) in his usual astute 
approach admits his own confusion with regard to the nature of 
reading: 
11 as for a doctrine of reading, I have 
none; on the other hand, a doctrine of 
writing is gradually taking shape. This 
confusion sometimes goes so far as to become 
a doubt: I do not even know if one must 
have a doctrine of reading; I do not know if 
reading is not, constitutively, a plural 
field of scattered practices, of irreducible 
effects, and of, consequently, the reading 
of reading, meta-reading, is not itself 
merely a burst of ideas, of fears, of 
desires, of delights, of oppressions about 
which we should speak in fits and starts, 
blow by blow ... 11 
In terms of the envisaged restructuring process, one way out of 
the cul-de-sac of an accepted or pre-ordained doctrine of reading 
is to become aware that there may be other critical and creative 
pathways of reconceptualizing and exploring it, as illustrated 
in Chapters 3 & 4. These alternative and yet cumulative pathways 
have proven to be plural, scattered or even "chaotic", according 
to Barthes. This implies that reading may not be such an 
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unproblematic straightforward and harmonious exercise but rather 
one which requires altering through innovative application and 
productive energy to problematize the conflictual or chaotic 
assumptions. 
Botha (1992: 20) considers the possible interrelated or 
conflictual discourses in the reading act of restructuring which 
have come to "wage war over the word". This view of Botha seeks 
to invoke dis-content and to de-axiomatize the "naturalized" and 
neatly-packaged assumptions of language, functioning as a 
technical tool for precision to construct meaning, and even more 
so, challenging the failed attempts of the established, 
sovereign subject who acts as the sole knower who has dominion 
over the object (text) . This manifestly dangerous one-way 
representation of subject to object is inevitably in "warfare" 
(Botha) and which has resulted in nothing but disconfirming 
"hysteria" (Barthes) all powerful metaphors deployed to 
problematize easy acquiescence into meaning and grounded 
understanding. Readers no longer seem to be able to control or 
design the common-sense or scientific meaning of that which they 
read, for the destabilizing "violence" that may disrupt their 
efforts in terms of what the written or readable word 
(literality) carries, has serious consequences for the identity 
of the subject and his actions and reactions in the processes of 
production, consumption and management (of technology, science, 
industry etc) . 
Part of the refocusing and restructuring project of the reading 
act therefore . entails consciously seeking to inject the 
"proliferation of chaos" (Lecercle, 1990: 5) which constantly 
"awakens other voices" (Levinas in Greisch, 1991: 68) in any 
"normal" reading act. This problem-oriented challenge, viz., 
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that the other voices may be unreadable and non-transparent, is 
consistent with the realities of our social world. Our critical 
stance has been to problematize not solely the readable text but 
more particularly the unreadable text and its effects (Felman, 
1987: 45). In the dynamism of the reading act it may very well 
be that the competing realism of the readable and graspable 
language needs to be grasped in other terms than its 11 tool-kit 11 
status (plugged gaps) which tends to communicate messages which 
are "based on information". 
The representational practice of subject relating to object in 
the usual referential manner, needs to be disrupted in order to 
become more expansive and deregularized than just that which is 
read in the linguistic signs. This process of deregularization 
(from representation pursuits) would ensure a more realistic and 
integrated framework which "matches" the dynamism of reading. 
The status of reading subjects as controllers, definers, shapers 
or as "poachers and consumers" (De Certeau, 1995) had been 
reconsidered to "prevent 11 them from pouring meaning into cast 
iron. In vibrant, progressive societies, economies, government, 
business, places of learning and production workers stubbornly 
resist being moulded by the bland application of the letter. 
Risking, in the context of deskilling the reading act from its 
axiomatic assumptions, subjectivity and representation had been 
problematized in Chapters 3 & 4 to avoid sterilising and 
ultimately totalizing meanings, and therefore regarding reading 
as a mindless "consumptive" act (De Certeau, 1995) . This has been 
our aim, to prevent readers from hypothesizing themselves that 
they have "established" theories and veritable bodies of 
knowledge for control of personal, social, economic and political 
ascendancy. Our restructured framework of reading holds out the 
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promise, rather, of healthy theoretical "anarchy" wherein reading 
frameworks (of Chapter 3 and 4) are encouraged, and as a result 
innovative and synthetic forms of "theory" and research 
strategies in knowledge and meaning are produced. 
If Blanchet (1982: 194), in his radical way, asserts that the 
dynamism of reading does not produce anything and does not add 
anything, Levinas (in Greisch, 1991:68) goes even further in 
calling reading a "hypocritical enterprise" insofar as it only 
constitutes"··. the voice of a determinate text [which] awakens 
other voices." Blanchet and Levinas' views, with that of Felman 
(1987), seem challenging for this study in view of the innovative 
potential of knowledge production and research which we will be 
able to derive from the cross-fertilization of ideas from the 
different frameworks that have been postulated by the old and the 
new masters. The naive view that language potentially always 
privileges its representational aspect (however indirect it may 
happen) for mechanical replication, or hierarchization of 
knowledge, suggests the uncritical and often disempowering 
pattern of how ordinary people in our society today tend to 
operate, as pointed out by De Certeau (1995: 153): 
"Today, the text is society itself. It 
takes urbanistic, industrial, commercial or 
televised forms. But the mutation that 
caused the transition from educational 
archeology to the technocracy of the media 
did not touch the assumption that 
consumption is essentially passive an 
assumption that is precisely what should be 
examined" (own emphasis) . 
The centralizing act of objectification of the text or the 
"poaching" and "consumptive" status of reading (De Certeau, 
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1995), is the dominant paradigm of what Bakhtin (in Volosinov, 
1973) calls "· .. a sort of perversion entailed by the logic of 
an objectivist kind of thought". This form of perversion is a 
disposition in reading which is indicative of those who have been 
initiated into the ideologized practice of some "master" 
framework or perspective. Bourdieu (1987: 94) moreover 
problematizes this "perversion or illusion" by questioning 
whether anyone can "read anything at all" without wondering what 
it is that, that particular reading means, for "The precondition 
for every construction of an object is a tight control over your 
relationship, which is frequently an unconscious and obscure one, 
with the object that you are supposed to be constructing (many 
discourses) on the object being, in fact, merely projections of 
the objective relation from subject to object". 
The vibrant matrix of interactions in the reading act falls 
outside the scope and agenda of referential logic and its 
expansionary variations. Therefore, these expansionary 
variations, in Chapter 3 and 4 come into being in our 
restructured approach to reading, suggesting revolutionary 
displacements which have not yet been filled in, or "resolved" 
in some way which marks closure of meaning. 
The inevitable effects of this problem-posing of revolutionary 
displacement extend well beyond the credibility of 
"methodologies", for the widespread "identity crises" of readers, 
authors and effects of knowledge construction in our present-day 
society, affect everybody in many (and idiosyncratic) ways, and 
had called for a radical questioning and restructuring of our 
views of the almost crippling desire for identity, unity and 
totality, by insisting on the representational status of language 
to describe and define this. Bachelard (in Weber, 1987: x) 
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argues that objects and the dynamics of modern science are 
irreducible to any single grounded or unified set of suppositions 
and hence incompatible to any single one, self-identical reality, 
for the "complexity of the manifold reality of contemporary 
science renders the idea of autonomy inoperative". This 
restructured reading approach wants to break with this sense of 
domesticity which is bent on reproductive conventions. 
Autonomy may presuppose a sense of self-assurance and perhaps 
"infallibility" of meaning construction. What should be 
challenged seems to be the problematic relation of identity to 
non-identity, of inclusion to exclusion, and possibly making 
constructs "relational" rather than 
"constitutive", and making it as a 
"substantial" or 
result irreducibly 
heterogeneous in its "composition". This complex heterogeneity 
may possibly be the end of the "peace time routine" of reading 
which henceforth precipitates the onset of a variety of meanings 
with a variety of nuances to enrich our communication practices 
and, moreover, the quality of personal and social identities. 
Restructuring which involves constant surveillance of life and 
resistance to life's usual practices, brings about conflict, 
argument, debate, uncertainty, crisis and often periods of 
"muddling through". The latter becomes a daily experience in the 
world of high technology as well as ordinary routine practices 
of engaging in documents. This calls for an awareness of the 
limitations of a monolithic approach into the content of the 
document which is believed to be the "constitutive" text as 
object, and which is to be identified by reference to some 
intrinsic quality, i.e. its form. It's irreducible character is 
achieved rather in terms of its vibrant working and capacity to 
be deformed and transformed. Weber (1987: xiv) consequently 
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argues that: "It is the tension arising from these two 
indispensable, inseparable, and yet mutually disruptive 
exclusions [i.e. subjective/ objective] that results in the 
"strange ambivalence" that contemporary science imposes on the 
idea of reality". This creative-destructive "tension" would 
always be the propelling force for other and more meaning because 
the sovereign subject's entrenched disposition (from an outside 
position) to pour over the objective text (in its receiving 
status) to confer meaning, has been radi~ally challenged. The 
question remains, to what extent is the subject conditioned by 
the objects in his world, rather than always being consensus-
seeking and imposing stability on the effects of meaning 
construction? Personal orientation or interests notwithstanding, 
reading certainly cannot be a one-way referencing game of either 
consumption or control. 
The difficulty of the consensus-seeking representational 
dimension in the stultifying causal matrix of the reading act, 
had become a distinguishing challenge of all theoretical 
discourse which places "reading" in perpetual " tension with 
its primary purpose, that of delimiting an area of practice which 
it had set out to legislate. Thus, a good case could be made for 
claiming that "reading theory" is really a "misnomer" (De Bolla, 
1989: 233). This misnomer status of reading had been served as 
the very impetus of our theorists to pursue a new or even 
different approach for an integrated and ultimately more enriched 
framework to the reading act and knowledge construction. Such 
a proposed framework would be commensurate with the events and 
experiences of all contemporary local and global communities -
which all are indisputably marked by diversity, multiplicity and 
constant change. If reading is to be 11 in keeping" with our 
rapidly changing South Africa, in particular, our reading theory 
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ought to accommodate all possiblities of all social, political 
and personal readings of persons and institutions striving 
towards democracy. For ultimately our envisaged differential 
reading framework (in Chapter 6) is to become a facilitative, 
albeit expansive, means towards the transformation of our people 
in all its diversity, as well as the optimum democratization of 
our society. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE TRANSFORMED NATURE OF READING 
6.1 FROM LITERAL TO DEFERRED MEANING CONSTRUCTION. 
The sustainable competitive advantage of the act of "struggle" 
for meaning construction in the reading act, encapsulates the 
critical notion of continuously avoiding any form of reading 
which performs a short-sighted act of direct perception and 
therefore affording easy and de-risking access to the assumed 
meaning of a text. Among the creative "struggle" components to 
establish a reading which is not a literal reading, we encounter 
the dynamics referred to as "deferred reading", i.e. the 
strategic competitive edge in meaning construction where we 
reconcile opposites instead of trying to choose between them. 
Beyond the unifying, coherence-seeking discourse of 
representation, which pursues a logic of secured and coherent 
identity, i.e. rendering all the contradictions of subjectivity 
a sense of unity of personhood (as in reader or author) , in this 
study the "non-referential" mode (as illustrated by reflexivity 
and plurality of text, respectively) "locates" the site of 
subjectivity in language and discourse where it could be both 
differential and integrated. The "subjectification" of being 
becomes solely the effect of language and discourse. Whereas the 
shorthand correspondence-seeking view of language privileges an 
objectivist (or perhaps also a subjectivist) representational 
dimension, i.e. a form of signification which leads to "faithful" 
objectification and therefore sensible totality, the 
supplementary and ultimately alternative views proposed in 
Chapters 3 & 4, pursued a innovative "mental model" in this 
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study, which regard language as being inextricably part of 
subj ecti vi ty, in discourse. The perpetual motion of the subject-
in-language does not seek to produce a conceptual shorthand of 
causal and linear (as in direct perception, mirroring and 
continuity) replication but rather negotiates a discontinuous, 
disruptive and indirect, yet innovative structuring of meaning. 
The heightened awareness of an "indirect" approach to capture the 
"other-side" of reading initially features Heidegger's "not-yet-
complete circle", Merleau-Ponty' s "circular determination of 
meaning", Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" in terms of historical 
prejudice (Vorurteil), Ricoeur' s "distanciation", Eco's "semiotic 
codes", Lotman's "extra-text", Barthes's "codes or voices" in 
writing, Derrida's "deconstruction and differance" in writing, 
and Lacan' s "mirror and symbolic stages" in the signifying chain. 
Their respective new-style theorising becomes a strikingly 
refreshing reminder of the insufficiency of language as symbol. 
They believe to have decentred and decentralized, and ultimately 
subverted the pretensious universal ground of epistemic certainty 
which constructs our world. The strategic mediative "distance" 
or perspective proposed by our new thinkers is necessary to 
dehomogenize our socio-politically, habitual conceptions of 
identity, consciousness, the subject and social "laws". 
It has been usually assumed that the act of mediation seeks to 
facilitate, enrich, consolidate or even change the assumed, 
expressed or potential wishes, ideas or state of being within the 
interaction between two or more engaging parties. This open-ended 
mediative process ameliorates and ultimately transforms the 
proximity of the readable and unreadable text, when complexity 
and confusion gel into some kind of new order. Pure referential 
or reproductive reading of the Cartesian kind has been 
characterized by its categorical pursuit of a more literal or 
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direct form of mediation via the signified-signifier route, often 
based on behaviouristic principles of stimulus-response. If 
these approaches have proven to have feet of clay, we are then 
to pursue a productive discourse, as embedded in the proposed new 
mode of meaning construction. It is ultimately finding a new 
"purpose" in reading that pursues mediated reading in which signs 
and symbols (Ricoeur} , mirrors acting as nodes (Eco} , cultural 
codes (Lotman} , the perceptible phenomenal body (Merleau-Ponty} , 
textual traces (Derrida} , etc., all through delayed and decentred 
means, interpose in a creative way to appropriate and 
disappropriate meaning construction. The latter suggests the re-
alignment of high-risking reading where the readable text is read 
as a variant of the unreadable text, in as much as the latter may 
listen to some of the "trade-offs" of the readable text. 
Furthermore, the competitiveness of deferred production of. 
meaning leads to the constant reconfiguration of the 
ontologization of subjectivity in the construction of meaning. 
The latter is assisted by the reader's strategic intent of 
"deferment" of meaning in the dialectic between intra- and inter-
subjective processes of reciprocity (eg. Gadamer's effective-
history, Lotman' s extra textual cultural codes, Lacan' s castration 
process to partake in the Symbol Order, etc.}. These variants 
mentioned, tend to be rooted in the reflexivity-centredness or 
strategic self-reconstruction of the textual object. On the 
other hand the expansive Barthesian continuous play of signifiers 
and the Derridean incessant free play of traces, facilitate a 
"writing-subjectivity" which can only be "mediated" by play, 
creating as a result, evermore networks of signs and 
relationships of traces. The signified for Lacan is related in 
discourse to the empty, yet productive unconscious, "mediated" 
by Desire. The redesigning and reinventing effects of the 
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mediation process of deferment of meaning is not an accomplice 
but a catalyst for the productive stance in discourse and always 
subject to the reinventing bent of reading discourse. 
Whilst the seen/spoken/readable/written text is physically 
"there" and, as such acknowledged, the theorists in Chapters 3 
& 4, have invoked other foci to redirect and, as a result, defer 
the reader's thinking to other dimensions of representation and 
subjectivity. What emerges is a critical awareness of elements 
or messages that are constructed or evoked in and around the text 
to dialectically include elements of the 
unseen/unspoken/unreadable/unwritten text. This expanded and 
perspectival view of deferment of final meaning "produces" the 
other ever-increasing, different textual voices involved in what 
can be regarded as multiple alternative readings. Instead of 
pursuing a homogenising and inhibiting literal reading of the 
text, the old and new masters articulate a critical def erred 
stance which implies that something greater is a stake. The 
inevitable effects are innovative and even titillating multiple 
readings, based on the other side of the "text" and therefore 
establishing an empowering new discourse referred to as 
differential reading. 
In Derrida's words, we cannot escape logocentrism until we invent 
other forms of writing. The wisdom of constantly deferring the 
readable and present text, introduces us to the highly charged 
multiplicity of different prespectives that the unreadable text 
inevitably engenders. Differential reading is suffused with the 
otherness, i.e. reading beyond the "mastered" at tempts, i.e. 
reading in the margins, gaps and blanks in order to avert the 
hegemony of obsessive sameness of thinking and blandness of 
being. Our transition from literal, representational reading to 
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differential reading is facilitated in the following schematic 
view. This schematic view evidences that we do not "abondon" the 
validity of representational elements in reading, but rather that 
our reading ought not to stop right there. The differential 
dimension gives our reading a so much more flexible, expansive 
and richer orientation. 
DIFFERENTIAL 
READING 
TEXT 
t SUBJECTIVITY 
rJGUAGE 
WRITING AS 
PRODUCTION 
Textual Reconstruction 
Self-RecoilE3truction 
Unreadable Text 
Unwritten Text. 
DEFERRED MEANING 
Disconnected Prolific 
Disruptive 
MOLTIPLE MEANING 
REPRESENIATIONAL 
READING 
WORK/DOciJMENT 
I SUBJECTIVITY I 
LANGUAGE 
DECODING AS 
INTERPRETATION 
Code Reproduction 
Self ~status Reproduction 
Readable Work 
Written Work 
REPRODUCED/DECODIFIED 
MEANING 
Totalized Limited 
Coherence 
REGULATED MEANING 
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The above schematic visualization of the reading act evidences 
a radical move of dislocating reality from an exclusive mode of 
representational reading where all meanings are routinely, albeit 
fallaciously, regularized in an through the letter. Our study 
has demonstrated a far broader and encompassing mode of an 
alternative reading theory which includes some basis in 
representational reading as a significant variant of the 
extensive other possibilities which the unwritten texts hold for 
the multiple processes in meaning construction. In exploring the 
dynamics of what is "not written" and its implications for social 
organization, social reform and authentic living, a framework of 
differential reading has emerged which would afford a strategy 
for a multiple mode of reading instead of only pursuing the 
narrow content-based approach of literal-representational 
reading. This proposed framework entails a visualization that 
will hopefully facilitate a creative process, in which texts will 
be able to be read substantially differently than that of the 
rigid programme of literal and unimaginable reading engenders. 
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6.2 TOWARDS A DIFFERENTIAL READING DISCOURSE 
6.2.1 DIFFERENTIAL READING AS ALTERNATIVE READING THEORY. 
This study has strategically set out to demonstrate the sheer 
unfettered possibilities of alternative (and ultimately 
integrative) modes of reading a text, including reading the world 
and people, other than a purely presumptuous literal 
representational mode of direct and myopic subject-object 
exchange which is bent on mirroring, imitating and referencing. 
Since we acknowledge the indisputable side of language in which 
we have come to accept the role of language as a logical 
instrument which favours the barrenness and limitations of 
representation in everyday life, we at the same time, realize its 
provocative potential to confuse and mislead. 
In the expanded and def erred sense of the reading act, this 
difference articulates and precipitates an imaginative sense of 
healthy confusion, especially in view of the reality that 
language cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be taken to 
impose order and stability on one's experiences. In contrast to 
the stability of rule-guided language, the "hysterical" nature 
of language (Barthes, 1986: 43) or "waging war over the word" 
(Botha, 1992: 20) or the "proliferation of chaos" in language 
(Lecercle, 1990: 5) engenders a process whereby readers are 
potentially always able to proceed beyond the inward-looking 
desire for "correctness" and realise"· .. the sheer absurdity of 
the use of verifiability as a meaning criterion " (Popper, 
1976: 80), for an 'exclusively representational view of life 
exposes a pretensious ideal which is empty or merely an 
unattainable sham. 
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What the theorists in Chapters 3 & 4 argue for is that the word 
or sentence cannot be trapped within a mere decodification 
process where it is safe, analysed and judged. Beyond the 
indefensible coherence-seeking tendency of "· .. referring back 
to the synthesis of the unifying fiction of a subject " 
(Foucault, 1972: 54 - 55) the reader has to "make peace" with the 
multiplicity and even self-discontinuity that is the presumed 
activation or stimulation in differential reading, in order to 
strip the reading from ideology-building. The exciting challenge 
is finding or creating other spaces for meaning-making. 
The act of reading the text, as a result, becomes the 
"existential" space where language becomes actively produced and 
transformed, rather than seeking to represent or express 
anything outside itself. This conscious shift to a different 
view of meaning construction proves to have major consequences 
for the notion of interpretation vs. reading, discovery vs. 
production of meaning. In differential reading readers are 
constantly compelled to become participatory stakeholders when 
they deal with the multiple readings or plurality of texts that 
a single text may have. This way of reading "occurs" in a new 
porous and permeable framework in order to exploit the 
possibilities inherent in an essentially exciting differential 
reading - the space of fruitful tension which exists between the 
readable and unreadable text, the written and unwritten text. 
In contrast to the legitimising inclination and inward focus of 
the reproductive reading pattern in literal representational 
reading, the "antirepresentational mode" implies a form of 
reading-in-tension that is compellingly dialectical. As there 
is no "licensed" and automatic transition from signifier to 
signified, from construing an unwritten or unreadable text purely 
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on the basis of a validated written or readable text, the notion 
of "multiple reading" presents an alternative and therefore 
different mode of reading which is curiously different and even 
qualitatively other than merely re-establishing a dialogue which 
seeks to construe more meanings in terms of a single document or 
text in front of us. Multiple reading in this study thus 
essentially entails a vigorous metaphor for: 
1. distancing oneself, methodologically, from the inhibiting 
pursuits of final, totalizing and institutionalized notions 
concerning the origins and causes of persons (readers), 
structures (texts) and intentions. 
2. living with constant rupture with regard to standardizing 
formulas that monopolistically equate written words with 
spoken words, spoken words with mental experiences, and 
voice with mind. 
3. 
4. 
demonstrating the constant 
indeterminacy of meaning. 
demonstrating reading as a 
structurating differences and 
reconstructing of the 
visionary 
continually 
system of 
questioning 
mimesis, i.e. the ability of a work to represent experience 
per se. 
5. conceiving the reading act as an incubating process of 
reflection back and forth, within and beyond, imposed and 
disclosed, conferred and deferred. 
6. constantly searching for contradiction and repositioning 
meaning construction. 
7. understanding the notion of productive tension and 
violation of views in textual reflection. 
8. increased perspective building in terms of part and whole, 
knowledge and action, process and product, subject and 
object, being and becoming, rhetoric and reality, structure 
and functions. 
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The ensuing critical and differ-ential reading conceptualizations 
of multiple reading render the above dimensions of reading an at-
risk voyage of discovery beyond the mainstream tendency, as well 
as an act of creation. At least we become active and reflective 
consumers of the world around us, rather than being blind and 
passive consumers. For example, in a political organization which 
aspires to give decision-making power to all, but actually 
functions to deprive some access to information with which they 
could influence crucial decisions about their lives, needs to be 
recognized as such. This scenario necessitates therefore that 
readers develop an almost polymorphous desire and awareness of 
reading in the gaps and spaces of ordinary expressions and 
statements which appear neutral or innocent in its usual social 
and political setting, and of necessity will have to be revealed 
or unmasked to bolster new pathways of thinking, and therefore 
new constructions of knowledge. While it is important to unmask 
common-sense discursive practices, ultimately it is also 
important that we seek ways of responsibly managing the 
inevitable integration of power/knowledge within those discourses 
that give life direction, whether in the election of politicians, 
our shopping experiences, research activities, social 
entertainment, teaching practices in schools, etc. 
In the context of consumption vs. investment of social activities 
we, moreover believe that the plurality and dispersive 
disposition of differential reading is particularly valuable in 
order to recognize, understand and combat ideology which is 
essentially reproductive and dogmatic at its very roots. The very 
notion of Ideology is "representative" in essence because it 
refers to a reproduction of a sense and meaning of certain 
beliefs, ways of living, etc. as being natural and common sense 
(see Balibar & Macherey, 1987). 
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Differential reading as an alternative theory has become our 
ideal precisely because the dangerous and exclusive reliance on 
literal representation which has reinforced social norms by 
grounding them in a determinate reality or social order. With 
regard to the latter, the critique of representation inevitably 
entails a political edge, as we will notice later, for 
differential reading resists mastery and the ideologizing of 
legitimized social institutions, by constantly placing them in 
other perspectives or other realities that are outside of 
representation altogether. Differential reading therefore 
inevitably expropriates and disperses vested interests and 
impacts on the perpetuation of the viability of meaning and power 
in a context that radically desires or warrants renewal and 
transformation at all levels. 
Whilst the positive sides of ideology consists in providing us 
with concepts, images and ideas in terms of how we can make sense 
of our social and political world, the debilitating part of it 
is that it inevitably remains selective in that it refers to 
"this" or "that" sense of the meaning. The various combinatory, 
rather than selected readings about interest groups and social 
and political engineering agencies, therefore ought to reflect 
a counter-ideological reading that recognizes distortions and 
errors of points of view that are out to control certain 
knowledge. In fact, differential reading seeks to demonstrate 
the viability of cross-territorialism of the literal and 
metaphoric, the metaphysical and ironic, which are reciprocally 
defining and mutually transforming each other (Hassan, 1982: 
264). Brown (1995: 13) argues that "· .. the very effectiveness 
of such a practice as ironic depends on its constituting at least 
part of the world as literally true in order to unmask false 
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versions". 
Plurality of reading/writing moreover effects the process of 
counteraction in unmasking the dominating and legitimizing codes 
or signs in any reading and, at the same time, challenges the 
standardization of grammar and their ensuing centred meanings. 
Our strategic pursuit of differential reading in this study is 
that it generally disperses or deconstructs the obsessive desire 
to secure a fully-integrated and central human subject 
comfortably situated in a world of clear roles, statuses, norms, 
values and systems. Instead of the "creation and totalization" 
of meaning, Hassan (1982:265) argues for the 11 decreation and 
deconstruction" of meaning. Denzin (1994: 187) points out the 
"antitotalizing" stance of Lyotard's claim" ... that terrorism 
resides in all attempts to conceptualize societies as coherent, 
integrated entities". Lyotard argues clearly that individuals 
and societies have paid a high price for the nostalgia of the 
"whole" and the "one". 
The regulated language of "standardization", because it pursues 
the "one" in mastered and reproductive reading, becomes 
ideological, for it assumes that meanings naturally insinuate 
themselves within a determinate reality as their fundamental 
constituents, and in order to remain in force, its validity is 
required to replicate itself. 
This "new" or 11 terrorist 11 (Lyotard) stance of differential 
reading immediately places all "reading components", the 
signifier and signified, in a vulnerable, questionable (?) and 
risky position. A certain text can potentially be read 
conjunctively (in a closed manner) to sustain, legitimize and 
reproduce dominant meanings and, as a result, produce docile 
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readers, but it can also be read disjunctively and dialectically, 
which means that readers can be open and become aware of the many 
sides of the issue by exploring other "non-representational" 
approaches. Kroker & Cook (in Kellner, 1988: 240-241) describe 
contemporary society as a "panic" scene which constantly seeks 
to elude the categories and social theories of the past and, as 
a result, requires a new form of theorizing and abandonment of 
previous social theory. What would therefore constantly now have 
to be problematized is not representation but the character of 
reality itself. 
This challenge of our alternative theory of reading, encapsulated 
in the differential approach as a "non-representational" 
approach, furthermore assumes having to perpetually live with a 
strange mix of plurality, multiplicity, resemblance, difference, 
assent and dissent, expectations confirmed and subverted, truths 
that have been validated and displaced, incompleteness of meaning 
and living "quasi-dangerously" with truths that are in constant 
circulation, contending with new or other insights for new or 
other readings for a better vision of a better world. Such an 
explosive measure of plurality of meaning and, given its 
potential effects on the vulnerability and challenges of our 
social system, would not simply imply that a text has several 
fragmented "arbitrary meanings" but rather that the restructuring 
scope of productive (as in Derridean writing) discourse or 
differential reading facilitates those change-inducing processes 
of plurality of meaning which remains irreducible. Hassan 
(1982:13-14) speaks of the "unmaking" of the text in which each 
reading becomes "the dialectic of transgression which moves 
towards infinity". 
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Differential reading therefore rejects any insinuation and 
criticism of it being merely avant-garde, but rather embraces the 
"affirmation" and decolonisation of impoverished representations 
which tend to superf icialize the shaping of personal identity on 
the one hand, and the consequences of social organization on the 
other. There would also be the criticism that the different 
view of looking at reading shows no respect for the integrity of 
the past, proves to be ambiguous and that its quest inevitably 
leads to plurality, looseness, deviation, etc. (see Lash, 1988: 
334-335) . This, too, is not solid and visionary criticism, for 
our intentionally visionary focus in this study had been on 
affirmative attempts to illuminate a transformational 
retheorization which pursues the myriad of creative, alternative 
possibilities of understanding the dis-affirming effects of 
permanent ends, the bankrupt systems and the stultifying essences 
of social life (the power-knowledge base) , but also to understand 
the powerful complexities of language vis-a-vis the limitations 
and bias of human knowledge. 
Differential reading as an affirmative discourse out of our 
social and political inertia, can occur neither in terms of the 
illusion of an absolute foundation, nor in the bleak dissolving 
imperium of language but rather in the space between the two. 
Differential as moreover an affirmative and expansionary 
discursive practice is not only nilly-willy open-ended, 
dialectical, and for some ironic, but "· .. it acknowledges the 
contradictions between the reflection of reality in language and 
the constitution of reality by language. It recognises that the 
very debate about whether language makes or fakes is itself 
foundationalist" (Fish in Brown, 1995: 13) . The reader or viewer 
thus risks being turned into a pathetic clone or a replicated 
sign whose meanings have been given and become ordained in the 
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media and its cultural texts. 
Conner (1989: 234), in his discussion of Gayatri Spivak and Edward 
Said's critique of cultural politics, emphasizes a "new reading" 
of the world in which the absence and or marginalization of 
women, blacks and other misrepresented human groups, are no 
longer the "silent other" but forms part of a new orientation 
(reading, if you wish) which "legitimizes": 
" ... the evacuation of the centre or the idea 
of the centre (or centred) , splintering it 
into "dissident micro-territories", 
"constellations of voices" and "plurality, 
of meanings" , allowing and promoting 
specificity and regionalism, social 
minorities and political projects which are 
local in scope, or surviving traditions and 
suppressed forms of knowledge." 
The "restless", "playful" and deconstructi ve articulation of 
differential reading is essentially a "process of change" 
orientation which also seeks to critique our "imperialistic" 
technological and media-dominated world, where symbols and 
meanings freely (purposefully?) circulate within a taken-for-
granted or natural (questionable ?) system that has no apparent 
anchoring in the "real", for the "real" has become the "unreal" 
or "hyper real" and, as readers and viewers, we are judged by our 
ability to match up against these media representations. This 
reactionary (and designed) view demonstrates the power of how 
information technology and media have come to have a fundamental, 
oddly authoritative, grip on our passive consumerist society. 
The various differential theories, by problematizing reflexivity 
and the plurality of texts, cast a form of disruptive suspicion 
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on the restricted assumption that one can "master" a text in its 
totality. They challenge the gripping interests of totalization 
and centralization of thought as often encountered in apparently 
inherited values, handed-own practices and socially expected 
lifestyles. In its multitude of representations (including the 
subject itself), differential theorists, in posing their 
alternative vision for meaning construction, moreover seek to 
risk concurrence-seeking and allow readers to transcend that in 
order to become creative, "alternative" readers who are 
comfortable with engaging in a disconnecting and even disruptive 
reading modality. Educated, active and enlightened readers do not 
only read semiotically since they need to expound all signs 
hermeneutically as well. Hermeneutically-derived meanings are 
applied to linguistic signs in terms of phenomenological 
perceptions, including apperceptions of the psycho-analytic kind. 
It is an interlaced, ongoing process of combination, metonymy, 
play, dispersal, misreading and indeterminacy. 
Therefore, any integrative, meaningful differential reading of 
whatever form of textual understanding, necessarily presupposes 
an interdependent mode of thoroughly circulating modes of 
engagement as schematically postulated in the accompanying 
textual approach which follows. In the visualization of 
differential reading no one single discourse dominates another. 
400 
·REAOD{G· IN. DISCOoRsE 
Semiotics 
READING IN DISCOURsE 
What we have in the above vibrant framework of differential 
reading where no single approach can be self-sustaining, but 
rather that they operate in an integrated, almost heterogeneous 
way, in which all approaches (those of the old and new masters, 
in Chapter 3 & 4), are approaches that constantly circulate and 
complement one another. In the construction of meaning, as it 
unravels in the differential reading act, each approach 
critically conditions the other, so that no single approach 
becomes the origin of fixed and authoritative procedure in order 
to ultimately excavate and create meaning. The phenomenological 
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approach of seeing is very much linked to hermeneutic 
understandings, as signifiers of writerly texts are linked to all 
semiotic signified of readerly texts - and in the process, the 
psycho-analytic evacuation of meaning renders, in terms of all 
the other interrelated approaches, a sense of indeterminacy in 
the construction of meaning. 
Such an emerging integrated and flexible textual discourse as 
illustrated in the above diagram of differential reading, aims 
to ensure that: 
* a text 
meaning, 
finality. 
cannot simplistically 
masquerading as a 
be 
form 
reduced to a single 
of completeness and 
* one textual orientation towards reading engenders a 
critical and dialectical awareness of another orientation, 
so that no one single approach becomes a ready-to-take-home 
approach to construct meaning. 
* the inherent limitation of each theory potentially 
sensitizes the reader to the gaps in the other theory. 
* the ideal of tentative, albeit delayed or deferred meanings 
is communicated, instead of pursuing epistemic certainty. 
* the complementary and reciprocal nature of all theories 
remains dynamic, all functioning in a kind or productive 
and constructive tension rather than in a state of 
confrontation, hierarchization or even and annihilation. 
* no single approach to reading should be ideologized and 
subsumed but each is to be read as a variant text of the 
other, i.e. the one challenges the other's conjunctive or 
closed assumption base. 
* to efface the boundaries between the past and the present, 
the private and the public, and map out a transformed 
social and political order with greater perspective of and 
space or human potential, for ultimately we are living in 
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an increasingly boundaryless intertextual world. 
* we become susceptible to an infinite discourse of virtually 
polymorphous meaning (personal and public) which constantly 
anticipates, intersects, conflicts with, and challenges one 
another. 
Instead of pursuing the self-sustaining, centralizing and 
standardizing hegemony of meaning construction, the affirmation 
of the deregularizing benefits of the differential mode assumes 
an "organizing" or catalytical role which remains curiously 
"hesitant" and is particularly characterized by critical 
distance, alienation and reflexive rationality (Gadamer, Lacan, 
Heidegger, Ricoeur) and by decentredness, diffusion and 
fragmentariness (Barthes, Derrida) . Differential theories tend 
to erode the questionable monopoly of thought and, as a result, 
unsettle and defy grand referents and finalities, and therefore, 
tend to "terrorize" and destabilize our entire uncritical reading 
orientation in so far as we interpret, infer, liberate, 
mimeticize or read texts. 
As the reading act is multi-dimensional, at times the text has 
to be mimeticized or inferred, following the traces and gaps, but 
at times we need to receive messages as only being nothing more 
than tentative meanings, or we have to emancipate ideological 
distortions. Therefore instead of reproducing what is always 
already reproduced and as a result consumed, the reader 
creatively exploits new pathways, not as grand interpretive 
schemes of master codes, but rather to render a form of reading 
of "chatting across the network" which will prove novel, 
inventive and challenging, ever mindful as Brown (1995: 14) 
reminds us that our realities are merely"· .. held to be a kind 
of shorthand for all the processes of construction that produce 
it". 
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Our realities regarding our "status" of who and what we are as 
reading or viewing persons, are equally mis-construed in terms of 
the shorthand attempts of our social and political institutions 
and media. People's general awareness that most of what is 
achieved in society is pervasively marked by impermanence, has 
very much to do with their general sense of restlessness with the 
social and political status quo. This status quo (state, church, 
business, education) has also got to do with that nagging desire 
for the establishment of their identities. People seem to 
experience constant doubt, insecurity, suspicion, feelings of 
failure, inadequacy, unfulfillment leading often to them 
frantically exclaiming (not necessarily pathologically): "I am 
tired, confused ... I often do not know who or what I am". What 
emerges in these significant statements are feelings and 
dispositions which question the notion of the "pluralization of 
identity". It is as though I (in my identity construction) ought 
to have the absolute guarantee of a controlled and totalized, 
unified conception of my personal identity all of the time. The 
unquestionable challenge is to re-evaluate the crucial role of 
subjectivity very much in terms of the differ-ential concept 
which takes these differential experiences of self and life into 
account. 
By reconceptualizing reading as being inextricably concerned with 
identity-production, grounded in language - we inevitably arrive 
at a more expansive view of ourselves and our world. The reader 
and his "position" becomes a reflection upon which language 
constantly modifies its experience in writing and production. 
The self, as a result, becomes interchangeable with the text 
(which is constantly being written and not which already has been 
written), and taking on a heterogeneous or plural identity. In 
this regard Kristeva (1984) refers to such an "identity" as an 
intertext, for the network character of intertext (as chatting 
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across the fence) replaces the solidified or fixed subjective 
interpretation of the self. Moreover the "essence" of the reader 
becomes constantly re-interpreted or redefined as an act of 
interplay and ultimately transformation and incessant dialogue 
with other texts. This shopping around for identity in the "in-
betweenity" is not only a reflexive process but rather a 
pluralizing effect of rewriting as well. Barthes, for example, 
dissolves the conventional dualism of writing/reading to produce 
a text where " ... everything signifies ceaselessly and several 
times,· but ·.without being delegated to a great final ensemble, to 
an ultimate structure" (Barthes, 1975:12). In a way the anxious 
statement of confusion, "I do knot know who I am", is therefore 
no contradiction, per se, for our ceaseless challenge is to 
constantly embrace attempts that remain vigilant, daring, 
innovative, critical, challenging and constantly "revealing" 
ourselves to "another side" or "another me", "a better me". This 
is the inevitable paradox of being in touch with oneself and 
one's world, and this seems to be the suspended, albeit 
challenging conditions of reality, the constant positioning of 
the "nomadic subject" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). 
Whatever reading effects ensue in the reading of newspapers, TV 
viewing, film or leisure reading, they ultimately have to 
proceed on the often difficult, yet challenging basis of readers 
writing their own text. Even the confusing complexities of our 
socially-constructed identities will become a constantly 
restructured and delayed process, for while we may be "in touch" 
with ourselves in a healthy way, we all constantly develop on a 
personal level and change in the course of life, and therefore 
cannot be "fixed" and "labelled" in a "typical" and unchallenged 
way. Deleuze & Guattari (1984) reiterate the critical notion of 
the "nomadic subject" in differential reading: 
This mobile positioning of subjectivity is 
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in itself political in that it leaves space 
for alternative forms of identity 
construction as well as the toleration of 
11 difference 11 in identity construction" 
(Lash,1988:323) 
We will notice the unquestionable impact of the political 
significance of differential reading, not just on how the 
personal and social identity of people gets constructed but how 
our entire social fabric becomes mobilized in terms of how people 
give meaning to their world. In this real world things are not 
either just "black" or "white", but apparent opposites collapse 
into each other, as Baudrillard says, they "implode", producing 
"a floating causality where positivity and negativity engender 
and overlap with one another" (Conner, 1989:57). 
6.2.2 
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SUMMARY OF INTEGRATIVE, DIFFERENTIAL READING 
SOCJ:ETY 
VALUES, HISTORY, CULTURE 
Texts, Documents, Books, 
Discussions, Interviews, Speeches, 
Panels, Reports, Minutes, Bills, 
Constitution, Pamphlets, White Papers, 
· Registers, Tables, Indexes'· 
Graphs, Databases, Facsimiles, 
Journals, Magazines, Newspapers, 
Computers, Advertisements, Voice Machines 
L 
1. POINT OF DEPARTURE 
PHENOMENOLO~Y, HERMENEUTICS 
SEMIOTICS, READING ~ WRITING 
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 
i 
2. MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
-i-
3 . MEDIATIVE FUNCTIONS 
T 
4. MULTIPLE READINGS 
r 
5. DIFFERENTIAL READINGS 
i-
IN CIRCULATION 
.__~----TRUTHS VALIDATED/DISPLACED 
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In reality every act of reading is consciously or unconsciously 
initiated as a result of our pursuit of knowledge, and this 
practice often starts with the doubtful, enigmatic, often 
cryptical and unknown. Our limited judgements of things, however 
careful and responsible, cannot seem to be derived solely on the 
basis of the text in front of me. This compels me as the reader 
to withdraw from the dispensing domain of using recipes when 
reading and acquiesce into the domain of the venturesome or even 
devil-may-care audacity where uncertainty, risk, but also renewal 
prevail. The above schematic visualization of our passage to and 
through differential reading summarizes how, in an alternative 
reading framework, readers and viewers, in developing a new 
pattern of reading and thinking, proceed in order to audaciously 
engage with the multiplicity of interfacing information conduits 
or channels. Moreover, readers may start to understand the 
fields of force of discourse which seek to be increasingly 
inventive and ingenious. Therefore, instead of vindicating a 
controlling economic and socially-politically problematic order, 
we as readers would be better served to critically respond to the 
frailties, power positions, ideologies and legitimized practices 
in terms of a refreshingly different perspective in our meaning 
construction practices. 
If multiple, differential reading proposes a reading process of 
reflecting back and forth, it means that the venturesome reader 
has to contend with those inevitable variables within and beyond, 
imposed and disclosed, conferred and deferred, in the integrated 
theories seeking ever newer perspectives. The emerging 
theoretical frameworks postulated in Chapter 3 & 4, afford us the 
invaluable space to excavate and search between and beyond the 
gaps and deficiencies among them, to suggest a complementary 
modality of reading in the differential mode. 
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6.3 DIFFERENTIAL READING AS POLITICAL PRACTICE. 
Differential reading cannot be viewed simply as either a counter-
suggesti ve or a progressive framework of reading; it must be seen 
as a fundamentally political act. No reading is absolutely 
neutral, for it affects (and can be affected by) every dimension 
of our social or interpersonal lives. Our view in this study, 
however, is that differential reading cannot rest on any prior 
ideological commitment; in fact it continuously seeks to 
transcend ideology and is therefore capable of also considering 
pursuing the worth and effects of alternative ideologies, and new 
points of view. 
We would hasten to point out that the philosophical difficulties 
(and insights) afforded by the notion "ideology" are legion. 
Suffice to say, in the context of this study that Simon 
(1984:382) points out that this practice is in "semantic 
disarray", for it essentially refers to no specific entity or 
phenomenon. Rather, writers of very different orientations tend 
to use the terms in a variety of loosely connected ways. In our 
context in this study we may gleen the view of Bowers (1977:35) 
who understood ideology to designate "· .. an interlocking set of 
beliefs and assumptions that make up the background or horizon 
against which the members of society make sense of their daily 
experience". As a result, Bowers argues that ideology ultimately 
denotes a socially constructed socially and maintained belief 
system that provides people with overarching rules and 
assumptions for symbolizing their reality. 
While this may be the reality, as it is in our society, it 
becomes problematic for our reading practice if people have 
tended to become stuck at the level where an ideology betokens a 
fixed consciousness; i.e. the reader had become fixated in the 
grip of an ideology which suffers from the conceptions of 
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reality which are necessarily misrepresentative of the world at 
large and the individual's relation to it. In terms of this 
pejorative sense of ideology, an ideology proves limiting, skewed 
and undesirable in order to "soar above" its effects to a more 
expansive view of reading of our world, and which will assist us 
to reform that world. 
Most, if not all, South Africans have come through an ideologized 
and therefore crippling process of socialization (including a 
schooling system), which operated along a class structure that 
had been linked to a legalized system of oppression whereby 
people have been categorized along racial lines. We all know 
that schools and the media serve particularly as important 
ideological conceptions (Apple, 1979) postulated and maintained by 
the formal political authority. In the schooling context, for 
example, the curriculum and styles of teaching reflected not only 
an ideologized, and prescriptive content but also a process that 
was designed for either empowerment for some and disempowerment 
for others (Meerkotter & Van den Berg, 1994:4). Either way, the 
system of Apartheid induced in all citizens a certain 
disempowering view 
world, where the 
(and fragmented and one-sided view) of the 
supposedly "natural" and "commonsense" 
understandings which transmit and reinforce ideologies that 
reflect the prevailing values and ethos of an essentially male-
dominated, hierarchical and racially-divided social structure 
(McLaren, 1989:216). In the domain of teaching methodology, the 
catalytic impact of critical theory, for example, hopes to 
sensitize educators and learners to adopt all critical means to 
unmask or reveal the inward-looking approach of the inequality of 
self-interest, the exploitation and disempowerment of 
transmission teaching styles that reproduce subservience on the 
one hand, and the dominance of the political status quo on the 
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other. 
On another level, we envisage the alternative and renewing value 
of differential reading as being essentially counter-ideological 
in that it seeks to assist the reader in engaging our diverse 
Apartheid texts in terms of a desocializing discourse of 
unmasking the limitations and bias which characterize our social 
practices in South African society. It is only in this way that 
readers will gain insight into their skewed, internalized and 
"naturalized" mediations and hopefully gain more control over 
their lives and social knowledge -construction. 
We remain mindful that readers from different social and ethnic 
contexts, and also of different ideological persuasions, tend to 
read their social and political scenarios differently and since 
it is difficult to escape from the hold of ideological 
restrictions on thought. However, the strategic inclusion of 
alternative beliefs and viewpoints, to a large measure, depends 
on the critical view- point from which the individual operates 
when reading. As Mannheim (1936:125) articulates the point with 
reference to political thought: 
"The significant element in the conception 
of ideology, in our opinion, is the 
discovery that political thought is 
integrally bound up with social life. This 
is the essential meaning of the oft-quoted 
sentence, "It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence but, on 
the contrary, their social existence which 
determines their consciousness". 
Attempting to read the somewhat enigmatic "script" of other 
people's consciousnesses will in all likelihood bring the reader 
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into conflict with his own socialized "script", confronting him 
constantly with rival ideas which may not be compatible with his 
own. Similarly, the myopia of reading within one's usual, 
limited framework of thinking and socialization may be 
compellingly justificatory and, as a result, preclude any 
expansive reading of other and new reading points of view. For 
many a reader, in the widest sense, the space for "shopping" for 
the development of new meanings and new personal identities prove 
to be difficult, or at best, puzzling. However, in terms of our 
proposed notion of differential reading, there is an emerging 
"other" reality which would prompt us to continuously question 
all "naturalized" and taken-for-granted certainties, resulting in 
readers experiencing a sense of fragmentation and a lack of 
coherence of meaning and self. 
The new, emerging social order for equality in this country 
should constantly be read as a challenging variant of my 
entrenched reader consciousness. This variant may perhaps be at 
odds with my previously "tranquil" scenario (like the present 
unemployment or violence, for example) . We experience that 
individuals and government continuously bluster, threaten, 
cajole, bluff, froth and announce new plan after new plan, 
without often appearing to grasp the nettle. The past, the 
future and the present will always prevail as competing forces, 
for all have to be read together in order to arrive at a 
"desirable outcome" which will be our vision for a better, if 
not, an "ideal society". This new vision has to be engaged in 
again and again, without seeking a short term kind of ready-to-
take-home package, specifiable in advance. 
6.4 DIFFERENTIAL 
PRACTICE. 
READING 
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AS EDUCATIONAL-TRANSFORMATIONAL 
The prospect that differential reading could essentially be 
educational and therefore transformational of the individual, is 
rooted in the fundamental assumption that learning (in whatever 
setting) which contributes to the individual's ability to think 
critically, can be regarded as being a manifest contribution to 
their education. It is our abiding view that most educational 
institutions (notably schools) with which we have become 
accustomed, seem to have traditionally done precious little, or 
nothing, to contribute to the abilities of their learners to 
think critically. In the context of differential reading: 
education and critical thinking are correlative; if you do not 
appreciate what critical thinking is, then you would not know the 
value of education. 
In South Africa we have charged our schooling system and child-
rearing practices (including our consumer consciousness when 
shopping or viewing TV) that they, generally-speaking, prevent 
people from thinking more critically about their lives in the 
social and political world which are their elements. Such 
learning has been characterized as being mainly rote-learning, 
the reproduction of the voice of authority (the newspaper or 
broadcasting journalist, the teacher etc), the fervour of 
reliable recall of the words of others, the reproduction of 
dominant social structures, and acquiescing into the status quo. 
If critical thinking, as encapsulated in differential reading, is 
to 11 conscientize" readers to incorporate all sides and all 
alternatives into their reading of the world, this will lead to 
a new reality, which is beyond the claim that it is "mere 
reaction" or "counter-suggestibility". 
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In our new mind-testing social structure, change is a polemical 
issue which appears to occupy the centre-stage of the social and 
economic arena of South African society and which has entered a 
dramatic phase of fundamental social, political transformation 
and renewal. This too has major implications for readers in the 
framework of differential reading. The proposed policy framework, 
for example, which underpins the renewal for a sustainable 
development and transformative programme for all people seeks to 
enhance the ability of the workforce to manage change, capacity 
building, assertiveness, decision-making, human resource 
development in the public service and in civil society so as to 
enchance the quality of people in terms of efficient and 
effective delivery. What readers effectively have to deal with 
is a change process of contending with an optimum level of both 
the controllable and the uncontrollable elements. One often 
overhears people complaining that things are not the way they 
were, or alternatively, they have no idea where things are going 
to. 
Conditions have been laid down by government in order that 
individuals would be free to transform their environment and 
themselves. Perhaps part of the reasons for resistance on the 
part of many people to engage in change is that there are 
conditions which have been legislated, and which citizens have to 
follow in a quasi-politically correct way. Perhaps also too 
little is done in "educating" people into democratic 
participation - in order to become politically literate and 
aware, and willingly engage in alternative points of view to 
develop their own "writing" (Derrida), in conjunction with that 
of the government and other institutions in civil society. 
O~r theorists, particularly in Chapter 4, portray reading, and 
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particularly differential reading as being sin-qua-non for a 
sense of liberation and empowerment, and which can, potentially 
be revolutionary. The excess of differential reading, applied to 
the revolutionary process has long ago been spelled out by Dewey 
(1922 :222): 
" ... if we once start thinking no one can 
guarantee where we shall come out, except 
that many objects, ends and institutions are 
surely doomed. Every thinker puts some 
portion of an apparently stable world in 
peril and no one can wholly predict what 
will emerge in its place". 
In the face of this uncertainty, the propensity of revolutionary 
differential reading puts every reading "in peril", dooming every 
finality of object and purpose. Here is the significance and 
cutting edge of the differential frame of reading: that it always 
threatens to expose and deconstruct representational reading in 
all its vacuous referencing (via linguistic conventions) as 
essentially a nonstart. For when the potential or actual effects 
of indoctrination of literal reading is read, it in fact becomes 
anti-differential. Consequently, if indoctrination of the 
signified is inevitable, then differential reading - at least as 
thorough-going differential thinking - becomes impossible. 
Vis-a-vis the precision-seeking tendencies of referential or 
literal reading, differential reading, to a great extent, defies 
paradigmatic rea~ing. Paradigms usually guide ordinary 
scientific practice which Kuhn (1962:viii) conceives of as 
"normal science", which is "research firmly based upon one or 
more past scientific achievements, achievements that some 
particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as 
supplying the foundation for further practice". Differential 
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reading seeks to transcend "achievements" and "foundations" and 
as such, being categorized as a paradigm for change. In fact 
Derrida wants to go beyond "transcendent reading" to do a non-
transcendent reading, to focus on the resistance of reading to 
itself. In differential reading readers do not just read the 
knowable, readable text, neither do they just read the 
unknowable, unreadable text. Readers in effect bring the two 
"together" in a "transposed" way of other or differential 
reading. 
In this regard Derrida (1981:62) emphatically states that reading 
is essentially transformational. We can capture reading in this 
sense as the "trance of reading" - trance, as in transition or 
transit, transposition, transformation, transgression and 
finally, entrancement. In its extreme form, the trance, of 
reading would involve forgetting one's surroundings, being "lost 
in the production of your text" and what Derrida refers to, in a 
portmanteau, as delireium (in Bloom, 1979:94). 
In the integrative framework of differential reading delireium 
suggests an anti-paradigmatic framework with no originarity or 
end. Coping with all social and political transformation in 
South Africa implies clear attempts to hold "in suspense" the 
possibility of a coherent and stable identity (eg. your gender, 
class, sexuality, age, scholarly standing etc.). One way in 
which reader identities might then be multiplied and dissolved is 
by the construction of a "typology" of readers, such as that by 
Barthes (1976:63) when he describes a psycho-analytic typology 
which links "the reading neurosis to the hallucinated from the 
text". What Barthes effectively suggests for our concerns of 
change is that the unending multiple reading process cannot only 
be written in terms of that which we have in front of us. For 
political transformation and consequently people development we 
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need not throw the baby out with the bathwater. We need to 
engage the existing pockets of excellence in all spheres of 
economics, administration, diplomacy, trade, research etc. and 
read those also as variants of the as yet unwritten text to 
produce creative, new and homegrown scenarios for the benefit of 
all South Africans and ultimately ourselves as individuals. 
In reading the entire text of our "new society" we have to 
constantly question old behaviours and practices in order to 
overcome stereotyping, thinking that always appeals to tradition, 
being trapped in either-or reasoning patterns, practising 
disguised, prejudiced and sterile tunnel vision which is usually 
exclusive and perhaps unjust. Reconstructing and re-creating our 
institutions, both public and private, can only emerge if we 
embark on, and acquiesce into an integrative reading of 
empowerment, development and understanding indi victuals. The 
trance (transformational effects) of reading, as suggested in 
Derridean delireium, may also be grasped in terms of the value of 
the "recognition of reading", i.e. the possibility of "seeing or 
entering the mind" of the other. The "schizophrenic" tendency of 
the reader implies that every reading is split or doubled, i.e. 
our thoughts as well as not our thoughts. The transformational 
character of differential reading therefore involves almost 
always the inclusion of a necessary otherness in which the reader 
recognizes himself in certain possibilities of existence in the 
other but , at the same time, is transformed. The reader thus 
yields and listens to the other, whether different or totally 
alien, in which we both, reciprocally condition and build each 
other. 
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6.5 DIFFERENTIAL READING AS CONGRUENT WITH A NEW REALITY. 
This study is moreover mindful that besides the fact that we all 
have moved into a new political dispensation, we are also in fact 
( or perhaps as a result thereof) living in very confused times 
because many of the things that gave logical and coherent 
structure to our lives are disappearing. Institutions which we 
relied on, particularly the workplace, are no longer so clear or 
so certain. If we observe institutions like the law, political 
structure, new technology, the media etc., we are constantly 
called upon to question or reassess them. In order therefore to 
give people a sense of "comfort" or even a sense of "cohesion" of 
things and the belief in their abilities, we have to constantly 
negotiate what the future is going to be like. 
In coming to terms with an eternally present "new reality", a 
differential reading of the shifting scenarios will persuade 
people that there is, after all, sense in what appears to be all 
this apparent chaos or nonsense around us. Differential reading 
accommodates a broad reading of what seems apparently chaotic, 
but chaos isn't chaos in the negative sense, but merely the 
flipside of underlying patterns in things, or spaces so that the 
reader can actually make a creative difference to the way things 
will turn out. As in the creative nature of differential reading 
where there is no pre-ordained meaning, our emerging reality 
decrees that the future is also not completely preordained; even 
science or just ordinary social relationships are not 
preordained. We have to constantly "shop around 11 for new meaning 
in relationships and new meaning for understanding our attempts 
of constantly shaping and reshaping new political and economic 
reality in South Africa. 
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Judie Lannon (in Sunter, 1996:81), in a scenario workshop 
entitled "Reality isn't what it used to be", offers us invaluable 
assistance in grasping how our post-industrial and post 
information society had evolved from the earlier industrial 
society in the areas of economics, social organization and 
business. This is helpful too in understanding our new reality 
in South Africa: 
INDUSTRIAL (MODERN)SOCIETY ~~~> POSTINDUSTRIAL (POSTMODERN) 
SOCIETY 
1. Economic Organization ~~~~~ 
Wealth creation: 
manufacturing 
2 . 
Restricted capital & 
people movements. 
Social Organization 
Authority vested in 
stable institutions. 
Hierarchical, defe-
rential social order 
Handed-down, Inherited 
values 
Status reflected by 
things/eternals 
National lifestyles 
Controlled/closed media 
Passive consumers 
3. Business activities 
Business activities 
backstage (covert) 
Mass media 
National markets 
Mass marketing 
> 
Wealth creation: information 
services. 
Unrestricted capital & 
people movements. 
Institutional authority 
questioned. 
Transference to media power 
Egalitarian social order 
tibes. 
Discovered Individual values 
Status reflected by expe-
riences/ internals 
Mixtures of global 
lifestyles/bazaars 
Open/free-access media 
Active/educated/moral 
consumers 
Business activities front-
stage and transparent(overt) 
Fragmented specialist media 
Global markets 
Mass customisation/ 
relationship marketing 
With the shift to information and services from manufacturing, we 
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have encountered a great sense of disruption in society, which 
has actually precipitated and intensified the disaggregation of 
society. Institutional authority (whether it's the church, 
school or workplace) is constantly being challenged in the 
increasing discovery by people of their individual values. In a 
new political reality in South Africa more and more people are 
becoming less restricted in their movement (job-wise and 
otherwise) , allegiance and their opinions so that pre-determined 
handed-down behaviours (men-women; black-white; Christian 
Muslim-Jewish; rich-poor) and their accompanying "stable" values, 
are constantly being reassessed and often replaced. 
Differential reading, as the ideal alternative framework of 
reading our personal, social and political texts, wherever we may 
be, is highly "suited" to dealing with the controllable and 
uncontrollable forces, of crossing borders, of developing 
varieties of global lifestyles and becoming comfortable with 
competing ideologies. 
What undergirds and assists our understanding of our emerging new 
society tremendously, is the emerging and almost already fully-
functioning potential of new technologies. With the emergence of 
global cultures (which we have not necessarily been aware of) , we 
encounter increasingly a legion of competing religions, value 
systems and lifestyles. It has been particularly clear with the 
advent of the Internet and other communication technologies that 
we have moved to a more individualized culture. People can stay 
at home, and yet be both open to an entire world of images, 
sounds, communication flows - which are potentially interactive. 
Castells (1989:1) argues: 
11 
••• that telecommunications allow work at 
home in "electronic cottages", while firms 
become entirely footloose in their location, 
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freed in their operations by the flexibility 
of information systems and by the density 
and speed of the transportation network". 
Castell's comments are significant in this study, for any 
analysis of a post-apartheid South Africa requires considerable 
creative speculation or consideration of social and economic 
policies to strengthen democracy and this can only lead to 
making meaningful choices in the global context . We have to 
concede that regional strategy is inevitably constrained by the 
effects of global political and economic changes. 
The use of the enormous advances in information technology and 
production systems will be inevitable and therefore decisive in 
assisting us in cutting down on time and on information flows 
which will lead, according to Padayachee & Motala (1994: 76), to 
dramatic changes in production and work processes, industrial 
relations, industrial design and managerial prerogatives. As a 
result of the facilitation of information technology, 
differential reading, as a strategy, will assist us to get a more 
coherent picture of the emerging Southern African region of 
economic and social activity, whose performance we can read in a 
more integrated way. Our richly textured text of our region is 
that of the new possibilities of technologies and the social and 
other global issues - read in an intertwined way. Our new reality 
can moreover be read and understood in a much wider and multi-
perspective manner, as Padayachee and Motala (1994:76) point out: 
"It is clear that no regional strategy for 
growth can ignore the imperatives of global 
economic developments and the restructuring 
of world politics. National economies cannot 
hope to survive unless they develop 
capacities to participate in the world 
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market as equals or on the basis of some 
special advantage". 
The very idea that differential reading is essentially 
transformational implies that all people can develop capacities 
to participate in the restructuring in this country. This is not 
just our usual stance of continuing to reproduce old practices 
and values, but rather of exercising critical thinking to extend 
our views to other and different views as well. The challenge of 
differential reading in this context reminds us how difficult it 
in fact is to make purposeful choices or to read this text as a 
variant of other (different) texts. 
Policymakers in South Africa will not be able to escape this 
challenge either. Quite aside from the difficulties of managing 
multilateral relations across our borders, in times of structural 
change, the emergence of our new democracy, as a fully-fledged 
player in regional and global issues, has complicated the range 
or regional and global options. In our reading of our 
aspirations of the new reality, South Africa cannot ignore the 
history of the breakdown of countries which have shown how 
fragile the nation-state is as a vehicle for human aspirations. 
The rise of virulent nationalism demonstrates that ancient ethnic 
impulses are certainly not a spent force in politics. Reading 
all perspectives, despite looming ethnic and other conflictual 
interests, goes a long way to demonstrate the efficacy of 
differential reading. How will South Africans nourish themselves 
and uphold the value of democratic living? Finding answers to 
these and other questions demand that people constantly change 
the way they think and feel about the world and, as a result, 
constantly reassess the way in which they can conduct their 
affairs - both internally as well as abroad. 
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The end of the Cold War has brought about more, new and even 
different political options (Evans & Newnham, 1992:127) - and so 
has the exigencies of our post-Apartheid era. International 
politics had started pushing economic questions. However, things 
obviously are not just monolithic and simplistically clear cut. 
These interdependent developments did not go unnoticed in 
Southern Africa, which in turn had lead to the steady process of 
political and social integration (Schoeman, 1990: 377) . The 
unfolding of the unwritten text of democracy in differential 
reading is markedly demonstrated in the decision to open South 
Africa's political process. This significant public policy 
decision signifies a reading of world affairs which brought us 
into step with global priorities, despite the debilitating 
conflictual feelings at the time that the only alternative was 
that of negotiation, of opening up the closed South African text 
to other shades of thinking, other priorities and a new vision. 
This altered understanding of South Africa's political process is 
significant in this study, as Peter Vale (1991:688) lends his 
understanding: 
"The moment produces a critical (this word 
is not carelessly chosen) paradox for 
policymakers in South Africa. At the very 
moment that Southern African states, in the 
face of global and domestic pressures, were 
seeking to deepen their co-operation, the 
region's dominant state was destined to be 
preoccupied with a complex and often 
violent -process of reconstruction." 
Reading in terms of the multiplicity of transformative processes 
that are at work, evitably opens the space to chaos and violence 
of thinking, words and interactions. What would ultimately be 
encountered is an "altered", different conceptualization of our 
423 
political and other identities, and an increased capacity to live 
up to the ideal of democracy. 
6.6 DIFFERENTIAL READING AND DEMOCRATIC LIVING. 
Finally, we consider the relation between differential reading 
and democracy in this study to be crucial. It is usually claimed 
that a properly functioning democracy is dependent on a balanced 
and educated citizenry. This begs the question of what sort of 
education does such a citizenry require. The answer is: not one-
dimensional. The latter embodies the multiple quality which is 
prerequisite for an expansive perspective on the part of readers 
when they read their social and personal script to strengthen 
democracy. 
On the meaning of "democracy" itself, Benn & Peters (1966:332) 
point out that nowadays virtually everyone is in favour of 
democracy: 
"··.it is a propaganda asset which no party 
can afford to surrender to its 
opponents ... virtually 
"democracy" with the 
force." 
everyone uses 
same prescriptive 
Ben & Peters argue that there is enormous variation in what 
people mean when they use the word "democracy", and conclude that 
general agreement on the prescriptive force of the word has to be 
paid for, however, by ambiguity or vagueness in its descriptive 
meaning. Our descriptive sense of "democracy" in this study is 
in an extended sense, beyond its merely referring to a political 
system or a form of government. 
In the context of differential reading, democracy rests on the 
idea of a community (of readers) as rational beings 
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organising 
collective 
knowledge 
their social life in the light of their best 
judgement of things. Our social construction of 
counts on "mature" and informationally competent 
The powerful multiplicity of the processes inherent in readers. 
the differential nature of reading, "safeguards" readers from 
being subject to manipulation (by others), becoming closed-up in 
one's own disinterest, remaining ill-informed about other 
perspectives and views , and finally falling prey to one's own 
arbitrariness of subjective preferences and fickleness. A crucial 
condition for democratic participation appears to be the ability 
to distinguish and choose between alternatives that would 
hopefully speed up our social reforms. J.S. Mill (1972:208) 
reminds us: 
" the rights and interests of every or 
any person are only secure from being 
disregarded when the person interested is 
himself able, and habitually disposed, to 
stand up for them." 
By "standing up" for himself in fact compels the reader to grasp 
fully the nature of democratic institutions and to embrace fully 
their responsibilities. In reading wider than the written text, 
the reader needs to read also the unwritten sides of public 
policy concerns, judge and read intelligently the many sides of 
issues facing society, challenge and seek alternative reasons for 
proposed changes (and continuations) of policy, to put self-
interest aside when it is appropriate to do so, and so on. 
If the democratic citizen is not a critical reader of the broad 
socio-political scenario, he is significantly hampered in his 
ability to contribute in any way to public life. Insofar as we 
are committed to democratic living, then, that commitment affords 
yet another reason for regarding differential reading as a 
fundamental alternative framework for reading in the gaps, 
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margins, spaces and alterations of all our social deliberations.· 
Differential reading seeks to mobilize the reader's intellectual 
diversion and radical action, which constantly unsettles all 
fixed thinking and complicity into sameness of ideology and one-
dimensionality of opinions. In short, our insistence on 
differential reading for democratic participation should develop 
readers with a kind of flexible "reading disposition" which will 
enable and dispose them to become more vigilant in choosing 
between mere consensus and seeking creative alternatives. 
As part of the broader scope of the democratization of Post-
Apartheid South Africa, we witness significant national attempts 
in the arena of labour, which seek to read a broader and more 
inclusive script so that all points of view and all sectors can 
participate in the country's productivity. Special mention in 
this context is the government's GEAR (Growth, Equity And 
Redistribution) and AA(Affirmative Action) policies - both of 
which atte, [t to affirm previously disadvantaged groups in the 
labour market, and redistribute resources to all sectors so that 
the job market and the economy will allow everyone to benefit and 
hopefully grow. Certain groupings with vested interest perhaps 
do not agree on all aspects surrounding either GEAR or AA, but it 
appears to be a struggle or conflict they have to regard as 
constituting a necessary and ongoing component in their readings 
in order to bring about a more differential reading of our new 
society. 
Another challenge to the differential reading is that of 
information and its freedom of being accessed and articulated. 
The second half of the 1980's represented the nadir of press 
freedom in South Africa, but during the 1990 's we have moved 
tremendously far and fast to ensure real press freedom. By 
lifting the old restrictive press laws, all citizens in this new 
democracy will be able to make available as well as have access 
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to all perspectives and therefore acquiesce into a more 
differential reading of local and global events and trends. John 
Patten (1998:6), ombudsman for one of South Africa's newspapers, 
poses the challenge of press freedom for a more comprehensive and 
unrestrictive reading, as advocated by differential reading: 
(i) that the press remains independent from government, (2) that 
the press attunes itself to minorities' needs while also 
reflecting the views of the majority, (3) that the past 
legislative restrictions are removed, and (4) that the press 
constantly persuades the authorities of the media's rights to 
public information. These challenges for the freedom of the 
press remains the constant pursuit in the differential reading 
attempts of newspapers as they face a balancing act in a still 
greatly divided society. 
6.7 THE IMPLICATION AND APPLICATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL READING 
FRAMEWORK. 
The application of an integrated, differential reading framework 
has become necessary in the context of the accelerating changes 
our post-information society is undergoing during a period of 
political and technological transition. This is further 
exacerbated by the volatile multiliterate character of our 
society, having to deal with managing and using the complexity of 
information channels via books, lists, periodicals, 
advertisements, CD Rom, Internet etc. "Reading" via these 
mechanisms takes on a whole new vision of meaning so that process 
becomes more important that product. In this regard Castells 
(1989:14) points out: 
"The fundamental trend overall seems to 
deepen not so much on the somewhat obsolete 
idea of the growing dominance of software 
over hardware, as on the ability of new 
6.7.1 
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information technologies to generate new 
information, thus emphasizing the specific 
nature of their output vis-a-vis former 
technological paradigms". 
THE DEMANDS OF OUR POST-INFORMATION SOCIETY. 
Within recent years, particularly, we have experienced dramatic 
social and other crises which seem to be reflective of the kind 
of social change which ceaselessly impacts upon our society. 
There has been moreover a considerable increase in the number, 
size and sophistication of information documentation and services 
proliferating at all levels of our society. Within the ever 
expanding information-producing industry, the areas and various 
peculiar ways of use of information is also constantly changing 
in order to adapt to, or keep abreast with an ever advancing and 
competitive socio-political environment, using such information. 
In this regard it seems that society itself, frames and 
influences technological innovation in a dialectical 
relationship. 
Closely related to these rapidly occurring changes have been 
certain clear concomitant social and economic phenomena and 
certain accompanying socio-political patterns which have become 
sometimes the result of social change and sometimes the cause of 
change. The nett result is that he interface between documents, 
texts and information on the one hand, and people, users, readers 
and viewers on the other, seem to have posed intensifying demands 
to ensure that breakdowns in communication will not result in 
administrative bottlenecks, misrepresentation, misinformation, 
inefficiency, hurt and ultimately waste in terms of time and 
money. "Preventing" such failed or limited attempts of 
understanding information, calls for an integrated approach 
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towards all the different messages that emanate from different 
quarters. 
While we realize that any organization or person will be limited 
by its or his capacity to "process": (i.e. read and interpret) 
information, messages and images, we remain committed to pursuing 
a kind of quality interface that would enhance quality messages, 
quality decisions, quality lifestyles and greater personal 
happiness and existential purpose. Ultimately it is not only 
about also having access to education but also having access to 
knowledge and information, amidst the often exacting reality of 
our information-driven society - a view that inevitably impacts 
on the complexities of subjectivity and representation as 
problematized in Chapter 2. These challenging complexities have 
been elucidated in terms of the complementary or interdependent 
textual discourse framework of meaning construction as elaborated 
in the context of differential reading. The various 
differential theories have effectively sought to challenge the 
tendency of totalization and centralization of thought in an 
information-driven society - an attempt to enhance the value of 
understanding message exchange, the management of information 
flow and developing dialogue in a broader and more profound way. 
6.7.2 OUR GROWING MULTILITERATE SOCIETY 
As language using subjects who operate in an increasingly multi-
literate society, ranging from the most advanced techno-literacy 
systems to the most basic oral-literacy systems of communication, 
we all seem to grapple essentially with a dual problem. On the 
one hand the compelling demands of contemporary 
technocratization, computerized and over-informationalization in 
terms of the availability, access, selection, choice and use of 
available information, have their own critical demands whilst, on 
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the other hand, ordinary people seem to struggle with their 
different personal understandings of what they hear, see, read 
and interpret. 
As with our proposed differential reading in the context of a 
wide spectrum of information-sharing, information-seeking, and 
information consuming, individuals which include economists, 
politicians, educators, scientists, workers, children - all have 
to network, liaise, exchange and interface with these realities. 
They all have to strive to effect a maximum measure of precision, 
clarity, criticalness, fairness, communicative competence, 
personal interpretations and personal satisfaction in information 
reception and information clarity. While these concepts of 
"clarity", "fairness", "competence " etc. seem to be at odds with 
our proposed differential reading mode, we believe that these 
notions inspire us to look at all sides and perspectives of our 
readings, in an expansive way. To have an integrated and 
comprehensive view of "programming", we need only to look at 
the complexity of information networks (i.e. systems and 
subsystems of information in movement) that exists in our 
society. As in our differential reading framework (see paragraph 
6. 2 .1) , all readings in the dynamic network of differential 
readings circulate and complement one another. Each approach 
conditions the other, to avoid a conjunctive or closed reading of 
the text. 
6.7.3 THE COMPLEXITY OF INFORMATION NETWORKS IN OUR SOCIETY 
At a macro-level there exists a formidable information network 
which shapes, structures and organizes our complex society. The 
information trends, their flow and knowledge generation 
inevitably "contribute to the change both in the structure of the 
production process and in the organization of society" (Castells, 
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1989:15). The "production process" we envisage, is that of a 
differential reading framework, for instead of "making sense" of 
the huge information network, and always pursue epistemic 
certainty, our reading rather thrives on tentative and deferred 
meanings. Without the expansive reading framework for meaning 
construction via the complex information-cum-communication 
structure in society, we will have little hope of achieving 
efficiency and development of understanding of our society. The 
structure below demonstrates a schematic overview of a possible 
social structure of information network in terms of which we seem 
to have to construct meaning for our daily purposes (see 
6.7.3.1). 
The reading of this "typical" information network, elevates areas 
of operation with seemingly clear boundaries or even assumed 
elements of hierarchization. However, within the differential 
reading framework we deal increasingly with a boundaryless, 
intertextual reading of meanings that becomes dispersed, the one 
reading is read as a variant of the other. No single area of 
"demarcation" in the network dominates. 
6.7.3.1 A POSSIBLE INFORMATION NETWORK STRUCTURE IN OUR 
SOCIETY. 
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This macro structure or network can be analysed into further 
information subsystems and networks. For this purpose we may use 
the area of Industry and Labour as an example to examine further 
subsystems. The various subsystems, as in the macro system, 
constantly anticipate, intersect and even conflict with one 
another, to produce new meanings. 
What we encounter in the dynamic flow of information in the above 
network could also be understood as an integrated look at how 
differential discourse continues to propel itself towards ever 
new meanings . Meanings become 11 deterritorialized 11 • Ulmer 
(1985:83) sees this deterritorialization as a subversive 
activity, severing meanings constantly from the original contexts 
(like severing pieces of paper to form a collage), and attempting 
an assemblage of fragments in a new arrangement. Ulmer (1985:84-
7) stresses the fact of severance and discontinuity rather than 
the fact of renewed unity. 
What becomes important in our proposed differential reading 
framework is to constantly read the network of information flow 
in terms of new compositions, recreated from the known and given 
units or elements in the network. Ulmer refers to Derrida's work 
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intertextual weavings of texts with one another. In the 
schematic network of systems and subsystems in our society, the 
one text (system) is transformed, deformed and contaminated by 
the others' content. At times they reject each other; they may 
pass elliptically into one another and ultimately become 
regenerated in the playful repetition of meaning construction. 
Derrida (1981:355) ultimately concludes that: 
" ... each grafted text continues to radiate 
back toward the site of removal, 
transforming that, too, as it affects the 
new territory" . 
The space or framework of differential reading between the 
different and various units in the network of life events itself, 
is a clear model for the inventive reading production. In this 
network of various disciplines (eg. research, public relations, 
training and development, media, community mobilisation) we 
encounter a field of force around and among documents in which 
deconstruction assists us to excavate meaning and, coupled with 
all our inventive reading energies, we as responsible readers can 
become creative, and even pioneering, in terms of the quality and 
variety of meanings we are able to produce. It is precisely as 
a result of this new modality of approaching our complex reading 
of our world and ourselves, that we are able to liberate 
ourselves from the defects and limitations of conventional 
reading modalities. 
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6.8 CONCLUSION 
6.8.1 DIFFERENTIAL READING AS FRAMEWORK BEYOND 
INTERPRETATION. 
The inventive character of the differential reading discourses in 
this study clearly seek to "consolidate" their bias toward an 
alternative reading of a text where there is manifestly no pre-
given meaning but only a here-and-now productive moment of 
meaning construction. A reading refers essentially to a 
discursive space where our level of perception and conception of 
the multiple variations and mutations we actively produce in 
reading. Our orientation and challenge is essentially that no 
reading can be pre-regulated or pre-controlled for whatever 
ideological reasons. The challenge of the practice of reading, 
as opposed to the practice of interpretation of our personal and 
social texts spawns an irreducible plurality of meaning which 
holds major consequences for our interactive behaviours, values 
and views in our global information society. 
Our overall theoretical framework detaches itself from the 
constraints of interpretation (of texts) and opens itself to a 
"space of flows" (Castells, 1989:6), which generates the complete 
lack of boundaries, i.e. II not to represent the 
representable ... " (Conner, 1989:220-21). It is one thing to 
oppose the tyrannical totalization and representation / (Bove, 
1986:22) of a text, but reading in the differential framework, 
assumes that readers and texts " ... become active agents in 
themselves, creating new substances, new social forms, new ways 
of acting and thinking, new attitudes, reshuffling the cards or 
"fate" and "nature" and social "reality" (Ryan, 1988: 560-1) . 
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Instead of merely interpreting our social world and our views of 
ourselves, reading, as it unfolds in the differential modality 
embodies a fundamental restructuring and transformative process 
which forges new relationships in our emerging socio-economic 
system, as well as, the use of new information technologies. In 
fact, these innovations reciprocally condition each other. Our 
new orientation of subjectivity and representation refocuses on 
the non-finality of our reading experiences, i.e. a reading or 
readings that operate beyond the representable: 
1. All reading, unlike interpretive practices, is a manifest 
decentering of the notions of the centrality of 
subjectivity and representation. This subject (author, 
reader) and the sign (word, message) cannot enjoy the 
unequivocal right of authority or a centre-stage position. 
2. All reading is ultimately destined for logos, i.e. for "I 
think 11 or 11 It thinks 11 • Thinking is the vehicle par 
excellence for critical activity in which all views are 
questioned, analysed, synthesized and dispersed in a spirit 
of fairmindedness, non-judgemental ism, openness and 
creativity. 
3. All reading is essentially both a mind-testing act of 
plurality and often a chaotic sharing of voices. It is 
however a process which inevitably unfolds in a non-
straightforward manner, i.e. it also engages the unreadable 
and unwritten text which resides beyond the borders of the 
written document. Democracy and negotiation, among others, 
are required to render a plurality discourse possible, 
although always in a tentative manner. 
435 
4. All reading is an almost polymporhous mutation process of 
grasping the readable text as a significant variant of the 
unreadable, i.e. not relying on the literal, often 
ideologized representation of documented content or 
"reliable" or "proven" knowledge. There is no past, present 
or future text, except the text created on the basis of the 
document, now, in an inventive manner. 
5. All reading essentially spawns excessive heterogeneity (of 
entrenched beliefs, expert messages), displacement (of 
conventional views) and fragmentation (of eternal truths) . 
6. All reading leads to perspective seeing, perspective 
thinking, and perspective knowledge: 
PERSPECTIVE 
SEEING 
Subjectivity is re-
orientated and re-
contextualized. It 
is not me but also 
other. It means 
seeing what is in-
cluded or excluded; 
emphasized or dimi-
nished. To be able 
to see through the 
eyes of academia, 
officialdom, gen-
der, science, race, 
history, political 
parties, futurism, 
religion, etc. 
PERSPECTIVE 
THINKING 
Subjectivity can be 
decentered. 
Thinking should be 
guided by the 
discourse. Follow 
the signs, the 
gaps, omissions, 
etc. This leads to 
thinking differ-
rently, alterna-
tively, laterally, 
creatively, criti-
cally and innova-
tively. 
PERSPECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge can be 
displaced. No 
knowledge is abso-
1 ute in that it 
cannot be ques-
tioned and chal-
lenged. Statistics 
may blur the real 
events. Traditions 
may anaesthetize 
the faculties. 
Expertise of ten 
inspires awe. 
Beliefs on race, 
gender, power, 
expertise can be 
constructed and 
reconstructed. 
7. All reading explores/excavates universalities. Behind the 
written and readable texts the universal driving forces for 
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excavation include: cultivating expansive critical 
dispositions, consultative attitudes, facilitative 
approaches, dialoguing and negotiating preferences, 
inquiring minds, open-mindedness, risk-taking, valuing 
failure, success and potential. 
8. All reading hold challenges for uncontrollable mechanisms, 
and as a result prompt self-examination and challenges 
entrenched and mastered assumptions. It is not only 
examining one's own personal script, as expounded in 
Transactional Analysis, but also establishing the locus of 
control (power bases for tradition/beliefs) and the 
omissions and gaps in ideological discourse. 
9. All reading is not primarily bent on giving or deriving 
meaning from a document/work. Reading playfully facilitates 
access to dispositions of curiosity, desire, imagination, 
escape, day-dreaming - leading to perpetual interpretive 
forces in circulation. Reading facilitates unmasking 
processes of access to the exposure of dogmatism, laying 
bare falsification, etc. Reading is essentially writing or 
producing one's own text often again and again. 
10. All reading seeks to prevent closure, determinacy, and 
completeness. Closure implies finality and completeness, 
but also compartmentalized or tunnel thinking, expert or 
authoritative thinking, totality-seeking thinking. 
Completeness also implies self-sufficiency and social 
sufficiency. Determinacy spawns the debilitating effects of 
totalization, stability, standardization and centralization. 
11. All reading is essentially liberatory and innovative. No 
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reading operates only under the yoke of the sign, the 
letter, the author or any pre-given meaning - except in 
discourse - now. It's liberating the boundaries of reading 
for the global context. 
12. All reading is essentially transformative. Transformation 
of any context (political, institutional, technological, 
personal} is a multifaceted, complex issue and the non-
restrictive and liberatory nature of differential reading 
facilitates an alternative process ideally suited to the 
multiplicity of conceptualizations that abound in social, 
political, scientific, institutional and cultural matters. 
Ultimately all reading transforms our notions of subjectivity and 
representation. Every act of reading, being itself the intertext 
of another reading, belongs to and is interwoven into the 
intertextual. This inter-text is not to be equated with 
"origins", "the source of", and "the influence upon" which. The 
obsession with origin, source and influence is based on fixations 
and a desire for mastery, rather than flexibility. Our ultimate 
challenge in this study has been to view subjectivity and 
representation as working or ~unctional constructs, here-and-now, 
in discourse. To give these dynamic discourses perspective, 
liberated from unified and totality-seeking schemes of reference, 
means viewing all of them in an integrative, complementary 
manner, and in a differential manner. 
6.8.2 
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THE OVERALL CHALLENGES OF DIFFERENTIAL READING 
DISCOURSES FOR READING TOWARDS TRANSFORMATION. 
It has become evident that our new theory of differential reading 
eschews the fallacious notion that reading (by the subject) can 
impose a sense of stability on texts (be these literary texts or 
the larger society as text) . In the same vein, any reading 
cannot fulfil the shortsighted act of one-way consumption of or 
control by our society. The unfolding promise of differential 
reading opens up unlimited horizons communication, as well as 
creativity, inviting readers to the exploration of new domains of 
experiences - from our inner selves as individuals to the outer 
reality in society. 
Scientific discovery and technological innovation are both an 
integral part, and a consequential effect of our larger societal 
change. How we read these relationships, spaces and 
opportunities will help us as readers to address and grasp the 
overall transformation of science, research, state, education, 
labour, etc, of which new technologies are a fundamental 
instrument. Our "judgements" of all the afore-mentioned areas 
are determined by an inevitable combination and integrative mix 
of approaches suggested in this study. They are not merely 
reproduced in a literal way. As the schematic representation 
below shows that our perception of things (phenomenology) is 
affected by a hermeneutic reading for deeper meaning of a text. 
At the same time, all semiotic signs are deconstructed and 
unmasked from ideological distortions. Each approach entails 
moments or dimensions of the other, elucidating textuality in a 
way that the other approach is not able to do. The Lacanian 
psycho-analytic reading entails dimensions of deconstruction, but 
at the same time, is not without hermeneutic overtones. 
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The arrows within the accompanying scheme provide a visual image 
of those proposed discourses which reciprocally condition one 
another to furnish an extraodinarily rich reading experience. 
While these approaches may be cri t-ical of each other, it is 
precisely their differences, antitheses and metonymic play of 
intertextual voices that lead to the writerly {scriptible) text 
which the reader constantly rewrites ad infinitum. The irony of 
the "radical decomposition of all central principles" (Hassan, 
1982:262), gives us the depth and "authenticity" of our reading 
experiences. 
It is in these moments of convergence· between theories, that we 
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have access to a differential reading, i.e. where we not only 
identify the canonic meaning, but at the same time encounter the 
space to revise, subvert and transform views and meanings. The 
differential reading framework above renders a valuable model for 
understanding the complex socio-economic-technical matrix that is 
transforming our present society. The current transformation of 
institutions and communication processes is a manifestation of 
the constant interaction between the informational model of 
development and the restructuring of all institutions and 
persons in our present-day society. Therefore, by adopting a 
comprehensive reading perspective that embraces all views, 
present and absent, we have the means of developing more profound 
insights into how the restructuring process or transformation is 
occurring. 
In the proposed "breathing" porous differential reading framework 
we propose an alternative theory of reading where variables 1 -
10 continually (in no particular chronological order) ensure that 
every reading is a rereading which will in fact be reread beyond 
the secured canon of entrenched views. The circulating 
discourses proposed in the above visualization of differential 
reading remain effervescent in order: 
1. To be able to create a commitment to interdependent, 
critical and creative information networks and thinking at 
all levels of personal, social and organizational life, as 
well as knowledge-construction. 
2 . To be able to cultivate and pursue meaningful avenues of 
information for democratic participation and exchange in, 
and have influence on decision·-making processes for creative 
meanings. 
3. To be able to render responsible, albeit creative, choices 
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in information regarding conscience, politics (elections), 
transactions (legal business), science, careers, leisure, 
which will result in greater understanding. 
4. To deepen our understanding for and sustain quality freedom 
of expression which will be self-edifying but also socially 
beneficial. 
5. To be able to articulate expressions of personal views and 
grievances in a non-conflictual manner which searches for 
creative, alternative meanings. 
6. To be able to recognize, understand and appreciate cultural, 
linguistic, ethnic and racial diversity as being part of our 
social text i.e. reading our social text in a 
complementary and inclusive manner. 
7. To be able to insist on the value of expressing meanings and 
information for democratic participation and accountability 
for long-term cost-effectiveness, and efficiency for 
continual renewal of self and society. 
8. To be able to understand and have access to information to 
implement constitutional rights, also the right to have 
access to information for personal, local and national 
development - and also to put it in an increasing global 
context. 
9. To be able to recognize opportunities to challenge self-
interest, bigotry and ignorance, which may distort 
information and meanings. 
10. To be able to advocate and mobilize meaningfully in defense 
of the understandings of common civil interest for all in 
order that everyone will have access to opportunities to 
develop confidence, self-esteem and goodwill - which will at 
the same time be in step with understandings of global 
priorities. 
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they emanate as salient effects of the differential reading 
framework, and could emancipate readers from socio-economic-
informational inertia. Restructuring our society cannot occur 
independently of the political process, but the significance of 
differential reading does ultimately go beyond political 
orientation or even personal interest or bias. 
This study proposed an inquiry into our reading practices which 
could have a dramatic effect on two macro processes, i.e. our 
personal and social transformation, and ~ts reciprocal influences 
on information flow. The usefulness of this theoretical model of 
differential reading is in providing an infinitely integrative, 
conceptual basis for a holistic platform for meaning construction 
so that we are not always dictated to by technology but that we 
too have significant input and abilities to influence the way 
society relates to technology, to produce greater space for 
inventive reading behaviour. This inevitably should enhance 
greater personal contentment and social responsibility, for the 
subject does not only read the text but in fact writes his own, 
rendering the subject"·· .a system of relations between strata: 
the mystic pad, the psyche, society, the world" (Derrida. 
1978: 226) . There is only discourse which circulates our infinite 
views of subjectivity and representation, so that all reading, in 
order to be profound and yet integrative, thrives on what is not 
there in the text: "I can decide that in the depths of every 
text, however readable its conception is, there remains a certain 
measure of the unreadable" (Barthes, 1986:35). This is the 
dizzying experience of reading, which promises to be enriching. 
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